Source: Xinmin Evening News
Schematic diagram of Fakhrizadeh's assassination depicted on a Russian website (some details differ from the latest claims)
Scene after fakhrizadeh's car was attacked
2020 is full of hardships for Iran. On January 3, Revolutionary Guard general Sulaimani was killed by a US missile. On November 27, Iran's "national treasure" nuclear scientist Fakhrizadeh was assassinated again, especially in the suburbs of Tehran, the capital of Iran. Watanka, an expert at the Institute of Middle East Studies in the United States, said: "At this (assassination) rate, no one in the Iranian regime can escape the catastrophe." This is an exaggeration, but it reflects the question, can Iran's security and internal guard system be trusted? Does the country's VIPs have a reliable "all-metal shell"? What is missing is that the security of Iranian DIGNITARANTS is mainly responsible for the security of the government intelligence and security department and the Revolutionary Guards Department, especially the key members of the military system such as Sulaimani and Fakhrizadeh, which are basically close to the protection of the Ministry of Security. From the perspective of assassination methods in the world, it is nothing more than close-quarters assassination and shooting, suicide bombing, poisoning, sniping, biological and chemical weapons, unmanned weapons, and the traditional hardware necessary for VIP security is bulletproof equipment, including bulletproof vehicles, body armor, stabproof vests, gas masks, night vision equipment, radio listening equipment, etc. In recent years, the new high-tech hardware is anti-sniper system, bone guide headset, digital communication equipment, anti-unmanned aerial vehicle system, anti-bomb electronic jammer (EJAB) and so on. Although Iran has long been subject to Western sanctions, most of these security equipment can be produced by itself or bought from the international market because it is not sensitive equipment. Bulletproof vehicles and body armor are protected. For bulletproof vehicles, the low-level can protect against small-caliber pistol bullets, the medium-level can protect against large-caliber pistol bullets, and the high-level can protect 7.62×54R or 7.62×51 mm high-power bullets. In August 1995, georgian President Shevardnadze, who was riding in a Volga sedan, was hit by a bomb and his face was scratched by shrapnel, and the German government presented him with a Mercedes-Benz 600 bulletproof sedan. On the night of February 9, 1998, Shevardnadze took a Mercedes-Benz car home, and on the way, he was shot by more than 20 killers and grenades, but Shevardnadze was unscathed, showing that the Mercedes-Benz 600 sedan met high-level protection standards. Looking at the Nissan Tianlai 250XV sedan that Helizad is riding, the protection level is very low, which is a simple modification model. At the scene of the assassination, the windshield of the destroyed car was bulletproof, and the bullet failed to break through after hitting it, but the left front door glass and the left rear side glass of the car were completely broken, and the bulletproof glass was obviously not used. The body and rear glass of the car are intact, which shows that the assassin did not take intensive shooting, but accurate short shooting. Iran's Flag Television said that Fakhrizadeh and his bodyguards once thought the vehicle was malfunctioning, so they pulled the car against the side of the road, and then the two got out of the car, only to be killed by subsequent shooting. This statement is full of contradictions, and it is impossible for the car to slow down or stop without the front gunfire, making Fakhrizadeh and others feel that there is something wrong with the car. But with such obvious bullet marks on the windshield, who would be foolish enough to think that this was a problem with the car? As for iran's official report that the two people were shot after getting out of the car, they should have fallen to the ground, but the photos showed that they both died in the back seat. In addition, the photos of the scene show that there is not much blood on the ground, which is not suitable for getting out of the car and being shot. On the other hand, the glass of the left rear side of the car was broken, suggesting that the deadly bullet was fired in, which is in line with the Iranian official statement that the bullet hit Fakhrizadeh three times, twice on the side and once on the back. It can be boldly speculated that the car in which Fakhrizadeh is riding is not a high-grade bulletproof car and cannot withstand large-caliber bullets. Speaking of body armor, the United States usually divides the protection level into six levels, of which the IIIA class body armor with protective insert can protect the NATO 7.62×51 mm high-power bullets fired from tens of meters away, and the IV body armor can protect 7.62 × 51 mm sniper bullets and armor-piercing bullets. Fakhrizadeh and his bodyguards didn't even wear ordinary soft