Old Week
Abstract: The Battle of Chosin Lake in November 1950 was a battle that was known as a battle that determined the course of Korean and even world history, and what was even more touching was that on the bitter cold plateau of the wind and snow sword, the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army participating in the battle was almost completely devoid of logistical supplies, and showed unimaginable extraordinary heroism and tenacity in the fierce battle, and painted an extremely rare tragic and magnificent picture in the history of war with its own blood and life, which not only won the respect of its opponents who were also soldiers, but also won the respect of China!
【Preface】
It is not easy to accurately and truthfully describe a battle, because the material obtained by war historians is often contradictory, and the author of this article has consulted a large number of relevant books and materials from both China and the United States, and strives to objectively and truly reflect this battle. We have published this article not to fully agree with the author's point of view, but only to commemorate the volunteer soldiers who fought to the death on the shores of Chosin Lake, and it is they who have won China the dignity of dialogue on an equal footing with the great powers, and it is they who have forced the United States to admit that "Communist China has become a terrible enemy, and it is no longer the weak and incompetent country of the Second World War!" It was they who kept the United States immersed in the exclamation of "what would have happened if such a soldier had the same technical equipment as us" until seventy years later!
Seventy years ago, the second battle of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea (the Battle of Chosin Lake was the eastern front of the second campaign) was not only a battle that was known as the battle that determined the course of the history of Korea and even the world, but what was even more touching was that on the bitter cold plateau of the wind and snow, especially the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army on the eastern front, which had almost nothing of logistical supplies, the unimaginable extraordinary heroism and tenacity shown in the fierce battle, and painted an extremely rare tragic and magnificent picture in the history of war with its own blood and life. Not only has it won the respect of its opponents who are also soldiers, but china has also won the respect of the world!
Figure 1: The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has won China the dignity of dialogue on an equal footing with the great powers
Miles to the plane
In 1950, jiangnan, golden autumn, it was the season of crab fat and rice, in a thick and intoxicating harvest atmosphere, just experienced a bloody fight of the Chinese People's Liberation Army East China Military Region (that is, the original Third Field Army, the third field army number has been abolished in August 1950, all its field army under the command of the East China Military Region) The headquarters of the Ninth Corps is resting in Wuxi, Suzhou, Shanghai and other places, and the horse and horse troops are actively preparing to cross the sea to attack Taiwan - in the central military commission's plan, This elite Tiger Ben Division is the first choice for attacking Taiwan, and is responsible for the heavy responsibility of the first echelon of the sea crossing operation.
However, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the plan to attack Taiwan was temporarily shelved, and the Ninth Corps naturally lifted the task of attacking Taiwan, while guarding southern Jiangsu and Shanghai, while continuing to reorganize.
As early as August 1950, with the development of the Korean War situation, the Central Military Commission had decided to transfer the Ninth Corps of the East China Military Region, which was relatively concentrated in the region, to Shandong as the second-line unit of the Northeast Border Defense Army, so that it could enter the DPRK and participate in the war at any time according to the needs of the development of the war situation. At the beginning of September, Chen Yi, commander of the East China Military Region, was summoned to Beijing to receive the task, and as soon as Chen Yi returned to Shanghai, he urgently convened a meeting of cadres at and above the ninth corps level on September 7 to convey the latest instructions of the Central Military Commission: Lift the task of attacking Taiwan and reorganize the training, the troops should be immediately concentrated, and they should be ready to go to Yanzhou, Shandong Province, at any time to start training and reorganization for the purpose of entering the DPRK and participating in the war, and demanded that the troops be ideologically and materially ready to enter the DPRK and participate in the war.
The East China Military Region immediately drew up a plan for the Ninth Corps to move north to Shandong, adopted the method of advancing in batches, and all arrived in Shandong by the end of October, and began to carry out reorganization and training in the DPRK operations in mid-November. Mao Zedong gave instructions on the northward transfer plan reported by the East China Military Region: "All the Ninth Corps can be unified to the Jixu Line (Jinan to Xuzhou) at the end of October, and the reorganization training will begin in mid-November." (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, vol. 1, p. 498)
On September 20, the Ninth Corps officially issued an order to go north: from October 1, in accordance with the order of the 27th Army, the 20th Army, the Corps Headquarters, and the 26th Army, they went north in turn and entered the eastern section of Jinpu Road, and the specific assembly sites of each unit were the 27th Army in Tai'an, the 20th Army in Yanzhou, the Corps Headquarters in Qufu, and the 26th Army in TengXian County.
In mid-October, each unit of the Ninth Corps arrived at the designated position by railway transport, and immediately began to carry out situation and mission education and tactical training with the US army as a hypothetical enemy. On October 29, at the mobilization meeting for cadres at and above the regimental level to enter the DPRK held in Qufu, Shandong, Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, attended the meeting and made a mobilization report. Zhu De emphasized the great significance of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea to defend the homeland and defend the country," analyzed the US military's superiority in weapons and equipment, sea and air, and stressed that the appetite for entering the DPRK should not be too big. In particular, the Ninth Corps, which has been fighting in East China for a long time and has no combat experience in alpine areas, should pay special attention to cold protection and antifreeze... However, the course of the battle made Zhu De's fears come true— just as the Ninth Corps began to move north to Shandong, the situation in Korea changed dramatically: the U.S. army landed at Inchon on September 15, the capture of Seoul on September 28, the Rok and U.S. troops crossed the 38th Parallel on October 1 and 7, and captured Pyongyang on October 17, respectively. China's first volunteer troops entered the war secretly on October 19 and began their first campaign on October 25.
Figure 2: The Volunteers are pursuing the remnants of the enemy in the first battle
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After the end of the first campaign on November 5, the United States was well aware that China had sent troops to Korea, but after synthesizing intelligence and analysis from all quarters, especially on the basis of the special reports on China's involvement in the Korean War submitted by the CIA, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. National Security Council believed that China's participation in the war might have a worrying impact on the course of the war, but such concerns were not enough to change its established policy of occupying all of Korea, so it decided not to change." The commander-in-chief of the UN army, Douglas MacArthur, was on a mission to five-star generals and allowed him to "act with camera" militarily. On the basis of this decision, MacArthur, who had just won a brilliant victory at the Inchon landings, arrogantly judged that the total strength of the Chinese army entering the DPRK was only 30,000 to 40,000 people, which was only symbolic in strategy, and the tactical use was only limited purposes such as protecting the plump hydropower station, so he decided to launch a "general offensive" with the US 8th Army in the west and the 10th Army in the east, launching a pincer offensive, advancing to the entire line of the Yalu River, eliminating all the volunteers and people's troops in Korea in one fell swoop, and striving to end the Korean War before Christmas.
At this time, the total strength of the "United Nations Army" in Korea was as high as 553,000 people, of which 423,000 were ground troops, and there were about 350,000 people in the first line of northern Korea, while the first batch of volunteer troops to enter the DPRK only had 6 infantry corps and 18 divisions, 3 artillery divisions and 1 regiment, with a total strength of about 230,000 people, the number of people was at a disadvantage of 1:1.6, the distance between equipment and firepower was even more huge, and it was urgent for second-line troops to quickly follow up, so the timetable for the Ninth Corps to enter the KOREAN war was suddenly advanced!
In this way, due to the drastic changes in the Korean war situation, the Ninth Corps' plan to enter the korean war went from the earliest from Shandong to the northeast for a period of training, to the spring of 1951 and then enter the DPRK to participate in the war, and then from November 1, it was transported to the Meihekou area of Jilin province for pre-war reorganization, and if there was a strategic urgent need on the front line, it could be called up, and if there was no such urgent need, it would not be easily called up. (Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai on October 27), followed by "The 27th Army marched directly from Tai'an to Ji'an on November 1 and went directly to the front line, and the other two corps then went to the Tonghua Ji'an area to rest and stand by for use if necessary." (Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai on October 29), and then "the Ninth Corps all went to the front, and on November 1, one army was opened first, and the other two corps were moved, without interruption." (Mao Zedong's October 31 to Song Shilun and Tao Yongdian), and finally to "the Song Corps immediately entered the DPRK, and the direction of Changjin in the Jiangjie Should be determined to be fully engaged by the Song Corps, with the policy of luring the enemy to penetrate deep and quickly annihilate the enemy." Thereafter, the corps is under your direct command (referring to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army), and we do not control it remotely. One of the nine corps should go straight to the river boundary and go to Changjin as soon as possible" (Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua and Song Shilun Tao Yongdian on November 5).
There have been four changes to the plan for entering the DPRK operations, and each time it has become more urgent than the last. As a result, the Ninth Corps, on the way to the northeast to prepare for the reorganization, did not make any stops and directly entered the DPRK in advance to participate in the war. The most direct evil consequence was that the Ninth Corps was extremely unprepared to participate in the war; the winter equipment and materials originally needed to enter the WAR in the DPRK had been concentrated in the areas of Shenyang and Meihekou, where the training was scheduled; because the troops went directly to the DPRK without stopping, there was no time to transfer materials, resulting in the Ninth Corps wearing winter clothes in east China rushing into the DPRK in the alpine region, and in addition to the fact that the Ninth Corps had been fighting in the eastern region for a long time, it lacked both combat experience in the alpine areas of northern Korea and the experience of living in the cold areas of the alpine areas. At the same time, the lack of understanding of the climate and terrain of the theater caused the Ninth Corps to suffer huge losses that should not be.
Photo 3: Stills from the movie "Chosin Lake", the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army boarded a car and drove to North Korea
Seventy years later, looking back, the Ninth Corps hastily entered the DPRK, ostensibly to cope with the rapid progress of the "United Nations Army" on the Eastern Front and to ensure the security of the flanks of the Western Front. In fact, the northern part of Korea is separated by the Wolf Forest Mountains, forming a natural east and west two parts, traffic is blocked, the large corps is more difficult to cross, the treacherous terrain is impossible for both sides to take advantage of, and there is no situation where the eastern front threatens the flank of the western front. Throughout the Korean War, there was never a single instance of a large army crossing the Wolf Grove Mountains. So what was the purpose of the Ninth Corps' emergency entry into the DPRK? -- Lao Zhou thought that the real answer was: Seize the opportunity of the "United Nations Army" on the Eastern Front to be lonely and divide its troops, and concentrate the elite Ninth Corps to strike a surprise blow!
