Author: Mo Guyan
After entering the Chosin Lake area, the 150,000-strong army of the 9th Corps of the Volunteer Army encountered the coldest extreme weather in 50 years, and the temperature dropped sharply to nearly minus 40 degrees Celsius. These disciples from Jiangnan hurried into the DPRK, the preparation of cold materials was insufficient, and some of the soldiers on the march were wrapped in towels, some were covered with blankets, in short, they tried their best to wear everything that could withstand the cold.
A North Korean liaison officer was very disappointed to see the equipment of the volunteer army, and bluntly said that such a unit would have to be completely destroyed. Song Shilun, commander of the corps, said: "Our troops are combat effective. The North Korean liaison officer said, "Bandits can also knock you down with their bare hands." ”
The Song Dynasty during the Period of The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea
Song Shilun has always had a hot temper, and suddenly turned his face: "You will try to knock me down first!" A punch hit the other side, the North Korean liaison officer took two steps backwards, fell to the ground, and said with satisfaction: "From your body, I see the combat effectiveness of the volunteer army!" ”
Of course, the volunteer army is effective! The 9th Corps is the ace elite of our army. If it were not for the large number of non-combat attrition caused by insufficient preparation of cold materials, which affected the exertion of combat effectiveness, it would certainly have dealt a heavier blow to the US troops on the Eastern Front and achieved more brilliant results. When people talk about the Battle of Chosin Lake today, they always attribute the reason to logistical negligence and point the finger directly at the Song Dynasty, but the actual situation is not so simple.
The first volunteer troops to fight in Korea
As we all know, the 9th Corps was originally trained as the first echelon of the attack on Taiwan and conducted landing operations training on the southeast coast, until after the operational plan for attacking Taiwan was canceled, as the second echelon of the Northeast Border Defense Army, it was prepared for entering the DPRK and was ordered to move north to Shandong to be on standby. In fact, the East China Military Region had long considered the problem of the cold after the 9th Corps entered the DPRK, and on September 5, 1950, it sent a report to the headquarters that the winter clothing to be issued to the 9 Corps was sewn according to the southern climate and might not be able to meet the needs of the alpine areas, but they did not know what the standard for sewing winter clothes in the alpine areas was, so they asked the Northeast Military Region to help prepare.
Providing winter clothes to hundreds of thousands of people is not an easy task, but there is no time to prepare. On October 12, the East China Military Region received orders and asked nine troops to go to the northeast in advance. Chen Yi had reservations about this order, and called back to ask whether he could postpone the dispatch of troops for two reasons: First, mobilization had not yet been carried out, and more importantly, "the equipment has yet to be adjusted, and the winter coat has not yet been issued." Chen Yi believes that it is ideal to go to the northeast in mid-November.
However, the military intelligence was in a hurry, and it was impossible to leave more preparation time for the 9 corps. On October 23, the chairman sent another telegram to the East China Military Region, asking for speedy training and preparing to drive an army to the northeast first." A week later, the chairman sent another telegram ordering the 9th Corps to go to one corps first, and the other two corps to start moving.
The reason why the 9th Corps rushed to the battlefield so fiery was closely related to the development of the war situation at that time. The Volunteers had decided to annihilate the U.S. 8th Army along the Cheongcheon River on the western front, and to ensure the security of the flank of the eastern front, it was not enough to rely on a 42nd Army. In addition, the US 10th Army on the Eastern Front was extremely dispersed in the process of advancing northward, and it was an excellent fighter for annihilating the enemy. Therefore, whether from the perspective of ensuring the safety of the flanks of the Western Front or from the perspective of taking the initiative to fight the war of annihilation, the 9th Corps must enter the DPRK as soon as possible.
The three corps of the 9th Corps did not advance at the same speed. The 20th Army was the fastest, reaching the battle assembly area on November 15; the 27th Army arrived at the designated area on the 17th two days late; and the 26th Army did not arrive until the evening of the 22nd. By this time, the U.S. 1st Marine Division had reached the Chosin Lake area and occupied Liutanli. If the 9th Corps had to wait until the winter supplies were complete before sending troops, the fighters would have been lost long ago, and the Battle of Chosin Lake would not have happened at all.
The 9th Corps rushed into battle without any preparation, so much so that when He Jinnian, deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region, met Liao Zhengguo, deputy commander of the 20th Army, in Shenyang, he said that if he entered the DPRK wearing such clothes, he would freeze to death alive! Song Shilun was also aware of this problem at that time, and especially reported to the main commander of the Northeast Military Region the serious difficulties in cold protection equipment. The Northeast Military Region also did its best to allocate all the cotton clothes in stock to the 9th Corps.
Is the cold material allocated by the Northeast Military Region to the 9th Corps sufficient? According to the summary data of the logistical experience of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, as of November 18, the Northeast Military Region had distributed a total of 140,000 cotton coats, 170,000 pairs of cotton shoes, and 180,000 cotton vests to the 9 Corps. Judging from this statistic, the cold materials issued by the Northeast Military Region to the 9 Corps are sufficient, except for the cotton coats, there are 10,000 pieces, and the others are over-issued.
Volunteer soldiers celebrate victory
Some people deduce from these figures that there was no shortage of winter clothes for the 9 Corps troops at that time, and the reason for the large number of non-combat attrition of the troops could not be attributed to the lack of cotton clothes. In fact, according to the survivors of a large number of combatants, the troops did lack winter clothes at that time. The reason for this phenomenon is that the time is too hasty, and the materials are sent to the corps and the army level, but there is no time to send them down, so that many of the vanguard troops have not received these materials in full and have already gone to the front.
Therefore, regardless of the actual situation on the battlefield at that time, some people blindly accused the commander of the 9 corps of being "ignorant and fearless" and lacking necessary preparations for dealing with extremely cold weather.
Another important reason for the large number of frostbite and frostbite of the volunteer army was the lack of food, the long-term starvation of officers and men of the troops, and the lack of physical heat.
The Volunteers attacked in the snow and ice
Since entering the DPRK, the 9th Corps has only distributed dry food for 4 days, and other times it is all up to itself to find its own way. The harsh climate and environment in the Chosin Lake area, the original sparse population, coupled with the bombing of US military aircraft, the village has long been left, and the volunteer army is a benevolent and righteous division that does not take a needle from the masses, how can it get grain on the spot? The only little grain can only be eaten cold because it cannot be cooked by fire (for fear of attracting AIR RAIDs by the US army), and the serious lack of food has led to the lack of human calories, which has a greater impact on the volunteer army than the lack of winter clothes.
Even the U.S. 1st Marine Division, which ate nutritious meals, covered with duck down quilts, and far exceeded the logistics of the Volunteers, also suffered 2,700 non-combat casualties, of which about 2,000 were frostbitten and 95% were frostbite on the feet. In contrast, the difficulties faced by the volunteers were unimaginable, and their astonishing will to fight erupted in desperate circumstances was enough to be admired by all soldiers, including their opponents.
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