Abstract:After the Communist Party of China entered the countryside to carry out revolutionary struggle, it was faced with the problem of "scissors difference" in the prices of industrial and agricultural products. On the one hand, the CPC attaches importance to adopting various economic policies to solve the problem of rising prices of industrial products and falling prices of agricultural products in the Soviet areas; on the other hand, it also pays attention to explaining and publicizing the causes of the phenomenon of the "scissors gap" and strengthening the economic mobilization of the masses to reduce the impact of the "scissors gap" on the economy and the rural revolution in the Soviet areas. Generally speaking, the CCP's interpretation and response to the problem of "scissors difference" was influenced by the overall military war situation and the economic policies of the base areas, and formed different explanations and response strategies in three different stages, partially solving the problem of material circulation and mass mobilization needed for the revolution, and accumulating experience in dealing with the problem of "scissors difference" in the prices of rural industrial and agricultural products. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, the Communist Party of China (CPC) was faced with the problem of rising industrial products and falling prices of agricultural products in the Soviet areas. Explaining the causes of the phenomenon of "poor scissors" and eliminating the phenomenon of "poor scissors" became an important task of the CPC during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. The problem of the "scissors gap" was once considered a product of the capitalist economy and system, and was an important means used by the economically dominant capitalists to try to keep the prices of agricultural products and industrial products as low as possible, and to exploit and plunder their own peasants and the working people of the colonial dependent countries. [Xu Yi and Shen Jingnong, eds., Economic Dictionary and Finance Volume, Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 1987, p. 150.] However, the macro theories of imperialist aggression and capitalist exploitation cannot fully explain the specific "scissors difference" that the CCP faced in the rural areas of the Soviet Union. In the field of historical research, Jiang Boying, Zhao Xiaomin, Xu Yi and others have described the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the western Fujian Soviet region in detail;[Jiang Boying: History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, Fujian People's Publishing House, 2019 edition; Zhao Xiaomin: Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, Guangdong People's Publishing House, 1983 edition; Xu Yi, editor-in-chief: The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas, People's Publishing House, 1982 edition. Shu Long, Huang Huiyun and others combined with the grain work and trade work in the Soviet area, and also revealed the problem of the price difference between industrial and agricultural products. [Shu Long and Xie Yibiao: "The History of Trade in the Central Soviet Area", China Social Sciences Press, 2009 edition; Huang Huiyun: "Research on Grain Work in the Central Soviet Area", Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2021 edition. However, these studies have not yet analyzed the CCP's continuous adjustment of the interpretation and response strategies of the "scissors gap" phenomenon with the changes in the overall military and political situation, so there is still some research space for analyzing the CCP's cognition and response to the "scissors gap" and adjusting to the revolutionary struggle and economic policies from a holistic and dynamic perspective. Based on this, this paper uses the relevant documents and historical materials during the Agrarian Revolutionary War to analyze the CCP's interpretation and response to the problem of "scissors difference", which is not only a price problem or an economic problem, but also a problem of revolutionary propaganda and mass mobilization, and has the characteristics of phased and dynamic changes with the changes of the overall military and political situation.
1. The emergence of the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the Soviet region and the CCP's explanation of the "scissors difference" in the prices of industrial and agricultural products mainly manifests itself in three forms: First, the price of industrial products has risen and the price of agricultural products has decreased. Second, the price of industrial products remains unchanged while the price of agricultural products decreases, or the prices of agricultural products remain unchanged while the prices of industrial products rise. Third, the prices of industrial and agricultural products have increased, but the prices of industrial products have risen more than those of agricultural products, or the prices of both have decreased, but the prices of industrial products have decreased less than those of agricultural products. The problem of "scissors difference" is not unique to modern China, and in the 19th century in capitalist countries such as Britain, France, and Germany, there was a problem of rising prices of industrial consumer goods and falling prices of agricultural products. In order to resist the inequality in the prices of industrial and agricultural products, the workers' organizations in the capitalist countries have successively established workers' consumer cooperatives to provide workers with cheap consumer goods, and the peasants have also organized and established production, distribution and marketing cooperatives to unite to maintain the prices of agricultural products. In the process of revolution, political construction, and economic development, the Soviet Union was also faced with the problem of a "scissors gap" that was becoming increasingly severe. During the NEP period, the Soviet Union believed that the main reason for the "scissors difference" was that the prices of industrial products were artificially raised too much, for example, state enterprises arbitrarily raised the prices of industrial products in order to obtain maximum profits, and private industrialists and businessmen also caused serious interference in the supply-demand and price relations of industrial and agricultural products. Therefore, during the NEP period, the Soviet Union adopted a policy of opposing the "scissors difference": on the one hand, it emphasized that "the state controls prices", resolutely lowered the prices of industrial products such as cloth, coal, salt, and rubber products through administrative means, and set the maximum prices for a series of daily necessities; on the other hand, it restricted the development of private capital and middlemen through taxes, loans, prices, and other means. However, these measures have not really eliminated the "scissors gap", and the way in which the state controls prices and cracks down on private business has further aggravated the price imbalance of industrial and agricultural products, as well as the tension between the market and the public-private relationship. [Chen Zhihua, editor-in-chief: Outline of Soviet History (1917-1937), People's Publishing House, 