By David M. Grants, Jonathan M. House
Translation: Sun Bo, Zhao Guoxing, Zhang Junming
During the Battle of Kursk, the Main Tank of the Red Army was the 1943 T-34
During the first two years of the Soviet-German war, German troops were rarely forced to launch a frontal assault on the well-prepared Soviet lines. However, in Kursk, the Red Army, through improving intelligence gathering and analysis, had basically accurately predicted the strategic focus of the German large-scale offensive, which was actually the first time in the Soviet-German war. This prediction explains to a large extent why Germany's "fortress" operation ended in failure, bearing in mind that blitzkriegs had never failed in their strategic deep breakthrough into Soviet defenses.
Preparations for the defense of Kursk were far from being as simple as massing the largest number of troops, although doing so would in itself deter the German offensive. More importantly, the specific methods adopted by the Soviets' combat experience, with the heavy physical labor of millions of people per year, made the Kursk salient almost indestructible.
The strength of the Kursk defense depends on many factors. The first important feature of the defensive plan was that the Soviet command apparatus at all levels, judging the likelihood of a German offensive, decided how to allocate troops to the defensive front: the areas where the attack was expected would maximize the concentration of the defenders on the narrowest front. For example, the average density of the defensive front of the Central Front was 870 men per kilometer, 4.7 tanks, 19.8 guns and mortars, while the average density of the defensive front of the 13th Army of the Central Front increased to 4500 men, 45 tanks and 104.3 guns per kilometer. As mentioned earlier, perhaps because of Zhukov's preoccupation with Army Group Center, the Voronezh Front was relatively weaker. Even so, however, the density per kilometer of the key fronts of the 6th and 7th Guards Army reached 2,500 men, 42 tanks, 59 guns and mortars. In addition, Vatutin's forces were deployed in depth, while Konev's forces occupied a more far-reaching defensive line as their backing.
An axiom in military theory, and a result of Soviet operational analysis, required the offensive side to outnumber the defender, ideally forming a strategic advantage of at least two to three times. Through clever concentration of forces, such an overall advantage can result in a 3:1 to 5:1 campaign advantage and a tactical advantage of 8:1 to 10:1 at the main attack site. However, according to Soviet statistics, the Red Army's strength in Kursk had surpassed that of the attacking side, forming a 2.5:1 numerical advantage, and the number of tanks and artillery exceeded that of the Germans. Although the Germans were able to launch a major offensive against a certain narrow area with all their might, and to form a local unfavorable balance of forces against the Soviet Union, in this case, no matter what the technical and tactical superiority of the Germans, whether this superiority was real or purely felt, could not guarantee their victory. However, there was a psychological constraint that diluted the Soviets' satisfaction with the status quo. The commanders of the Red Army realized that in the previous German offensives, the Red Army also had numerical superiority and could never defeat the Germans beyond strategic depth. The fact that the Germans had driven hundreds of kilometres twice before being frustrated in Moscow and Stalingrad was enough to keep the most optimistic Soviet commanders in mind, while the most pessimistic Germans were encouraged (see table below).
(Above) Comparison of forces in the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk
(1) Based on an assessment of the actual number of German ministries involved in the war in classified Soviet literature.
(2) Including half of the German Second Army.
(3) Includes forces invested before 15 July (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army and 27th Army).
As can be seen from the table above, the Central Front and Voronezh Front alone have more than 1.3 million troops, 19,794 guns and mortars, 3,489 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,650 aircraft (including the 17th Army of the Air Force). Behind them were also supplemented by the strength of the Prairie Military District.
The second important feature of the Soviet defense plan was the great defensive depth (see map below). Several armies occupied only the first three of the six main defensive zones, each divided into two or three positions. In general, the first and second defensive zones should be fully occupied, the third and fourth defensive zones were occupied by troops retained as reserves, and the last two defensive zones were largely unoccupied. Moreover, even if the Germans succeeded in slitting the Kursk salient from the roots, they would have to face several other defensive strips built east of the salient by Konev's Steppe Military District (later the Steppe Front). Therefore, the claim that the Soviet Defense was 300 kilometers deep was only a slight exaggeration.
Soviet lines around Kursk
Soviet analysts concluded afterwards that one of the shortcomings of the defensive plan was the lack of diagonal positions. It was a diagonal defensive line that helped prevent the Germans from expanding to the two wings after a breakthrough. In the absence of such diagonal positions, especially in the defensive zone of the 7th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, it was much more difficult for Vatutin to prevent the breakthrough of the Fourth Panzer Army and the detachments of the "Kempf" Army.