Mao Zedong's October 31 telegram to Song Shilun and Tao Yong explicitly gave the Ninth Corps "the goal of seeking opportunities to annihilate four divisions, including the South Korean Capital Division, the 3rd Division, the US 7th Division, and the 1st Marine Division." Annihilating 4 divisions of the "United Nations Army" on the Eastern Front one by one, such a grand campaign determination is obviously based on the experience of the Great Annihilation War in the War of Liberation (the specific encounter nature of the first battle also made the Volunteer Army have a wrong and fatal underestimation of the combat effectiveness of the American army). Such a decision is actually unnecessary from a strategic point of view, because the Eastern Front is only a secondary direction, mainly in line with the main offensive of the Western Front, as long as the concentrated forces are concentrated to repel the US 8th Army on the Western Front, then the US 10th Army on the Eastern Front will inevitably retreat. Tactically speaking, it also violated the operational principle of the PLA's consistent concentration of superior forces, and dispersed the two corps entering the DPRK on two fronts. Logistically speaking, the hasty entry into the DPRK and the lack of rearmament have further increased the burden of war supply on the ground, which is already quite weak in logistical supplies. Therefore, some war historians believe that if only the 27th Army was taken to replace (or strengthen) the strength of the 42nd Army on the Eastern Front, and the main forces of the Ninth Corps, the 20th Army and the 26th Army, joined the Western Front and concentrated the main forces of the Thirteenth Corps and the Ninth Corps, greater results could be achieved on the Western Front. This would allow the Ninth Corps to gain time to change its equipment before entering the DYNASTY, and on the other hand, it would also be able to avoid the various unfavorable situations that would arise from changing the plan in the middle. One of the unfavorable conditions was that when the Ninth Corps received the order to directly enter the DPRK in the middle of the way, the 27th Army had already sailed to Andong and could not be transferred, so it had to be changed to the vanguard of the 20th Army, and as a result, it was diverted to the Meihekou Because of the large slope of the railway line, the trains had to be dismantled and reorganized, resulting in the reorganization of the 20th Army when it entered the DPRK.
In other words, there was no absolute necessity for the Ninth Corps to enter the DPRK so urgently, and its purpose was to seize the fighter plane to fight a great war of annihilation on the Eastern Front, but the actual development of the war proved that not only did it not realize the great plan of annihilating the 4 divisions of the "United Nations Army" on the Eastern Front (in fact, not even a single 1st Marine Division could be annihilated), but on the contrary, it caused a huge negative impact on the troops.
Patch: Ninth Corps of volunteers
The Ninth Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, formerly known as the Ninth Corps of the Third Field Army of the People's Liberation Army, was formed in January 1949, with commander Song Shilun and political commissar Guo Huaruo under the jurisdiction of the 20th Army, 27th Army, 30th Army and 33rd Army. In November 1950, the Ninth Corps entered the Korean War and was renamed the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army. Song Shilun, then commander and political commissar, Tao Yong, deputy commander, Qin Jian, chief of staff, Xie Youfa, director of the Political Department, and Wang Bin, deputy chief of staff, had 3 corps under their jurisdiction, the 20th Army, the 26th Army, and the 27th Army.
The 20th Army, formerly known as the 1st Division and the 6th Division of the New Fourth Army, which was reorganized from the Red Army guerrilla units that persisted in the three-year guerrilla war in eastern Fujian, was su Yu's oldest unit, reorganized into the Huaye First Column during the Liberation War, known for being good at field warfare, especially in depth penetration, and was also the military-level combat unit that the PEOPLE's Liberation Army had annihilated the most enemies during the entire Liberation War, and was a veritable trump card.
The 26th Army, formerly known as the Eighth Column of Huaye, which was reorganized from the troops of the Luzhong Military Region during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, was known for its strong points in the Huaye army.
The 27th Army, formerly known as the Ninth Column of Huaye formed by the troops of the Jiaodong Military Region during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, was the premier first-class main force of Huaye, and it repeatedly accomplished miraculous feats in major battles such as Menglianggu, Jinan, Huaihai, and Crossing the River.
In order to better meet the needs of fighting abroad, the East China Military Region transferred the 88th Division, the 89th Division, and the 94th Division of the 32nd Army to the 3rd Corps before the Ninth Corps entered the DPRK, so that each army had 4 divisions under its jurisdiction, and recruited hundreds of young students in southern Jiangsu, Shanghai, and other places, and about 15,000 people from the 16th Corps of the former Kuomintang Army who revolted in Sichuan, to each army of the Ninth Corps, basically meeting the standard of 10,000 people per division and 50,000 people per army, and a total of about 160,000 people in 12 divisions of the whole corps.
Patch: The development of the Eastern Front of the Korean Battlefield is in contrast to the timetable for the Ninth Corps to enter the DPRK
On October 20, the ROK 1st Army captured Gora-ri and Hongwon (a predetermined defensive area for the Volunteer Army). On the same day, in accordance with MacArthur's order to appoint his chief of staff and commander of the US 10th Army, Major General Edward Almond, to command the US 10th Army and the ROK 1st Army to fight in a unified manner, Almond opened the "United Nations Army" General Headquarters on the Eastern Front in Wonsan, ordering the ROK 1st Army, which had already reached the theater of operations, to advance along the east coast with the capital division towards the Tumen River, and the 3rd Division to Chosin Lake via Hamungung and Goraoli. At this time, the US 10th Army from Incheon and Busan shipped to Wonsan was hindered by mines laid by the Korean People's Army in the waters off Wonsan and was still unable to land on the surface of the waters off The Port of Wonsan, so Almond ordered the 1st Marine Division to land in the waters outside Wonsan Port while waiting for the mines to clear, and the US 7th Infantry Division landed instead to Leewon.
On the same day, the 42nd Volunteer Army entered Korea from Ji'an (present-day Ji'an).
On October 22, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army ordered the 42nd Army to rush to the Eastern Front and establish a defensive line at Chosin Lake and its southern line of Desheli and Jiujinli to block the enemy on the Eastern Front. By this time, the fighting on the Eastern Front was very urgent, and the vanguard of the ROK 1st Army had approached the gateway to the Chosin Lake area, Hwangcho-gilng and Go-To-Battle-ro, while the Korean People's Army had only 2 infantry companies and a small number of tanks and artillery in the area. To this end, the 42nd Army concentrated all vehicles to urgently transport 2 battalions to seize Huangcao Ridge and go to Battle Ridge.
On October 25, the U.S. 1st Marine Division began to land at Wonsan, and Almond ordered the division to leave 1 regiment at Wonsan and Xingnan to cover the rear, and the main force took over the ROK 3rd Division to advance toward Chosin Lake, and then drove north with the western front troops to attack Jiangjie (the temporary capital of the Korean government); the ROK 3rd Division advanced along the east coast along the East Coast towards Tumen River after landing in Leewon; and the US 7th Division advanced through Toyonsan towards the Yalu River via Phongsan.
At dawn that day, the 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army, which had just arrived at Huangcaoling, exchanged fire with the 26th Regiment of the 3rd Division of the 3rd Division of the ROK Army, and successfully stopped the ROK advance.
On October 27, the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army and the 45th Regiment of the 8th Artillery Division all arrived at Huangcaoling and the Battle Ridge area, and quickly launched a defensive deployment.
After completing the deployment adjustment (after the discovery of the main force of the volunteer army), the Japanese and Roksar 3rd Division stormed the Huangcaoling and Zhanling areas, and the volunteers abandoned Caofangling and The 577.8 Highlands that night and withdrew to the second-line positions south of Huangcaoling.
-- The Central Military Commission ordered the 27th Army of the Ninth Corps to transport Liaoning Ji'an to Ji'an in three days from November 1 and assemble on standby.
From October 28 to 29, the ROK 3rd Division continued its onslaught at Hwangcho ridge and the area of Gosang Ridge, capturing go-to-battle ridge and detouring west to the rear of the Hwangcho ridge flank.
On the night of October 29, the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army launched a counterattack, defeating the 26th and 23rd Regiments of the 3rd Division of the ROK Army, and recapturing Caofang ridge and going to Battle Ridge in the early morning of the next day.
-- The Ninth Corps held a mobilization meeting for cadres at and above the regimental level to enter the DPRK in Qufu, Shandong Province, and Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, attended the meeting and made a mobilization report.
On 1 November, the 1st Marine Division began to advance towards Chosin Lake, and its vanguard 7th Marine Regiment entered Shuidong.
- The 27th Army of the Ninth Corps boarded the train from Tai'an and Dawenkou in Shandong and marched toward Ji'an in the northeast.
Figure 4: The 1st Marine Division marches toward the Chosin Lake area
On November 2, the 7th Marine Regiment attacked Yantai Peak and Matsutake Cave on the front line, and engaged in fierce battles with the 124th Division of the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army, and after repeated battles, the 124th Division abandoned Yantai Peak and Matsutake Cave at dusk. That night, the 124th Division invested 4 battalions to carry out a multi-way counterattack against the American troops in front of them, and the 1st Battalion of the 370th Regiment once broke into the core position of the 7th Marine Regiment in Shuidong. The 3rd Battalion of the 370th Regiment, which was responsible for the deep detour, attacked the 400.1 heights south of the water cave, and was immediately besieged by the American army, and the heavy siege was not broken until the evening of the 3rd.
On November 3, the 124th Division of the Volunteer Army fought fiercely with the 7th Marine Regiment of the United States at Yantai Peak and Matsutake Cave.
- The 27th Army arrived in the Tonghua area of Jilin and received an urgent order from the Central Military Commission to change the original plan for its trip to Ji'an and take a short route directly from Andong into Korea. At this time, the 79th Division of the vanguard division of the 27th Army had reached the vicinity of Ji'an, and had to order the 79th Division to return south while changing the route of the follow-up troops to march directly to Andong. Before entering the DPRK, all personnel and units must leave all items with the mark of the People's Liberation Army, such as hat badges and badges, in the country, and all seals and documents will be handed over, and the troops will be formally incorporated into the combat sequence of the volunteer army, and the numbers of the army, division, and regiment will not change.
-- The Central Military Commission ordered the Ninth Corps, the other two corps, the 20th Army, and the 26th Army, to immediately go to the meihe estuary in the northeast to assemble and prepare to enter the DPRK after a short period of rectification.
On November 4, in view of the fact that the 124th Division of the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army had been fighting in the Huangcaoling area for nine consecutive days and nights, with heavy casualties and poor supplies, the Ninth Corps was already on the way, and the headquarters of the Volunteer Army ordered it to withdraw to the first line of Caofangling for mobile defense and resisted step by step.
