In the fourth campaign to resist the United States and aid Korea, the US military originally hoped to regain its lost positions through a blitzkrieg. But unexpectedly, in the end, it actually achieved the reputation of the volunteer army blitzkrieg. In the fourth battle, the volunteer army and the American army broke out the Hengcheng counterattack, and in this battle, the American army was gray-headed and fled. At the same time, the Hengcheng Counterattack has also become a battle that our army has won since the beginning of the Korean War.
Ridgway never imagined that the person who would go to Korea to take over as commander of the Eighth Army would be himself. Since Walker's death in a car accident, the morale of the American troops on the front line can be said to have plummeted. Now everyone is wondering whether this battle should be fought or not. When Ridgway came to North Korea, Washington immediately asked him what the situation was like on the Front line in North Korea, and Ridgway told the US Joint Senate categorically that it was too early to say defeat.
As long as un troops can resume the offensive, the situation remains unknown. Washington asked Ridgway to judge the situation on the front line on his own and organize an attack, and Ridgway immediately began to reorganize the US Eighth Army, so that they could regain their spirits and devote themselves to the subsequent battles. After inspecting the front-line troops, Ridgway was a little disappointed, because he found that the U.S. troops in Korea now had very few people who had participated in World War II, so Ridgway asked the command that it would be best to mobilize some veterans who had participated in World War II from the United States and among the troops stationed in Europe and Japan to take command of themselves, which might have a good effect on reversing the situation on the front line.
Ridgway's proposal was quickly affirmed by the top level of the United States. Suddenly, the morale of the US army was greatly restored, and at the same time, Ridgway believed that the US army must not be passively defensive. Although the opinion of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was to remain stubborn, he still pushed the U.S. First and Ninth Armies forward and made them ready to attack. At the same time, the Tenth Army, which was originally a reserve team, was also mobilized by him to the vicinity of the 37th Line, ready to launch a counterattack on the 38th Line at any time. In fact, just as Ridgway thought, the passive defense of the US army not only did not reap any good results, but also was beaten by the volunteer army all the way, so in Ridgway's view, if you want to turn the tide of the war, you must take the initiative to attack, so Ridgway developed a tentative attack called Operation Wolfhound.
On January 15, 1951, Ridgway's vanguard began to advance. He ordered the 3rd Division of the U.S. 25th Division and the Turkish forces on the front lines to make a tentative attack at the battalion level company size. In the course of this attack, the US military adopted the style of guerrilla warfare, going out day and night, and committing crimes in a rogue manner. The 50th Army of the Volunteer Army, which was stationed at the front line at the time, felt overwhelmed. Ridgway's operations had a certain effect, and soon the American army stole several villages from under the eyes of the volunteers. So the U.S. 25th Army immediately decided to enter Osan-ri from Pyeongtaek and attack the outpost positions of the 50th Army. The U.S. 24th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, under the cover of South Korean and Australian forces, will make a tentative attack on the Icheon area where our 38th Army is stationed. U.S. troops went in and out, from the 18th to the 21st, and in and out of Lichuan in and out of Lichuan in the past few days.
Our army finally decided to voluntarily abandon Icheon and then make plans, so on the 24th, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division occupied Icheon and continued to harass north. This campaign was the first offensive campaign based on Ridgway's so-called worship offensive, and Ridgway believed that the logistics supply line of the volunteer army was very long, and the supply method was very backward, which led to the volunteer army each carrying only a week's worth of food. Therefore, every offensive of the Volunteer Army could not exceed a week. Therefore, Li Qiwei judged that what the volunteer army should do now was to consolidate the defensive front near the 38th line, rather than take the initiative to launch an attack. After a series of tentative attacks, Ridgway finally decided on January 25 to send all his troops and 16 divisions to launch a counterattack against our army, and Ridgway's counterattack was code-named Operation Thunderbolt. He hoped to be able to completely follow the model of the Second World War as a lightning station, under the cover of air units, with mechanized troops to break through our army's defense line in all directions, and then capture Seoul.
On February 5, Li Qiwei ordered the US Tenth Army and the South Korean Third Army to jointly launch a siege and annihilation operation on the central and eastern fronts. According to Ridgway's idea, they should quickly occupy Yuanzhou and Hengcheng, and then continue to attack north. After capturing these two places, they would immediately march east towards the north of Chungju and assemble. It can be said that Ridgway's abacus hit the sky, but Peng Dehuai was not a vegetarian, and he quickly noticed the idea of the US army's offensive. Peng Dehuai believes that instead of sitting still, it is better to take the initiative to attack. Soon, Peng Dehuai ordered the main force of the 42nd Army to quietly assemble in the longtouli and Pingli areas on the night of February 1. Their task was to control the south of Dengpingli, ensure the smooth flow of the road, and create conditions for the 66th Army to occupy Longtouli and Hongchuan. As soon as the two units were ordered, they set out and arrived at the designated area on Both February 4 and February 6. With the cooperation of the local Korean People's Army. Our army unfolded in the predetermined area and completed the layout of the defensive line.
