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In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

author:A cat's eye on history

In 1947, Hu Zongnan gathered 250,000 troops to attack Yan'an, and Peng Dehuai led more than 20,000 People's Liberation Army troops to engage in a series of bloody battles with the enemy.

Neither Mao Zedong nor Peng Dehuai originally planned to withdraw from Yan'an, and even if it were, it would be the second or even third plan.

Many military and political experts at home and abroad also believe that Hu Zongnan will not forcibly take Yan'an, that is to ask for self-inflicted hardships, and it is necessary to bump into the nose and face.

However, Hu Zongnan made a desperate bet and frantically attacked Yan'an, and the CPC Central Committee decided to withdraw from Yan'an after multiple considerations.

The enemy and us held each other for more than twenty days, and Hu Zongnan was in a dilemma, and with the change of the situation on the battlefield, the strategy and tactics of our army naturally had to make corresponding changes.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

With the safe transfer of the Party Central Committee, Peng Dehuai commanded the People's Liberation Army, and after more than 20 days of stalemate between the two armies, Mao Zedong came up with a plan, and after Peng Dehuai adopted it, he was able to achieve three battles and three victories under the condition that the enemy was strong and we were weak:

1. The Battle of Qinghua.

2. Battle of Yangma River.

3. Battle of Panlong.

Our descendants will include these three battles in the Yan'an Security War.

Mao's tactics, later called mushroom tactics, roughly meant:

In Yan'an, although the Chinese Communist Party's strength is far inferior to that of the enemy, it has a deep mass base and is familiar with mountains and rivers.

With the support of the masses, there is no need to rush to fight a decisive battle with the enemy, but to lead the enemy's nose to fight a war of attrition, circling in a labyrinth of mountains, leaving him exhausted and starved of food.

Another thing is to explain clearly to the masses that this is the road to victory and to believe in the Party Central Committee and the People's Liberation Army.

Under such circumstances, Hu Zongnan will inevitably rush to a decisive battle and look for Peng Dehuai's main force everywhere, and over time, he will be chaotic. The People's Liberation Army took advantage of the fatigue of the Hu army and ran out of food, and in turn launched a thunderous one- strike, two-strike, three-strike...

The article has a few inks, and this matter seems to be not difficult to say, but the paper is shallow, and the three or five pages of history books are light, but they are changed by the blood and tears of the revolutionary ancestors.

This starts with our article in this issue, which tells how Peng Dehuai used mushroom tactics to achieve three battles and three victories.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

All this began in February 1947, when Chiang Kai-shek was deeply aware that he had occupied the tactical initiative and was strategically passive.

Tactically, the nationalist army was far superior to that of the People's Liberation Army, and strategically, the Communist Party won the support of the majority of the poor people.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

The War of Liberation had been fought for more than half a year, and Chiang Kai-shek was horrified to find that if he continued to fight in this way, he would gradually lose his tactical superiority and would lead to inevitable defeat.

So Chiang Kai-shek's gaze looked at the heart of the Red Regime— Yan'an!

Chiang Kai-shek personally arrived in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, and personally formulated a series of tactics to seize Yan'an in one fell swoop and fulfill his wish eleven years ago.

Some historians also joked that if Chiang Kai-shek had gone to Hu Zongnan eleven years ago and not Zhang Xueliang, history might have been rewritten.

And now, when Chiang Kai-shek really went to Hu Zongnan, will history really be like a joke by historians and rewritten by the Kuomintang?

Compared with eleven years ago, the Nationalist army has gathered 230,000 troops.

Although the quantity was lower than that year, the quality far exceeded that year, and most of them were of the Jiang family lineage, all pedantic and loyal to the Nanjing side, and would not repeat the Xi'an Incident.

The enemy frantically advanced toward Yan'an from three directions, but at this time, the CCP was no longer the weak CCP of eleven years ago, and the spark of the stars had already burned.

Chiang Kai-shek's large army pressed the border and adopted the tactic of encircling the iron barrel, which not only failed to break the shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia defense line, but also led to a large number of troops being pinned down in northern Shaanxi.

Beginning in March, the Nationalist army abandoned the encirclement tactics and adopted a focused offensive approach, clenching its forces into fists to fight the People's Liberation Army in northern Shaanxi.

By this time, Chiang Kai-shek's total strength had reached more than 250,000 people, and there were thirty-four brigades in formation, and most of them were composed of elite troops, veterans who had been baptized by many years of war.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Hu Zongnan's troops, hereinafter referred to as Hu Jun, came out of the nest and served as the main offensive force for the "blitzkrieg Yan'an".