When the 124th Division of the Volunteer Army was adjusting its deployment, the US army formed a rapid assault force with tanks and mechanized troops, rushed along the road under the cover of aircraft, and reached Zhenxingli and Sanjuli north of Caofangling at dusk that day, and cut off the defense line of the 124th Division. The 124th Division threw in its reserves to counterattack with all its might, and the 42nd Army also dispatched the 378th Regiment of the 126th Division to rush to the rescue, and finally restored the original defensive line late that night.
- The 27th Army and the 80th and 81st Divisions arrived in Andong and crossed the Yalu River that night.
-- The Corps Headquarters of the Ninth Corps, the 20th Army, and the 26th Army boarded a train from Shandong and drove to the northeast.
On November 5, MacArthur ordered the Far East Air Force to carry out a two-week concentrated bombing campaign of all the Korean People's Army and Volunteer Army in Korea, and specifically ordered the Far East Air Force to dispatch all 90 B-29 bombers under its command to bomb all international bridges on the Yalu River in order to cut off communications between China and North Korea and prevent the transportation of volunteers' follow-up troops and supplies.
- The 27th Army, the 80th Division, and the 81st Division advanced to Sei-shang-ri, Namseong-dong, and Fangdan in the early hours of the morning, respectively, and the 79th Division also returned to Andong. In view of the retreat of the British 27th Brigade to the south, while the enemy on the eastern front was still continuing to advance northward, posing a great threat to the flanks of the western front, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army ordered the troops of the 27th Army to withdraw to Andong, preparing to enter the Dprk from Linjiang and enter the battlefield on the eastern front.
On November 6, in view of the victorious end of the counterattack on the western front and the crossing of the Yalu River by the Ninth Corps, the headquarters of the Volunteer Army sent a telegram ordering the 42nd Army to withdraw from the Position of Huangcaoling, resist one after another, and lure the enemy north to Chosin Lake, creating conditions for the Ninth Corps to surround and annihilate the enemy.
The U.S. 10th Army on the eastern front continued to advance northward, the 1st Marine Division advanced toward Gutuli, and the ROK Capital Division advanced to occupy Jiju and Myeongcheon on the east coast.
-- The Ninth Corps received an urgent order from the Central Military Commission to change its original plan for short-term reorganization and re-entry into the DPRK in the northeast, and quickly entered the DPRK directly from Ji'an and Linjiang. Therefore, in addition to the 27th Army having been ordered to change its route to Andong, and before it was too late to turn around, the Ninth Corps ordered the 20th Army to be the vanguard and immediately entered the DPRK, and set up a temporary headquarters in Shenyang to command the troops to change their route to the DPRK. At the same time, competent personnel were dispatched to the Yalu River to coordinate the organization of troops to enter the DPRK.
On the same day, the 20th Army had just arrived at Shenyang Railway Station, and He Jinnian, deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region, who had come to inspect the troops' preparations for entering the DPRK on the orders of the Central Military Commission, saw the officers and men of the 20th Army wearing cotton coats from East China, wearing a large brimed hat of cloth without hats and ears, and wearing rubber-soled single shoes on their feet. Liao Zhengguo, deputy commander of the 20th Army, who was directly commanding the transportation of troops, was immediately found, and asked for an emergency stop for two hours in order to mobilize thick cotton coats and cotton hats from the troops of the Northeast Military Region, but the military intelligence was in a hurry, and the 58th, 59th, and 89th Divisions of the 20th Army basically did not stop and drove directly to the Korean river boundary, and only the 60th Division directly under the army and the rear guard received a few thick cotton coats and cotton hats in a short parking gap.
On November 7, the 42nd Army was ordered to withdraw from the Huangcaoling position, and the main force withdrew to Liutanli, leaving only the 378th Regiment to continue to block north of Gutuli.
-- The vanguard 59th Division of the 20th Army of the Ninth Corps arrived at the border of the Korean River by train, while the 58th Division of the Second Echelon had to cross the Yalu River on foot because the Korean side of the Yalu River Railway Bridge in Ji'an had been blown up by US aircraft.
- The 27th Army has entered the DPRK and returned to Andong.
On November 8, in accordance with MacArthur's orders, the Far Eastern Air Force and the carrier-based aviation units of the Far Eastern Navy rushed out to bomb the international bridges on the Yalu River and the roads and railways between the Yalu River and the Qingchuan River, and the six bridges along the Yalu River along the River Xinyizhou, Shuozhou, Chushan, Manpu, Huishan and other places were the key targets of the bombing - in the bombing of the Yalu River Bridge, in order to avoid aircraft entering China's airspace, the US military specifically required pilots to take a route at right angles to the bridge to approach the target. In this way, the pilots had to keep the course on the south side of the winding main channel of the Yalu River, and combined with anti-aircraft fire along the coast, the bombing operation was costly and ineffective in the first few days, and only four bridges were blown up at a high cost by the end of November. In order to reduce aircraft losses and improve the effectiveness of the bombing, the junior officers and pilots of the bomber unit tacitly changed the course of the bombing, flying all the way north along the route parallel to the bridge (usually north-south), dropping bombs on the North Korean side of the bridge, and then turning sharply south to return. In this way, it is inevitable that aircraft will invade China's airspace, which is why China protests against the us aircraft violating its airspace. By December, all road and rail bridges on the Yalu River had been blown up. However, by this time, winter had arrived, the Yalu River was frozen, and the volunteers could easily cross the river from the frozen river.
On November 10, the U.S. 1st Marine Division crossed the Yellow Grass Ridge and entered gutuli.
On November 11, all 20 armies entered Korea.
On November 12, the 27th Army reached Linjiang, crossed the Yalu River almost without stopping, took a short rest in the area around Lishudong, and then took a train through the river to Juli, Dongmen, and then drove on foot to the scheduled assembly area. The 26th Army, another army of the Ninth Corps, was temporarily retained in the Houchang and Jiangkou areas as reserves for the corps due to insufficient transportation capacity.
On November 15, the U.S. 1st Marine Division captured Hagaru-ri.
The 20th Army arrived at the assembly area centered on Namgheung-dong and began pre-war preparations. It also replaced the 42nd Army in the Chosin Lake area with the 176th Regiment of the 59th Division and the 267th Regiment of the 89th Division.
On November 17, the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army completed the task of covering the Ninth Corps, handed over the defense to the 20th Army, and began to move west that night, reaching the old warehouse area on the 20th for recuperation.
The 27th Army (owed to the 94th Division) arrived at the assembly area centered on Echijo Sho and began pre-war preparations.
Patch: Is the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army at the Battle of Chosin Lake lacking cotton clothes?
There was a lot of discussion about the Battle of Chosin Lake, and one of the key topics was that the Ninth Corps did not get warm clothing in time due to the emergency entry into Korea, and as a result, they fought in severe cold weather, resulting in a large number of frostbite and attrition. For example, the "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" compiled by the Academy of Military Sciences says that "all of them have not been distributed in time."Please note that this statement is very accurate to indicate that the Ninth Corps received winter clothes, but the number was not enough. However, according to the memoirs of Zhang Xiushan, who was then the head of the Organization Department of the Northeast Bureau, they took out all the cotton clothes in the Northeast Military Region and provided them to the Ninth Corps.
So, did the Ninth Corps receive cotton coats in the northeast? The actual situation is that the Ninth Corps received a large amount of cotton clothes in the northeast, and until the period of the Korean War, the logistics of the Volunteer Army and the Northeast Military Region did not stop the transportation and distribution of cotton clothes to the Ninth Corps.
According to the records included in the authoritative book "Selected Materials for summarizing the LogisticAl Experience of the Logistics War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" in the series of books entitled "Selected Materials on the Logistics Experience of the Logistics War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea: Military Quarters," the Ninth Corps did receive a large number of cotton clothes, cotton hats, and other cold-resistant items.
Figure 5: The distribution of winter clothes of the Ninth Corps recorded in the book "Selected Materials on the Summary of Logistical Experience in the Logistics War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea: Military Quartermasters"
When the Ninth Corps entered the DPRK, it had three armies and twelve divisions, with a total of about 150,000 people, and as of November 18, a total of 141413 cotton coats, 234,000 gloves, 172331 pairs of cotton shoes, 185319 cotton hats, 185876 cotton vests, and 50,000 fleece pants. Judging from this figure, in addition to the gap of about 10,000 pieces of cotton clothes, other gloves, cotton shoes, cotton hats, and cotton vests are basically enough or even over-distributed. Judging from the date of issuance, it should be when the Ninth Corps was in the northeast before entering the DPRK. Considering that at that time, the nine soldiers were on their way to advance nervously, the time was relatively hurried, and it was impossible to completely distribute them according to the number of people, there should be a situation where some troops were overused and some troops failed to pay the full amount. Moreover, after the Ninth Corps entered the DPRK, it still received a steady stream of supplies for warm clothing.
According to the post-war summary of the 20th army and the 26th army, there are records of receiving warm clothing supplies in Korea. Receiving supplies of warm clothing from the Logistics Division II and Division IV of the Volunteer Army, all of which were carried out in Korea. The logistics summary of the 26th Army also mentions the large number of uniforms for the 27th Army.
Therefore, in summary, the Ninth Corps did receive enough warm clothing, so what is the reason that the widely rumored Ninth Corps lacked winter clothes in the Chosin Lake area, resulting in a large number of frostbite and attrition?
According to the book "Selected Materials for summarizing the Logistical Experience of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea: Military Quartermasters," the supply of warm clothing for the Ninth Corps was distributed to large units, but they could not be distributed to the front-line troops in a timely manner.
The military history of the 20th Army gives the impression that due to the tight time of entering the DPRK, it did not receive cold supplies in Shenyang, and only received a small number of cotton hats and coats in Ji'an before entering the DPRK. However, according to a November 30 report by the Logistics Department of the Northeast Military Region, 35,000 cotton coats were issued to the 20th Army alone. The post-war summary of the 20th Army also clearly mentioned that it received supplies in Shenyang and distributed them, and described the distribution situation with the use of "chaotic mess", if it was only a small amount of temporary supplementation, it would not use words such as "chaotic mess". It should be a rush to receive a large amount of supplies without a distribution plan, and then it will be "a mess".
