On November 23, the website of the US "Diplomacy" magazine published an article titled "The Intelligence Services of the Islamic State Refuse to Die – Why Emini Will Not Die Immediately", which is summarized as follows:
In the darkness of a safe hidden house in Mosul, where 10 Iraqi soldiers slept, the mobile devices of the two intelligence officers were still glowing with blue light. The two intelligence officers are busy searching for suicide cars, improvised explosive devices and ISIS bases, as well as looking up the names of ISIS members. The information was provided by civilians in areas controlled by the Islamic State. On the other side of the front, the same process is taking place. And these actions are much more complex in many ways. Even now, even now, at the same time as this terrorist organization is disintegrating, the activities of its intelligence services pose significant challenges.
information warfare
For many civilians who provide information to the Iraqi authorities about extremist groups, doing so is a way of defying their dire situation. An Iraqi Army intelligence officer told us: "So many people in Mosul want to cooperate with us because they want to retaliate for the killing of their families by extremist groups." "For others, the work is done purely for material gain, and the amount of remuneration depends on the value of the information provided.
Gathering information is easy. A female informant in Mosul obtained intelligence by flirting with extremist group militants. To avoid attracting attention, she often walked around with her young nieces and nephews because she didn't have children of her own. Another woman, a hairdresser, spied on the intelligence through the wives of the leaders of the extremist groups who patronized her barbershop.
But the hard part of the job is to share the intelligence gathered by many people, regardless of its content. Islamic State-controlled territory is surrounded by Iraqi troops and coalition forces, making it impossible to personally relay intelligence. Although there are still Internet cafes in areas controlled by extremist groups, according to locals, at least in Mosul, "not a single employee is not an informant of Emini (the internal security agency of the extremist group) and no customer is not a member of the extremist group." "Extremist groups are also skeptical of advanced electronic devices. Extremist groups reportedly arrested a civilian on espionage charges on the day they captured Mosul because he was carrying a sports watch with a GPS system.
While some informants have satellite phones, the most direct way to get information done is through a simple cell phone. However, extremist groups prohibit these things. This means that linemen have to be creative in hiding these devices. The female spy hid her phone in her bra. Others placed their phones in the treetops, in altar jars and jars in the kitchen, and in furniture. Someone told us that he buried his phone in the garden and only dug it out once a week to send messages.
Beyond that, the situation has become even more difficult: in Mosul, it is not easy to find good cell phone coverage areas, so line people have to send text messages from high places, such as the top floor of a building or a residential area on the hill. Of course, members of extremist groups also know this, as they conduct searches of anyone who regularly goes to these areas. If they find that a phone contains relevant information, it means executing the phone owner. It's even more suspicious if a phone is empty. This means that mobile phone holders are subjected to torture.
Despite the dangers, the linemen continued to work and played a key role in the preparations for the fight against extremist groups and in major operations such as the capture of Mosul.
Profile image: IS Extremist Organization. (Image from the Internet)
Data collection
While people online risk their lives to obtain intelligence about extremist groups for the Iraqi army, intelligence flows in the opposite direction: from sympathizers outside the group's control to the extremist command and control centers. Their intelligence-gathering methods are relatively complex because they draw not only on the experience of Iraqis who once worked for the intelligence agencies of Saddam Hussein's regime, but also on foreign terrorists from different countries.
In preparing to take Iraq's big cities, extremist groups gather intelligence by infiltrating government agencies there. Although the locals also know this, they dare not make any whistleblowing. While extremist groups focus their efforts on infiltrating security agencies, they also spy on the economic side. Before capturing Mosul, they placed personnel at the Mosul Museum and eventually looted it. According to the museum's director, Raya Unus, the museum recruited a new worker with a suspicious appearance before extremist groups seized control of the city. He probably gathered intelligence about where the most valuable artifacts were stored.
