Tan Zhenlin believes that Chen Yi has made three extremely important contributions to the Chinese Communist Party in his revolutionary career.
The first time was in October 1927, after the Nanchang uprising troops defeated Sanheba, he actively cooperated with Zhu De, stabilized the hearts of the army, and preserved the flame of revolution;
The second time was in August 1929, at the risk of his life, to Shanghai to help the central government solve the problems of the Red Fourth Army;
The third was in October 1940, when he commanded the New Fourth Army to victory at the Battle of Huangqiao.
Lao Qin had previously written an article titled "Lieutenant General of the Nationalist Army who served as Chiang Kai-shek's attendant, brother of Chen Yi, single-mindedly serving the country, living at the age of 101", which mentioned in detail the process of Chen Yi going to Shanghai to report to the Central Committee on the situation of the Red Fourth Army. At that time, Chen Yi's brother Chen Mengxi was a major general of the Sichuan warlord Liu Cunhou and served as a representative in Shanghai, and Chen Yi successfully completed the task under the cover of his brother.
Today, Lao Qin focuses on the reason why Chen Yi personally went to Shanghai to report on his work.
It should be known that Chen Yishi was the former secretary of the Red Fourth Army and had a heavy responsibility, and the Red Fourth Army was under the situation of the enemy's menacing "suppression of the three provinces.", which can be described as a whole body.
The reason why he did this was that "Zhu Mao" had a disagreement and there was a controversy within the party.
How big is the difference between this "vermilion"?
On June 22, 1929, when Presiding over the meeting of the "Seventh Congress" of the Red Fourth Army, Chen Yi bitterly said to the "Zhu Mao" duo: "You are like the two great powers of the Warring States period, the Jin State and the Chu State, arguing, and I, like Zheng Guo, are sandwiched in the middle, and I don't know how to be good." You have to unite. ”
The seriousness of this matter can be seen.
The dispute between "Zhu Mao" began in April 1928.
At that time, in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Red Fourth Army established the Central Military Commission.
In October 1928, the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army reorganized the Central Military Commission in accordance with the instructions issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 4, 1928, and established the former committee.
The secretaries of the Central Military Commission and the former secretaries of the Central Committee are all designated by the Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission is subordinate to the former Committee, and the list of members of the Central Military Commission is decided by the Former Committee.
On January 14, 1929, in order to break the enemy's "suppression" of Jinggangshan, Chairman Mao decided to move the tiger away from the mountain and march to Gannan and western Fujian, implementing the strategy of encircling Wei and saving Zhao, alleviating the pressure on Jinggangshan, and eliminating the enemy from the periphery.
It is not difficult to imagine that the main force of the Zhumao Red Army was fighting outside, the situation was urgent, the fighter planes were fleeting, and all actions were decided by the front committee with Chairman Mao as its secretary, that is, the Central Military Commission with Zhu De as its secretary stopped functioning.
By May, with the opening up of the base areas in southern Gannan and western Fujian and the unfolding of party affairs, government affairs, military affairs, and mass work, the work was complicated and difficult for the former committee to take care of, and the work of the Central Military Commission began to resume.
However, the post of secretary of the Central Military Commission was no longer held by Zhu De, but by Liu Angong, who was new to the Red Fourth Army.
This Liu Angong is a native of Yongchuan County, Sichuan Province, who drank foreign ink, studied in Germany at the age of 18, and later joined the Comintern in Belgium and became a member of the Communist Party. In 1926, he and Zhu De worked secretly in the Sichuan warlord Yang Sen's ministry, and later participated in the Nanchang Uprising together. But after the failure of the uprising, he was sent to the Soviet Union to study military affairs. At this time, he worked in the Red Fourth Army as a central commissioner.
After he became the secretary of the Central Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army, he rigidly copied some of the practices of the Soviet Red Army and implemented the chief responsibility system, believing that the former committee had taken over the work of the Central Military Commission instead of the Central Military Commission, and practiced a "paternalistic system" and "one-word hall."
Therefore, he presided over the Decision of the Central Military Commission: the former Committee only discussed the operational issues of the Red Fourth Army and did not care about other matters of the army.
Obviously, in doing so, he was restricting the leadership of the front committee, that is, limiting the party's leadership over the Red Army.
This is something that Chairman Mao cannot tolerate.
Chairman Mao believes that the Party commands the gun, which is non-negotiable.
But Jude agreed.
Zhu De believes that there is nothing wrong with the Central Military Commission and the former committee performing their respective duties.
Chairman Mao and Zhu De were the two leaders of the Red Fourth Army, and their different views on the issue inevitably led to controversy among the senior leaders of the Red Fourth Army.