1991, pp. 209-212.] Bukharin's and Stalin's disagreements then arose over the issue of the "scissors difference", especially on the issue of food prices. Bukharin advocated raising grain prices, "normalizing" the market, and adjusting and raising grain purchase prices according to regions. ["On the New Economic Policy and Our Tasks" (April 17, 1925), by Nikolai I. Bukharin, Zheng Yifan, ed., Selected Works of Bukharin, People's Publishing House, 2014, pp. 221-222. Stalin was opposed to raising food prices, believing that as soon as he embarked on the path of raising food prices, "he would inevitably continue to roll on, and there would be no guarantee of a sufficient amount of food" Moreover, there are two related deep-seated problems: First, after raising the purchase price of grain, it is necessary to raise the price of raw materials for agricultural production in order to maintain a certain price comparison of various agricultural products; second, after raising the purchase price of grain, it is necessary to raise the selling price of grain, and in order not to harm the interests of workers, it is necessary to accelerate the increase in wages, but in doing so, it is necessary to raise the price of industrial products, and the result is that the prices of both industrial and agricultural products will rise. As a result, Stalin put forward a program that was different from the NEP and Bukharin's adjustment of grain prices, that is, emphasizing the adoption of the pre-purchase system and the exercise of planned leadership over the national economy. ["On the Right-Leaning in the Communist Party" (April 1929), under Stalin's Selected Works, People's Publishing House, 1979, pp. 146, 148.] Stalin also opposed the inappropriate reduction of the burden on the peasants when the conditions were not ripe, believing that the Soviet Union at that time could only gradually reduce the "scissors gap", but could not immediately eliminate the "scissors gap", otherwise it would hinder the industrialization of the country and thus hit agriculture and the national economy as a whole. [Ye Qingfeng: General History of Socialism, Vol. 4, People's Publishing House, 2011 edition, p. 319.] In 1929, a joint meeting of the Politburo of the USSR and the Presidium of the Central Supervisory Commission formed a resolution on the issue of the "scissors gap", which regarded the "scissors gap" as an excess tax paid by the peasants who rapidly developed Soviet industry and "flowed" capital from agriculture to industry, and considered this "inflow" method necessary in the process of maintaining the high pace of industrial development. ["On the Right Tendency in the Communist Party" (April 1929), Selected Works of Stalin, p. 149.] Therefore, in the process of industrialization, the Soviet Union always maintained a certain "scissors difference" or excess tax on the prices of industrial and agricultural products, and accumulated a certain amount of funds for industrialization. It can be seen that the reasons for the emergence of the "scissors gap" in the prices of industrial and agricultural products in the Soviet Union and the ways in which they deal with it are different from those of the European capitalist countries, and the real problem reflected is the unbalanced state of economic development in the socialist industrialization of the Soviet Union. [Chen Zhihua, ed., Outline of the History of the Soviet Union (1917-1937)", p. 211.] After modern China was incorporated into the world economic system, the overall problem of unreasonable price comparison of industrial and agricultural products in the world economic system will also be transmitted and transferred to China. However, after the 1920s, the price problem of industrial and agricultural products in China was different from that of the West and the Soviet Union, especially the regional price problem of agricultural products was more complicated. As far as grain prices are concerned, according to the statistics of Zou Dafan and others, grain in modern China is not stable when it rises and falls, but the price index generally rises instead of falling. In some areas, land productivity is already weakening, and there is more and more wasteland, and as a result of the reduction of agricultural products, the price of rice will be more expensive every year. At the same time, in some rural areas, where land is concentrated, most of the grain is in the hands of the landlords, resulting in a phenomenon of "monopoly." As a result, the landlords have raised the price of grain, causing the price of rice to soar and the peasants' bankruptcy to intensify. ["Resolution of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian on the Land Question" (July 27, 1929), edited by the Institute of Economic Research of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: Selected Historical Materials of the Land Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, Xinhua Bookstore, 1981, p. 301. In the 1920s, there were also differences in the views and measures of different economic agents in China on the issue of food prices. Landlords, middlemen, and wealthier yeoman farmers wanted to continue to raise the price of grain, while a large number of peasants, especially the landless poor peasants and hired peasants, and the early peasant associations led by the CCP, wanted to lower the price of agricultural products. For example, during the Hunan peasant movement during the Great Revolution, the peasant associations emphasized the need to stabilize the price of grain and prevent the export of grain, because 90% of the peasants in Hunan were poor peasants, and they had lost their land or had insufficient land, so they had to buy rice from the landlords at a heavy price, so they hoped that the lower the price of grain, the better. ["The True Situation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan - Report of the Hunan People's Petition Group (Excerpt)" (June 22, 1927), Selected Historical Materials of the Agrarian Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, p. 139.] In the peasant movement in Hunan, there was a movement of "Pingguang Blocking and Banning", that is, poor peasants were mobilized to open warehouses and sell grain at a flat price. When Mao Zedong led the Hunan peasant movement in August 1925, he convened the backbone of the party branch and the peasant cooperatives in the Shaoshan area to mobilize the peasants to open warehouses and level the peasants. [Edited by the Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Mao Zedong's Annals (1893-1949), People's Publishing House, Central Literature Publishing House, 1993 edition, p. 135.] The Hunan Agricultural Cooperatives also limited the circulation of grain and rice to the township as a unit, and if the grain and rice flowed out of the township and circulated in other townships, it was necessary to have an order from the Agricultural Cooperatives and be managed by a special person, [Chen Jixin: "Overview of the Hunan Peasant Movement (1921-1927)", edited by the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the Hunan Provincial Museum: "Selected Materials of the Hunan Peasant Movement", People's Publishing House, 1988 edition, p. 783. ] to maintain food prices and maintain the lives of the masses. By 1927, however, the CCP's perception of grain prices and their circulation had changed. The Hunan District Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a "Circular on the Issue of Banning Pingzong," pointing out that the "Pingguang Ban" movement has also given rise to new problems, such as the gradual decline in grain prices, the increasing isolation of rural finance, and the tendency of petty-bourgeois peasants such as yeoman farmers and tenant farmers to break away from the peasant cooperatives. [Chen Jixin, "Overview of the Hunan Peasant Movement (1921-1927)", Selected Materials of the Hunan Peasant Movement, p. 783.] The CCP also believes that the problem of grain prices and the problem behind the "Pingguang Blockade" movement is not the price itself at all, but "it is entirely a land issue, and it is only possible to solve it after the land issue is resolved" ["The Real Situation of the Hunan Peasant Movement - Report of the Hunan People's Petition Group (Excerpt)" (June 22, 1927), Selected Historical Materials of the Agrarian Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, p. 139. 