The 20th Army not only received a large number of warm clothing supplies at home, but also received cold supplies from the second and fourth logistics divisions of the Volunteer Army after entering Korea. The summary of the 20th Army after the war on military supplies and warm clothing is as follows:
Figure 6: The 20th Army summarizes the report on military supplies after the war
It is also mentioned here that some materials were not transported to the front-line troops in the rear, but the military revenue and expenditure table stated that in addition to the three items of cotton rubber shoes, cloth cotton hats and cotton coats, the rest were reissued later, indicating that cotton rubber shoes, cotton hats and cotton coats were sufficient and did not need to be reissued. Table II shows separately the quantities of supplies transported after the war and the distribution of the various units. Among them, warm clothing also only involves fur shoes, cotton vests and lint cotton hats.
As for the first logistics conference of the Northeast Military Region, the preliminary summary of the logistics work made by the 20th Army mentioned that there were 25,000 wounded in the whole army, and frostbite accounted for more than 60 percent, about 15,000 people. The reason is that the troops "have not been replenished with cotton hats, cotton shoes and other warm materials except for cotton clothes." Fighting in the ice and snow is very painful, and the only way to remove the quilt is to make socks, gloves, ear tips, etc. According to incomplete statistics, sixty percent of the quilts in the whole army have been torn down. ”
Although there are discrepancies between the cotton hats and cotton gloves mentioned here and the 20th Army's own records of collar use, it at least shows that the cotton coats of the 20th Army were all distributed before the war. In addition, the 20th Army also had a situation in which the troops were lightly armed with coats and hats in order to speed up the march in the process of advancing toward Chosin Lake. Although the temperature is not very low when they are lightly loaded, they are about to enter the alpine zone, and winter is coming, which is too sloppy.
The logistics part of the other 20th Army's post-war summary mainly reflected the lack of food, and did not write a word about the shortage of warm clothing. This is correct with the relatively sufficient amount of warm clothing reflected in the 20th Military Supplies Report. This is also in line with the situation when the 20th Army first arrived in the northeast and received a large amount of warm clothing at Shenyang Station.
The 27th Army was the most bitter army in the Battle of Chosin Lake, with the largest combat area, the most brilliant results, and the most losses. From the records of the military history of the 27th Army, it is clear that some of the winter clothes have not been released in time. However, according to a telegram sent by the Northeast Military Region to the Central Military Commission on November 30, the Northeast Military Region distributed 42,000 coats to the Ninth Corps in Sujiatun, of which 2,980 were for the Corps Headquarters, and the rest of the 39,527 were all given to the 27th Army, so the gap in the lack of winter clothes for the 27th Army was not too large. However, in more than one source and the recollection of the person concerned, it is mentioned that the 27th Army lightly loaded the warm clothing to Linjiang when crossing the river.
The most mentioned problem in the summary of the logistics work of the 26th Army is the lack of food, and very little is said about the lack of warm clothing. The 26th Army also suffered a large number of frostbite, but the most important reason for frostbite in the logistics summary of the 26th Army was not the lack of warm clothing. The general lack of antifreeze in the troops is one of the main reasons for preventive knowledge and experience. Moreover, the main reasons why the 26th Army was better served in cold weather were: The army was the last unit of the Ninth Corps to enter the DPRK, and it was relatively well used in the country; moreover, after entering the DPRK, it was deployed as a second echelon and deployed in the rear area, and it was relatively easy to be issued in the uniform.
In summary, the Ninth Corps did not receive winter clothes as the legend suggests, and only wore thin East China cotton clothes into battle.
In the northeast and after entering the dprk, he received winter clothes, even if there is a gap, the amount is not too large. The situation of the 20th Army and the 26th Army is basically better, and the 27th Army does lack winter clothes, but this situation is mainly because the winter clothes and light clothes they have generals have left in the country. The so-called shortage of winter clothes is mainly due to the fact that some winter clothes have not been distributed to the grass-roots troops in time, and some have been lightly loaded in order to speed up the march. The reason for the large number of frostbite in the Ninth Corps is not only due to insufficient winter clothing, but also due to the lack of hot food, no heating conditions and no experience in cold areas.
The "miracle" of hidden advances
The northern part of Korea was divided into natural east and west parts due to the barrier of the Wolf Forest Mountains that run through the north and south, and in the general offensive plan of the "United Nations Army", it was decided to divide the troops into two routes according to the natural terrain, and carry out pincer-shaped attacks from the east and west flanks. The Western Front is the main direction of attack, and the "United Nations Army" has invested 3 corps (corps), 11 divisions (brigades) and 1 regiment of the US 8th Army, with a total of about 240,000 people and a front-line force of about 130,000 troops. The specific deployment was the left-wing US 1st Army, advancing towards Xinyizhou and Shuozhou; the US 9th Army in the middle of the road, attacking Bitong and Chushan; and the right-wing Han 2nd Army, attacking Xichuan and Jiangjie.
The eastern front is the 5 divisions of the US 10th Army, a total of about 100,000 people, the specific deployment is to attack with the US 1st Marine Division as the main attack, first capture Liutanli on the shore of the Chosin Lake, and then advance to the river boundary on the Yalu River, and meet the 8th Army Division on the western front; the US 7th Division advances east of Chosin Lake toward the Yalu River; the ROK 1st Army advances along the East Coast Highway toward the border between North Korea and China and the DPRK and the Soviet Union; the US 3rd Division and the ROK 1st Marine Regiment are responsible for garrisoning the rear areas such as Wonsan and Heungnam.
On November 6, the "United Nations Army" launched a simultaneous attack on the east and west fronts, and by the 21st, the 17th Regiment of the US 7th Infantry Division on the Eastern Front had entered Huishan on the Yalu River, just across the river from China. On the 25th, the volunteer army on the western front began to counterattack fiercely, with the most classic three interludes in the Korean War as the prologue, under the rapid attack of the volunteer army combined with the combination of depth and penetration, the US 8th Army began to retreat south of the 38th line from December 1, and its main force retreated from the first line of the Cheongcheon River to the first line of Sucheon and Shuncheon before it gained a foothold and reorganized the defensive line. The Rohan 7th, 8th, U.S. 2nd Division, and Turkish Brigades were all devastated, and the U.S. 1st and 25th Cavalry Divisions suffered significant losses. On 2 December, the Volunteers on the Western Front stopped pursuing and the operations on the Western Front ended.
The fighting was raging on the Western Front, while the Eastern Front was strangely calm. On 15 November, MacArthur decided to move westward on the U.S. 10th Army on the Eastern Front, cutting off the main supply line of the Volunteer Army in the Manpo area and preparing for the offensive of the 8th Army on the Western Front, so Edward Mallory Almond, commander of the 10th Army, ordered the 1st Marine Division to boldly advance north along the west bank of Chosin Lake, rapidly advancing towards the Jiangjie and Manpo areas. But Major General Oliver Prince Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division—a frequent smoker with silver hair who looked like a gentle and humble gentleman but a very stubborn and stubborn personality—thought it extremely dangerous to act on this order, because there was only one simple road with very complicated terrain on the more than 100 kilometers from the rear base, Xingnangang, to the Chosin Lake area, a narrow path paved with a mixture of mud and gravel, winding between the mountains , can only barely count as a road. Especially in the nearly 80 kilometers of the mountainous area, the road is so narrow that only one car can pass, and it is on the mountainside, next to the abrupt rocks on one side, and the steep abyss on the other! All troops and supplies will have to pass through this road, so that the entire marching formation will drag on for a long time, and in order to ensure the smooth flow of this lifeline, it is necessary to deploy garrison troops at several points, which is bound to cause the troops to disperse, and once they are divided and surrounded, they are easily broken by each one, and from a military point of view, such a deployment is simply stupid. So he immediately put forward a different view, but was rejected by Almond, although Almond himself did not approve of the plan very much, but he was a close confidant of MacArthur and could not show open opposition to MacArthur to his subordinates (not to mention that Smith was not an army but a marine). And Almond was just as optimistic about the game as MacArthur, believing that it was a sure victory! He even blurted out when Smith proposed to build an airport in Hagaru in order to evacuate the wounded in time to deliver supplies, "How can there be casualties?!" For such a superior, even if the deep-seated service contradictions between the Army and the Marine Corps are discarded, many officers of the 1st Marine Division are extremely disdainful of Almond's military command in terms of pure military ability. In particular, he was extremely dissatisfied with Almond's luxurious private carriages, equipped with refrigerators, hot showers and flush toilets, which, by the standards of the battlefield, amounted to a luxurious palace. The officers' dining room of the 10th Army Headquarters, with its fine linen tablecloths on the table, on which were placed luxurious porcelain, silver tableware and silver napkin rings, and fresh fruits, vegetables and meat were airlifted by aircraft from the Far East Air Force every day, all of which made the Marines, who admired a simple life like the Spartans, feel that this general who emphasized extravagance and hedonism could not be trusted.
Figure 7: MacArthur and Almond on the flagship at in-tram landing
Even Almond's chief of staff, Colonel Clark Ruffner, was critical of the plan, describing MacArthur's plan to attack west from Chosin Lake in 1979 in a letter to historian Eric Hamel that it was "a crazy plan." ”
Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, chief of operations of the 1st Marine Division, also shuddered at the map for the task that the division was about to undertake, believing that the prospect of success in such a mountainous region during the winter in the alpine region was based entirely on luck. Smith wrote a long letter to Admiral Clifton Cates,The 19th Marine Corps Commander, detailing the situation on the battlefield and the reasons for his own concerns, writing: "... We are the left wing of the 10th Army, and our left wing has no protection, and our left wing has no friendly presence for at least eighty miles... I am very concerned about the ability to supply troops in the mountains during the winter months. Melting and freezing snow can make mountain roads more impassable, airdrops in winter are not enough to supply two regiments, and it is difficult to inspect troops even by helicopter due to the climate and dispersion of troops, as well as the altitude of altitude... The staff officers of the 10th Army draw up plans on a map in one part per million, and we carry out our missions on a map in one in fifty thousand. Smith hoped to negotiate with MacArthur through Kaz to correct the mission, but macArthur's prestige reached its peak after the inching of Inchon, so the result of the coordination was naturally lost.
At the urging of Almond to "advance fast" every day, the 1st Marine Division had to comply with the order and began to advance northward, but due to Smith's concerns, although the resistance of the Volunteer Army was not large, the 1st Marine Division was still cautious, and the troops advanced very slowly, with an average daily advance speed of no more than 2 kilometers! The 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army abandoned Huangcaoling on November 7, and in addition to leaving 1 regiment to resist the favorable terrain north of Gutuli, the main force gradually moved north of Liutanli. On the 17th, the Ninth Corps arrived and took over the defense of the 42nd Army in the area south of Chosin Lake and Liutanli.
