On April 6, 1927, the Beijing government presided over by Zhang Zuolin sent more than 300 armed military and police officers to surround the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, searched the Soviet Far Eastern Bank, the Beijing Office of the China Eastern Railway and other official offices, arrested the Soviet embassy personnel and Li Dazhao and other Communists, and seized a large number of Soviet archives and documents, which shocked the world for a while.
The other occurred on May 27, 1929, when Zhang Xueliang instructed Zhang Jinghui, the governor of the Eastern Provincial Special Region, to send military police to search the Soviet Embassy in Harbin, arresting 39 Soviet personnel and confiscating a number of important documents, known as the "·May 27 Incident." Although Zhang Zuolin searched the old Russian barracks used by the embassy, not the embassy itself, it is an indisputable fact that the military and police entered foreign embassies and consulates and arrested embassy staff. The two diplomatic incidents were both committed by Zhang's father and son, and the time was only two years apart, and the occurrence of the two incidents was not an isolated phenomenon by chance, and the two were both related and different. Most of the previous studies have ignored this problem, and the author will not be superficial, but make a simple comparative analysis.
1. The starting point is to recover the right to the Middle East
In the two diplomatic incidents, the search of the Soviet embassy was only the surface of the problem, and the essence of the problem was the struggle between China and the Soviet Union for the right to the Middle East and the Sino-Russian negotiations caused by the unequal rights and interests of the Middle East Road. Whether it is Zhang Zuolin or Zhang Xueliang, the starting point of the two is the same in recovering the right to the Middle East, and Zhang Xueliang inherited the practice of his father Zhang Zuolin.
1. The Soviet side violated the agreement and deprived China of its rights and interests
The Middle East Road issue has always been a focal point of many contradictions between China, the Soviet Union (Russia), and the international community. After the October Revolution, the Soviet government issued two declarations on China, and in the 1919 manifesto on the issue of the Middle East Road, the Soviet side announced that it was willing to return it to China free of charge, but the 1920 declaration regressed to the Sino-Soviet confederation. After repeated negotiations, on May 31, 1924, the Soviet government and the Beijing government signed the "Sino-Russian Agreement on the Outline of the Settlement of Outstanding Cases" (i.e., the "Sino-Russian Agreement") and the "Agreement on the Provisional Management of the Eastern Railway", and diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union were restored. On September 24, the Soviet government signed the "Feng-Russia Agreement" with the local governments in Northeast China, which was basically the same as the principles and contents of the "Sino-Russian Agreement", and the Beijing government posthumously recognized it as an annex to the "Sino-Russian Agreement." After the signing of the "Feng-Russia Agreement", the two sides began to "jointly manage" the Middle East Road in early October.
Both the Sino-Russian Agreement and the Feng-Russia Agreement clearly stipulate that the China Eastern Railway is purely commercial in nature; Except for the business affairs of the road, which is directly under the jurisdiction of the road, all matters related to the national and local sovereignty of the Republic of China, such as judicial, civil, military, police, municipal administration, taxation, land acres (except for the land necessary for the railway itself), etc., shall be handled by the Chinese government." The "Feng-Russia Agreement" also stipulates that the personnel of the railway shall be appointed according to the "principle of equal distribution" between the Chinese and Soviet peoples. "The budget and final accounts of the railway shall be submitted by the board of directors to the joint meeting of the board of directors and the board of supervisors for examination and approval." "All the net profits of this railway shall be kept by the council in the committees organized by the two sides, and shall not be used until the issue of the distribution of the net profits between the two parties has been resolved." The two agreements made principled provisions for the "joint management" of the Middle East Road between China and the Soviet Union.
However, the signing of the Sino-Russian Agreement and the Feng-Russia Agreement did not completely resolve the Middle Road issue, because the agreement only stipulated the principles of settlement and did not set out specific implementation rules. In this way, the Soviet side regained the right to administer the Middle East Road through the agreement, and could only hope for the Sino-Russian conference stipulated in the agreement on China's demand for the abolition of treaty privileges and the settlement of various outstanding cases.