】。 Therefore, in the process of entering the countryside to explore a new path of revolution, the CCP began to vigorously promote the agrarian revolution, and through the redistribution of land, the peasants were protected from the rise and fall of grain prices through self-cultivation. In areas where land is divided equally, new problems arise one after another. The blockade of the revolutionary base areas in the countryside by the Kuomintang and the continuous rise in commodity prices and the continuous decline in the prices of agricultural products in the Soviet areas have widened the "scissors gap" between the prices of industrial and agricultural products. [Fu Fengxiang, editor-in-chief: "History of Transportation in Jiangxi Soviet District", People's Communications Publishing House, 1991 edition, p. 134. After solving the land problem, the problem of "scissors gap" in rural areas has not been solved, but has become more and more serious. For example, western Fujian was one of the first rural base areas in which the CCP opened up and established Soviet power, and by the summer and autumn of 1929, revolutionary regimes at all levels had been established in the revolutionary base areas of western Fujian, and land distribution had been basically completed. The peasants who had been allocated the land were overjoyed and harvested the millet from their land for the first time, but the price of rice fell rapidly. Among them, the price of grain in Caixi Township, Shanghang County, fell from 10 yuan for 100 catties of millet before the riot to 2.5 yuan after the riot. Prices of other agricultural products have also fallen sharply, such as pork prices in southwest Jiangxi, which have fallen by 90 percent. On the contrary, the prices of urban industrial products have risen rapidly, especially the prices of salt, sugar, and foreign oil, for example, in western Fujian, the price of a foot of cloth has risen from 6 cents to 2 jiao 4 cents, and the price of a pound of salt has risen from 3 cents to 1 jiao. [Zhao Xiaomin, Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, p. 192.] For example, the profits of some industrial products in the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet areas were as high as 100 percent, and some merchants in the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Soviet areas raised the price of a foot of cloth from more than 300 yuan to more than 1,000 yuan, making several times the profit. [Zhao Xiaomin, Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, p. 194.] As a result, the price difference between agricultural products and industrial products is too far, and the edge of the scissors is opening wider and wider. ["Circular of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian (No. 7) - On the Problem of Scissors Difference" (September 3, 1929), edited by the Research Committee for the Collection of Party History Materials of the Longyan Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Cultural Relics Management Committee of the Longyan District Administrative Office: "Documents and Materials on the Revolutionary History of Western Fujian" Volume 2, Internal Distribution, 1982 Edition, p. 208. After the land is divided equally and the grain is harvested, it is difficult for farmers to exchange for industrial consumer goods and materials needed for production and life, which poses a new challenge to the CCP. Although the peasants have a share of the land, they are still at a disadvantage in the market. The CCP believes that the peasants can only exchange a large amount of agricultural products for a small amount of industrial products, which is also a kind of exploitation, and this kind of exploitation is "more powerful than any method, and the peasants will inevitably be impoverished if they suffer from this kind of exploitation" [Jiang Boying, History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, pp. 216-217]. 】。 The CCP is aware of the need to explain and analyze the causes of the "scissors difference" phenomenon in detail, and to carry out targeted propaganda to protect the peasants who divide the land equally from the exploitation of the "scissors difference". The Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian was the first to study this phenomenon and believed that it was also a "great exploitation" ["Resolution of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian on the Land Question" (July 27, 1929), Selected Historical Materials of the Agrarian Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, p. 300. 】。 To this end, in September 1929, the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian issued a special circular on the problem of "scissors difference" to explain to the party and outside the party the causes, effects and countermeasures of the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the Soviet area. ["Circular of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian (No. 7) - On the Problem of Scissors Difference" (September 3, 1929), "Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian", vol. 2, p. 208.] The special committee of the Communist Party of China in western Fujian believes that the phenomenon of "scissors difference" is a special phenomenon in the local red-colored separatist areas, and from the point of view of the increase in the price of industrial products, the lack of industrial development in the Soviet area under the condition of insulating the military and economic blockade from the external industrial areas, is the objective reason for the price increase due to the shortage of industrial products. ["Outline of Teaching on the Scissors Problem" (October 5, 1929), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 2, p. 242.] In addition, at that time, most of the commodity circulation in the red areas was still carried out through private commerce and rural polders, and the middlemen were opportunistic in the process, which exacerbated the rise in the prices of industrial products to a certain extent. In addition, the radical commercial policies adopted by the CCP at the beginning of its entry into the Soviet zone, such as confiscating shops, burning account books, and prohibiting merchants from the white zone from doing business