On November 23, the U.S. 10th Army drew up a general offensive battle plan: the 1st Marine Division was tasked with the main offensive, first capturing Wupingli, about 90 kilometers west of Liutanli (from where the road conditions to the Yalu River were better), and then continuing to advance towards the river boundary. The 7th Infantry Division, assisted, deployed on the east flank of the 1st Marine Division, advancing along the eastern shore of Chosin Lake towards Liutan-ri. The 3rd Infantry Division was responsible for covering the western flank and protecting the rear area. The plan was approved by MacArthur on the evening of the 24th, and the 10th Army immediately issued a formal combat order on the 25th, requiring the units to launch an attack on the 27th.
According to this order, the 1st Marine Division immediately issued an order to attack Wupingli, but Commander Smith specifically requested that the Area of Zhenxingli be included in the Combat Area of the Marine Division, and that garrisons be deployed between Zhenxingli and Gutuli to ensure the division's rear supply line, a decision that once again showed Commander Smith's deep concern for the safety of the rear supply line, and this move was to rely on his own troops to defend the rear supply line, so that Smith felt a little at ease. In the previous stage of his northward advance, he always paid great attention to the supply line: after capturing Kotoori on the 10th, he not only immediately ordered the engineers to build a road between Kotooli and Shinheung-ri to make the M26 "Pershing" tanks passable, but also built a small airport for light aircraft to take off and land; on the 19th, he sent an sapper company equipped with 5 large bulldozers to build a small airport in Hagaru-ri; on the 23rd, a supply substation was opened in Hagaru-ri to store a large amount of supplies (of which grain and fuel were 8 days each, and ammunition was 1.3 bases)—— These measures, which focused on rear replenishment, played a huge role in the ensuing battles.
Figure 8: Hagaru-ri airstrip and piled up supplies
On 24 November, the 1st Marine Division ordered the 7th Marine Regiment to capture and take control of Liutanli, and then the 5th Marine Regiment in the Xinxingli and Neidongzhi areas marched westward, overtaking the 7th Marine Regiment to the west to take Wupingli, while the 1st Marine Regiment served as garrisons in Xiajieuli, Gutuli, and Zhenxingli to cover the supply line. At this point, the 1st Marine Division was fully deployed in the Chosin Lake area and completed the preparations for the general offensive.
Chosin Lake, located between the Dongzhan Ridge Mountains and the Wolf Forest Mountains in northeastern Korea, is the largest lake in northeast Korea, formed by the Chosin River originating in the Hwangcho ridge region between Yootan-ri and Hagaru-ri. About 30 kilometers east of Chosin Lake, it is the Xiangzhan Lake formed by the largest tributary of the Chosin River, the Tozhan River, and the two lakes and their vicinity are collectively known as the Chosin Lake Area. The two lakes are surrounded by mountains, with an average altitude of about 1300 meters, almost all of which are rugged mountains with continuous mountains and mountains, with flourishing forests and narrow mountain roads, and occasionally a few villages are sparsely populated. The Chosin Lake area has entered winter from late October, and by the end of November, the average daily temperature has dropped to minus 27 degrees, the cold climate of wind and snow, the narrow and complex terrain of the mountain high road, and the battlefield environment is extremely dangerous, it can be said that even basic survival is not easy in such an environment - the Siberian cold current has affected northern Korea since November 14, causing the temperature in the Chosin Lake area to drop sharply from above zero to minus 30 degrees Celsius from the night of the 14th!
After entering the DPRK, the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army deployed according to the plan and marched towards the Chosin Lake area. On the way to the march, the troops strictly implemented the requirements of concealment, night and night, tight camouflage, about 100,000 people of the 2 armies quietly entered the war zone, although the "United Nations Army" sent aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the area every day, but did not find any trace of the action of the Ninth Corps - after the war, the "United Nations Army" called the hidden advance of the Ninth Corps a "miracle"! After learning that a certain division of the Volunteer Army had created an average daily marching speed of 30 kilometers in the rugged mountains for 18 consecutive days, and that it was with almost no supplies and strict concealment and camouflage! Joseph Gouldon, a well-known American military commentator, commented with great respect: "By any standard, the ability of the Chinese Communist army to forcibly march is extraordinary!" "However, due to the haste of entering the DPRK, the pre-war preparations were extremely insufficient, and after entering the DPRK, due to the large-scale bombing of the US military (the US military began to carry out large-scale air raids on the north of Korea in order to cooperate with the upcoming general offensive), the logistics supply was extremely difficult, and the grain, clothing, ammunition and other materials could not be transported to the hands of the troops, while the Chosin Lake area was sparsely populated, and it was impossible to solve the problem of food and accommodation on the spot, so the troops had to camp in the snow, and the food and clothing were seriously insufficient, and there was a large number of attritions caused by freezing and starvation. The Ninth Corps' preparations for the battle could not be completed on time, so they had to ask for the original november 25 counterattack to be postponed by two days, which is why the Volunteer Army began to counterattack on the 25th and the eastern front remained calm.
On 26 November, the 1st Marine Division began to adjust its deployment as planned, and the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment had withdrawn to Participate in the upcoming operations as the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Division had taken over the defense of the area north of Hagaru-ri.
On that day, the other units of the 1st Marine Division were as follows: the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment was waiting in Hagaru-ri for the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment to come to Liutanli so that it could rush to Liutanli, the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment (owing the G Company) was on its way to Hagaru-ri, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment was in Gutuli, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment was in Zhenxingli. On this day, because the main force of the volunteer army had not yet arrived, the movement of the various units of the 1st Marine Division was almost without resistance, and it was very smooth. Division Commander Smith also rushed to Liutan by helicopter, listened to the battle report and carefully observed the terrain of the attack road from the helicopter. On the same day, the 7th Marine Regiment captured 3 volunteer soldiers in a skirmish in the area around Liutanli, who confessed that they belonged to the 60th Division of the 20th Army, and that their unit planned to invest 4 divisions to attack Liutanli, Hagaru-ri, and Gutuli at the same time. According to the practice of its own troops, the US military believes that ordinary soldiers cannot understand the battle plans of military-level units at all, and have not paid any attention to them.
On November 27, heavy snow fell in the Chosin Lake area, the temperature dropped to minus 30 degrees, and the 4 divisions of the 20th Army of the Ninth Corps (the 58th, 59th, 69th and 89th Divisions) and the 3 divisions of the 27th Army (the 79th Division, the 80th Division and the 81st Division) totaled about 80,000 people, overcoming the difficulties of lack of food and clothing with amazing perseverance, and quietly entered the attack position. The 94th Division and the 26th Army of the 27th Army also began to advance from the Houchang area to Chosin Lake.
Figure 9: The Ninth Corps braved the wind and snow to march towards the intended attack position
At 8:25 a.m. that morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment advanced towards the mountains on both sides of the Road from Liutanli to Wupingli, and after overcoming slight resistance, successfully occupied the 1426 and 1403 heights west of Liutanli. The 2nd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment then went west beyond the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment, but at the first target, the 1271st Heights, it was met with stubborn defenses of the 20th Army of the Volunteer Army, and several attacks were ineffective, and finally with the support of the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment, it was difficult to capture the 1271 Heights. In fact, if the 20th Army does not carry out stubborn resistance at the 1271 heights, it can not only reduce casualties but also make the 1st Marine Division more dispersed, which is more conducive to the next step of operations. At the same time, the 7th Marine Regiment sent combat reconnaissance detachments equipped with mortars to the southwest and north, all of which encountered large volunteer troops, and after fierce fighting, they had to withdraw to Liutanli. After noon, the U.S. army found that volunteer reconnaissance personnel arrived near Liutan for reconnaissance, and there was no doubt that after nightfall, the volunteer army would definitely launch the night raids that they were good at, so from 15:00 p.m., the U.S. army stopped the attack, built fortifications, and prepared for the battle after dark - not as some sources claim, the U.S. army was attacked without warning.
At dusk that day, as night fell in the snow, the Ninth Corps began to attack according to the predetermined deployment: the 59th Division of the 20th Army attacked the Dedong Pass south of Liutanli, cut off the connection between Liutanli and Xiajieyuli, and attacked Liutanli from the south; the 58th Division attacked Xiajieli from three sides, southeast and west; the 60th Division attacked north of Gutuli, cutting off the road between Gutuli and Xiajuuli, attacking Gutuli from the north; the 89th Division attacked the enemy in Liutanli with 1 regiment in coordination with the 59th Division, and the main force of 2 regiments was deployed west of Liutanli. As a reserve (after the battle began, the 89th Division was changed to guard against the enemy in the Society). The 79th Division of the 27th Army attacked Liutanli from the north; 1 regiment of the 80th Division and 81st Division attacked Xinxingli; and the main 2 regiments of the 81st Division were deployed in the Battle Lake area to alert the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division in the area and effectively cover the flanks of the army.
The plan of the Ninth Corps was to go north to south, first annihilating the American troops in the far north of Liutanli and Xinxingli, then annihilating the American troops in Hagaru-ri, and finally transferring forces to surround and annihilate the troops of the 1st Marine Division that dared to go north to reinforce. This plan of the Ninth Corps is still based on the combat experience of the Liberation War, lack of understanding of the US military's organization, firepower, equipment, air superiority, mobility, etc., and willingly think that with the absolute superiority of the 6 elite main divisions, the US 3 regiments that have become turtles in the urn can be easily eaten.
Patch: 1st Marine Division
Speaking of the Marine Corps, the position of the U.S. Armed Forces is very special in the U.S. Armed Forces, as an important part of the Navy, it accepts the administrative leadership of the Admiralty, but it is not a subordinate unit of the Admiralty, but it is the same level as the Department of Naval Operations, and the Commander of the Marine Corps, like the Chief of Naval Operations, is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy in peacetime, unless the Secretary of the Navy issues special instructions. Only to accept orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in the name of the Secretary of the Navy, and only to accept orders issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in wartime. The Marine Corps implements the rules and regulations and regulations of the Navy in peacetime, but implements the rules and regulations of the Army when fighting with the Army in wartime, and at the same time has its own complete administrative command system. Because the Marine Corps is mainly responsible for amphibious landing combat missions, it is well known that landing operations are backwater battles, and the danger and arduousness of combat require the Marine Corps to have a tenacious will to fight and a strong fighting style, and the Marine Corps has indeed cultivated a fighting style and will far superior to that of ordinary US troops through the harsh training on weekdays, and this feature has been manifested in all the island battles of the Pacific War.