In accordance with Article 2 of the "Sino-Russian Agreement," a Sino-Soviet conference was held within one month after the signing of the agreement to discuss the detailed rules for settling all outstanding cases between China and the Soviet Union, including the Middle East Road, but due to the deliberate delay of the Soviet side, the meeting was not officially opened until August 26, 1925, and six special committees were set up, namely, the treaty, debts, road affairs, boundary affairs, air traffic rights, and special services. Due to further delays on the part of the Soviet Union, the subcommittees of the Sino-Russian Conference did not meet one after another until November 28, 1925, a full year and a half later than the time stipulated in the agreement.
If the Sino-Russian conference cannot be convened for a long time, the Chinese side's demand for resolving the Middle East Road issue will not be resolved, and the "Sino-Russian Agreement" stipulates that until the Sino-Russian conference is settled, the old Sino-Russian agreement on the joint construction of the Eastern Province Railway and the provisional management of the Middle East Railway will remain valid. In this way, the "Sino-Russian Agreement" and the "Agreement on the Provisional Administration of the Eastern Railway" have become long-term and effective treaties, and the clauses that infringe on China's sovereignty will also be in effect for a long time.
The Soviet side took advantage of this to gradually achieve "unilateral" control over the China Eastern Railway, and its performance was varied: the non-railway business that should be returned to the Chinese side, such as telegraphs, telephones, mines, libraries, observatories, schools, etc., was not handed over to the Chinese side; Although the Chinese side serves as the chairman of the council, it has no supervisory power. The director of the railway bureau belongs to the Soviet side, and the deputy director belongs to the Chinese side, but the director is responsible for the system, and the important directors of all departments are also controlled by the Soviet side; The Soviet Union unilaterally controlled financial and personnel rights, and most of the profits of the railways were monopolized by the Soviet side. In addition, the Soviet side also used the Middle East Road as a base to engage in activities beyond the scope of the railway's commercial operations, such as collecting Chinese intelligence and bribing foreign-related officials in Northeast China. The Soviet Union's breach of contract prevented the Chinese side from effectively exercising its administrative rights and enjoying its due rights, and since then, the Middle East Road has become a fuse for the constant conflicts and frequent frictions between China and the Soviet Union, and the local authorities in the northeast and the Soviet institutions in China have been at odds
(2) The negotiation and struggle between the father and son to recover their rights and interests
In the face of the loss of power in the co-management of the railway, both generations of the Zhang father and son took action and made continuous negotiations and efforts to recover the rights. During the period of Zhang Zuolin, he actively used the Sino-Russian conference to recover his rights.
Since the issue of the Middle East Road and Songhei navigation rights is closely related to the northeast region, the road and navigation of the Sino-Russian conference were presided over by the Feng side. At the meeting of the road affairs, Feng Yi asked for the revision of the powers of the director of the bureau, the regulations of the road bureau, and the employment and writing of the Sino-Russian average, etc., in the case of "the council cannot implement the agreement, and it is controlled by me, so that the director of the road bureau has the exclusive power to do things, and there is no common benefit". On the one hand, it used strong means to recover sovereignty and force the Soviet side to make financial and administrative concessions, otherwise it would not hesitate to abolish the agreement. It can be seen that Zhang Zuolin's attitude on the Chinese side was quite tough in his negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Because the Soviet side was unwilling to give up any vested rights and interests, the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union did not go smoothly, and the contest between the two sides continued all along, with the Soviet side taking a tough attitude and Zhang Zuolin also going-for-tat. On January 22, 1926, Zhang Zuolin arrested Ivanov and imposed military control on the Middle East Road. The Soviet side lodged a serious protest, demanding the release of Ivanov and the resumption of normal operation of the railway, and issued a three-day ultimatum.