in the red zone, led to the interruption of the red and white trade, which also exacerbated the phenomenon of "scissors difference" to a certain extent. [Zhao Xiaomin, Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, p. 195.] In order to protect their own interests, businessmen also pass on the cost to the goods, so that the "scissors gap" widens. In terms of falling prices of agricultural products, the CCP believes that the reasons are more complicated. First, in the rural areas after the uprising, the original bonds were burned, and in some areas all debts were even cancelled, so that rural loans and financial circulation were completely stagnant. However, during the harvest season, the peasants still have to hire workers to rush to harvest and need cash to pay their wages, and when rural loans are interrupted, they can only sell grain at a low price for relief, which aggravates the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the rural areas. ["Resolution of the First Enlarged Meeting of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian on the Land Question - Circular No. 15 of the Special Committee of the Special Committee" (November 5, 1929), Selected Historical Materials of the Land Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, p. 327.] Second, after the victory of the anti-rent struggle, the peasants did not have to pay land rent, and there was a surplus of grain, and the peasants sold rice to buy daily necessities, causing the rice market to be crowded and the price of grain and rice to fall. Third, the peasants were horrified by the momentum of "being able to suppress" and were afraid that the grain would be snatched by the enemy, so they sold rice and grain at a low price to seek cash profits. In addition, due to the impact of the war, grain could not be adjusted in various places, and there were more and less grains, so that the price of rice was different from place to place. ["Circular of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian (No. 7) - On the Problem of Scissors Difference" (September 3, 1929), "Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian", vol. 2, p. 209.] On the basis of analyzing the causes of "scissor difference", the CCP also realized that "scissor difference" will cause adverse effects in many aspects. Economically, some peasants who have been allocated land think that farming is better than working as hired laborers, because hired workers can get more than five buckets of rice for one job, and six jobs are enough for one year's grain. This will not only make the peasants who have been allocated land still in a position of exploitation, but may also cause the peasants to slack off their work, or abandon their fields and not harvest, or even be unwilling to take the land for cultivation. This is not conducive to peasants' self-cultivation and expansion of production, and is likely to lead to the decline of agriculture, and is also contrary to the original intention of the Chinese communists to plan to develop agriculture after the land is divided equally. In addition, due to the impact of the war and the rise in the price of industrial products, the purchasing power of the peasants for industrial products has actually decreased, which is not conducive to the development of industry and commerce, and has exacerbated the unemployment of workers and the decline of the entire social economy. Politically, while encircling the Soviet areas in the military, political, and economic aspects, the Kuomintang also used the phenomenon of "poor scissors" in the Soviet areas to carry out reactionary propaganda, and put forward reactionary slogans such as "the Communist Party deceives the peasants, and the communist peasants do no good." ["Circular of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian (No. 7) - On the Problem of Scissors Difference" (September 3, 1929), "Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian", vol. 2, p. 209.] The Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian pointed out that adjusting the phenomenon of "scissors difference" is an urgent task of the Soviet government, and that "if these problems cannot be remedied," it will not be able to fundamentally solve the problems of the livelihood of the workers and peasants; if it is difficult to move forward the social economy, the foundation of Soviet power will be even less stable. Therefore, adjusting the phenomenon of "poor scissors" is one of the main tasks of the CPC in the Soviet zone, and every party member must study and understand the causes and effects of the phenomenon of "poor scissors" and discuss and implement the policy of eliminating the "poor scissors." The CPC's special committee for western Fujian also put forward 10 policies to deal with it: First, the county government should try to set up peasant banks and loan offices to provide low-interest loans to poor peasants, so that peasants will not have no way to borrow money and sell grain at a low price. Second, the county and district governments should raise funds to buy and store grain at high prices in the market, or transport it to places where there is a shortage of grain and rice prices are relatively high, so as to regulate the price of rice. Third, the economic committees of the county and district governments should carry out propaganda among the masses in a planned way and help the masses establish cooperatives of various types in production, consumption, and credit, so that the peasants will not be exploited by businessmen when they sell rice and buy goods, and so that financial circulation will be carried out. Fourth, it is necessary to limit the wages of rural workers from being excessively high. Fifth, it is necessary to restrict the wages of workers in the urban market from being excessively high. Sixth, it is necessary to limit the prices of important commodities such as salt, foreign oil, sugar, and so on, and not to raise prices. Seventh, we should continue to implement the policy of dividing the fields. Eighth, relief should be provided to unemployed workers in urban areas. The ninth is to expand propaganda or discuss the scissors policy in rural mass meetings or congresses. The tenth is to publicize the undesirable effects of the scissors phenomenon among the trade unions or the masses of workers, so that the workers understand that wages should not be raised too much, so as to protect and consolidate the workers and peasants. ["Circular of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian (No. 7) - On the Problem of Scissors Difference" (September 3, 1929), "Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian", vol. 2, pp. 209-210.] The CPC's Special Committee for Western Fujian also formulated the "Teaching Outline on the Scissors Issue" as a teaching material for the training class for cadres in western Fujian, requiring cadres to do different propaganda work for different targets such as peasants, workers, and businessmen. First, with regard to the peasants, it is necessary to give emphasis on explaining the reasons for the drop in rice prices, so that the peasants can understand the adverse effects of the local tyrants' manipulation of rice prices, understand the mistake of canceling all debts, understand the function and organization of the cooperatives, and understand