body armor. Iranian officials stressed that no assassins were seen at the scene of the assassination, but the assassins hiding in the unknown place were completed by remotely operating a remote control machine gun embedded with artificial intelligence technology through mobile phones, but the Iranian security services did not equip the Fakhrizad team with electronic jamming equipment such as EJAB to interfere with and block the surrounding mobile phone signals. It is undeniable that what Iran lacks in terms of VIP security is not equipment, but the right way of thinking, as the Israeli "New News" reporter Bergman described, "the establishment, weapons, training, intelligence, they may all be complete, but coordination and organization is another matter." Since 2009, there have been more than 10 assassinations of nuclear scientists and missile experts on Iran alone, as well as several incidents of attacking key facilities and stealing confidential information, highlighting the urgent need for improvement of Iran's security and internal health system. Thomas Juno, a professor at the University of Ottawa in Canada, said that the battle between assassination and counter-assassination is first intelligence. For assassination, with accurate intelligence, a comprehensive plan can be formulated, and for anti-assassination, with accurate intelligence, it is possible to give early warning and then take the correct response. Intelligence gathering is a long-term and meticulous undertaking, and it involves a great deal of departments, institutions and personnel. For the assassin, relying only on satellites, aircraft, and networks to collect technical intelligence such as images and voices is far from enough, because it is impossible to judge the personality characteristics and behavior style of the target character based on technical intelligence, and once the target person takes measures such as electromagnetic silence, technical intelligence cannot be determined. Therefore, human intelligence has become an important supplement to technical intelligence, and even a key means in many cases. A major source of human intelligence is to bribe and plot against the personnel of the opposing side, because assassinations are carried out within the enemy country, all kinds of information on the target person, the mobile tools and equipment required for the operation, the entry of secret agents into the enemy country to hide and wait, the operation, the evacuation, and so on, all need the cooperation of the enemy country's internal personnel. Otherwise, the risk of dispatching agents is extremely high, and even if they are lucky, it may be difficult for agents to retreat. As far as anti-assassination is concerned, it is necessary to collect information on what are the targets of possible assassination activities, the composition of departments and personnel, the characteristics of training, the style of conduct, and the performance of equipment, and at the same time, it is also necessary to collect and analyze various types of communications and find clues from them. Internally, it is necessary to have the ability to effectively control electromagnetic signals and networks, strictly select the surrounding groups of dignitaries, and equip them with reasonable defensive equipment and security personnel. Among them, reverse infiltration is an extremely important task, and only strict internal prevention and control can cut off the other side's human intelligence sources and operational cooperation personnel. When the other party finds that there is no opportunity to take advantage of it, naturally it is impossible to carry out the assassination. However, judging from the assassinations that have taken place, Iran has been infiltrated beyond recognition. Bergman pointed out that the root cause of Iran's poor security is the unscientific allocation of resources, especially the position of the Revolutionary Guards is too prominent, ignoring the professionalism of security work, and the Revolutionary Guards Protection Department rarely cooperates with the Iranian government's Intelligence and Security Department and the police department, on the contrary, these departments compete with each other for budgets and block their own intelligence, which further weakens Iran's already weak security capabilities. Sulaimani and Fakhrizadeh are iranian heavyweights, and their killings have shaken the country. Iran can no longer tolerate the inefficient operation of its intelligence services as it did before, and it is bound to undergo major restructuring, otherwise similar incidents will occur. Not only that, but the succession of DIGNITARIES has been killed, and the iranian people's resentment against the security sector has also grown. If reforms are not in place, if similar assassinations occur in the future, it will not only be a matter of losing important people, but also may cause strong public dissatisfaction and social unrest. (Shi Hong)
(Source: Xinmin Evening News)