At the same time, the Soviet army entered mobilization preparations. Zhang Zuolin did not show weakness, and ordered the armies of Jiji and Heiji provinces to "take active military action". In order to ease relations with the Feng side, the Soviet side dismissed Ivanov from the post of director of the bureau, and at the same time promised to transport the Feng side of the road convoy free of charge in the future. On April 21, Soviet Deputy Minister of Communications Serebryokov met with Zhang Zuolin and agreed on the issue of the Middle East Road, in which Zhang proposed to reduce the authority of the director of the bureau, the equal appointment of Chinese and Soviet staff, and the delegation of economic and financial powers to the Council. In order to speed up the process of settling the Middle East Road issue, on May 21, June 7, and July 2, 1926, the two sides held three meetings to negotiate the Middle East Railway Agreement. During the meeting, the Soviet side put forward eight demands, including that the China Eastern Railway be jointly guarded by the Chinese and Soviet armies. Bong decided that the requirements were too harsh and announced the suspension of the meeting.
On the one hand, the Feng side negotiated with the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, took practical measures to recover the administrative power of the Middle East Road Area. In March 1926, Zhang Zuolin ordered Zhang Huanxiang, chief executive of the three eastern provinces, to dissolve the public councils of all cities along the China Eastern Railway, including the Harbin public council, and set up an autonomous provisional committee composed entirely of Chinese.
On August 21, 1926, Zhang Zuolin ordered the Northeast Coast River Defense Fleet to take over all the ships and ancillary properties of the Navigation Office of the Eastern Railway Administration, and on September 4, he closed the Academic Affairs Office of the Eastern Railway Administration and forcibly took back the right to education along the Eastern Railway. At the same time, the Soviet ambassador to China, Garahan, was expelled on the grounds of interference in internal affairs.
On March 11, 1927, Fengfang sent personnel to search the Soviet Trade Representative Office in Harbin, and on April 6, the Soviet Embassy was searched. The contradictions between Fengxi and Russia intensified, and the negotiations were suspended. The Middle East Road issue was not finally resolved in the Zhang Zuolin era.
After Zhang Xueliang took charge of the Northeast, he wanted to do a career. At that time, the Sino-Russian negotiation meeting had been suspended. However, with the changes in the international situation and the improvement of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union not only broke the contract and monopolized power, but also intensified its efforts, taking all the regions through which the Middle East Road passed as its sphere of influence. In response to the Soviet side's arbitrariness, Zhang Xueliang continued his father's hard-line stance, and from December 1928 to May 1929, he took a series of actions to seek to regain more sovereignty over the Middle East Road. It was not until May 27, 1929 that the armed search of the Soviet Embassy in Kazakhstan triggered the sensational "·May 27 Incident".
At the beginning of his administration, Zhang Xueliang immediately appointed Jiang Bin, the supervisor of the three eastern provinces, to forcibly take back the "Harbin Central Telephone Bureau" on the Middle East Road and change it to the "Harbin Telephone Bureau". After the Northeast changed banners, he "forcibly received" the Harbin Cultural Relics Research Society and the Harbin Meteorological Observatory from the Soviets step by step, and expelled Filipbowich, the head of the Soviet Section of the Department of Education. At the same time, Zhang Xueliang forced the Soviet side to agree to the Middle East Road to bear the education expenses of China's Eastern Province Special Region, and also changed the funds of the Middle East Road, which had always been stored in the Far Eastern Bank of the Soviet side, to be deposited in the Far Eastern Bank and the Bank of China in half. In addition, in early January 1929, the local authorities in the northeast closed the Soviet newspaper "Voice of the Masses" (6), which had 10,000 copies of the sunrise. All these actions show Zhang Xueliang's determination to regain the right of way in the Middle East.
