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As 520 approaches, Lai Qingde's cross-strait policy has set the tone, saying that dialogue with the mainland is possible under the four major principles

author:Sun Xuwen

Just as 520 was approaching, the outside world paid close attention to Lai Qingde's policy speech and cross-strait policy. Recently, Lai Qingde's confidant Lin Junxian gave a briefing on Lai Qingde's 520 inaugural speech in an interview.

He said that Lai Ching-te's cross-strait policy has already set the tone, stressing that there is indeed the necessity and importance of resuming cross-strait communication, and that if cross-strait dialogue lacks a political basis, it can be started through agricultural products and tourism, and the most important thing is that the two sides can sit down and talk first, and it is also possible to talk through the Strait Exchange Foundation and the Mainland Affairs Council.

Lin Junxian also said that Lai Qingde is a "pragmatic" person, and he will also adopt a pragmatic approach on both sides of the strait. Under the current cross-strait situation, there is no way for the mainland and Taiwan to evade the DPP in carrying out exchanges, so if the mainland wants to talk, it should respect Taiwan's position. Therefore, in his inaugural speech on 520, Lai Qingde will release a certain amount of goodwill to the mainland, hoping that the outside world will keep an eye on Lai Qingde's inauguration ceremony.

As 520 approaches, Lai Qingde's cross-strait policy has set the tone, saying that dialogue with the mainland is possible under the four major principles

Lai Qingde

In addition, at the "Democracy Summit" held in Copenhagen on May 12, Lai Qingde also delivered a speech by video, saying that in the future, he will continue to promote the "National Hope Project" in his tenure, and is willing to continue to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, and start a dialogue with the mainland under the four principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit, dignity and no preconditions.

Lai Qingde's confidant and Lai Qingde's statement was widely interpreted on the island as saying that Lai Qingde's attitude on the cross-strait issue might have softened, and this point would be reflected in the inauguration ceremony of the 520 event. As the "golden grandson of Taiwan independence" and a "pragmatic Taiwan independence worker," it is not easy for Lai Qingde to make such a statement. But in essence, this change is actually the result of external pressure, not that Lai Qingde's political ideas have changed and turned to a blue-leaning position.

Why? On the one hand, since last year's election of the leader of the Taiwan region, the United States has been beating Lai Ching-te, because the United States has always been worried that Lai Ching-te will directly declare "independence" after being elected. As far as the United States is concerned, maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is still the most in line with the interests of the United States, and in the future, whether Taiwan moves toward reunification or "independence," the final result will be either peaceful reunification or reunification by force, and the former means that the United States will completely lose the ability to intervene in the Taiwan issue, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will have a huge loophole as a result, which will eventually lead to the collapse of the containment strategy against China.

As 520 approaches, Lai Qingde's cross-strait policy has set the tone, saying that dialogue with the mainland is possible under the four major principles

If it is the latter, the United States will face the question of whether to intervene or not, and intervention will mean the outbreak of a head-on conflict between China and the United States, whether the United States is willing to pay a huge price for Taiwan, and if it does not intervene, it can only watch China complete reunification, and the impact of the two will basically mean the same to the United States. Therefore, starting from the warm-up for the election of the leader of the Taiwan region, Rosenberg, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, went to Taiwan five times with one and only one purpose, that is, to beat Lai Qingde. Therefore, under the pressure of the United States, Lai Qingde must choose a middle line between his own governing philosophy and the United States, so as to ensure that the United States will continue to support him.

In addition, the mainland's pressure on Taiwan is also a key reason for Lai's change of attitude. According to Lai Qingde's previous cross-strait stance, almost all public opinion in the outside world believes that if Lai Qingde's cross-strait stance does not soften, the mainland will certainly adopt more means to suppress Lai Qingde during his four years in office, and even will not rule out the use of force.

In addition, the anti-dumping and anti-dumping investigation on Taiwan has also exerted a lot of pressure on enterprises on the island, and this pressure has forced Lai Qingde to face up to the relations between the two sides of the strait and the mode of getting along, otherwise Taiwan's economy may face a huge impact. At the same time, pressure from the mainland and the United States is likely to be the direct reason for Lai Qingde to soften his stance and seek a middle way.

As 520 approaches, Lai Qingde's cross-strait policy has set the tone, saying that dialogue with the mainland is possible under the four major principles

However, there has been no essential change in Lai Qingde's stance on the cross-strait issue, and Lai Qingde's softening is only reflected in the softening of his "tone and rhetoric." For example, Lai Qingde is willing to engage in dialogue and communication with the mainland under the four principles, and his term is not "China" for the mainland. In addition, Lin Junxian's briefing also said that he asked the mainland to respect the DPP and Taiwan's position, and I believe that the DPP's position goes without saying much, and everyone knows what the background color is.

Therefore, whether it is Lai Ching-te or Lin Chun-hsien, the "preconditions" expressed by them to carry out dialogue with the mainland is actually a preset position, that is, the two sides of the strait are not subordinate to each other, and the communication and exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland are equal to "state-to-state," not Taiwan as a province.

In response to Lai Ching-te's request to express his willingness to carry out cross-strait dialogues on many occasions in recent days, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council put forward the "two onlys." Chen Binhua stressed that as long as any political party in Taiwan recognizes the one-China principle, there will be no obstacle to its exchanges with us. As long as the DPP abandons its "Taiwan independence" stance, dialogue and exchanges can be carried out.

As 520 approaches, Lai Qingde's cross-strait policy has set the tone, saying that dialogue with the mainland is possible under the four major principles

Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council

Obviously, however, the DPP authorities are simply unable to fulfill the "two onlys" we have proposed. For example, Wu Zhaoxie, the outgoing head of Taiwan's foreign affairs department, recently published an article in the US media saying that the Taiwan issue is not an "internal affair" of China, but an "international issue." He called on Lai Ching-te to treat the Taiwan issue as an "international issue." In addition, Taiwan should strengthen its defense to achieve a deterrence strategy, because only by combining these two points can the status quo be maintained.

In a word, Lai Ching-te has indeed softened his attitude on the cross-strait issue, but in fact this is not due to the adjustment of his own stance, but is hindered by pressure from all sides. Therefore, on the Taiwan issue, we must not listen to what Lai Qingde said, but will see what he does next.