Old Week
Abstract: Recently, I saw an article that actually praised Tang Shengzhi as a famous anti-Japanese general. Who is Tang Shengzhi? In the fourteen years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he only commanded one battle, that is, the Battle of Nanjing in November 1937, and the outcome of this battle was a painful and disastrous defeat. If you want to say what kind of famous general, I am afraid it can only be a famous loser.
Figure 1: Tang Shengzhi
Recently, I saw an article that actually praised Tang Shengzhi as a famous anti-Japanese general. Who is Tang Shengzhi? In the fourteen years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he only commanded one battle, that is, the Battle of Nanjing in November 1937, and the outcome of this battle was a painful and disastrous defeat. If you want to say what kind of famous general, I am afraid it can only be a famous loser.
First, let's take a look at the life of Tang Shengzhi:
Tang Shengzhi, born in 1890, the character Meng Xiao, the number Mande, a native of Dong'an County, Yongzhou Prefecture, Hunan Province (now Dong'an County, Hunan Province). In 1908, he was admitted to the first phase of the Hunan Army Armed Preparation School (Army Primary School), and in 1909, he entered the Third Army Middle School in Wuchang, Hubei Province, and under the influence of Tan Renfeng and others, Tang Shengzhi participated in the League. In the autumn of 1911, Tang Shengzhi graduated from the Army Middle School and was transferred to the Baoding Army Officer School to join the army. When the Xinhai Revolution broke out in October, Tang Shengzhi invited several Baoding classmates to go south to Shanghai to participate in the revolution, and in November he served as a clerk in the Shanghai Military Governor's Office, and after December he went to the Yantai Governor's Office as a staff officer, and later as a company commander.
In October 1912, Tang Shengzhi returned to baoding military academy to study in the second company of the first infantry section. In October 1914, he graduated from the Baoding Military Academy and was assigned to the Hunan Army Mixed Brigade as a probationary platoon leader, and thereafter served as acting company commander, battalion commander, regiment commander, brigade commander, and division commander in the Xiang Army.
In 1925, Hunan broke out in the Campaign to Woo Woo (Pei Fu) to drive Zhao (Heng Ti), Tang Shengzhi began to drive Zhao out in early 1936, Zhao Hengti was forced to resign by telegram under pressure from all sides, and recommended Tang Shengzhi as acting governor.
Wu Peifu appointed Ye Kaixin, an old subordinate of Zhao Hengti, as the commander-in-chief of the Xiang Army of the "Thief Alliance" and counterattacked Hunan. Tang Shengzhi's army was defeated and retreated to Hengyang, and then he officially joined the National Revolutionary Army, serving as the commander of the Eighth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the commander-in-chief of the former enemy of the Northern Expedition, leading his troops to participate in the Northern Expedition.
On April 12, Chiang Kai-shek launched a counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai, and Tang Shengzhi actively advocated a crusade against Chiang Kai-shek. Subsequently, he led his troops on an eastern expedition to the line of Wuhu, Hefei and Bengbu. Forcing Chiang Kai-shek to electrify Shanghai. After the confluence of Ning and Han, Tang Shengzhi's forces entered Anhui, which contradicted the Gui clan. In October 1927, the Gui-controlled National Government in Nanjing decided to attack Tang Shengzhi. In November, Tang Shengzhi telegraphed Shino and crossed east to Japan, and most of the troops were absorbed by the Gui clan.
In January 1928, Chiang Kai-shek came back to power, and Tang Shengzhi returned to shanghai from Japan to express his obedience to Chiang Kai-shek. In April 1929, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Tang Shengzhi as the commander-in-chief of the Fifth Route Army, commanding the old unit stationed in Pingjin.
In October, he was dispatched by Chiang Kai-shek with a huge sum of 1.5 million yuan to Tianjin and Tangshan, and regained the command of the old department in one fell swoop. In November 1929, Chiang Kai-shek ordered all the troops in Henan to be under the command of Tang Shengzhi and led his troops to defeat the Northwest Army in Henan. Although Tang Shengzhi had full authority to deal with the aftermath of Henan, he conspired with Shi Yousan and Yan Xishan to jointly oppose Chiang Kai-shek.
In December 1929, Tang Shengzhi, Song Zheyuan, Liu Wenhui and others telegraphed against Chiang Kai-shek and became the commander-in-chief of the "Fourth Road of the Party Protection And National Salvation Army". However, he failed in the battle against Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the Tianjin Concession in disguise, and went into exile in Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore, losing his military power.