The Soviet Union, of course, was reluctant to share control of the Middle East Road with China. On February 28, 1929, when Zhang Xueliang ordered Lu Ronghuan, the governor of the Middle East Road, to discuss with Zirkin, vice chairman of the Soviet side of the Middle East Road Council, to reduce the authority of the Soviet director and increase the authority of the Chinese, the Soviet directors agreed not to attend the council, so that the Chinese demand had no chance to be discussed. In March of the same year, under the chairmanship of Zhang Xueliang, the Chinese side again proposed to the Soviet side the implementation of the resolution: (1) All orders and documents of the Road Bureau shall not take effect unless they are signed by the director of the bureau and the deputy director of the Chinese side; (2) The funds used by the road bureau must be approved by the inspection bureau and shall not be disbursed; (3) The directors and section chiefs of the road bureau and the section chiefs and station chiefs along the line shall be reassigned to half of the Chinese; (4) the average method of other staff members, which will be implemented gradually; (5) All documents on the Middle East Road should be used in both Chinese and Russian. These demands were reasonable and legitimate, but in its reply on 6 March, the Soviet side completely rejected the countersignature proposed by the Chinese side, and only agreed to reassign the directors of several divisions, such as commerce and general affairs, to Chinese posts. On 27 March, the Chinese side reiterated the above demand, but the Soviet side still adopted a policy of delay.
The attitude of the Soviet side caused the issue of the Middle East Road to be protracted and Zhang Xueliang had to adopt a "rapid strategy." On May 27, 1929, the Harbin Special Police Department was ordered to search the Soviet Consulate General in Kazakhstan and arrested a large number of people including the heads of the Russian side of the Workers' Federation of factories along the stations of the Middle East Railway and the 36 Sheds area, as well as the Soviet Merchant Shipping Bureau, the Far Eastern Kerosene Bureau, the Far Eastern State Trade Bureau, and other organizations and departments.
It can be seen from the above analysis that it was the Soviet side that breached the contract first, and the negotiations between the Zhang father and son to recover the rights of the Middle East road were inevitable, and in the process of negotiations, due to the escalation of the contradictions, they became hostile to the Soviet Union, which eventually led to two diplomatic incidents.
2. The reasons for initiating the incident are the same and different
In the 20s of the 20th century, the establishment and consolidation of the socialist Soviet Union and the vigorous development of China's democratic revolution made the opposition to socialism and communism the mainstream of propaganda by the government in power at that time in China, and the "Sino-Russian Agreement" did have the stipulation that "each other should not oppose propaganda with the public order and social organizations of the other country".
(1) The two searches were conducted under the banner of "anti-redness".
On April 6, 1927, Chen Xingya, director of the Jingshi Police Department, at the behest of Zhang Zuolin and with the permission of Minister Odenko, the leader of the embassy district, led more than 300 policemen, gendarmes, and plainclothes detectives to the embassy district, claiming that a large number of Communists had recently taken refuge in the Far Eastern Bank, the office of the Eastern Eastern Railway, and the Gengzi Indemnity Committee in the embassy area, "inciting students and workers to premeditate riots in the capital," and that "the spread of this Bolshevik ideology would certainly harm foreigners and disrupt local peace and order." Therefore, it was necessary to "take decisive measures" and "raid the aforementioned communist shelters" before a large number of military and police entered the Soviet embassy district.
After the search of the Soviet Embassy, Zhang Zuolin talked about the search with United States Minister Ma Murui and claimed: "He is waging a struggle against Bolshevism in China and is determined to fight hard to the end!" In a letter to Japan Prime Minister Yoshiichi Tanaka, Zhang Zuolin openly declared: "The red is poisonous, and the whole world is angry," and "I am deeply afraid that the gods and goddesses will be degraded, so we will not hesitate to make heavy sacrifices and try to save them." He regarded himself as an "anti-red" cadre and boasted about the raid of the Soviet embassy as a great military achievement.