After extremist groups seized large swathes of territory in Iraq and Syria, they turned their attention to gathering intelligence on areas controlled by the Iraqi government. Local taxi drivers are particularly useful in this regard, especially when it is still possible to travel freely between territory controlled by extremist groups and other parts of Iraq. Many drivers were later arrested. In addition, in 2015, managers of several hotels in Baghdad were arrested for collaborating with extremist groups. In 2016, a teacher in Kurdistan was arrested for not only providing intelligence to extremist groups, but also buying mobile phones for easy access to intelligence.
At the same time, extremist groups are monitoring civilians in areas under their control. For example, the organization employs children to eavesdrop on the streets, in markets and even in vehicles. Adults frequent other public places. According to a member of the intelligence agency of the extremist group, "I used to go to the barbershop in the city and eavesdrop on it while queuing. After praying, I went to the mosque and pretended to read the Qur'an while eavesdropping on people's conversations. ”
Espionage vs. counter-espionage
Extremist groups have infiltrated its opponents in the past. Some members of the intelligence apparatus of Iraq's Kurdish autonomous region suspect that some members of the Kurdish armed forces sympathize with the extremist group and pass on the intelligence to the group. According to Kurdish armed spokesman Hargold Hikmaat, "Until now, none of us in the Kurdish armed forces have found members of extremist groups, but I am not saying that it is impossible to find them. "In Syria, extremist groups have spies in some militant groups. Just 2 months ago, a foreign fighter belonging to the Liberation Of Al-Sham (formerly known as the Al-Nusrah Front) was identified as an informant of the extremist group.
At the same time, extremist organizations have implemented sophisticated counter-espionage measures focused on the arrest of individuals who are spying from within, and their subjective perception of the urgency of this operation is understandable. As Iraqi forces began to regain lost ground, many members of the local lower- and middle-class extremist groups began to consider working with the Iraqi government to save their own lives. Over time, extremist groups have also become increasingly concerned about being infiltrated by foreign intelligence agencies. Not only did coalition airstrikes accurately target the leaders of extremist groups, but foreign leaders also spoke openly about infiltrating extremist groups. As Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov put it: "Even before the extremist groups were called that, we had agents there." ”
Responsible for eradicating the "traitors" is the internal security force of the extremist group, "Emini". The organization has absorbed some of the most experienced and loyal members of extremist groups and has undergone the most rigorous scrutiny. For example, it is common practice for militants in Syria to change their affiliations several times, but Aimini only absorbs those other than extremist groups who have never fought for any other group. In addition to The Imini's grassroots members, the extremist group employs an army of informants. They operate under cover, earning $5,000 for every spy they capture. Not only is the remuneration high, but acting as an informant is also a "shortcut" to start a "career". A nearly illiterate man began working as an informant in a village outside the city of Mosul and was later able to get a job in the Court of Appeal for Extremist Groups in Mosul. Some civilians act as Informants for Emini because doing so benefits their business. In theory, under the rule of extremist groups, anyone can start a business, but in practice, people need to gain the trust of the organization. This trust can be gained by providing intelligence to extremist groups.
Because extremist groups fear infiltration at the organizational level, they constantly use secret informants to supervise their members. For foreign members of extremist groups, such surveillance usually begins before an militant arrives in Syria. First, informants among supporters of extremist groups in foreign communities will censor potential fighters. They are then constantly monitored after they arrive in Turkey. For example, a militant from Kazakhstan recorded a video of himself as Turkey crossed the border into Syria. Another smuggler noticed this, and the fighter was immediately arrested, imprisoned, and later executed by Emini. And all of this happened before he actually joined the group. Extremist groups suspect he made the video of the crossing to send his location to foreign governments. Inside the extremist group, a former foreign militant recalled: "Everyone was in a constant state of fear for being spied on. According to him, it is impossible to discuss anything, even with their own ethnic friends in the troops, because Amini's informants would record all the conversations. (Compilation/ Yin Hongyi)