At the end of World War II, the Marine Corps was also downsized, and at the outbreak of the Korean War, the total strength of the U.S. Marine Corps was only 74,200 people, the combat force was less than 40,000 people, and the number of ground combatants combined was not up to the number of a standard Marine division in wartime. After the outbreak of the Korean War, with the authorization of the president, the Marine Corps urgently recruited 1,800 officers and 31,600 soldiers, plus personnel drawn from other regions, and the entire Atlantic region was almost completely evacuated, leaving only 3 marine battalions! Only then did they reluctantly piece together the 1st Marine Division in September.
The earliest predecessor of the 1st Marine Division was the 1st Marine Company formed in 1775, making it the oldest unit in the Marine Corps. The Division's 1st Marine Regiment, founded in 1846 as the first regimental combat unit in the Marine Corps, participated in the Eight-Power Coalition and U.S. wars abroad: invasion of Mexico in the 1880s, Spanish-American War of 1898, invasion of Cuba in 1906, invasion of Mexico in 1914, and invasion of Haiti in 1915. The remaining two regiments of the 1st Marine Division, the 5th Marine Regiment and the 7th Marine Regiment, were formed in 1914 and 1917 respectively, with the 5th Marine Regiment receiving awards from the French government for its outstanding service in World War I. In February 1942, the 1st Marine Division was formed at the Lejena base in North Carolina, based on the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marine Regiments, and was the first divisional combat unit of the Marine Corps. The division performed particularly well in the Pacific theater of World War II, and in the Battle of Guadalcanal in 1942, the 1st Marine Division was the first in the U.S. Army to receive the highest honor of the United States army, the "Presidential Unit Citation", and thus left the words "GUADALCANAL" (Guadalcanal) on the division emblem forever. Subsequently, he participated in the landing operations on New Britain Island, the Sulphur Islands and Okinawa Islands, and became the ace division of the US army in the Pacific Theater. In particular, during the Korean War, the soldiers of the 1st Marine Division, including the reserves conscripted after the outbreak of the war, were all volunteers, which was very different from the morale and combat skills of other UNITS troops composed mainly of conscripts.
Figure 10: The emblem of the 1st Marine Division, there is "GUADALCANAL" (Guadalcanal)
It is said that the 1st Marine Division is also quite related to China, and the US troops in the Eight-Nation Alliance that invaded Beijing in 1900 were the division's troops; it was also the division that landed in Beiping, Tianjin, Qingdao and other places after the end of World War II in 1945; the "Anping Incident" and the "Shen Chong Incident" that raped female students at Peking University in 1946 were also committed by the division. This time they met again in the narrow road of North Korea, which can be said to be not a gathering of wrongdoers!
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the first batch of units of the 1st Marine Division, composed of the 5th Marine Regiment as the backbone, landed at Busan on August 2, as the reserve of the 8th Army, served as a fire brigade, rushed around to "extinguish the fire", and made great contributions to the stability of the Nadong River defense line.
When the 1st and 7th Marine Regiments all arrived in Korea in September, the 1st Marine Division, as the most important trump card in MacArthur's hands, assumed the heavy responsibility of being the vanguard of the Inchon landing, and won the honor of being the first to land at Inchon.
At this time, the 1st Marine Division was a campaign group composed of 3 marine infantry regiments as the backbone, plus several divisions directly under the units, with a strong combat force, and the number of the whole division was about 25,000 people.
Divisional units include:
11th Artillery Regiment: 4 artillery battalions (18 105 mm howitzers each for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 18 155 mm howitzers each) and 1 114 mm multi-pack rocket artillery company (the company did not participate in the Battle of Chosin Lake).
1st Tank Battalion: 4 tank companies with a total of about 70 tanks.
1st Engineer Battalion
1st Coastal Battalion (remained in Hingnam Port and did not participate in the Battle of Chosin Lake)
1st Amphibious Vehicle Transport Battalion (stayed in Xingnan Port and did not participate in the Battle of Chosin Lake)
Each Marine Regiment has 3 infantry battalions, heavy mortar companies (equipped with 12 107 mm mortars), anti-tank companies (12 75 mm recoilless guns and 5 tanks).
Each infantry battalion consisted of 3 infantry companies and machine gun companies (also known as firearms companies, equipped with 4 81 mm mortars, 4 75 mm recoilless guns, and 12 12.7 mm heavy machine guns).
Each infantry company consisted of 3 infantry platoons and 1 machine gun platoon (equipped with 89 mm bazookas, 2 81 mm mortars, and 6 12.7 mm heavy machine guns).
Each infantry platoon consisted of 3 infantry squads and 1 machine gun squad (equipped with 89 mm bazookas, 3 light machine guns and 1 heavy machine gun).
Each infantry squad was equipped with 10 M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles and 2 Browning BAR automatic rifles, squad and platoon commanders were equipped with M1 carbines, and officers above the company commander were equipped with Colt automatic pistols.
In addition, the 1st Marine Division is closely supported by the Marine Corps' 1st Air Wing, which is usually organized into 3 squadrons (72 aircraft) and up to 7 squadrons (about 150 aircraft) at most. The 1st Aviation Wing also dispatched veteran flying officers as forward aviation fire control personnel to accompany the ground forces, summoning and directing air support.
Captain Michael Capraro, then a public relations officer in the 1st Marine Division, once told the news media: "This is the most powerful infantry division in the world, and I think it's like a Doberman, a ferocious hound with a tight belt, bent on biting the enemy..."
Patch: U.S. 10th Army Commander Edward Mallory Almond
Born in Virginia in 1892. He graduated from the Virginia Military Academy in 1915 with the rank of second lieutenant of infantry, and in 1918 participated in the First World War with the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. After the end of World War I, he was a teacher at the Marion Military Academy, transferred to the Benningborg Infantry School in 1924, graduated from the U.S. Command and Staff College in 1930, served in the Philippines from 1931 to 1933, served in the Intelligence Group of the Army Staff Headquarters from 1934 to 1938, graduated from the Army War College in 1940, served as a staff officer of the Sixth Army in 1941, served as deputy commander of the 93rd Infantry Division in 1942, and was promoted to commander of the 92nd Infantry Division in 1943 to fight in Italy. In 1945, he was transferred to the 2nd Infantry Division, in 1946 he was appointed as the staff officer of the Far East Command, in 1947 he was promoted to the deputy chief of staff of the Far East Command, in 1949 he was promoted to the chief of staff of the Far East Command, and in September 1950 he was also the commander of the US 10th Army, participating in the command of the Inchon landings. He took over as president of the Army War College in February 1951 and retired in January 1953 with the rank of lieutenant general. He died in June 1979.
Figure 11: Commander of the U.S. 10th Army, Almond
Patch: Oliver P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division
Born in 1893 in Menna, Texas, he graduated from the University of California, Berkeley in 1916, entered the Marine Corps in 1917 with the rank of second lieutenant, served as the marine detachment leader of the battleship Texas in 1921, transferred to the personnel group of the Marine Corps Command in 1924, served as deputy staff officer of the garrison in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 1928, entered the Command Staff Class of the Army Infantry School in 1931, and served as a company commander at the Marine Corps School in Guantimore, Virginia in 1932. In 1933 he was appointed deputy combat officer of the 7th Marine Regiment, in 1934 he was transferred to the Naval Attaché Of the United States Embassy in Paris, France, in 1936 he was transferred to the Marine Corps School instructor in Guantimore, in 1939 to marine base operations officer in Santiago, in 1940 to the 1st Battalion of the 6th Marine Regiment, in 1942 to the deputy head of the Planning and Policy Group of the Marine Corps Command, in 1944 to the commander of the 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division, in 1944 to the deputy commander of the 1st Marine Division, and in 1944 to the deputy chief of staff of the 10th Army. He fought in the battles of New Britain, Peleliu and Okinawa during World War II. He was appointed principal of the Guntimo Marine Corps School in 1945, commander of the Guantimo base from 1948, deputy commander of the Marine Corps in April 1948, commander of the 1st Marine Division in June 1950, commander of pendent at Penderton in May 1951, commander of the Atlantic Marine Corps in 1953, and retired in September 1955. He died on December 25, 1977.
Figure 12: Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division
Patch: November 27, U.S. military deployment in the Chosin Lake area
NeidongZhi: 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment, 7th Army Division, Heavy Mortar Company, 31st Regiment;
Xinxingli: 3rd Battalion, 31st Regiment, 7th Army Division, A Company A, Company B, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and D Company, 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion;
Houpu: 31st Regimental Headquarters and Tank Company of the 7th Division of the Army (22 tanks);
Between Houpu and Surabaya: (1) The 31st Regiment Health Company arrived in Houpu that night and continued north;
(2) The support company of the 57th Artillery Battalion camped between Houpu and Surabaya on the same night, and arrived in Houpu on the 28th;
Surabaya- Company A, 1st Engineering Battalion, 1st Marine Division;
Liutanli: 5th Marine Regiment, 7th Marine Regiment (owed to the 2nd Battalion Headquarters, F Company and Machine Gun Company), 1st Battalion, 4th Battalion and 3rd Battalion G Company I Company of the 11th Regiment of Marine Artillery;
Unnamed Highlands northwest of The Dedong Pass: C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (owes 1 platoon);
Dedong Pass: F Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment;
Hagaru-ri: 3rd Battalion (owed to G Company) of the 1st Marine Regiment, 2nd Battalion Headquarters and Machine Artillery Company of the 7th Marine Regiment, D Company and 3rd Battalion H Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Regiment of Marine Artillery, D Company of the 1st Engineer Battalion of the 1st Marine Division, D Company of the 10th Engineer Battalion of the 10th Army, and some scattered support units at the platoon level;
Guturi: 1st Regimental Headquarters and 2nd Battalion, Company E, 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment of Marine Artillery, B Company, 31st Regiment, 7th Army Division, 185th Engineer Battalion, and some scattered units;
Zhenxingli: 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment;
Matiandong: Tank Battalion of the 1st Marine Division (4 tank companies, about 70 tanks).