The Nationalists had a clear goal, to gather scattered troops into sharp knives to destroy the CCP's head organs, destroy the PLA headquarters, and preferably settle the battle west of the Yellow River.

At this time, we have to mention that in terms of intelligence, Hu Jun's every move is under the surveillance of CCP agents.

Hu Zongnan's confidential secretary, named Xiong Xianghui, was Hu's confidant, but this person was actually an undercover agent of the CCP, who controlled most of Hu Jun's classified intelligence.

That is to say, the People's Liberation Army has mastered every move of hu jun and has achieved the goal of knowing oneself and knowing the other. At this time, Hu Jun's so-called "blitzkrieg" had lost its practical significance.

Blitzkrieg, as the name suggests, is a surprise attack, and if you lose your suddenness, blitzkrieg can't be talked about.

Xiong Xianghui is known as the head of the Three Masters of Longtan, lurking around Hu Zongnan for thirteen years, and he later took charge of China's highest intelligence agency, the "Central Investigation Department", which is a legend in the field of secret agents, but this is also a digression.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Looking at Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun of the Northwest Bureau, the PLA they could command only four brigades of regular troops and three local brigades, with a total strength of only more than 20,000 troops.

In terms of equipment, the gap between the enemy and us is even greater.

The Central Military Commission of our army learned of the Hu army's "blitzkrieg" plan in advance and realized that our army would face tremendous pressure, and if the battlefield changed drastically, it was necessary to consider the possibility of abandoning Yan'an.

It was also at this time that the Central Military Commission, headed by Mao Zedong, formulated what we later called "mushroom tactics."

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Peng Dehuai later sighed and said: This kind of battle can only be fought in Yan'an.

Marshal Peng made this evaluation because the core of the mushroom tactic is to use the "geographical advantages" and "the CCP has a deep mass base in Yan'an."

The military and civilian families that have been promoted over the years, with three major disciplines and eight points of attention, have played an important role at this critical moment in history.

In terms of terrain, Yan'an is undoubtedly the home of our army, and the People's Liberation Army occupies an absolute advantage.

After having the geographical advantages and people, the next thing to do is to pin down the elite Hu army of the Kuomintang in the battlefield of northern Shaanxi, so as to ease the pressure on other liberated areas.

According to Mao Zedong's tactical vision, when the Hu army was exhausted and ran out of food, the command and the army would lose their square inches, and then it would be the moment when our People's Liberation Army would counterattack.

In military terms, the tactics adopted by our army are movement defense, just like leading an ox in a circle in the mountains.

On March 13, 140,000 Hu troops, with the cooperation of the air force's indiscriminate bombardment, vainly wanted to occupy Yan'an for three days.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

The PLA troops along the way used flexible tactics to block the attack step by step.

Three days later, the PLA troops in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia were under the command of Peng Dehuai and Xi Zhongxun, the former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and The secretary of the Northwest Bureau.

Just when our army set up an ambush circle and waited for the Hu army to rush forward, Hu Zongnan, an old fox, sensed the danger and immediately slowed down the speed of the march and refused to enter the trap.

As soon as our army saw that the Hu army was stagnant, it immediately dispatched more troops, took the initiative to attack and harass, and adopted the advantage of veterans' proficiency in night combat to block the enemy.

Mao Zedong issued orders to deplete the enemy in the defense, gather superior forces in the movement war, and annihilate the enemy individually.

In fact, to put it bluntly, it is to look for fighters, and once it is found that the enemy's single regiment or even brigade, our army will gather superior troops and give a heavy blow to the thunderbolt.

Two days later, the deployment of a large force of the Nationalist army was completed, with the Hu army as the main force and the Ma family army as the supplement, and their front-line troops were only twenty miles away from Yan'an.

Three days plus two days, in these five days, the most important thing is not to prove that Hu Zongnan bragged, but that the central organs in Yan'an have successfully transferred and left Yan'an safely.

The central organs headed by Mao Zedong, at this dangerous moment, instead of increasing security and security, streamlined their organs and remained in northern Shaanxi to continue their command.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

With the arrival of Wang Zhen's troops, it was equivalent to the arrival of the outer troops on the battlefield to cooperate with Peng Dehuai's internal troops.

That is to say, the central organs have been safely transferred, and the next thing to be done is to make the enemy short of food and cut off the stove, and to pursue the mountains tired and blind.

According to Xiong Xianghui's recollection, after Hu Zongnan entered Yan'an, he looked at Mao Zedong's office and then looked up at the sky and laughed wildly.

Xiong Xianghui believes that Hu Zongnan, a person, laughs wildly when he is happy, and laughs wildly when he is angry, and Hu Jun is tied down in Yan'an, as if sitting on a stove, and the only thing he can do is to fight quickly and make a quick decision.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

The first battle, Qinghua Gong!