In April, Yan Xishan, Feng Yuxiang and Chiang Kai-shek launched the Central Plains War, and Tang Shengzhi traveled from Hong Kong to Tianjin to serve as the commander-in-chief of the Sixth Front, but Yan Xishan and Feng Yuxiang lost the Central Plains War, and Tang Shengzhi completely lost military power.
Figure 2: Tang Shengzhi went through several ups and downs in the warlord melee, and finally completely lost his military power
In February 1931, Chiang Kai-shek put Hu Hanmin under house arrest. In May, the reorganization faction, the Xishan conference faction, the Hu Hanmin faction, the Lin Sen and Sun Ke factions, as well as the Liangguang local power factions Chen Jitang and Li Zongren, established the "Extraordinary Meeting of the Executive Supervisors of the Central Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang" in Guangzhou, and Tang Shengzhi was elected as a member of the State Council of the Guangzhou Extraordinary Government and one of the three members of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, which was also Tang Shengzhi's third anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign.
After the September 18 Incident, Tang Shengzhi advocated unanimous external relations and joined hands with Chiang Kai-shek to make peace. He was subsequently elected as an alternate member of the Central Executive Committee for the fourth term. In January 1932, Tang Shengzhi became a member of the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government and the president of the Military Senate. In December 1934, he was reappointed as the director of the First Department of the Military Commission of the National Government in Nanjing and the director of the Training Director Department. In April 1935, he received the rank of General of the First Class in the Army.
It can be seen that before the all-out War of Resistance in July 1937, Tang Shengzhi's life was a typical warlord, but also a defeated warlord, and finally completely lost his military power, although he had the dignity of a general, he did not have any real power.
Then we have to talk about today's theme, how did Tang Shengzhi perform in the War of Resistance?
In July 7, 1937, the Lugou Bridge Incident broke out, and a full-scale war of resistance broke out.
On August 13, the Battle of Songhu began, and after three months of fierce fighting, the Chinese army paid a huge price, but still failed to stop the Japanese army, and had to withdraw from Shanghai on November 11. According to the predetermined plan, two national defense fortifications had been built between Shanghai and Nanjing, the Wufu Line (Suzhou to Fushan) and the Chengxi Line (Wuxi to Jiangyin), but the Japanese army pursued them very quickly, and the troops withdrawn from the Songhu battlefield were too late to occupy the defensive line to organize resistance, so these national defense fortifications basically did not play a role, and the troops were defeated all the way to Nanjing.
Figure 3: The Defeated Chinese Army to Nanjing
Nanjing was the capital of the Nationalist government at that time, but the situation at this time was very grim, the troops had just passed through the rout of Songhu, the casualties were very large, the structure was in ruins, and it was urgent to replenish and rest. At the same time, the terrain of Nanjing is backed by the Yangtze River, and there is no danger, so it has not always been a terrain conducive to defense. Therefore, at the first high-level military conference held in mid-November, He Yingqin, Bai Chongxi, Xu Yongchang, Liu Fei and other senior generals all believed that Nanjing should not be held, but should leave a small number of troops for symbolic resistance, and the main force should continue to retreat to Jiangxi and Anhui. However, the meeting did not produce a formal resolution.
At the second high-level military conference, more people attended than the first, and Tang Shengzhicai participated; at the meeting, when discussing whether Nanjing was to be defended or abandoned, Tang Shengzhi spoke passionately, proposing that Nanjing was the capital and the mausoleum of the father of the nation, so how could he give up so easily? These words occupied the moral high ground and stopped Chiang Kai-shek, who had been hesitant to abandon Nanjing!
Judging from the situation at that time and from the perspective of the long-term and lasting strategy of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, abandoning Nanjing was undoubtedly a wise and correct move. Some people will say that the Soviet Union did not successfully hold the Moscow defense war during World War II, but the Moscow defense war and the Nanjing defense war are fundamentally different, first of all, the Soviet army has a steady stream of fresh troops (transferred from the Far East and various places), while Nanjing does not; the German army has gone through nearly half a year of combat, driving straight into the Soviet Union at a depth of two thousand kilometers, logistics supplies have reached the limit of the end of the crossbow, and the Japanese army from Shanghai to Nanjing is only three hundred kilometers, supply is not a problem, especially the Japanese Tenth Army landed from Jinshanwei on November 5, 2017. The vigor was in full swing and had nothing in common with the situation of the German army.