The headquarters of the 1st Marine Division was still in Xingnan, but the main personnel of the division headquarters company and various departments were already on their way to Xiayuli. Thus, in the Chosin Lake area, the US army has 4 infantry regiments, 1 artillery regiment and 1 battalion, 1 tank battalion and 1 company, with a total strength of nearly 30,000 people.
In addition, the DivisionAl Reconnaissance Company of the 1st Marine Division, the G Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, and the 41st Detachment of the British Marine Corps are advancing towards the Chosin Lake area. 2nd Battalion, 31st Regiment, 7th Division (Owe E Company) at Hamhung.
The first battle is emerging
Xinxingli is located in the east of Chosin Lake, the Fengliu River flows from the north of the village to the south side of The Chosin Lake, the terrain of the village is high in the south and low in the north, narrow in the east and west, the terrain in the north of the village is flat and has a narrow gauge railway (but abandoned) and a highway, the west of the village is lakeside, the terrain is narrow, it is not convenient for large troops to expand, the three peaks of the south peak of the village, the 1221 highland, and the 1239 highland are three-legged, and the bird's eye view leads to the Houpu and Hagaru-ri highways. Strictly speaking, Xinxingli is not a village, there are no streets and no obvious regional boundaries, but in the sparsely populated Chosin Lake area, a few independent family houses are relatively concentrated.
The U.S. army in this area was a unit of the 7th Infantry Division, and in November, due to the wide distribution of the 7th Division's troops, it was unable to assemble on time to implement the 10th Army's combat plan, so it temporarily formed the 31st Regiment Combat Team (31RCT), composed of the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 31st Regiment (missing the E Company, replaced by the 1st Battalion B Company) and the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, which were still relatively concentrated in the Chosin Lake area. It was assigned to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion (missing C Company, replaced by D Company of the 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion) and the Heavy Mortar Company and Tank Company of the 31st Regiment, under the command of Colonel Alan McLean, commander of the 31st Regiment, and was tasked with attacking on the east bank of Chosin Lake. At this time, the 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment was still serving as a guard along the coast east of Chosin Lake to Hyesan, and did not enter the Chosin Lake area, so it was not included in the sequence of the 31st Regiment detachment.
Due to the harsh climate and difficult roads, the above-mentioned units of the 7th Division moved very slowly. On the afternoon of November 25, only the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment reached the east bank of Chosin Lake and deployed at The Heights of 1221 south of Sinsingli. On the night of 26 November, Colonel McLean led the 31st Regimental Headquarters to Houpu, about 6 km south of Xinxingli, and opened a regimental headquarters there, but no other troops arrived. On the morning of 27 November, Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment, suggested to Colonel McLean that the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment continue north and enter the position of the 3rd Battalion of the former 5th Marine Regiment in Neidong Toh, in order to continue northward the next day. McLean agreed to this suggestion, and the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment began to advance north, reaching Neidong Ridge, about 5 km north of Xinxingli, in the afternoon of the same day. After Fei Si led the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment to Neidongzhi, he used the original position of the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment to deploy and occupy the position from left to right in the order of A Company, C Company, and B Company - after the war, the US Army believed that the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment abandoned the 1221st Heights to enter the Inner Cave Ridge, because the 1221 Heights were not only the most suitable terrain for defense in the area, but also made the 31st Regiment detachment's already weak troops more dispersed, if the 32nd Regiment 1 Battalion joined the 31st Regiment Detachment after the rendezvous with the follow-up troops of the 31st Regiment Detachment, they would advance north together. Probably not as passive as later.
On the afternoon of the 27th, when the 3rd Battalion and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion of the 31st Regiment arrived at Xinxingli, it was nearly dusk, and they were ready to camp overnight, the I Company and the K Company of the 3rd Battalion were in the east of the village, the L Company, the battalion headquarters and the machine gun company were in the center of the village, the 57th Artillery Battalion A Company and the B Company were in the south of the village, the battalion headquarters and the anti-aircraft artillery battalion D Company were in the southwest of the village, the camp site was completely unsuitable for defensive operations, and because of the late arrival time, the soldiers who had been running for many days were very tired, so they just dug some scattered pits and rested, and the whole defense was very lax. It laid the groundwork for failure in the fierce battle that was about to break out. The tank company of the 31st Regiment also arrived at Houpu at dusk, and the company commander, Captain Robert E. Drake, without receiving new instructions, decided to spend the night in Houpu. Soon the 31st Regiment Health Company also arrived at Houpu, but the company commander insisted on not listening to Derek's suggestion to stay in Houpu camp, and led the sanitary company through Houpu to xinxingli, and was later ambushed on the way, almost completely destroyed.
At this time McLean decided to move the regimental heavy mortar company between Neidongzhi and Xinxingli, and set up a forward command post there in order to command and support the nearby 2 battalions (3st Battalion of the 31st Regiment and 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment), and the regimental headquarters remained in Houpu.
The 2nd Battalion (Ow E Company) of the 31st Regiment to which the detachment belonged was still far behind Xianxing at this time, and the 1st Battalion B Company, which was temporarily transferred to the command of the 2nd Battalion, was in Gutuli.
Figure 13: Map of the deployment of the detachment of the 31st Regiment of the US Army in the Xinxingli area on November 27
At 12 o'clock on the night of the 27th, the Volunteer Army concentrated 4 regiments of the 80th Division and the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division, and Zhan Danan, deputy commander of the 27th Army and commander of the 80th Division, launched an attack on the enemy in Xinxingli under the unified command. The 2nd Battalion of the 240th Regiment attached to the 238th Regiment directly inserted the Xinxingli Highway Bridge and the Xinxingli Ergou along the ravine to the north, because the first 1st Battalion of the Regiment took the wrong road, so the regimental commander Yan Chuanye temporarily changed to 3 Battalions to attack first, and the 3rd Battalion attacked more than 50 independent houses in Ergou at the same time in squads, and the 1st Battalion rushed through the Ergou where the battle was in full swing and pounced on the 1100 Heights and 1200 Heights on the north side of Xinxingli, and then rushed into Xinxingli, and the 2nd Battalion of the 240th Regiment quickly inserted into the depth of the US position in Xinxingli and captured the Xinxingli Highway Bridge Then, together with the 3rd Battalion, they eliminated the U.S. troops at Ergou and severed the connection between xinxingli and neidongzhi.
The main force of the 239th Regiment attacked from fengliuli south through Surabaya, capturing the 1455 and 1250 highlands successively, and rushed into Xinxingli from the south and southeast. The 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion, which was responsible for penetrating the 238th Regiment to cross the Fengliuli River north of Xinxingli, left 2 squads to hold the 1100 heights after clearing the US military guard posts near the 1100 heights, and the rest of the troops rushed all the way into the village, and were intercepted by US fire, and Zhuang Yuandong, the instructor who rushed to the front, and more than 1 squad of fighters fell under the fierce fire of the US troops The walls are also covered with operational maps, and it turns out that the 5th and 6th squads were killed by the US military headquarters (this is the 3st battalion headquarters of the 31st Regiment of the US Army, not the 31st Regimental Headquarters as mentioned in the history of the Volunteer Army, because the 31st Regimental Headquarters is still in Houpu at this time)! Since it was not known in advance that these houses were the headquarters of the US military camp, after the 2 soldiers who broke into the house were killed, they did not send anyone to rush in for further cleaning, but only threw a few grenades into the house, causing william R. Riley, the commander of the US 3rd Battalion, who was seriously injured inside the house. Lieutenant Colonel Reilly and several others escaped and were rescued after dawn. Then the 5th and 6th squads continued to advance westward, and on the eve of dawn, they raided the artillery positions of the A Company of the 57th Artillery Battalion of the US Army, cleanly solved some of the artillery that were still sleeping, and captured 4 105 mm howitzers. The remnants of Company A retreated to the position of Company B, and finally withstood the breakthrough of 5 squads and 6 squads. Just as the 5th and 6th squads were winning the battle, the 7th and 9th squads seized the houses by the highway bridge and took control of the bridgehead position. At this point, the 4th Company has done an excellent job of penetrating the enemy's depth, but the 4th Company has suffered 67 casualties, and the squad and platoon structure has also been disrupted, and after dawn the US troops counterattacked from three sides, the 4th Company was in a very dangerous situation, so after asking for instructions from the 2nd Battalion, it was a pity that after asking for instructions, the 2nd Battalion withdrew from Xinxingli, but unfortunately due to insufficient troops, the captured howitzers and a large amount of materials were not brought out - the 4th Company 5th and 6th Squads fought extremely well, destroying the US military headquarters and attacking the US artillery positions, but the shortcoming of the United States was that the action was not complete, and the US troops mainly used grenades to destroy the headquarters. However, they did not rush into the house for further cleaning, so that the commander of the US 3rd Battalion, who had been injured by the grenade, and many other people were rescued after dawn, and when the captured howitzers could not be brought back, they were not destroyed, so that the guns could still be used by the US troops. Fortunately, due to the low terrain of the US military, it was unable to carry out impact observation, and the air-ground connection was once cut off, and it could only carry out visual shooting, and its power could not be fully utilized. Nevertheless, the 4th Company was the company with the most significant results in this battle, so after the war, it was awarded the honorary title of "Xinxingli Combat Model Company" by the 27th Army.
Figure 14: The battle flag of the "Xinxingli Combat Model Company"
The U.S. military history records the battle that night: "The 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment was attacked around midnight, because the soldiers had just marched for several days and were very tired, so the guard was relatively loose, the defense line was quickly infiltrated, many people were killed in their sleep, the I Company and the K Company suffered heavy casualties, the defense line collapsed, and the survivors fled westward. Only the machine gun company in the center of the village could take advantage of its heavy weapons and fierce firepower to hold its position. The communists soon rushed to the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, and the battalion commanders did not have time to enter the nearby fortifications, so they had to retreat into the room in a hurry to resist, most of them were killed and wounded by grenades thrown by the communists. Then the communists rushed to the position of the A Company of the 57th Artillery Battalion, and the A Company was caught off guard, most of them abandoned their positions and retreated to the positions of Company B, and the officers and men who retreated from various places gradually gathered in the positions of Company B, not only resisting the impact of the communists, but also counterattacking at dawn after reorganization. After dawn, the 3rd Battalion regained its position, and the 105 mm howitzers of the A Company of the 57th Artillery Battalion were still usable without being destroyed by the communists, so they and the B Company reoccupied the position. ”
The Battalion Headquarters Company of the 57th Artillery Battalion and the D Company of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion also contracted their defensive lines after dawn for redeployment. In particular, D Company's three M19 twin 40 mm anti-aircraft gun vehicles (4 of which were originally 4, but 1 was damaged in battle) and four M16 quadruple 12.5 mm anti-aircraft machine gun vehicles were deployed in the north, east and south directions, forming a fire network and becoming an important support firepower for the second night.