On March 19, hu jun frantically searched for Peng Dehuai's main force, and they deeply realized that if they continued to consume in this way, they would undoubtedly lose.

The Yan'an Defense War actually began in February, and now the two sides have been holding each other for more than 20 days, and Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan have launched a peak duel.

From the perspective of the system of the Nationalist army, Zhou Enlai once commented that Hu Zongnan's military ability was superior to Chen Cheng's.

It can be seen that Hu Zong's South Africa is not a straw bale, but a top general of the Jiang family. However, he encountered one of the best marshals of the People's Liberation Army, Peng Dehuai!

At this point, it can be seen that in addition to having superiority in strength, the Hu army is completely inferior to our army in terms of intelligence, popular will, terrain, and so on.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Our army has penetrated the psychology of the enemy and sent a part of its troops to Anse, so that the Hu army mistakenly believes that the main force of the People's Liberation Army has rushed to the north.

In fact, the main forces of our army are hidden in Ganguyi and Qinghua in the northeast.

This means that after sending some people to pull the neck of the chicken and pull it longer and longer, the main force is like a sharp blade, and then cut it off.

Overall, Peng Dehuai fought this battle relatively smoothly.

On the 21st, the Hu army sent five brigades to pounce on Anse, marching all the way with full horsepower. In order to protect the main force, they were in charge of the flank of the headquarters of the 31st Brigade, with the 92nd Regiment, and went out to Qinghua.

That is to say, the brigade headquarters took a regiment and broke away from the large troops of the Hu Army, and ventured into Qinghua, and Peng Dehuai would naturally seize this opportunity to attack the enemy who was alone and deep.

The main forces of the six brigades of our army were hidden on both sides of the cheong hwa Road.

At ten o'clock in the morning of March 25, the 92nd Regiment of the Nationalist Army, which had penetrated alone, plunged headlong into the ambush circle of our army.

When the movement is moving, when it is time to counterattack, it must be a thunderous punch, and the tactics adopted by Nishino divide and surround it, annihilate it, stop the snake's head, cut off the snake's tail, and then pinch the snake's belly left and right.

This battle was a complete victory, the first great victory achieved after Nishino moved out of Yan'an, except for a few enemies who escaped from the battlefield, most of them remained in the mountains, and the results of our army annihilating the enemy were close to 3,000 people.

Previously, our army had been explaining to the masses that "mushroom tactics" were an effective means of victory, and through the Battle of Qinghua, Mao Zedong's tactical expectations were proved.

The reasons for the victory are very complicated, and if we pick the most important ones, it is that Hu Zongnan is very anxious and Peng Dehuai is very calm; Chiang Kai-shek is very anxious, and Mao Zedong is strategizing.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Battle 2: The Sheep Horse River.  

Hu Zongnan, having experienced the fiasco of Qinghua, began to be more eager to find Peng Dehuai's main force and wanted to launch a major battle as soon as possible.

In the case of chaotic inches, the Hu army began to divide the troops into multiple roads and launched a dragnet search in the mountains.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

As far as our army is concerned, it is hoped that Hu Zongnan will divide the troops, so a situation favorable to our army will be formed.

The commander of the Nationalist army, Mai Zongyu, led the reorganized 135th Brigade to the YangmaHe area, with about 4,700 people.

The main force of our army, in the northwest region of Panlong and Qinghua, was repaired, and troops who could fight and run were sent to be responsible for attracting the enemy's main force and making the Hu army continue to be tired of running for their lives.  

In April, Hu Zongnan pounced one after another, but he never found the main force of the People's Liberation Army, and he saw that the grain was about to be eaten, so he became more anxious.

On April 6, Hu Zongnan suddenly received news that Peng Dehuai's main force had appeared in the Panlong area, so he immediately sent a large army and rushed towards The Dragon.

Peng Dehuai learned that the enemy's large troops were coming, so he sent a brigade of the People's Liberation Army, deliberately creating a big movement along the way, marching all the way to the northwest of Panlong, pretending to be the main force of our army.

Hu Jun's large group frantically pounced on the northwest of Panlong. Since the large group was dispatched, the defense was bound to be empty, so the 135th Brigade went south alone and replenished to the Yangma River area.

Peng Dehuai immediately commanded four brigades of the People's Liberation Army, killed all the way to the Yangma River, set up a large ambush circle in advance, and launched a fierce battle with the enemy's 135th Brigade at 10:00 a.m. on April 14.