At Tang Shengzhi's strong request, Chiang Kai-shek finally decided to hold on to Nanjing, and appointed Tang Shengzhi as the commander of the Nanjing garrison and commanded the defense of Nanjing.
Then, why did Tang Shengzhi insist on sticking to Nanjing? As a high-caliber student at the Baoding Military Academy, don't you have this bit of strategic acumen? At that time, anyone with a little strategic acumen knew that Nanjing could neither be defended nor defended.
Figure 4: Nanjing at that time could neither be defended nor defended
If Tang Shengzhi was only unwilling to see the capital surrender to the enemy because he had a high fighting spirit full of enthusiasm, it would be a lack of military ability at most. But if there is still a small nine-nine of its own, it is not talentless, but moral.
Tang Shengzhi's small calculation was that although the all-out war of resistance had begun, war had not yet been declared between China and Japan, and in this case, the Japanese army might not necessarily capture Nanjing, the capital of China, because it would further escalate the war. After the occupation of Shanghai, although the Japanese army pursued the retreating Chinese troops, the operational purpose of the Japanese General Staff Headquarters to the Central China Front was to "eliminate the nearby Chinese troops in coordination with the navy, destroy their will to fight, and achieve the purpose of ending the war." At the same time, it was stipulated that the combat area of the Central China Front was east of the first line of Suzhou and Jiaxing, and the Shanghai dispatch army was sent to the first line of Fushan Town, Changshu and Suzhou; and the Tenth Army was to the front of Pingwang Town, Jiaxing and Haiyan. The Japanese army eventually crossed the stop line, which was completely the disobedience of the Tenth Army.'
Tang Shengzhi once went into exile in Japan and had some contact with the Japanese elite, and he had some understanding of the idea that the Japanese top level had no intention of occupying Nanjing. Therefore, it will be strongly demanded to hold Nanjing, then if the Japanese army stops under the city of Nanjing, it will have a great merit in defending the capital, and it is entirely possible to take this opportunity to take power again and re-enter the center of power.
If it is only a matter of ability to make a mistake in judging the situation and lacking strategic foresight; if at a time when the country is in danger, regardless of the overall situation' gains and losses, we still want to plan our own fame and fortune in the midst of national disasters, it is a matter of character.
Leaving aside the strategic mistake of sticking to Nanjing, Tang Shengzhi's performance in specific command was even worse.
Figure 5: The defense of Nanjing
On November 24, Tang Shengzhi was officially inaugurated as the commander of the Nanjing Garrison, and on the 26th, the Military Commission issued the sequence of combat troops under the Nanjing Garrison Command, a total of 13 divisions and teaching corps, gendarmerie units, etc., but only 2 of them were newly transferred reinforcements, and the remaining 11 divisions were all troops withdrawn from the Songhu battlefield, so there was a large shortage of troops, according to the establishment of these units, the total strength of these units should be 180,000 people, and in fact, less than 100,000 people.
On December 1, the Japanese army captured the fortress of Jiangyin, and it was only then that the Japanese General Staff Headquarters issued the Eighth Mainland Order, ordering the Central China Front to capture Nanjing.
On December 3, the Japanese army began to attack the first line positions outside Nanjing, and after four days of fierce fighting, by December 6, the first line of defense had basically broken through. From December 7, the attack on the Fukuo position began, and by dawn on the 9th, the Japanese army had entered the Qilin Gate, Guanghua Gate, and Yuhuatai, approaching the nanjing city wall.
On December 9, the Japanese made a breakthrough on the first line of Gwanghwamun, and a small number of troops broke into the city. The defenders fought back desperately to repel the Japanese.
On December 10, the Japanese army began a full-scale onslaught, and the battle was even more fierce than on the 9th. By the 11th of the battle, the Fukuo position had been broken through by the Japanese army in many places, and the defense of Nanjing city was already in danger. Moreover, when Tu and Wuhu had already fallen on the 9th and 10th, and small groups of Japanese troops even began to cross the river from Dangtu, the Nanjing garrison was in danger of being annihilated, so Chiang Kai-shek asked Gu Zhutong to order Tang Shengzhi to retreat north of the river by telephone at noon on the 11th, and the defenders broke through. However, because Tang Shengzhi had originally advocated holding out, and now he withdrew first, he was afraid that he would be held responsible in the future, and he must require a clear order before retreating. That night, Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to Tang Shengzhi: "If the situation cannot last, the camera can retreat." Only then did Tang Shengzhi summon the staff officers to discuss and decide to start the retreat on the evening of the 14th, and at 2 a.m. on the 12th, he asked the staff officers to formulate a retreat plan and orders.