On 16 April, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beijing Government stressed in a note to the Soviet Government that "the search of the old Russian barracks by the Chinese military and police was carried out in an attempt to overthrow the government and disturb public order by organizing organs including the Party in a destabilizing manner, which is in fact a violation of public international law and the Sino-Russian agreement." The search was carried out in accordance with the country's self-defense. As a result of the search, the flags, seals, lists, and various evidentiary documents used in the uprising of important rebel parties and party members were obtained, as well as most of their ordnance and various machine gun bullets, as well as evidentiary documents of private collusion with the chaotic party, all of which were obtained under the jurisdiction of the Russian embassy or in various organs with close relations. The "anti-red" movement enabled Zhang Zuolin to find the most high-sounding reason for the embassy raid.
Similarly, Zhang Xueliang also carried the "anti-red" banner into the Soviet embassy in Harbin. By 1929, Zhang Xueliang and the Northeast authorities believed that the China Eastern Railway had become the abyss of the Communist Party, and they "used various methods to publicize it" and carried out large-scale activities. Therefore, "the Soviet consulate in Harbin engaged in secret communist propaganda activities" became the best excuse for the "·May 27 incident". As the report of Zhang Jinghui, the governor of the Eastern Provincial Special Administrative Region, described: "The Third International secretly met in the cellar of the Soviet Consulate General in Kazakhstan to propagate communism, and all the party members and cadres of the Communist Party administration along the Middle East Road were present.
This meeting is a clear violation of the Feng-Russia agreement. The Special Police Department then ordered the Third Police Station to send officers to search the museum at about 1 p.m. on the same day, and found that 50 people were gathering in the cellar. At the same time, many documents and books were found in the museum to publicize the redness, as well as firearms, bullets, tobacco and other objects. ”
Therefore, on May 28, the day after the incident, Zirkin, the vice chairman of the Soviet side of the Middle East Road, protested, and received a reply that "this incident occurred because the Communist Party used the consulate assembly to propagate communism." At this time, it is not a violation of the agreement between the Russian Federation, but also a violation of the public law of the country. For the sake of local security, it has to be banned." Zhang Xueliang also reiterated in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 9: "The Soviet Russian Consulate in Kazakhstan convened the Communist Party and held a secret meeting, which not only disturbed local public order, but also violated the Sino-Russian agreement. The consulate had to be searched as a last resort. (4) It can be seen that the reason for the search of the Soviet embassy by the Zhang father and son is the same in the point of "anti-red".
(2) "Revolutionary diplomacy" helped Zhang Xueliang recover his rights
Unlike his father Zhang Zuolin, who was simply "anti-red", Zhang Xueliang also had a revolutionary side while "opposing the red", that is, he had the consideration of promoting Chiang Kai-shek's "revolutionary diplomacy".
"Revolutionary diplomacy", that is, the use of "revolutionary" methods and means to resolve unequal diplomatic relations between China and foreign countries, was proposed when the Guangzhou Nationalist Government began the Northern Expedition under the cooperation system of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and after the establishment of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, it evolved into "revolutionary diplomacy" centered on the revision of unequal treaties.
On June 15, the Nanjing Nationalist Government issued a declaration to the outside world: "For more than 80 years, China has been bound by unequal treaties. Such restraints are contrary to the international principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and are not permitted by independent countries. Now, when the reunification of China has been completed, it is necessary to further follow the proper procedures and carry out the reformulation of the new treaty, so as to fulfill the purpose of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty. "The revolutionary diplomacy pursued by the Nanking government will be carried out in five phases, including the restoration of tariff autonomy, the abolition of extraterritoriality, the resumption of concessions, the resumption of leased land, and the resumption of railway rights, inland navigation rights, and coastal trade rights, etc., with the aim of abolishing unequal treaties in a very short period of time and realizing the recovery of all rights; If the negotiations with other countries cannot be resolved within the predetermined period, China will unilaterally abrogate the treaty and resolutely withdraw all its rights. Since then, there have been nationwide calls for the abolition of unequal treaties.