that the rise in the price of industrial products is the cause of the economic blockade by the reactionary forces; and make the peasants understand that only when they develop more united and outward and get in touch with the proletariat in the big cities can they be relieved of this suffering, and that only after communism is realized can the masses be completely relieved of their suffering. Second, on the workers' side, it is necessary to publicize the phenomenon of "poor scissors" among the trade unions or among the working masses, which will cause the peasants to slack off and the decline of agriculture, and even more so to make the workers in the shopping malls unemployed. It is necessary to make the workers understand that wages must not be raised too high, and that the interests of the workers and peasants can only be safeguarded if they strive to lead the peasant struggle and gain the faith of the peasants from the realities of the revolution. It is all the more necessary to make the workers understand the significance of the revolution, because only by emancipating the peasants and developing the rural economy can China's industry develop and the workers can do their work. Thirdly, as for the merchants, it is necessary to convene meetings of the merchants and publicly explain the party's urban policies in the course of the revolution, so that they can do business with peace of mind. Explain that the result of the "scissors difference" phenomenon will make the mall snub and encourage them to take out loans. At the same time, it shows that the Kuomintang could not unify China, and after years of war, exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous taxes, soldiers and bandits were everywhere, and businessmen had no way out. It shows that the Chinese revolution must succeed quickly, and that the merchants should not dream of the arrival of the White Army or the restoration of land rent. ["Outline of Teaching on the Scissors Problem" (October 5, 1929), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 2, pp. 243-244.] At the beginning of its entry into the Soviet area, the CCP faced the problem of "scissors difference" in some ways different from that of the West and the Soviet Union, and also different from the "flat and prohibitive" policy implemented by the CCP during the Great Revolution in order to mobilize the enthusiasm of poor peasants and hired peasants to participate in the Great Revolutionary Movement. Therefore, we cannot apply the causes of the "scissors gap" problem caused by Western capitalist exploitation in a general way, nor can we apply the experience of the Soviet Union in maintaining a moderate "scissors gap" in order to promote industrialization during the same period to explain the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the rural areas of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, the problem of the "scissors difference" in the Soviet area was a special problem in the price comparison of industrial and agricultural products under the state of military and economic blockade during the war, and it was necessary to take into account the comprehensive situation of the military encirclement, economic blockade, supply and demand relationship, and production situation faced by the Chinese communists at the beginning of their entry into the Soviet area. At the response level, the base areas represented by western Fujian began to explain the problem of the price difference between industrial and agricultural products in a more systematic and in-depth manner, and emphasized the use of propaganda methods to mobilize workers and farmers to resist the exploitation of middlemen. With the changes in the war environment and the adjustment of the party's economic policies, the CCP has further shifted from the "scissors difference" to the adjustment of the prices of industrial and agricultural products. 2. Initial Response to the Problem of the "Scissors Difference": Although the Western Fujian Soviet Region has put forward a 10-point policy to eliminate the "scissors gap," under wartime conditions, there is no experience to follow in much work; and it is difficult to set up banks, raise funds to purchase grain, stabilize grain prices, and establish cooperatives overnight. In order to solve the problem of "scissors difference" as soon as possible, when implementing Circular No. 7 of the Special Committee, the western Fujian Soviet region mainly used administrative means to limit the prices of industrial and agricultural products, in an attempt to curb the problem of "scissors difference" with price as the center in the short term. [Xu Yi, ed., "The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas", p. 12.] After Deng Zihui became the secretary of the Provisional Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian in March 1929, he quickly took measures to implement the price limit policy. The so-called price limit policy is divided into two levels: First, the price of industrial products is limited so that it will not continue to rise. The second is to set the prices of agricultural products, but in areas where the fields have been divided and those that have not been divided, the specific policies and preferences are different. In areas where the fields have been divided, the CPC has adopted a policy of not letting grain prices fall, so as not to hurt the peasants. In areas where the fields have not been divided, on the one hand, it is stipulated that the grain in the fields shall be returned to the peasants for harvest, and that the landlords shall not be allowed to forcibly collect the grain for rent or the peasants shall not give away the rent without permission, so as to unite all the peasants and concentrate their attacks on the landlords; on the other hand, it is stipulated that the price of rice and grain shall not be raised after the summer harvest, so that the landless and impoverished peasants can receive relief. ["Resolution of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian on the Land Question" (July 27, 1929), Selected Historical Materials of the Agrarian Struggle during the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars, p. 303.] However, in the areas where the fields had been divided, the Soviet government's policy of forcibly raising grain prices and limiting the prices of industrial products did not achieve the desired effect, and even backfired. First, the peasants, who are anxious to use the money, actually do not care about the policy of limiting prices, and on the one hand hang up the government's price in the market, and on the other hand, they "secretly give away as if they were selling plasters." As a result, the peasants sell grain in accordance with the price limit in name, but in fact they sell one bucket to get one bucket for another, and sometimes even sell one bucket to get two buckets free, and this has not played a role in curbing the decline in grain prices. Second, after the implementation of the price limit policy for industrial products, the masses feel inconvenienced. The refusal of urban industrial producers to sell their goods has led to market stagnation, undermined economic policy, and contributed to the widening of the "scissors gap" phenomenon. Obviously, the administrative measure of imposing a price