For Lieutenant Colonel Ray O. Embree, commander of the 57th Artillery Battalion, who was wounded in the first face-to-face confrontation with Chinese soldiers, the night he will never forget, recalled: "I have never seen such a large number of Chinese soldiers, such a tenacious and repeated attack. They braved the bitter cold and the marine artillery fire to come, and their spirit of seeing death as a home made the Marines awe-inspired! I felt strongly about this battle, because I had lost a lot of comrades. We suffered heavy casualties. I've never seen a fight like this. I once encountered the last German counterattack in the Ardennes in World War II, but it was not as fierce as the Battle of Chosin Lake, and the scene was really unbearable. ”
The 242nd Regiment bypassed Xinxingli and appeared unexpectedly on the road south of Xinxingli, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions capturing the peaks on both sides of the highway and the 1221 heights, completely cutting off the road from Xinxingli to Hagaru-ri. That night, the health company of the US 31st Regiment traveled from Houpu to Xinxingli, only to be ambushed by the 242nd Regiment, and almost all the troops were destroyed except for four or five people who fled back to Houpu. The 2nd Battalion of the 242nd Regiment attacked from the southwest to Xinxingli, just in front of the double 40 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun position of the D Company of the US anti-aircraft artillery battalion, suffering heavy casualties, according to the US military's recollection, the M19 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun vehicle had fired fiercely at a group of people approaching from the southwest highway at dawn, destroying most of it.
In this night's battle, the volunteer army emerged an outstanding combat hero Kong Qingsan, Kong Qingsan was the 5th squad leader of the 80th Division Artillery Regiment, in the battle that night Kong Qingsan's artillery squad was equipped with the 3rd Battalion of the 238th Regiment to attack Xinxingli Ergou, in order to destroy the fire point of the US army in a group house, Kong Qingsan commanded the artillery squad to push the 92nd infantry artillery forward to shoot closely, because it was cold and freezing, he had to use the terrain to tie the left gun to the hoe on a large earth bag, but the right hoe had nowhere to use and cocked At this time, the battle situation was very urgent, and there was no room for a moment's hesitation, Kong Qingsan inserted a shovel into the hand-held ring of the right hoe, held the shovel handle on his shoulder, formed his body as the base of the cannon, and then loudly ordered the gunner to fire - after a loud noise, the group house was accurately destroyed, and Kong Qingsan died of huge recoil impact! As the commander of the artillery squad, he was very aware of the power of the recoil of the artillery and the result of this, but he did not hesitate to sacrifice his life for the victory of the battle, and after the war he was posthumously awarded the title of "Volunteer Army First Class Combat Hero".
Figure 15: Kong Qingsan, a first-class combat hero of the Volunteer Army
The mission of the 3rd Battalion of the 240th Regiment was to capture Neidong Ridge, which was located about 5 kilometers northwest of Xinxingli and was a commanding height in the Xinxingli area. After the battle began, the first reaction of Lieutenant Colonel Feith, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment of the US Army guarding the area, was that the Korean soldiers were firing randomly due to nervousness! After the 3rd Battalion of the 240th Regiment captured 4 highlands in a row, it was suppressed by the American fire of the 1318th and 1216th Highlands, and it was difficult to continue to develop. The regimental commander immediately threw the 1st Battalion into battle, which broke the deadlock, and at about 4:00 a.m. captured 3 high ground in one go, and by the early morning, the 240th Regiment had occupied many highlands in the northeast, due north, and northwest of Xinxingli. In the volunteer offensive, the U.S. Company A bore the brunt of the attack, Captain Ed Scullon, the commander of the A Company, was killed in the battle, the deputy company commander was frightened and hid in the bunker and refused to command the troops, and Captain Edward P. Stamford of the A Company's A Fire Advance Control Group (commonly known as the Land-Air Liaison Group, hereinafter referred to as the same) immediately took command as the highest-ranking officer. Although he was a pilot by birth (the officers in the Land-Air Liaison Group were veteran pilots), he had never fought on the ground, and in Stanford's own words: "Having a pilot command an infantry company is as absurd as putting a baseball player on an American football team as a quarterback." Fortunately, in 1944 he had received 13 weeks of infantry training at the Marine Corps Airborne School in Quantico, which had given him the most basic knowledge of infantry tactics. When Stanford took command, he immediately gathered the scattered soldiers and re-entered the battle. Under his command, Company A not only stabilized its position, but also quickly organized a counterattack to plug the gap. Stanford's land-air liaison job was even better, with U.S. pilots saying in their postwar reports that the air attacks called by "Boy 14" (Stallford's radio call sign) were getting closer and closer, and finally they were less than 50 feet (about 15 meters)! People with a little military knowledge know that the distance between direct air and close support and their ground troops can reach 50 meters, which is already very rare, and it is unimaginable to reach 15 meters like Stanford! That would be tantamount to using air support as a grenade.
Shao Mingze, who was then the commander of the 1st Battalion of the 240th Regiment and then the deputy commander of the 27th Army, recalled: "The village of Neidongzhi is very small, with more than a dozen households, the terrain is not good, there are ditches, the enemy is in the ditches, the firepower is dense, and the machine guns are whimpering, like a wind!" The reconnaissance (of the volunteers) was inaccurate, the enemy's situation was not clear, and it was thought that it was 1 company, and when it was found that it was 1 battalion, it could not be moved. The [U.S.] tanks formed a circle, and the grenades smashed on them as if they were tickling. [The volunteers] fought all night without gain. ”
For the volunteers who fought with the US army for the first time, looking back on the fiery years decades later, the biggest impression of the old people is that "the firepower of the US army is really fierce!" Huang Wanfeng, then commander of the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 243rd Regiment, recalled: "The mountains in North Korea were all bushes, that dense, and when we went up to the heights, the corners of our pants were all scratched by bush thorns, and cotton was exposed, but after a day, the enemy planes exploded, the artillery bombarded, and they all exploded and burned out." The frozen soil is like being ploughed over and loosened. The mountain is scorched black, and the snow can't cover it! ”
Xin Dianliang, then deputy company commander of the 7th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 235th Regiment, said: "The infantry and artillery of the [US army] coordinated well, lost a hill, and two minutes later the reconnaissance plane (which should be the artillery school shooter) arrived, and three minutes later the artillery fire came up." ”
After a night of fierce fighting, the 238th Regiment captured the first-line highlands north and east of Xinxingli; the 239th Regiment captured the 1455 and 1100 highlands south of Xinxingli and once invaded the village of Xinxingli; the 240th Regiment captured the first-line highlands northeast, due north and northwest of Neidongzhi; and the 242nd Regiment captured the 1221 Highlands, Gaofeng and Xindaili south of Xinxingli, completing the encirclement of the American forces in the Xinxingli and Neidongzhi areas. At dawn on the 28th, the highlands around Xinxingli were almost all controlled by the volunteers, and the US troops were compressed in a narrow area of less than 2 kilometers, and the situation was precarious.
Patch: Deployment of the 31st Regiment Detachment of the U.S. 7th Division in the Xinxingli area
Goura:
31 regimental regimental company
Tank company
Heavy mortar company
Medical Company
Support Company
1st Platoon, C Company, 13th Engineer Battalion
There were 598 U.S. troops and 50 Rok troops, for a total of 648 men
Inner Cave:
1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment
Battalion headquarters company
A连
B Company
C even
D-linked
1st Platoon of Heavy Mortar Company, 32nd Regiment
Marine Corps Air Force Air Liaison Group
There were 817 U.S. troops and 150 Rok troops, for a total of 967 men
Xinxingli:
3rd Battalion, 31st Regiment
I even
K Conn
L even
M even
United States Air Force Land and Air Liaison Group
There were 784 U.S. troops and 150 Rok troops, for a total of 934 men
57th Field Artillery Battalion (owed to C Company)
A Company of Artillery
Artillery Company B
D Company, 15th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
There were 574 U.S. troops and 165 Rok troops, for a total of 739 men
In total, there were 2773 U.S. troops and 515 ROK troops, for a total of 3,288.
Patch: U.S. Aviation Fire Advance Control Group
U.S. Aviation Fire Advance Control Group, commonly known as the Land-Air Liaison Group, each liaison group is usually composed of 1 officer and 3 or 4 soldiers, the officers are experienced veteran pilots, the soldiers are mostly radio operators and communication personnel, directly with the ground forces, responsible for the role of coordinator between the ground forces and the close-range ground support attack aircraft, when the local forces require the support aircraft to attack a target, the land and air liaison officers set the best attack route according to the target situation and personal experience. The angle then directs the aircraft to attack with a radio. If the pilot of the attacking aircraft finds that the target is too close to his own troops or cannot confirm the ground target, he will ask the land and air liaison officer to notify the ground force to indicate the location in some way, at which time the liaison officer will notify the ground force to issue a specific identification signal agreed with the pilot, such as a land-air contact plate, signal bomb, colored smoke grenade, etc., to indicate identity or location.
The Volunteers believed that in the Xinxingli Battle, the Volunteer soldiers wore cotton coats, and the white paddies became the best camouflage in the snow, and the troops tried to engage in close combat with the American troops, plus they also used captured land and air liaison boards to confuse the American aircraft, making it difficult for the Us air superiority to be exerted. In fact, the reason why the US military lost air support in Xinxingli was because the members of the land-air liaison group assigned to the 3rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment were all killed or wounded in the battle on the night of the 27th, so that no one could get in touch with the air, if the land-air liaison group was still there, even if the land-air contact plate was lost, it could also be communicated by radio or other methods such as colored smoke grenades, and each time the ground troops used the land-air contact board, colored smoke bombs, etc., they were different, so as not to be imitated by the enemy. When the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Regiment of dongzhi withdrew to Xinxingli within 29 days, the Land and Air Liaison Group (that is, Captain Steinford) with the 1st Battalion arrived in Xinxingli with the 1st Battalion, and the air-ground liaison in Xinxingli was immediately restored, which explained the problem.
【To be continued, stay tuned】
(The picture of this article is from the network)