From the end of 1926 to the beginning of 1927, the Nationalist Government, with the support of the people, recovered the British concessions of Hankou and Jiujiang. The people of the whole country and public opinion unanimously demanded the recovery of sovereignty in all aspects. The Nationalist Government also complied with the will of the people and demanded the return of foreign concessions, the withdrawal of foreign garrisons, and the resumption of sovereignty. This wave of recovering sovereignty in the whole country is manifested in the attitude towards the Middle East Road in the northeast, and the northeast has also issued a call for the recovery of the Middle East Road.
In December 1928, Zhang Xueliang realized the "change of banner" in Northeast China, obeyed the Three People's Principles, and subordinated to the Nationalist Government, and the whole country was formally unified. Zhang Xueliang's righteous act has been unanimously praised by the whole country. Zhang Xueliang after the change of banner believes that "Yu Xi has been sent to Xinjiang for a year, and he has been in the burden and pain every day", "The Northeast environment is special, and the Northeast will be the Northeast of the Chinese people or the Northeast of others in the future, and I dare not know." However, we should do our best to swear to defend the land for the country, and seek the cause of security for the people, so that we will always be for the people of the country." Therefore, Zhang Xueliang also wanted to show his skills in the foreign side, and Zhang Xueliang took action on the Middle East Road to achieve two goals: one is to recover the management power of the Middle East Road, and the other is to promote "revolutionary diplomacy" by recovering the Middle East Road, which will help abolish the "consular jurisdiction" and tariff negotiations, and "if the sovereignty of the Middle East Road can be recovered with the power of the government and the people, then all other unequal treaties can be abolished." Against this background, Zhang Xueliang searched the Soviet embassy in Kazakhstan.
Third, the outcome of the incident was very different
After Zhang Zuolin searched the Soviet Embassy, although the Soviet Union strongly protested, it did not take strong retaliatory measures, and in the end it was not resolved. Zhang Xueliang's search of the Soviet embassy became the fuse of the Middle East Road incident, which then triggered the Sino-Soviet border war.
Zhang Zuolin's search of the Soviet embassy set a precedent in the history of the Republic of China for searching foreign consulates and arresting diplomats. The Soviet side reacted quickly to the atrocities committed by the military and police: After the incident, the acting Soviet ambassador to China, Zirnykh, personally visited Gu Weijun at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lodged a protest, demanded the immediate release of the arrested embassy personnel, and published a letter of protest in various newspapers. On the 9th, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Livetinov put forward an ultimatum to Zheng Yanxi, the Chinese chargé d'affaires in the Soviet Union, pointing out that Zhang Zuolin's arrest of the Soviet embassy was a violation of extraterritoriality and public international law. (2) the immediate release of Russian personnel; (3) Documents returned to the Military Attache's Office of the Embassy for copying; (4) The books of money and property stolen by the military and police shall be handed over to the owner. Before the Beijing government complied with this request, the Soviet Union withdrew its embassy personnel and retained only the provincial consulates in protest. Mass demonstrations were also held across the Soviet Union to protest the atrocities of the military and police in Beijing.
The response from the Beijing government to the Soviet government's demand for limited moderation was quite tough. On the 16th, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the Chargé d'Affaires in the Soviet Union, instructing him to convey to the Soviet Government that it was "difficult to comply with the four demands made by him at present" and that he was willing to "leave it at his own convenience" as for withdrawing the embassy from China. This blunt stance is like a fast-acting refrigerant, causing the air in diplomatic relations between the two countries to drop to the freezing point immediately. On the 19th, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Zirkin led more than 30 librarians back to China, and did not bid farewell to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before leaving, and Gu Weijun did not send anyone to see him off. After that, the charge d'affaires of the Beijing government in the Soviet Union remained in Moscow, and the Soviet consuls stationed in various parts of China's three eastern provinces were not abolished. It can be said that the Soviet Union did not retaliate against Zhang Zuolin's search of the embassy, and even acquiesced in this behavior.