However, the Japanese offensive became more and more fierce, and at noon on the 12th, it broke through the Zhonghua Gate and attacked the city. The defenders began to waver, and order in the city began to be chaotic. The 74th Army was preparing to erect a pontoon bridge on the Three Forks River, but before Tang Shengzhi ordered the 36th Division to maintain order in the area of Rujiangmen and Xiaguan, and strictly forbade the evacuation of the army and the people, the 74th Army's erection of the pontoon bridge was blocked by the 36th Division. If this pontoon bridge can be successfully erected, more people will surely escape.
Figure 6: The Japanese army breaks through the Zhonghua Gate
In view of the urgency of the battle, it was difficult to persist until the 14th to retreat, so Tang Shengzhi decided to break through in advance, called a meeting of generals at and above the division level at 17:00 on the 12th, issued an order to retreat that night, and issued a retreat plan, according to which the main force of the defenders would break through to the front, and only a small number of troops would retreat with the garrison headquarters from Xiaguan to the north of the river. However, after the meeting, Tang Shengzhi was worried that if Chiang Kai-shek's troops suffered heavy losses during the breakout operation, it would be difficult to account to Chiang Kai-shek, and he also issued verbal names to Chiang Kai-shek's troops such as the 87th Division, the 88th Division, the 74th Army, and the Teaching Corps: "If you cannot break through all of them, you can cross the river and concentrate on Chuzhou when there is a ferry." This verbal order greatly weakened the authority of the original breakout order and provided an excuse for some troops not to carry out the original breakout plan. Because the troops of the Thief Clan did not break through as originally planned, it caused dissatisfaction and confusion among other troops, resulting in the breakthrough plan becoming a waste of paper, and the entire breakthrough completely evolved into a great rout that was disorganized and orderly.
Originally, organizing a retreat was far more arduous and difficult than organizing an offensive, and a breakthrough in an unfavorable situation was the most test of the general's military command ability, and Tang Shengzhi's performance in the process of organizing the breakthrough of the Nanjing defenders was no longer mediocre, but could be described as a crime. First of all, in order to avoid being held accountable in the future, it was necessary to obtain a written order before issuing the breakthrough order, and missed a few hours of precious time; secondly, the organization of the breakthrough plan itself was not strict, and for the sake of selfishness, it was even necessary to change the breakthrough plan at the end of the day, which directly led to the chaos of the troops' breakthrough.
At 21:00 that night, Tang Shengzhi led the garrison command personnel to board the coal port and crossed the river on a ferry that was directly controlled by the garrison headquarters in advance and fled nanjing.
In recent years, some descendants of the Tang clan have washed him white, saying that he wanted to commit suicide, that he did not commit suicide because he took down the pistol by the guards, and that he was forcibly set up by the guards before leaving Nanjing Yunyun - there will be no chance to commit suicide, even if there is no pistol, jumping from the ferry to the Yangtze River, the Yangtze River has no cover. Besides, since we have the ambition to coexist and die with Nanjing, what should we do in preparing the ships in advance? Ten thousand steps back, even if Tang Shengzhi committed suicide, he would be able to wash away the guilt in the defense of Nanjing? Not to mention that he did not commit suicide, and he lived until 1970.
Figure 7: Tan Daoping, then chief of the first section of the Staff Office of the Nanjing Garrison Headquarters, recalls how Tang Shengzhi left Nanjing (published in the China Literature and History Publishing House, "The Defense of Nanjing: A Personal Experience of the Kuomintang Generals in the War of Resistance Against Japan").
On December 13, the Japanese army occupied Nanjing, and immediately launched a terrible massacre in Nanjing, of the 300,000 people killed, there were tens of thousands of defenders who laid down their weapons, if Tang Shengzhi was properly commanded and well organized, most of them had a chance to break through.
Therefore, in the Nanjing Baozhu Station, Tang Shengzhi's performance can be said to be talentless and immoral, and the guilt of the failure of the defense war is that the military law is light, and it is not too much to say that the national sinners are heavy. And he also commanded such a battle in the entire fourteen years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. It will be true, the first-level general of the hall, the name, I am afraid that there is only the insult of the defeated general.
(The picture of this article is from the network)