For the enemy, it belongs to the sudden encounter with the People's Liberation Army, there is no time to take precautions, and Peng Dehuai was caught off guard.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Our army once again adopted the tactic of pinching the head and tail to fight in the middle, dividing and encircling the enemy's integrated brigade, and fighting until four o'clock in the afternoon, completely annihilating the 135th Brigade of the Hu Army.

The fierce battle lasted for more than five hours, and Nishino won a great victory in this battle, with a victory of nearly 5,000 people.

Mai Zongyu, the brigade commander of the 135th Brigade, was captured by our army at Yangma River and accepted the transformation of communism.

According to Mai Zongyu's own recollection, he said:

Our last position in Xishan was lost, and I had no choice but to retreat to the ditch, but I did not expect that in the ditch, there was a large force of the People's Liberation Army.

I was confronted by a soldier from the People's Liberation Army, and I became a prisoner of the other side, and he took me to the side of the road.

Not long after, Wang Zhen and Wang Enmao came to me, as if they were friends meeting each other, and we informed each other of their names.

At night, when I ate, I slept with the second king on a clay kang at night in an ordinary house.

Wang Zhen fell asleep very quickly, purring like thunder, but I couldn't sleep at all, because just a few hours ago, we were still fighting in the sky, but now we are like brothers, sleeping in a bed, I feel the great heart of the Communists...

The above is a fragment of Mai Zongyu's memories, and the greatest significance of this battle is not to capture Mai Zongyu, but to completely reverse the situation.

Before this battle, the Hu army had been attacking, and our army was moving defensively; but after this battle, the Hu army began to passively defend, and our army gradually turned to the offensive.

This is the first time that our army annihilated the enemy's integrated brigade after the beginning of the War of Liberation, and it is of great historical significance. It is not difficult to explain why Wang Zhen attaches so much importance to Mai Zongyu and sleeps on a clay kang at night. 

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Battle 3: Dragon Town!  

Chiang Kai-shek suffered two successive fiascos, and received news from the front that Nishino's main force was near Waya Fort.

Nanjing did not pay attention to Hu Zongnan's suffering, but immediately formulated tactics and attacked Peng Dehuai's main force in two ways.

On April 26, the main force of the Hu army group began to march to Suide, leaving only one brigade of regular troops, and not a whole structure, plus three security corps, staying in Panlong.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

Peng and Xi, the two of them seized this opportunity, believing that Panlong was an important military base, and if they suddenly hit Panlong hard, the Hu army group would not have time to come back for reinforcements.

Nishino's headquarters immediately dispatched some troops, disguised as Nishino's main force, to attract Hu Zongnan's troops to quickly move north.

A southward detachment was formed to threaten the flank rear of the Hu army group.

Our army gathered the main forces of four brigades, killed all the way to Baolong, and arrived at the predetermined location at the end of April, doing a good job of thunder strikes.

In May, the large army of the Hu army began to attack Suide.

On May 2, as the sun set, the main force of our army suddenly launched a fierce attack on the town of Panlong.

The Nationalist troops who remained at this base wanted to use the offensive they had built to block The main force of Nishino, and then wait for the Hu army to turn around and reinforce.

Two days later, our army laid the eastern position of The town of Panlong, thus opening a breakthrough, and Peng Dehuai immediately ordered a general offensive of the Battle of Panlong.

Until 12 o'clock in the evening, the entire town of Panlong was laid down, killing more than 6,700 enemies, twelve thousand packs of flour alone, and countless other kinds of supplies.

In 1947, Peng Dehuai and Hu Zongnan held each other for more than 20 days, and Mao Zedong made a plan, followed by three battles and three victories

This battle was bold, and the commanders were even more brilliant, and mao Zedong's strategy and tactics fought a wonderful sports battle.

If the enemy goes to Suide, our army will fight the dragon, and if this battle does not go well, the main force will most likely fall into the counter-encirclement of the Hu army.

Peng Dehuai taught Hu Zongnan a lesson, showing what is a quick battle and a quick decision, and after taking the base in Panlong Town, he obtained a large amount of grain supplies, which solved some of the logistical problems of our army.

Then there is the fact that Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Zongnan are already fainting in northern Shaanxi, and when the Lord will be dizzy, how can we say victory?

Peng Dehuai adopted new strategies and tactics according to the changes in the battlefield under the strategy formulated by Mao Zedong, and mushroom tactics shined in the Yan'an Defense War.

Editor's Profile: Song Xiaole, a post-90s grandfather, from an ordinary family, full-time writing for 5 years, earned the first bucket of gold in his life by relying on self-media writing, and cooperated with a number of new media companies. If you are interested in self-media, writing, and making money, and want to be able to do side jobs and part-time jobs every month after work, you can search for and follow my public account "Today's People" on WeChat to discuss and make progress together.

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