The main defensive belt of the USSR consisted of several battalion defensive areas, anti-tank hubs and a large range of engineering obstacles. The 37 infantry divisions occupying the first defensive zone established a total of more than 350 battalion defensive areas, and two or three battalion defensive areas were arranged in single or double echelons before and after the defensive areas, forming a regimental defensive section 4-6 km wide and 3-4 km deep. The average width of the division's defensive zone was 14 km (6-12 km in threatening areas, up to 25 km in secondary areas) and 5-6 km deep.
Each defensive position was a labyrinth of trenches and bunkers. Settlements close to the front line were evacuated, and more than 300,000 civilians, mostly women and the elderly, worked for months in military engineering construction projects. From April to June, the Voronezh Front alone dug 4,200 kilometers of trenches and erected 500 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles. In the areas of the 13th Army, the 6th Guards Army and the 7th Guards Army, the defenders planted an average of 2,400 anti-tank mines and 2,700 anti-infantry mines per mile 1 1 ○ front. Therefore, the 6th Guards Army planted a total of 64,340 anti-infantry mines and 69,688 anti-tank mines in the main defensive zone of its army group, and a total of 9,097 anti-infantry mines and 20,200 anti-tank mines in the second defensive zone of the army group. Shells fitted with remote control devices were also buried in the ground for use as additional mines. However, most of the mines were distributed in the first two defensive zones, and the defensive zones in the rear were not so densely covered.
In addition to infantry positions, the Soviets focused on the defense of tanks. In particular, on the expected German advance route, the forward infantry divisions and infantry corps built special anti-tank hubs and anti-tank areas, and occupied them using infantry, infantry equipped with anti-tank guns, and anti-tank fighter artillery units. The Guards 6th Army alone constructed 28 such hubs, of which 18 were located in the main defensive zone and 10 in the second defensive zone, each of which was deployed on the most favorable terrain, with a wide view and careful camouflage. The planners of the Guards 7th Army arranged a total of 27 anti-tank hubs along 6 routes where tanks might rush into the defenses of the army group.
A typical anti-tank hub consists of an anti-tank infantry company or battalion, an engineer platoon carrying explosives equipment, an anti-tank fighter battery armed with 4-6 anti-tank guns, and 2-3 tanks or self-propelled guns. The Red Army, recognizing that anti-tank guns and 45 mm anti-tank guns had little effect against the thick frontal armor of the Leopard, Tiger and Ferdinand, equipped these hubs with self-propelled anti-tank destroyers, 85 mm and 152 mm guns, and prepared to attack German tanks with direct fire. In addition, some anti-tank hubs have tailored camouflage positions for the T-34, allowing them to enter these preset firing positions with only the turret exposed. 2-4 such anti-tank hubs cover a direction suitable for tank attack with coordinated action, forming an anti-tank area. Each infantry regiment constructs 3-4 anti-tank hubs, and each division has 9-12.
Forward infantry regiments, infantry divisions and infantry corps have also formed anti-tank reserves, ready to act in coordination with the anti-tank hub and the anti-tank area. The regiment's anti-tank reserve consisted of two to three anti-tank guns, an anti-tank infantry platoon and an automatic weapons platoon, the division's anti-tank reserve was an anti-tank company or battalion, and the army's anti-tank reserve was an anti-tank destroyer regiment. Anti-tank reserves are also aided by tank reserves, which are usually assigned to a tank company for each infantry battalion, one tank battalion for each forward infantry regiment, and one tank regiment or tank brigade for each forward infantry division.
(Above) Soviet forces fought in tandem at the Battle of Kursk
Combat engineers laid defensive tank mines and engineering obstacles in designated "kill zones" to stop German tanks from advancing, from short-range anti-tank guns to various artillery pieces, where all available anti-tank weapons could ambush advancing German armored vehicles. In addition, infantry commanders at all levels have established rapid obstacle set teams of engineers, equipped with anti-infantry mines and anti-tank mines, which can quickly expand to key threatened directions and construct new obstacles while fighting fiercely. Usually each regiment will have an engineering squad to perform this task, and each infantry division and infantry corps will have several engineering platoons and one engineering company to perform similar tasks. Soviet commanders would also place anti-tank fighter artillery regiments and anti-tank destroyer artillery brigades as reserves in different depths behind the forward forces, ready to move forward at any time to meet further breakthroughs by the Germans.
Soviet command at all levels also used a large number of reinforced artillery, multiple rockets and mortars to consolidate a tight defense against tanks. The artillery was deployed in depth and concentrated in key German offensive directions, ready for artillery and counter-preparation, engaging advancing German forces, supporting counter-shock, counter-assault and the two planned counter-offensives. Soviet planners, as they had before mid-1943, added various types of counter-shocks and counter-assaults to their original defense plans.
This article is excerpted from the Battle of Kursk
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