Compared with his father Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang was far less lucky, and the "· 27 Incident" became the fuse of the Middle East Road Incident, and finally broke out the Middle East Road War.
At the beginning of the "· 27 incident", the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR lodged a serious protest and declared that "from now on, the Soviet Government will not respect the representative office in Mozambique in China and its consulates on the territory of the Soviet Union, regardless of the constraints of public international law, and will not recognize the extraterritoriality conferred by public international law." However, the Soviet protests had no deterrent effect on Zhang Xueliang. Because Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards the search of Soviet consulates in the northeast was very clear, that is, "to be tough on Soviet Russia." The local authorities in Northeast China, in accordance with the Nanjing government's telegraphic order to "take the camera", planned to take over the Middle East Road by force. Chiang Kai-shek also went to Beiping in person to arrange the Northeast Army to deploy defenses along the Sino-Soviet border to prepare for war. On 10 July, the authorities in the northeast dispatched armed personnel to forcibly take over telecommunications institutions along the China Eastern Railway, seized the Soviet state-run commercial organs, disbanded the workers' federations on the road, completely took over the Middle East Road, sent Fan Qiguang, deputy director of the Chinese side, to act as director of the railway bureau, and sent 59 senior staff members, including Yemisanov, director of the Soviet bureau, out of the country. The Middle East Road incident broke out.
Even in the ultimatum of 13 July, the Soviet Union still proposed to convene a meeting as soon as possible to resolve all the problems on the Middle Road, but the Nanjing Nationalist Government took a tough attitude in its reply on 16 July. On the 17th, the Soviet Union announced the severance of diplomatic relations with China, the cessation of railway communication with China, and the reservation of all rights of the 1924 Sino-Russian and Feng-Russian agreements, and warned the Northeast authorities and the Nanjing Government that if the status quo ante of the Eastern Railway was not restored, China would be in great danger.
After the severance of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union, the situation on the Sino-Soviet border became increasingly tense. On August 6, the Soviet Union formally formed the Special Far Eastern Army with Gallon as its commander. On August 15, Zhang Xueliang formed the first and second armies to defend against Russia, and since then the two sides have been in constant military conflicts. On October 12, 1929, the Soviet army launched the famous Battle of Tongjiang, and the Sino-Soviet border war officially broke out. After two months of fierce fighting, the Northeast Frontier Army suffered heavy losses in Tongjiang, Zalanor, Manchuria and other important military positions. After successive military defeats, the Nanjing government and Zhang Xueliang had no choice but to seek to negotiate with the Soviet government to resolve the Middle East Road issue.
On December 22, 1929, Cai Yunsheng, a representative of the Nationalist Government, and Simenovsky, a representative of the Soviet Government, signed the Agreement of the Sino-Soviet Boli Conference, deciding to restore the pre-war "state of peace on the border between China and the Soviet Union, and the two sides immediately withdraw their troops", and agreed that "China and the Soviet Union will hold a meeting in Moscow on January 25, 1930 to resolve all problems", and the Middle East Road incident came to an end.
Looking at the two raids of the Soviet embassy by Zhang's father and son, the two pursued the same goal and initiated the incident for the same reason, but the results and effects were very different, which was determined by the domestic and foreign political environment in China at that time.
First of all, the evolution of the international situation directly affected and guided the policies of the great powers towards the Soviet Union. The Northeast in the early 20s of the 20th century was both the focus of contention among the great powers and the front line of their opposition to the socialist Soviet Union. The crisis-ridden government in Beijing, which was under Zhang Zuolin's control, and the surging anti-imperialist patriotic movement that swept China, opened an important gap in the temporary partial stability of the capitalist world and made the powers restless. The Soviet Union's assistance to the Chinese national liberation movement made the great powers extremely hostile.
