As soon as World War II ended, the Cold War ideology appeared in the United States, Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech" in 1946 kicked off the Cold War, and in 1947, the "Truman Doctrine" marked the official beginning of the Cold War.
After setting the tone of the Cold War, there was still a lack of systematic strategy and tactics, and at this time, George Kennan, a "Soviet expert" with the pseudonym "X," published an 8,000-word article entitled "The Roots of Soviet Behavior" in the quarterly magazine "Foreign Affairs," that is, the famous "X Report," which systematically expounded the policy proposition of "containing" the Soviet Union, and thus gave him the reputation of "the father of containment policy."
George Kennan's 8,000-word message won the appreciation of the US Government, and he was quickly promoted to the first director of the "Policy Planning Office" under the US State Department. Since then, although George Kennan's career has had ups and downs, the "X Report" has become the basic strategy of the United States towards the Soviet Union until the collapse of the Soviet Union, so Kennan is known as the top strategist in the United States.
World War II was not only a brutal war, but also a war to reshuffle the cards and rebuild order. After World War II, the traditional powers declined one after another, the United States and the Soviet Union took advantage of the situation to become two hegemons, and the colonized peoples, including China, set off a wave of independence. For the Soviet Union, George Kennan adopted a policy of containment, so how would George Kennan view the new China?
Before 1947, according to George Kennan, he had never been to East Asia and had never been interested in East Asian culture. Nonetheless, George Kennan was deeply involved in the formulation of postwar American policy in East Asia.
Before the Korean War, the Truman administration's East Asian policy was based on Japan, the gradual withdrawal from China, the withdrawal of troops from the Korean Peninsula, and the fact that Southeast Asia became part of the containment of the Soviet Union, all of which were inseparable from George Kennan.
After the Korean War, George Kennan's career was up and down, one would do academic research at the university, and the other would continue to be the acting director of the policy planning office, during this period George Kennan and the U.S. government had a big difference in East Asia policy, because Kennan was more inclined to political containment, while the United States was more inclined to military containment, which may be the reason for the ups and downs of his career.
Kennan believes that the United States can recognize New China, oppose crossing the "38th parallel," oppose the US-Japan militarized alliance, and advocate the withdrawal of troops from South Korea. These policies are clearly not going to be accepted by the U.S. government. Of course, Kennan brokered the Korean armistice talks, but this was actually because the United States was forced to "reason" and had to accept negotiations.
In short, Kennan does not advocate hostility and containment of New China, nor does he recommend a direct conflict with New China.
The question is: why did Kennan treat New China like this, is it really because he saw that the profound heritage of Chinese civilization would burst out with great power?
In fact, the core reason for Kennan's advocacy is not that he attaches more importance to China, but that he looks down on China at all!
At that time, in the entire East Asian region, only Japan was the industrial and military center, so Kennan believed that Japan was the cornerstone of the United States' East Asian strategy, and as for China, the Korean Peninsula, and even Southeast Asia, they were not of special strategic importance to the United States and could be "sacrificed," so he had some of the above-mentioned strategic propositions.
In other words, Kennan did not believe that China would develop into an industrial military power, but would only be a country with little potential that would not have any impact on the situation in East Asia, so it would not be of strategic importance to the United States.
In fact, the United States generally looked down on China at that time, for example, Ma Murui, the former ambassador to China, once slandered the national character of the Chinese and concluded that China could not industrialize. Later, the United States did not adopt the Kennan policy, not because they saw China's potential, but in fact they still did not think that China would be strong, but because of the nature of Western culture, they chose the later strategy.
If it is said that before and after the founding of New China, China was indeed poor and white, and it is indeed despised, but after resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, building the atomic bomb, and building New China, how did Kennan view China? The answer is still the same!
In 1972, when the United States and the Soviet Union lagged behind in the struggle for hegemony, China's role became prominent, and Nixon visited China. Kennan, however, is critical and continues to argue that China has little strategic role for the United States. Kennan remained unchanged until 1996, as he noted in a 1996 interview, "I don't see what we can gain from closer intergovernmental relations with that country." ”
In 2001, China had changed dramatically from before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China, but Kennan argued that "I failed to understand our media and public's fascination with that country" and that there was "no reason to see China as a major ally" in any case. It can be seen that after the new century, Kennan still does not believe that China has any strategic role for the United States.
Finally, there are three other points worth mentioning about the topic of this article:
First of all, it is obviously a misunderstanding that Kennan saw the charm of Chinese civilization and did not advocate that the United States be hostile to and contain New China, but I don't know whether this "misunderstanding" was unintentional or intentional. But in connection with the current strength of China, this misunderstanding can put Kennan on the altar and make people worship it.
Second, the reason Kennan's misjudgment of China is that he simply looks down on China. In fact, before 2008, how many American strategists systematically argued that China could grow into a superpower? After all, the history of the United States is too short to understand a civilized country that emphasizes "self-reliance" for 5,000 years.
Third, do not overestimate the strategic level of the United States and even the West as a whole, their strategy is more eager for quick success and quick gain, and they will not look too far. Especially when it comes to China, because of modern history, the West often looks down on and belittles China, and cannot truly understand China's history and culture, and cannot know itself and the enemy, so how can it formulate a correct strategy?
References: "Zhang Xiaoming - George Kennan's Containment Policy, He Doesn't Look Down on China at All", etc