As we all know, the Battle of Midway, which took place on June 4, 1942, ended with the collapse of the Japanese Navy and the complete victory of the United States Navy.
In the battle, the U.S. Navy lost 307 men, an aircraft carrier (YORKTOWN), a destroyer (HARMAN), and 98 aircraft.
The Japanese Navy suffered even worse losses, with 3,057 killed, four aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser, as well as 332 aircraft.
The Battle of Midway changed the balance of japanese and American aircraft carriers in the Pacific, causing the Japanese to lose their strategic initiative in the Pacific theater, which also laid the foundation for its final defeat.
But when we look back at this battle, it is not difficult to find that in fact, the Japanese Navy still has a chance to "win", at least it will not lose so badly!
So, what exactly led to the fiasco of the Japanese Navy?
The reason why the Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Midway is inseparable from these three strategic loopholes of Yamamoto Isoroku!
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="14" > the first loophole: the gambler mentality, wanting everything</h1>
As the commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, Yamamoto Isoroku has a high reputation in Japan, but this person has a very distinctive characteristic in his personality, that is, a gambler mentality!
After sneaking up on Pearl Harbor and tasting the sweetness, he wanted to win a big one on Midway.
So you see, this is a typical "gambler mentality", just won a little money, and then bet all on the table, trying to make another big one. But what good thing under the heavens can make you win?
At that time, Yamamoto's strategic blueprint was roughly as follows:
"I'll take Midway first, preferably as soon as I do, and your U.S. Pacific Fleet will come all the way from Hawaii to the rescue, and I'll lay out a pocket formation here and defeat you on the spot." In this way, you Americans can only obediently go to the negotiating table with me, sign a "peace agreement", and the war will be over. ”
In order to realize his strategic blueprint, Yamamoto fifty-six pondered for a long time, a series of complex deployments in his small book full of paintings.
According to Yamamoto's plan, the Japanese combined fleet had a total of 350 ships (including 8 aircraft carriers), divided into six modules, integrated operations.
Before attacking Midway, Yamamoto sent two aircraft carriers to attack the Aleutian Islands to the north.
Although there is a US naval base stationed here, it is still too "desolate" in itself, and even if it is laid down, it will not play much role in the overall situation.
Of course, Yamamoto himself did not want to take down the Aleutian Islands, he just wanted to force the US Pacific Fleet to divide its troops from Hawaii to rescue them through feint. In addition, it also helps to attract the attention of americans and thus relax their vigilance against Midway.
After that, Yamamoto Wasoroku divided his troops again from the remaining 6 aircraft carriers, allowing Minamimoto Tadaichi to take four to attack Midway Island, while he himself hid 300 nautical miles away from the battlefield with the then "sea giant" Yamato and a light aircraft carrier, and when the U.S. Pacific Fleet came, it could be killed here in one fell swoop.
Through these deployments, it is not difficult to see that Yamamoto's strategic goals in this battle are too many, both to take down Midway and to completely annihilate the US Pacific Fleet, and to achieve these two goals, its actions must be deformed.
Not to mention that the Japanese Navy does not have this strength, and the US Pacific Fleet is not a vegetarian, how can you not see this little ninety-nine of your Yamamoto Fifty-Six!
So much so that after the war, a Japanese officer reflected on the battle and concluded: "The Battle of Midway was initiated by a group of people who did not understand the ocean, and it was carried out by a group of people who did not understand the sky, so they must lose." ”
And this is a big loophole in Yamamoto's fifty-six strategy!
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="74" > the second vulnerability: the comparison of strength between the two sides</h1>
Before launching the Battle of Midway, Yamamoto compared the strength of the Japanese and American armies, believing that he had 8 aircraft carriers and that the battle should be ten to nine.
Therefore, Yamamoto fifty-six dared to send two aircraft carriers thousands of miles to the north to attack the Aleutian Islands and engage in some kind of feint.
Then he took the Giant Yamato and another light aircraft carrier to the rear pocket array, waiting for the American aircraft carrier to drill.
On the Midway battlefield, the Japanese actually had only four aircraft carriers, Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Wyvern, led by Tadaichi Minamimoto.
Yamamoto dared to do so because he felt that the Americans had only two aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Hornet. So in the eyes of the Japanese, the 4-to-2 advantage is "overwhelming".
