Jiaqing and Daoguang, the two lords of Shoucheng, whom the Qing historian Meng Sen called "Jia Dao Shouwen", handled the "bandit" uprising and dealt with the maladminist policies of Cao grain, river workers, and salt government, and had exhausted the enthusiasm of "salt and restoration". The Opium War suddenly arrived, and Daoguang suffered the most serious crisis in the history of the Qing Dynasty. However, when the defeat of this war is decided, who is responsible?
The Qing Dynasty's Internal Strife and the Opium War
James S. by M. Boracek
Translated by Li Wen
Chinese University Press
For Chinese, the first half of the 19th century was the beginning of a century of bitter history. The Jiaqing and Daoguang dynasties, which brewed this bitter history, were labeled in the field of history and literary studies as "the middle of Jiadao" and "the beginning of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society" and many other disgraceful labels.
The general social crisis of the late Qing Dynasty, which began in the Qianlong Dynasty, was not reversed in the slightest during the Jiadao period. Jiaqing and Daoguang, the two lords of Shoucheng, whom the Qing historian Meng Sen called "Jia Dao Shouwen", handled the "bandit" uprising and dealt with the maladminist policies of Cao grain, river workers, and salt government, and had exhausted the enthusiasm of "salt and restoration". The Opium War suddenly arrived, and Daoguang suffered the most serious crisis in the history of the Qing Dynasty. However, when the defeat of the war was decided, why did the Qing government's foreign policy still oscillate between strict xenophobia and opportunism? Who is responsible?
Should the literati be responsible for the Opium Wars?
Boracek, author of "The Internal Strife and Opium War of the Qing Dynasty," argues that the literati elite who rose up during the Jiadao period should be quite responsible for this. This classic of modern China studies is intended to explore "why the unequivocal defeat in the Sino-British War or the Opium War of 1840 did not prompt China to reform its diplomatic and military strategy." Unlike Fairbank and Schwartz, who started from the values and ways of thinking of Chinese Confucianism, Bo was more concerned about the impact of "court politics" on foreign policy. In Bo's view, before and after the Opium War, the important decisions of the imperial court were mainly influenced by two factions of interest groups, one was the Han literati elite, such as Lin Zexu, Huang Juezi and others, who tended to fight uncompromisingly; the other was the pro-treaty faction dominated by Manchu interest groups, such as Qi Shan, Mu Zhang'a and others, who were more pragmatic and inclined to conclude peace treaties.
The book is divided into seven chapters, the first chapter "The Rise of the Literati Again", the second chapter "The Rise of the Chunyu Sect", and the sixth chapter "Gu Ancestral Festival", which mainly discusses how the literati clique rose up during the Jiadao period and eventually formed a new force dominating the diplomacy of the late Qing Dynasty. The third chapter, "The Politics of Smoking Bans," the fourth chapter, "The Myth of Victory in Guangdong," and the fifth chapter, "Controversy Over the War," revolve around the political struggles between the imperial courts before and after the Opium War, presenting a complex historical scene of constant confrontation between the two factions, which ultimately leads to "the institutional problem of the weak strength of the pro-treaty faction and the greatly increased influence of the isolationist thinkers around them." Chapter Seven, The End of Manchu Diplomacy, is the fall of Mu Zhang'a and Qi Ying with the ascension of the Xianfeng Emperor to the throne, and the foreign policy that was not influenced by the literati was gone, and the Qing government no longer played an active role in adapting to the international diplomatic environment.
Bo believes that before and after the Opium War, the literati made many mistakes at important points. Bo pointed out that the large number of poems and writings on "maritime" written by the post-war literati were merely the defenses of the failure of their actions by the literati.
The "Late Ming Wind" of Jiadao Politics
Whether the literati should be responsible for the Opium Wars is debatable, but it is worth noting that the literati became a noteworthy force in 19th-century politics. As early as 1976, Bo had clearly pointed out in his doctoral dissertation "Literati Groups and Literati Politics in Early 19th-Century China" that attention should be paid to the "voices" of the literati in the Jiadao period. The article mainly discusses the Xuannan Poetry Society, the reform cause of the Jingshi literati, and the rise of the "Qing deliberation" political culture. Bo asked: Why did the literati begin to rise as a political force in the first half of the 19th century, and what did this new rising force mean for the entire political scene? It should be pointed out that the "literati" that Bo shi is concerned about mainly refers to the Han Elite who were active in Xuannan, the capital in the 19th century, that is, the "Xuannan Shiren". In his doctoral dissertation, the term "literati" was equated with "scholar-doctor."