limit on industrial and agricultural products was not welcomed by the peasants. [Jiang Boying, History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, pp. 218-219.] The reason why the price-limiting policy has not won the support of the peasants is that the price-limiting policy has not really solved the practical difficulties faced by the peasants. Especially in areas where the fields have been divided, many farmers need to hire workers to cut the crops after the fields have been divided, and they need to pay their wages in cash. Since the CCP's line of agrarian revolution in the countryside relied on poor peasants and hired peasants, and demanded higher wages for poor hired peasants when organizing peasant unions or poor peasant groups, the yeoman peasants who had already divided their fields also had to pay higher wages when they hired workers cut crops, and could only sell grain cheaply for cash. Many scattered farmers sell rice cheaply, resulting in an oversupply of rice during the marketing season and a drop in prices. At that time, the Soviet government did not have such organizations as banks, credit unions, etc., and there were no channels of credit in society, so the peasants had to sell their grain. There is a lot of food on the market, which naturally causes grain prices to fall. [Jiang Boying, History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, p. 220.] It can be seen that the rise and fall of grain prices are not only affected by the relationship between supply and demand, but also by the overall war situation, the policy of revolutionary struggle in the countryside, and even the needs of individual peasants in production and life. The CCP soon realized the problem of the price limit policy and immediately adjusted the direction of the price policy. In mid-October 1929, the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian held its first enlarged meeting in Shanghang, pointing out that it was impossible to use a negative policy to limit the price of rice, and that if the policy of limiting the price was reluctantly implemented, "the government would be separated from the masses." [Xu Yi, ed., "The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas", p. 12.] Therefore, the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian demanded that governments at all levels stop the policy of using administrative means to limit the market prices of grain and industrial products. In late October, Xie Yunkang, inspector of the Fujian Provincial CPC Committee, also mentioned the social and economic problems in the Soviet areas in his report to the Fujian Provincial Party Committee, pointing out that the peasants had to rely on rice for all their supplies, and that even if the price was low, some peasants would come out of the country, so it was useless for the Soviets to eliminate the price limit. Xie Yunkang pointed out that the party's policy should be readjusted; on the one hand, it is necessary to correct the policy of cracking down on businessmen who are too severe, and while preventing and strictly punishing profiteers from deliberately raising prices, it is necessary to implement the party's strategy toward small businessmen, earnestly protect small businessmen, ensure that the market can be maintained, encourage small businessmen to buy and sell abroad, and promote communication and communication between the Soviet areas and the white areas; on the other hand, it is necessary to encourage the Soviet masses to practice economism and to open rural cooperatives and small banks. ["Report of Inspector Xie Yunkang to the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China -- On the Situation and Problems of Jin Handing's Entry into Fujian and Our Coping Strategies" (October 25, 1929), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 2, p. 263.] Although the price limit policy has been blocked, the CCP still needs to curb the continued expansion of the "scissors gap". In order to effectively adjust the price difference between industrial and agricultural products, the CPC has also tried to control commodity prices through public commerce, expand commodity circulation through private commerce, adjust surplus and shortage through cooperatives, and further regulate grain prices and grain quantities. First, the development of public commerce. In the process of opening up the Soviet areas and creating Soviet power, the CCP paid attention to the establishment and development of red shops, mainly providing certain commodities for the party organizations, the Soviet government, and the Red Army. For example, in the winter of 1929, the Ruijin underground party organization of the Communist Party of China organized the "Yumao" grocery store to deal in groceries and serve as a secret transportation station for the underground party. In June 1930, after confiscating the shop property of the big capitalists and businessmen in the county, the Red Revolutionary Regime in Ruijin County used the surplus materials to open a "public store" in addition to distributing them to the poor masses and satisfying the needs of revolutionary work, and sold the goods to the masses at a discounted price, so as to maintain normal commerce, resist intermediate exploitation, and consolidate the Red regime. [Yan Fan and Liu Xingming, "Consumer Cooperatives in the Ruijin Soviet Period", Wang Jinshan, ed., Selected Historical Materials of Consumer Cooperatives in the Chinese Soviet Republic, Internal Edition, 2001 edition, p. 134.] Promoting the development of public commerce was an important economic policy of the CCP during the agrarian revolution, which was conducive to mastering the materials needed for the revolution and regulating commodity prices. Second, adjust the policy of private business. At the beginning of its entry into the Soviet areas, the CCP adopted a relatively strict policy toward private industry and commerce, causing some businessmen to flee the Soviet areas and destroying the network of private businessmen that used to play the role of circulation channels between the cities and the countryside, which also aggravated the problem of "scissors difference" to a certain extent. With the establishment of the base areas, the Soviet governments began to correct the erroneous industrial and commercial policies and to formulate commercial policies to protect trade, in order to facilitate the circulation of industrial and agricultural products within the Soviet districts and between the Soviet districts and the white areas. Third, start cooperatives. On the basis of developing public commerce and readjusting the policy of private commerce, the CPC believes that helping the masses to run cooperatives is one of the main ways to solve the problem of "scissors difference." ["Outline of Teaching on the Scissors Problem" (October 5, 1929), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 2, p. 242.] In November 1927, the "Provisional Political Program of the Jiangxi Provincial Soviet" clearly proposed the establishment of various cooperatives to transport rural and urban goods and adjust the prices of agricultural and industrial products. ["Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Provisional Political Program" (November 1927), Jiangxi Provincial Archives, Jiangxi Provincial Party School Party