Among the founding generals, the vast majority of them have experienced the baptism of the battlefield and have rich combat experience. If so, who among the founding generals is the most capable of fighting? There is no standard answer to this question, and everyone's views are different; some people will choose General Peng, who dealt a bitter blow to the US military in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and some people will choose Xu Shuai, commander-in-chief of the Fourth Front of the Red Army.
On the combat command ability of the large corps, during the Liberation War, the ability of Commander Su, acting commander of the Third Field Army, and Lin Chang, commander of the Fourth Field Army, was recognized by the vast number of military fans. Commander Lin Zong and Commander Su are high-ranking military commanders at the level of the "God of War" and are recognized as people in our army who can fight.
It is worth mentioning that Commander Su's military ability was once questioned, and at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1958, some people questioned that Commander Su would not fight, and fought two defeats in Nanma and Linqu. At the meeting, when Chen Geng heard that some people had slandered Commander Su and questioned Commander Su's military command ability, he could not sit still and immediately retorted: If Su Yu cannot fight, then who in all of China will fight? Trouble stand up for me to see.
During the Liberation War, Chen Geng and Commander Su did not serve in the same field army, so how did Chen Geng understand Commander Su's military command ability? As a founding general, Chen Geng was also good at combat command, and his revolutionary qualifications were profound, so why did he have the ability to command a millet commander, and what kind of understanding did he have?
It is undeniable that the two battles of Nanma and Linqu were rare defeats of the East China Field Army, and since Meng Lianggu Baiwan's army took the first rank of general, huaye's situation has not been optimistic since the division of troops in July, resulting in low morale for a period of time, especially since the battles of Nanma and Linqu, Commander Su himself was once questioned. So, should the commander of these two defeats be responsible?
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="6" > should the commander of the two battles of Nanma and Linqu be responsible? </h1>
The defeat in the two battles of Nanma and Linqu was the darkest moment in Huaye's year. After the failure of Chiang Kai-shek's plan for a "decisive battle between Luzhong and China," he learned his lesson and concentrated his superior forces to attack. Fan Hanjie carried out Lao Jiang's tactics very thoroughly, adopting the "drum tactics" method.
Commander Su was also a little confused in the face of the "drum tactics" for a while, and there was no very good way to deal with it, so he planned to attack Lunan with three columns, and then concentrate Huaye's main force on Yishui, forcing Fan Hanjie to return to the division for reinforcements, and Commander Su looked for fighters from it. At this time, the central authorities sent a telegram to the effect that Liu Deng would lead the Jinji-Hebei Luyu Field Army to cross the Yellow River in the south, and the chairman hoped that Huaye would divide the troops into three roads and open the passage with Liu Deng's army.
Since the superiors had a request, Hua Ye decided to divide the troops into three roads after discussion at the meeting, one way to Lunan, one way to Luxi, and all the way to Yishui. According to the original plan, the number of troops separated from Luzhong increased from three to five, and in history, this event was called "July Division".
As we all know, during the Liberation War, our army's usual method of play was to concentrate superior forces to destroy the enemy a little, use mobility to fight a mobile war with the enemy, and look for fighters in the movement. After Huaye divided the troops in July, the number of large armies on all sides was insufficient, and they did not form the combat effectiveness of the previous one.
In addition to the damage to the combat strength of Huaye's division of troops, there were also some problems in the command of the three-way army, coupled with the fact that it was an external operation, there was no strong logistical support, comprehensive weather, geographical advantages and other factors, so that Huaye suffered a lot of setbacks in the two battles of Nanma and Linqu.
After the defeat of the two battles of Nanma and Linqu, should Commander Su be responsible? As the military commander of an army, it is obviously impossible to have no responsibility, but for the defeat of the campaign, Commander Su should not be responsible for this matter alone, because the July division of troops was a decision of the Party Central Committee and was carried out after discussion within Huaye, and as for the defeat of the battle, Commander Su also wrote a review after the war and requested punishment.
Analyzing the situation, the Central Military Commission held that the defeat in the two battles of Nanma and Linqu could not put the main responsibility on Commander Su, and called back: "It does not matter if a few battles are not fought well," "Please work with peace of mind, boost morale, and facilitate another battle."