In the Battle of the Coral Sea in May of that year, the Americans lost an aircraft carrier called the Lexington and another aircraft carrier called the Yorktown.
Japanese engineers calculated that even if the Yorktown aircraft carrier successfully returned to Hawaii for maintenance, it would take at least 3 months to move, and it would take half a year to completely repair it, so the Yorktown could not be counted at all!
But it turns out that the Japanese are wrong again!
On 27 May, Yorktown stumbled back to Hawaii for repairs, but only 68 hours later, it was back on its feet and on its way to the battlefield.
So you see, on the Midway battlefield, the ratio of the number of aircraft carriers between Japan and the United States is not 4 to 2, but 4 to 3.
Although the Yorktown was scarred, it still took more than 70 planes to the Midway battlefield.
Of course, you might say, "On the Midway battlefield, the number of Japanese aircraft carriers is not more than that of the Americans!" ”
If we only say it in terms of the number of aircraft carriers, this is true.
But what you need to know is that the national strength of Japan and the United States is huge, and the Japanese people will be very precious when they get an airplane, and all kinds of maintenance and care will be cherished. Therefore, there are very few carrier-based aircraft on an aircraft carrier in Japan.
But the Americans are big, and there are many more carrier-based aircraft on an aircraft carrier than the Japanese.
So although the number of aircraft carriers is four to three, from the perspective of carrier-based aircraft, both sides are similar, and everyone is more than three hundred aircraft.
Therefore, Yamamoto's omission of the comparison of the strength of the two sides on the battlefield was also an important reason for the japanese Navy's fiasco at Midway!
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="75" > the third vulnerability: too much subjective awareness</h1>
From the series of plans formulated by Yamamoto Isoroku, it is not difficult to see that in order to successfully implement these plans, there must be a premise, that is, the Americans must act according to the ideas of the Japanese.
But anyone knows that this is simply not possible! Yamamoto's various self-made clevernesses are revealed throughout the process.
For example, before the battle began, he sent a large number of submarines, and from June 1 onwards, he ambushed early between Midway and Hawaii and laid two blockade lines.
According to Yamamoto's idea, if the American aircraft carrier comes to the rescue, then I can find and sink you immediately, at least I can also run to the headquarters to report a letter.
Therefore, in his view, the US Pacific Fleet could not appear on the Battlefield of Midway. And this is the typical wishful thinking.
But the question is, what if these plans are known to the Americans? Wouldn't those plans collapse in that way?
What the Japanese never expected was that this really happened!
At that time, there were two lieutenant colonel officers in the United States who were engaged in intelligence, and they had already deciphered the code of the Japanese Navy very early on, and they knew exactly what the Japanese wanted to do and what they were doing.
For a while, the two officers noticed that the Japanese had been mentioning a place code-named "AF" in recent Japanese telegrams.
Obviously, the Japanese wanted to attack this place, but where was this? They figured it out and eventually thought it should be "Midway", but it was just speculation, and if it was wrong, the consequences would be unimaginable.
However, the way to verify whether this "AF" is Midway is also very simple, and you only need a little trick to find out.
They asked the U.S. military on Midway to send a "clear code telegram" to the headquarters, saying that the desalination facilities on Midway had failed, and you quickly sent someone to repair it.
The Americans are deliberately telling the Japanese that there is a shortage of fresh water to drink on Midway, and if you attack now, we will certainly not be able to sustain it for long.
The telegram, of course, was intercepted by the Japanese, who gleefully reported it to Yamamoto. When the Americans intercepted the telegram again, they already knew that this "AF" referred to Midway, so they stepped up their arrangements.
Commander Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, urgently ordered the reinforcement of the fortifications on Midway, and then all the fighters that could be found flew to Midway to prepare for the coming war.
But that's not enough! Nimitz desperately tried to repair the scarred Yorktown.
In addition, the Americans ambushed three carriers about 300 nautical miles north of Midway on June 1, before the Japanese submarines laid out the blockade line.
So in fact, the Japanese had no idea that american aircraft carriers were going to join the battle! And this was the basic situation on the battlefield at that time.
Throughout the decision-making process, it is not difficult to see that Isoroku Yamamoto, as the commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, is indeed a little too taken for granted, and the "gambler mentality" of his personality is revealed.
Of course, these three strategic loopholes of Yamamoto Fifty-Six finally led to the Japanese Navy's disastrous defeat at the Battle of Midway!