History Teaching and Research Office, ed.: "Selected Historical Materials of the Central Revolutionary Base Area", Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 1982 edition, p. 13. In the revolutionary base areas of western Fujian, consumer cooperatives, oil, salt and meat cooperatives, cloth cooperatives, and slaughtering cooperatives were established one after another, dealing in cloth, medicinal materials, tobacco leaves, shoes and socks, and other commodities. [Shu Long and Ling Buji, eds., History of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2021 edition, pp. 348-349.] The rural cooperatives in the Soviet districts were established in a scattered manner along with the process of the revolutionary contingent opening up the revolutionary base areas and the establishment of the Soviet government, forming a special mode of operation. Taking consumer cooperatives as an example, in the early days, most of the consumer cooperatives in the Soviet area were invested and established by the Red Army troops or the Soviet government, and some consumer cooperatives also relied on the procurement and transportation of materials for the armed defense of the Red Army, and "adopted a guerrilla-style business system" ["The Cooperative Movement in the Soviet Area" (1937), Yang Deshou, editor-in-chief: Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, Vol. 2, China Financial and Economic Publishing House, 1990, p. 247. ], often accompanied by the flow and development of the revolutionary ranks. Although cooperatives can play a certain role in regulating the "scissors gap" in the early days, the independence of each Soviet region is strong, the development is unbalanced, and a unified financial system and cooperative leadership organization system have not yet been formed. As a result, the cooperatives established in different Soviet areas are quite different in terms of systems and policies, and the phenomenon of doing their own thing is prominent. At the same time, the Soviet governments did not have a good grasp of the number and business of cooperatives in their areas. Therefore, during the period when the revolutionary base areas had not yet been consolidated, it was difficult to carry out the work of preparing for the establishment of agricultural banks and cooperatives and raising funds to purchase rice grain to stabilize grain prices. In the face of the phenomenon of "scissors difference", which still existed and even worsened, on November 2, 1929, the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian pointed out: "The Party should guide the Soviets in all localities, reward mass production, organize general cooperation, practice economism, maintain urban policies, and provide relief to unemployed workers. ["Circular No. 13 of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian - Resolution on the Spirit of the First Enlarged Meeting of the Special Committee of the Communist Party of China in Western Fujian and the Present Tasks of the Party in Western Fujian" (November 2, 1929), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 2, p. 288.] Focusing on how to solve the problem of "scissors difference", Fujian and other places began to formulate and implement new economic and commercial policies. In March 1930, the Soviet Government of Western Fujian was established, and the Declaration issued by the First Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers of Western Fujian put forward the guiding ideology of solving the problem of "scissors difference", that is, to coordinate the social and economic development and regulation of Western Fujian, so that paper, wood and tobacco could be exported, and foreign daily necessities could come in a steady stream, and food and finance should be regulated to solve the living problems of the masses in the red area. Soon after the announcement was issued, the summer harvest season soon came, and the problem of grain prices and the "scissors gap" was imminent. After Deng Zihui became chairman of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian in March 1930, he convened a peasant forum and conducted an in-depth investigation, and learned the specific reasons why the peasants did not support the price limit of agricultural products. [Jiang Boying, History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, pp. 219-220.] On June 1, 1930, the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Western Fujian Soviet Government formulated and issued the "Propaganda Outline for Adjusting Rice Prices" based on Deng Zihui's investigation and research. [Jiang Boying, "Deng Zihui and China's Rural Reform", Fujian People's Publishing House, 2004, p. 96.] The "Propaganda Outline" publicized to the masses the causes and consequences of the low price of rice after the equal division of land, and predicted that in the summer of 1930, the peasants still lacked cash to start work and buy oil and salt, which would still cause the price of rice to fall. [Zhao Xiaomin, Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, p. 196.] The Soviet Government of Western Fujian also explicitly pointed out that the establishment of a grain adjustment bureau and the adjustment of rice prices are "an important way out for the development of the social economy of western Fujian, and an important task that needs to be carried out urgently at present." The Soviet Government of Western Fujian also explicitly pointed out that the establishment of a grain adjustment bureau and the adjustment of rice prices are "an important way out for the development of the social economy of western Fujian, and it is also an important task that urgently needs to be carried out at present." It demanded that the Soviet governments in all localities actively implement this resolution and make the Soviet governments "a political power of genuine workers and poor peasants and resolutely seek the interests of the working and poor peasant classes." ["Proclamation of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian (No. 15) - On the Question of Organizing the Grain Dispensing Bureau" (June 14, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 3, Internal Edition, 1982 edition, p. 320.] The Soviet Government of Western Fujian also stipulated that the grain dispensing bureaus in all districts and townships must be established before June 30. Specifically, the township governments will convene mass meetings to elect 5 workers and poor peasants and organize grain dispensing bureaus. Each district and township has 5 members of the grain adjustment bureau, including 1 director, 1 clerk, 1 accountant and 2 custodians. ["Proclamation of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian (No. 15) -- On the Question of Organizing the Grain Dispensing Bureau" (June 14, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 3, p. 320.] In order to arouse the enthusiasm of the poor peasants, the Soviet government encouraged the poor peasants to organize themselves on their own, eliminated the wavering kulaks and the pro-kulak elements in the district and township organizations at all levels, and selected loyal, capable, iron-faced and selfless workers and poor peasant elements to organize the bureaus of adjustment, so as to organize the poor peasants and effectively regulate the price of rice. ["Propaganda