Since the beginning of the year, the issue of nuclear weapons has been the focus of hype for the United States and its NATO allies.
The United States has accused China of refusing to participate in nuclear arms control consultations and has explored the possibility of launching a nuclear surprise attack on China.
Recently, the Stockholm Institute, which has long been funded by NATO, released a report on its nuclear military strength, which exaggerated the rapid expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, which once again triggered a heated discussion within NATO about China's nuclear threat.
The report, released by a U.S.-backed European think tank, once again hyped up the topic of China's massive expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
According to the report, China's nuclear warheads have increased significantly from a long-term 250 to 410, and some European estimates even suggest that China already has 500 nuclear warheads.
The report also claims that China has built 72 Julang-3 SLBMs in one year, and at this rate, China's sea-based nuclear strike capability will increase by 720 within a decade.
If land-based mobile missiles and silos-based missiles are added, China's nuclear power will surpass that of the United States and Russia within six years at most.
The rapid expansion of China's nuclear weapons, as mentioned in the Stockholm report, was seen by the Western world as a reconfirmation of the rapid build-up of the PLA's nuclear capabilities.
However, this confirmation appears hesitant to face up to the true level and purpose of China's nuclear arsenal buildup.
The report even shy away from the long-hyped truth about China's new wind turbine facilities in three northwestern regions, which has been hyped up by Western open-source intelligence agencies.
On the one hand, these European think tanks have issued a report with US funding, claiming that China's nuclear forces have developed significantly, the number of nuclear warheads has doubled, and it can produce a large number of sea-based nuclear missiles in a year, predicting that China's nuclear strength will surpass that of the United States and Russia in the future.
On the other hand, they are reluctant to admit that China's nuclear system is developing much faster than they expected, and that the structure of China's nuclear forces is far more complex than they advertise.
This reflects the deep contradictions in which the United States and its NATO allies are embroiled.
They are trying to put pressure on China by hyping up China's nuclear expansion, while at the same time exaggerating the China threat theory and making excuses for their own nuclear arms race.
However, they are also afraid of China's nuclear expansion, and they are worried that after China's strength increases, it will wield the big stick of nuclear deterrence, so that NATO will lose its superiority in nuclear forces when its conventional forces are gradually falling behind, and thus lose the possibility of defeating China in a nuclear war when conventional conflict is unfavorable.
Thus, we see this paradoxical phenomenon - the West, on the one hand, declares that "China is expanding its nuclear forces", but on the other hand says that "China's nuclear expansion is unlikely".
They speculate that China produced dozens of ICBMs in a year to highlight the rapid expansion and strength of China's nuclear capabilities.
However, they also stressed that they do not see any signs that China is producing more warheads, trying to maintain the concept that "the advantage is in me", and emphasizing that NATO still has enough capabilities to defeat China in the nuclear field.
The root of this contradiction lies in the fact that the United States, the backer behind these European institutions, is facing the decline and collapse of nuclear power and is losing its advantage in scale and the possibility of victory in the nuclear field.
For the United States, the key question is not how quickly China's nuclear forces will expand or how strong it will be in the future, but rather that the United States itself will no longer be able to catch up or even maintain the current size of its nuclear arsenal in the face of the growing nuclear capabilities of the People's Liberation Army.
The current state of the United States' nuclear arsenal is worrying. The only main force of its land-based nuclear missiles is the Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missile, which has been in service for nearly 60 years and is difficult to maintain both fuel reliability and the remaining life of components.
In terms of sea-based nuclear forces, the core of US nuclear forces, although the "Trident-D5" submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile is still very advanced, the "Ohio"-class nuclear submarine equipped with it began service in the mid-80s.
It has been in service for 40 years, and it is difficult to continue to extend its life and combat readiness due to the limited life of the pressure-resistant shell and the loss of nuclear fuel.
Although the United States has begun work on the replacement of its nuclear forces, this process has been bogged down due to the serious degradation of scientific research capabilities and industrial production capacity.
The cost of the new Sentinel ICBM has risen to $125 billion, and technical difficulties make it difficult to mass-produce until 2030.
The cost of the first nuclear submarine of the Columbia-class nuclear submarine, which replaces the Ohio-class, is expected to exceed $15 billion and may continue to rise, putting huge pressure on the Navy's budget.
At the same time, its completion is being delayed due to a shortage of workers in the shipbuilding industry and supply chain issues.
These two types are regarded as the killer weapons of the future nuclear combat power of the US military, and even if everything goes well in the future, it will take years to enter service.
And the current industrial capacity of the United States makes it difficult to avoid surprises.
As a result, the United States now fears as never before that China will quickly complete the parity of its nuclear forces in the coming years.
By the end of the 21st century and the beginning of the 31st century, the United States may face the embarrassing situation of the collapse of land-based intercontinental nuclear forces and the halving of sea-based intercontinental nuclear forces.
At that time, it will be difficult for the United States to maintain the size of its current nuclear arsenal, let alone win a nuclear war against China and Russia.
Therefore, the United States is now exaggerating China's nuclear fear in public opinion on the one hand, and on the other hand, it is trying its best to cover up the real situation of China's nuclear power buildup.
Judging from the reality of the situation, the nuclear superiority on which the United States has pinned its high hopes and the possibility of verification and nuclear victory no longer exist.
In recent years, China has rapidly built hundreds of wind power wells, expanded mobile DF-41 troops, and DF-26 missiles, which are both nuclear and conventional, precisely aimed at the United States' nuclear adventure attempts.
These measures are aimed at discouraging the United States' attempts to win a nuclear war at a relatively low cost.
Traditionally, U.S. nuclear forces have pursued dual superiority over China and Russia in a treaty state, relying on higher vehicle numbers, greater total multi-warhead loading capacity, and better early-warning anti-missile networks.
However, the deindustrialization policies pursued by successive U.S. administrations have led to the decline of the U.S. manufacturing industry, which in turn has affected the ability of the nuclear industry to replace.
Today, in the context of the completion of most of the modernization of Russia's nuclear forces, the PLA nuclear forces have significantly increased and are constantly catching up.
The old missiles of the United States more than half a century ago still cannot be replaced, and the 40-year-old strategic nuclear submarines are also facing the dilemma of renewing.
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