During the Jiadao period, there were three powerful collective activities of literati, namely the Xuannan Poetry Society, the Chun zen sect, and the Gu Ancestral Festival. The Xuannan Poetry Society began in 1814, a year after the Tianli sect uprising, and declined in 1827, when Jiang Youhua and Tao Shu's initiative to transport shipping failed. Closely associated with Huang Juezi and Xu Baoshan, the Chun zen faction was influenced by Pan Shien and began to operate around 1826, and by the time of Cao Zhenyong's death in 1835, cao zhenyong had rapid political success, exerting an important influence in the subsequent anti-smoking movement and allying with Lin Zexu. With the defeat of the Opium War, the Chun zen faction's activities subsided, and in 1844, the Temple of Mr. Gu Tinglin was built at the Ciren Temple of the Beijing Master, and a festival was held with Gu Yanwu as an idol. Gu Cihui had deep ties with Qi Liaozao, Pan Shien and others, and eventually succeeded in contributing to the fall of Mu Zhang'a.
Influenced by Weng Fanggang's worship of Su Shi, all three events set up idols for collective worship. In the Xuannan Poetry Society, it was Zheng Xuan, Su Dongpo, Zhu Yizun, and Wang Shichen; in the Chunchen Sect, it was Ouyang Xiu, Wang Shichen, and Xu Qianxue; in the Gu Ancestral Hall, it was Gu Yanwu. By calling for birthdays and Spring and Autumn restorations for these historical figures, the literati met regularly. This collective activity of the literati is reminiscent of the activities of the Late Ming Association and the Donglin Party. In fact, although the political tendencies of collective activity were still beginning to emerge during the Xuannan Poetry Society, they had formed a permanent network of friends to participate in the reform of the empire through seemingly pure literary activities, looking for suitable officials to serve in the provinces. When the Chunyu school appeared, the literati did not hesitate to promote "Literary and Political Philosophy in the Style of the Ming Dynasty", believing that even without official positions, literati could directly participate in political expression. Guan Tong, Fang Dongshu, Lu Yitong, Yao Ying, and others even openly defended the "Qing Discussion." When Gu Yanwu became a new academic symbol and an ideal scholar, the spirit of resistance of the scholars was further encouraged.
Bo's review of the three collective activities of the literati in the Jiadao period provided a programmatic framework for studying the mode of communication between the literati in this period, the relationship between teachers and friends, aesthetic concepts, and poetic fashions. In the past 20 years, the research of the Xuannan Poetry Society, the Chun zen school and the Gu Ancestral Festival in the Chinese literary and historical research circles has been much related to Bo's research results. Some revisions have also emerged, such as Duan Zhiqiang's book "Gu Ancestral Temple: Gu Yanwu and the Personality Reshaping of the Late Qing Dynasty", which argues that the existing materials cannot infer that Qi Liaozao and others can be used as "protectors" of Gu Ancestral Hall, and there is no clear political intention for Gu Ancestral Sacrifice. However, the author believes that the study of political history requires precisely some reasonable "imagination". On the surface, the three collective activities of the literati are all ordinary literati collections, and the existing materials are mostly bland poems, but what the collective activities Chinese people have discussed and conspired with, although the literature has no records, it cannot be inferred that there is nothing to do. Moreover, it is strange that although Qi Liaozao sponsored his in-laws Zhang Mu to build the Gu Ancestral Hall, he never participated in the Gu Ancestral Festival during the Daoguang years, and it was not until after the fall of Mu Zhang'a during the Xianfeng Period that Qi's father and son began to participate in Gu Ancestral activities frequently. Qi Liaozao's deliberate distance from the Gu Ancestral Sacrifice during the Daoguang Years may indicate that the Gu Ancestral Sacrifice has political intentions against Mu Zhang'a.
Perhaps because of the inability to speak on the most core political issues of the imperial court, the collective activities of the literati in the Jiadao period rose up, and the voice of participation in politics and deliberation was constantly raised, which also heralded the resurgence of the "scholarly arrogance" in the late Ming Dynasty. Bo's theory has important inspiration for understanding the rise of scholarly theory after jiadao.