Judging from the attitude of the central authorities, commander Su should not be responsible for a series of difficult problems faced by Huaye after the division of troops in July. It is worth mentioning that Tan Zhenlin believed in his report that Commander Su's military command "lacked foresight" and "often only saw one or two steps" and made the mistake of carelessness, but at that time the central authorities did not agree with Tan Zhenlin's report.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="15" > Chen Geng admired the military prowess of Commander Su </h1>
Chen Geng was an all-rounder, one of the Three Masters of Huangpu in his early years, and was deeply loved by Chiang Kai-shek. Under the leadership of Premier Zhou, Chen Geng joined the revolutionary ranks. In his early years, Commander Su was an obscure revolutionary who did not receive much attention, but this did not hinder the development that followed.
It is worth mentioning that since the division of troops in July, after Hua Ye was frustrated in Nanma and Linqu, his old partner Chen Yili supported Commander Su and sent a telegram to the central authorities, which is very interesting:
"There are not many outstanding military figures we have created in more than two decades. Recently, Su Yu and Chen Geng have stood out one after another, and they have a great future and will advance side by side with Peng, Liu and Lin. ”
In this sentence, Chen Yi put Together Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, Lin Biao, Su Yu, and Chen Geng and called them outstanding military experts. Liu, Peng, and Lin had already become famous as early as the Red Army period, and Su and Chen were the high-ranking generals of our army during the Liberation War.
Previously, Chen Geng and Commander Su had been friends for a long time and had never met until December 1947, when Hua Ye and Nakano joined forces for the first time, and Chen Geng's corps was temporarily under the command of Commander Su. The two were familiar with each other's deeds, but they had never had the opportunity to see each other, and after joining forces, Commander Su commanded two large armies and launched the Pinghan Campaign, destroying more than 45,000 enemy people and conquering Xuchang and other important towns.
In the first phase of the Battle of Huaihai, Huang Baitao withstood the first wave of attacks from Commander Su with his strong fortifications. Seeing that the troops suffered heavy casualties, Commander Su immediately held an emergency meeting and clarified that the tactics changed from field attacks to close-range operations, and approached the enemy's positions by digging trenches.
The method of digging trenches to approach the enemy's positions was very effective, and the zimu forts set up by Huang Baitao's army were pulled out one by one, and eventually the Seventh Corps of Chiang Kai-shek's army was completely destroyed. In the second stage of the Huaihai Campaign, Huang Wei's 12th Corps was stronger than the Seventh Corps in terms of weapon firepower, and Nakano did not have the weapons to attack the fort, and the strong attack was violently blocked by the enemy, and the losses were very large.
Nakano was unable to attack the stronghold, and Chen Yi immediately called Commander Su to seek a way to break through the enemy's powerful firepower. Commander Su replied: "Dig a tunnel, approach the enemy position, and then launch a sudden attack to divide and annihilate it." Commander Su patiently explained to Chen Yi how to eliminate the Seventh Corps, and Chen Yi applauded after hearing this, and told Liu Deng's two chiefs.
With a plan to break the enemy, Liu Bocheng immediately dialed Chen Geng in the front-line position and told him that he could refer to Commander Su's method of breaking Huang Baitao's corps. In order to let Chen Geng go, Liu Bocheng let Chen Geng fight according to the situation on the front line. Soon, after Chen Geng used the method of Commander Su, Huang Wei's corps collapsed.
epilogue
During the period of cooperation between Chen Geng and Commander Su, Chen Geng fully felt Commander Su's military command ability, saw with his own eyes how he commanded freely on the battlefield, and cooperated with Commander Su. Chen Geng was very happy, and the corps he led was willing to obey the command and admired this rising star.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the central authorities asked Commander Su to serve as deputy chief of the general staff in charge of operational matters. Commander Su thought that Chen Geng was capable and senior, and that he was more suitable than himself, and recommended him to the chairman.
Of course, in the end, the chairman insisted that Commander Su take up his post. Commander Su, who came to work at the General Staff Headquarters, proposed to build a military engineering college, and the candidate for president once again thought of Chen Geng, and the chairman listened to Commander Su's suggestion and asked Chen Geng to return from Korea to be responsible for the establishment of the Military Engineering Academy and serve as the president.
In 1958, Chen Geng was not afraid of pressure and protected Commander Su at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission. At that time, some people criticized Commander Su for not fighting, and Chen Geng said unceremoniously:
"Su Yu will not fight at all, so who else in China will fight, please stand up and let me see."
As Chen Geng said, if Commander Su cannot fight, then among the generals of new China, I am afraid that no one dares to say that they can fight and will fight.