In 1979, a war that suddenly came like a spring breeze overnight, but suddenly changed dramatically, started on the Sino-Vietnamese border. That year, in response to Vietnam's provocation, the Chinese People's Liberation Army carried Type 62 light tanks and other heavy equipment, crossed the national border with great thunder, and launched a massive self-defense counterattack against Vietnam. The purpose of the war is simple and clear, to end the conflict quickly and restore peace and stability on the border. But the real situation on the battlefield is far more complicated than planned, and the PLA faces many unforeseen difficulties and challenges. What are the little-known stories behind the heavy losses of tanks, nearly ninety percent of the battle losses in just four days of fighting?
In the spring of 1979, the mountains and flowers on the Sino-Vietnamese border were brilliant, but there was also war. In response to Vietnam's repeated provocations against the mainland border areas, China decided to give a forceful response, which is known as the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam. This battle is not only for peace on the border, but also for the defense of national dignity.
Before the outbreak of the war, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) made careful preparations and mobilized 7 regiments and 1 battalion of tank troops, equipped with the advanced Type 62 light tanks in China at that time, as well as the historic T34 and Type 59 medium tanks. The Type 62 light tank, with its light maneuverability, was particularly suitable for fighting in mountainous and hilly terrain, while the T34 and Type 59 tanks, with their thick armor and powerful firepower, showed their superiority in more open terrain.
Pre-war preparations are not only limited to the deployment of materials and equipment, but also include tactical drills and battlefield adaptability training. In particular, for the troops operating the Type 62 light tank, they have received special training in rapid maneuvering and deployment in complex terrain to ensure that they can respond flexibly in actual combat. Units operating medium tanks, on the other hand, are intensively trained to maintain a stable formation and sustained firepower output under conditions of intense enemy firepower.
The brutality of the war was far greater than expected. Although the People's Liberation Army (PLA) crossed the border with lightning speed, the Vietnamese People's Army (LPA) was clearly well prepared. They not only studied the tactics and operational modes of the PLA, but also made full use of the complex local terrain conditions and arranged a large number of ambushes and traps. At the heart of these ambushes are pre-dug camouflage tunnels on roads where PLA tanks may pass. These tunnels are outwardly integrated with their surroundings and are almost impossible to detect in advance.
When the PLA tanks are advancing at a rapid pace, the results are often disastrous if they accidentally drive into these well-camouflaged tunnels. Although the Type 62 light tank was agile, its light armor protection was inadequate in the event of explosive mines or buried bombs. Many tanks were overturned by bombing, or their mechanical parts were severely damaged, and their combat effectiveness was greatly reduced. And those medium tanks, despite their stronger armor, were no longer able to survive the Vietnamese army's rockets and anti-tank weapons.
The tragedy after tragedy in the battle is painful, but it also gradually reveals the shortcomings of our army in the application of tactics. The first is the underestimation of the enemy's tactics. Although the PLA had technical and numerical superiority, it was clearly lacking in knowledge of the Vietnamese terrain and the tactics of the Vietnamese army. The Vietnamese army took advantage of the terrain and guerrilla tactics, so that the PLA's tank units often fell into passivity. The PLA also had obvious shortcomings in pre-war intelligence gathering and terrain analysis, which directly led to heavy losses on the battlefield.
Another fatal problem on the battlefield is the failure of command and coordination. Although the tank units have strong firepower, they do not receive sufficient infantry support and air coverage in complex terrain, so that the tank units often go deep alone and are easy to become fixed targets for the enemy. Due to the limitations of communication equipment and the interference of the battlefield environment, there are also problems in the coordination of tank units with command centers in the rear and other arms of the army, which to a certain extent weakens the overall combat efficiency and survivability of the troops.
As the war continued, the PLA began to gradually adjust its tactics, enhancing its familiarity with the terrain and adapting to the enemy's tactics. More scouts were sent out to ensure a safer route of movement for tank units. Coordinated operations between infantry and tanks have also been strengthened to prevent tank units from falling back into isolation. Nevertheless, the brutality of the war and the loss of equipment and personnel, already made a deep impression on all those involved.
In this war, the tank units of our army suffered heavy losses, almost reaching a staggering proportion of ninety percent. This is not only a loss of materials, but also a deep reflection on tactics and strategy. This war has undoubtedly set higher demands on the modernization process of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and has also provided valuable experience and lessons for future military operations.
Through this baptism of blood and fire, it is not difficult for us to find that war is never a simple confrontation of forces. Behind every battle, there is a profound test of strategy, technology, and people.