As early as October 1928, when Bukharin, secretary of the Communist International, delivered a speech at the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, there was an argument that "instead of building base areas, we should divide the Chinese Red Army into pieces and disperse them to the localities."
Therefore, on February 7, 1929, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a letter to Zhu Mao and the Xianggan Border Special Committee, requesting that the Red Fourth Army be reduced to pieces and scattered into the villages on the border between Hunan and Gansu, and that "comrades Zhu and Mao leave the army."
This letter, historically known as the "February Letter".
For this letter, Zhu De's opinion is to do it according to the orders of the central authorities.
Chairman Mao, on the other hand, adhered to the strategy of opening up base areas and wrote back to the central authorities to persuade them to take back their lives.
At this time, because of the relationship between the former committee and the Central Military Commission, the old saying of the central authorities asking "Comrades Zhu and Mao to leave the army" was revived.
Although the Provisional Military Commission was abolished at the discussion meeting, the discussion in the army has not disappeared, but has become more and more intense, involving more and more extensive military operations since the establishment of the Red Fourth Army, the various systems of the Red Fourth Army, the various policies of the Red Fourth Army, and so on.
Of course, the biggest debate is the topic of "should the party manage everything".
Zhu De believes that "the party manages everything as the highest principle, and it is really impossible to find it in communism", so he does not agree with the statement that "the party manages everything".
He also proposed that Party members should strictly enforce discipline within the Party, and only the enforcement of iron discipline can enable Party members to rely on the Party. Former Secretary Mao did not do a good enough job in this regard and did not conscientiously implement the instructions of the central and provincial party committees.
Chairman Mao believed that the reason for such a controversy was that there was a fundamental problem with the guiding principles of the organization and that the work could not be carried out, and he demanded his resignation.
On June 22, 1929, the "Seventh National Congress" of the Red Fourth Army was held in Longyan, Fujian Province, and the host Chen Yi criticized Chairman Mao and Zhu De for adopting the method of "hitting fifty big boards each", with the aim of eliminating the "gap" between Zhu and Mao and strengthening the unity of the Red Fourth Army.
However, he did so, causing a very bad consequence.
It should be known that he, Chairman Mao and Zhu De were originally the "big three" of the Red Fourth Army, and at this time Mao and Zhu were in a state of endless argument and were punished. Then, when electing a new former party secretary, some of the delegates attending the meeting did not vote for Chairman Mao, but voted for him.
As a result, the votes for and against Chairman Mao were exactly equal.
At such a critical moment, Chen Yi voted for himself, and he was elected as the new former party secretary.
This is the reason why people say that "Chen Yi voted against Mao Zedong."
At the end of the "Seventh National Congress," Chairman Mao fell ill and went to Jiaoyang to recuperate.
Chen Yi bluntly called himself unfit to serve as the secretary of the former party committee, and on July 9, in the name of the former party secretary, he wrote a "Report on the Situation in Western Fujian and the Work Plan of the Former Committee" to the central authorities, hoping that the central authorities would send other people to take on this heavy responsibility.
On 29 July, the enemy's "suppression of the three provincial capitals" came fiercely, claiming that they would pull out our base area in western Fujian within a week.
The situation was urgent, and Chen Yi and Zhu De rushed to Jiaoyang overnight to find Chairman Mao and hold a meeting of the front committee to discuss countermeasures.
Chen Yi implored Chairman Mao to return to the Red Fourth Army to preside over the work of the former committee.
Chairman Mao categorically refused, saying: "I do not agree with the practice of the Seventh National Congress, and I cannot go back like this." ”
However, for the enemy's "suppression", he still carefully formulated a countermeasure - adopting the policy of cattle grate and fighting guerrilla warfare with the enemy.
After the meeting of the former committee, in order to ask Chairman Mao to return to the work of the former committee, Chen Yi took the road to Zhangzhou, went to Xiamen, and took a detour to Shanghai, where he reported to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on the current situation of the Red Fourth Army and the Controversy between Zhu Mao and Mao.
Zhou Enlai agreed with Chen Yi that "Mao Zedong was the best candidate for the leadership of the Red Army," and on September 28, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he sent a letter of instruction to the former Committee of the Fourth Red Army, asking Chairman Mao to take office as the former party secretary. This is known in history as the "September Letter".
The "September Letter" was brought back by Chen Yi to the revolutionary base area in western Fujian.
In the end, Chairman Mao returned to Changting, met Zhu De and Chen Yi, and the three pairs of large hands were tightly held together again.
After that, throughout their long revolutionary careers, they remained united and never separated again.