The Third Army of the Korean People's Army also began to transfer troops from the Jincheng area to the front, but now facing the Volunteer Army Command is a very serious problem, that is, the main force of the US army is now divided into two routes. Should we fight Pingli first, or should we fight Hengcheng first? Commanders and fighters at all levels in the Volunteer Army Headquarters expressed their opinions, but after receiving reports from the front, everyone found that there was a difficult bone to gnaw in the pingli. Although there were only five battalions of American troops here, they were not quite concentrated, and the fortifications had been laid out in advance. At the same time, it is also very close to the enemy's reinforcements, and if the battle cannot be ended within a day, the enemy's reinforcements are likely to come, so our army should attack Hengcheng first. This proposal was finally unanimously approved by everyone, and finally the Volunteer Army Command decided to put Deng Hua in charge of annihilating the enemy of Hengcheng.
At 2 p.m. on February 9, Deng Hua concentrated parts of the 40th and 66th Armies, as well as the 42nd and 39th Armies, and a total of nine divisions launched the Hengcheng counterattack. At 5:00 p.m. on the 11th, our army was ready to attack, and at the same time launched a short-term artillery bombardment of the enemy on the front line, followed by a full-scale attack. The enemy never imagined that the volunteer army would take the initiative so quickly, so soon after the 42nd Army launched a surprise attack, the two lines of defense of the ROK army were directly breached by our army. The contact between the troops of the Korean Eighth Division and Hengcheng was completely decided, and the Korean defenders were directly annihilated by more than 800 people and lost six heavy artillery, but our army did not choose to consolidate its position, but continued to attack forward.
By the next day, our army directly cut off the retreat of the Eighth Division of the Rokso Korean Army and annihilated more than a thousand fleeing enemies. As the 40th Army launched its assault, the 120th Division on the right side of the line quickly captured two enemy positions, annihilating enemy forces in both places. The left side progressed equally rapidly, and soon rendezvoused with the 42nd Army, completing the siege of Hengcheng. By 8:00 a.m. on February 28, the South Korean army had annihilated more than 1,300 people and captured more than 100 cars. American armored forces came to reinforcements and, after destroying three tanks, retreated to their positions.
The 66th Army launched an emergency assault on the American positions, and the 198th Division captured the American positions in Caotang the next day, completely annihilating an American artillery company, destroying three American tanks and capturing more than two hundred enemy soldiers. By this time, the Korean Eighth Division north of Hoengseong had been completely divided and encircled by the volunteers, and by 8 a.m. it had been largely annihilated. At that time, two battalions in South Korea were ready to break through under the cover of American troops, but they were directly blocked by the 117th Division of our army on the road. The South Koreans sent two battalions to support the breakout forces, but after more than three hours, they were all defeated by the 117th Division. By the evening, all South Korean troops trying to escape had been killed or captured.
In this pursuit and escape operation, our army killed and wounded more than 2,300 enemy prisoners, and also captured more than 200 cars. At the same time that our army was fighting in Hengcheng, the People's Volunteer Army also sent two legions to launch an all-out attack on the enemy. Under the devastation of the large troops, the 3rd and 5th Divisions of South Korea were completely annihilated and began to retreat on a large scale. By the early morning of the 13th, the Hengcheng counterattack was completely over.
In this battle, our army annihilated a total of three regiments of the South Korean Eighth Division and one battalion of the American Second Division. Four artillery battalions were completely annihilated by our army, and the 3rd and 5th Divisions of South Korea, which came to the reinforcement of the enemy, were also defeated by our army. In this battle, our army annihilated a total of 12,000 enemy troops, killed one enemy regimental commander, and also captured various artillery pieces, countless rocket launchers, and the casualties of the enemy and us reached a staggering 4:1.
After this battle, Ridgway's strategic deployment was completely disrupted, and the Un army had to retreat 26km backwards again, and Ridgway's plan to counterattack on all fronts was completely aborted. It can be said that this campaign is a typical case of our army's encirclement and annihilation operations, choosing to attack where the enemy's defense is weak, boldly interspersing, and cutting off the enemy's retreat. Then pay attention to destroying the enemy artillery, so that its infantry loses the source of firepower, and then surround and annihilate them. It can be said that this battle is enough to become a typical case in the military textbooks of various countries.
After the Hengcheng counterattack, Ridgway finally decided to continue to maintain a strategy of entrenchment. The Korean War once again entered a phase of strategic stalemate.