The seizure of the Soviet embassy caused by Zhang Zuolin made the great powers see the hope of a turning point in the situation, so they instigated and supported Zhang Zuolin's behavior. At the end of the 20s, the Nanjing Nationalist Government pursued a line of "revolutionary diplomacy", which made governments feel that their interests in China were in jeopardy. This consistency of interests in China prompted the great powers to form a "united front" against China's movement to reclaim its rights, and to switch from uniting against the Soviet Union to sympathizing with the Soviet Union and opposing Zhang Xueliang's actions. This was an important external factor influencing the Second Sino-Soviet Embassy Incident.
Second, changes in the domestic situation and domestic policies directly determine the attitude of the great powers toward China. After the establishment of the Nationalist Government in Guangzhou, the center of Sino-Soviet relations was actually moved from Beijing to Guangzhou. The Soviet government's policy of supporting the Nationalist government's Northern Expedition and unifying China was hated by the warlords of Feng and Zhizhi. Relations between the Beijing government and Moscow did not develop steadily, but came to a standstill. At a time when the revolutionary tide was growing all over the country, the anti-Soviet stance of the Beijing government became increasingly obvious.
In June 1926, Zhang Zuolin entered Beijing, and Sino-Soviet relations suddenly became tense. The Beijing government under Zhang Zuolin was very hateful of the Soviet Union and pursued an anti-Soviet policy, which coincided with the "anti-communism" of the great powers and would inevitably be supported and recognized. From the beginning of 1929, the situation in China seemed to be developing in a good direction, and the peaceful reunification of the north and the south was finally achieved. At this time, the "revolutionary diplomacy" practiced by the Nanjing government pushed itself to the opposite side of the great powers to a certain extent, and the attitude of various governments towards China inevitably changed.
Third, the consolidation of the Soviet Union's position and the strengthening of its strength were the key to influencing its China policy. In the early 20s of the 20 th century, when the Soviet Union had just been established and its strength was not yet strong, the Soviet Union was relatively isolated in the face of the "anti-Soviet front" formed by the great powers. The Soviet Government was convinced that this would be sponsored by the workers of all countries and the friendship of the Chinese and Soviet peoples. The diplomatic isolation caused the Soviet Union to acquiesce in Zhang Zuolin's search of the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
During the period of Zhang Xueliang, the Soviet Union was increasingly consolidated, and with the improvement of the economic situation, nationalism and great-power doctrine made a comeback. At the same time, if the Middle East Road was taken over by force, the great powers stood on the position of sympathy for the Soviet Union because of their interests, and the attitude of the Soviet Union was naturally tougher, and the League of Nations and the Non-War Pact Organization had no choice but to solve the Middle Road issue by force.
Fourth, the differences in the specific strategies of the Zhang father and son affected the outcome of the incident to a certain extent. Zhang Zuolin was fully aware of the international and domestic situation, so he communicated with the great powers before the action. In the early morning of April 6, 1927, Zhang Zuolin immediately sent Wu Jin, director of the Foreign Affairs Division of the General Headquarters of the Angolan National Army, to the Netherlands Embassy to secretly contact the leader Minister Odenko. Zhang Xueliang, on the other hand, overestimated the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, and underestimated the possibility of a military response and retaliation by the Soviet side. In particular, the practice of recovering the Middle Road by force not only caused the governments of the great powers to disagree with it, but also failed to make full preparations for the war on the Middle East Road in the near future, with the result that the good wish to recover the right of way led to the humiliation of defeat.
In short, the two incidents of Zhang's father and son searching the Soviet embassy are the same in terms of starting point, the same in the cause of the incident, and completely different in terms of the outcome and impact of the incident. The two incidents were not only a reflection of the specific stage of Sino-Soviet relations in the 20 th century, but also a reflection of the changing international situation and the complicated domestic and foreign political relations at that time.