Stills from the Opium Wars movie
Historical responsibility that is difficult to assume
In his recently published essay "Revaluing Nineteenth-Century China," Wei Zhou'an (Editor: Provost of NYU Shanghai) commented on a series of recently published overseas works on 19th-century China that for this period, the view that "Imperial China was obsessed with the past and would never accept new ideas unless it had to." But the revelations from The Qing Dynasty's Internal Strife and the Opium War still remind people that at least in the first half of the 19th century, the Qing government's acceptance of new ideas was indeed not optimistic, both in its rejection of the opinions of the literati reformers and in its rejection of the Manchu pro-treaty strategy. What's the problem?
Mr. Bosch made it clear that he had gone to great lengths to discuss how the literati had risen and influenced policy in order to figure out "why it was particularly difficult for literati to express themselves politically for decades in the early 19th century." However, it is not so much more difficult for literati to express themselves politically than to be heard. When Wei Yuan confidently wrote the "Atlas of the Sea Kingdom", he did not know how to present it to the imperial court. Wei Yuan wrote a letter asking the famous imperial historian Zhu Qi to forward it to the imperial court, but the latter was helpless. In the poem "Sending Wei Mo's Deep History of Thorns", Zhu Qi revealed this helplessness:
When Wei Zi said goodbye to me, he gave me a book. It is said to be the "Chronicle of the Sea Country", which is quiet and mysterious. Fang Jin was anxious to defend the border, and the fatigue did not stop. Painstakingly wrote this book, searched for a long time. The beginning of the war and defense, followed by the painting of its mountains and rivers. The islands are involved in poverty, one by one. The humble body is humble, and there is no reason to reach the heavens. Bundle the load to see the payment, said I should be Chen. Cool autumn things for a while, according to the picture to peek at the nine sides. The one is Francis and the other is Mi Plough. It is Europa, and the green mountains are linked. Dzungar borders the Netherlands. The exhibition volume is still vague, and the volume is covered with a long sigh. Border defense must be straightened out, and only the best people are in a hurry. There are tens of thousands of reasons in the world, and there is no spare time in the day. The situation is written, and the city is carved. The people who want to buy it will not count the money. Tiancong is easy to reach, and there is no way to give it to the minister. Holding this Xie Weizi, I will be ashamed of the preface for a long time. (Yizhitang Poetry Preliminary Edition, Vol. 4)
From the poem, it can be seen that this book has been of great benefit to expanding the knowledge of the frontier and dealing with the border defense crisis during the Daoguang years. However, "the world is reasonable, and there is no spare time in the day", the emperor is too busy to pay attention to such a small matter as entering the book. Of course, this was a word of resentment, this kind of dangerous complaint, Zhu Qi unreservedly poured out to Wei Yuan. Of course, Zhu Qi did not completely break Wei Yuan's expectations, but pointed out that the "Chart of the Sea Kingdom" was very well marketed in the capital, and the high-ranking officials and nobles who were close to the emperor competed to buy it. Zhu Qi felt that if the emperor could listen, it would be enough to have those close ministers report. Zhu Qi could only apologize to Wei Yuan in this way, and behind the apology was actually clear that the emperor did not see the Chart of the Sea Kingdom, but did not want to adopt it.
Many of Boch's theories are at odds with the prevailing domestic views, and his view that the literati failed to initiate a series of reforms after the Opium War is also debatable. After all, during the Opium War, it was precisely the light of the road and the hesitation of the war that made the whole situation wobble. After the war, the growth of the literati and Manchu interest groups also depended entirely on the emperor.
From the small story of the "Chart of the Sea Kingdom", it can be seen that the literati of the Jiadao period did not have difficulties in political expression, but that this expression could not play a role. Even the members of the Xuannan Poetry Society, such as Jiang Youhua and Tao Shu, who were already in the governorship of Liangjiang, had many difficulties in promoting the shipping of grain, and at most the trial would be stopped after half a year. According to Bo's words, the failure of Jiang Youhua and Tao Shu was due to the fact that they touched a huge Manchu interest group, after all, important positions such as CaoDu, Hedu, and Yanzheng were all controlled by manchus. But don't forget, the emperor is also a Manchu. Thus, if Bo's inference that the literati should be responsible for the stagnation and failure of the Qing Dynasty's diplomatic reform before and after the Opium War was established, then the literati were not only against the so-called Manchu clique, but also the emperor. However, even if the literati clique grows stronger, how can it defeat the emperor and assume key historical responsibilities?