Outline of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Western Fujian Soviet Government to Adjust the Price of Rice" (June 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 310.] After the grain dispensing bureau was organized, it was first necessary to raise funds, mainly from the township governments to borrow from the local wealthy families, ranging from 350 to 3500, and the Soviet government and the dispensing bureau should draw up a debit and return it after one year, with an interest rate not exceeding 5 percent per annum; after the money was lent, the Soviet government would protect the property of the wealthy families and not confiscate them under the pretext of panicking. At the same time, the Soviet Government of Western Fujian was preparing to set up a peasant bank to raise shares and raise funds to serve the grain distribution work. ["Propaganda Outline of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Western Fujian Soviet Government to Adjust the Price of Rice" (June 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 309.] With basic funding, there are two important working methods of the Food Adjustment Bureau. The first is to buy grain at a high price, that is, when the grain is on the market, the poor peasants buy millet at a price higher than 1/3 of the market price, so that the poor peasants do not have to sell it in the market and are not exploited by the market. The millet bought at a high price is stored and sold back to the original owner at 95% of the original price when the masses are short of grain. The second method is to buy rice at a high price, that is, when the price of rice is still low, the Grain Adjustment Bureau will take out a part of the money to purchase rice at a high price in the market within the scope of its possibilities, and transport it to a place where the rice is expensive for capital turnover. The Soviet Government of Western Fujian stressed that under no circumstances should it abandon the work of basketing grain and only do the work of basketing rice; at the same time, it should pay attention to storing the grain and adjusting the price of rice in the whole of western Fujian. Generally speaking, the grain and rice are all aimed at the poor peasants, and the majority of the poor peasants are rescued first, and the interests of the rich peasants are not sought for the benefit of the rich peasants, so as to prevent the rich peasants from breaking away from the poor peasant masses by making the mistake of the rich peasant line. ["Propaganda Outline of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Western Fujian Soviet Government to Adjust the Price of Rice" (June 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 309.] Of course, the Soviet government of western Fujian also pointed out that although there were certain advantages to adjusting the price of rice, it was only a method of curing the symptoms rather than the root cause, and in particular, the method of buying rice at a high price should be implemented only when it was financially possible. The only way to fundamentally raise the prices of agricultural products is to concentrate our forces, expand the struggle outward, and push forward the arrival of a national revolution. At the same time, the prices of agricultural by-products and products from mountains and forests will gradually increase, peasants' incomes will increase day by day, and the prices of industrial products will become more and more balanced, so that the problem of rice prices can be fundamentally solved. ["Propaganda Outline of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Western Fujian Soviet Government to Adjust the Price of Rice" (June 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 310.] The work of adjusting grain has been carried out vigorously and resolutely, and good results have been obtained, which have played a role in adjusting grain and rice and stabilizing grain prices to a certain extent. However, in the process of preparing for the establishment of the Food Adjustment Bureau, due to lack of experience, there were violations of policies in various localities in raising funds. The first is the question of who will raise funds, because the funds of the Grain Adjustment Bureau need to be obtained by borrowing from the "rich houses", and under the revolutionary situation, borrowing money is compulsory. Second, the definition of who is a "wealthy family" is not accurate and clear, and in the actual course of operation, loans are also made to poor peasants and middle peasants, so that the scope of fundraising is unplanned and unlimited, causing uneasiness among poor peasants and middle peasants. Third, the restrictions on grain purchase prices are too rigid, for example, when buying grain, the price of grain executed mechanically is 1/3 higher than the market price, which often does not conform to the laws of the market and causes malpractice. ["Circular of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian (No. 8) -- On the Question of the Grain Dispensing Bureau" (July 9, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 349.] When summing up the work of the Grain Adjustment Bureau, Deng Zihui and Zhang Dingcheng pointed out that after the implementation of the policy of buying grain and rice at high prices, grain prices began to stabilize, and the poor peasants were quick to say goodbye, but the rich peasants opposed it and the middle peasants wavered, which was not conducive to the development of the overall revolutionary situation. They believed that "the establishment of the Grain Adjustment Bureau was necessary and correct, but it was inappropriate to raise funds from the rich peasants" [Jiang Boying, History of the Revolutionary Base Areas in Western Fujian, p. 222]. 】。 Under the auspices of Deng Zihui and others, the western Fujian Soviet District began to correct the problems related to the work of the Grain Adjustment Bureau, and issued a circular on July 9, 1930 on the issue of the Grain Adjustment Bureau, re-stipulating the grain adjustment policy. First, it is made clear that the object of the grain adjustment bureau's loans is the wealthy families who "exploited people in the past and still have money to spare," and "those who exploited people in the past who have no money now do not borrow; those who had no money in the past and have no exploitation in the past do not borrow if they have a little money but do not exploit others"; second, the amount of loans borrowed should not be too small and the number of borrowers should not be too large, and those who do not meet the conditions for borrowing must be returned. The amount of money borrowed by the grain bureaus of each township shall be based on the needs of the poor peasants of the township and the ability of the rich peasants to raise funds, and the total amount of borrowings shall be determined by the district Soviet government to form the budget book. The second is to adjust the regulations on the price of rice purchased by the Grain Adjustment Bureau. The "Circular" adds that each district stipulates that the price of rice and grain is slightly higher than the current market price according to local conditions, and does not have to be higher than 1/3, and stipulates that the minimum price of rice and grain shall not be lower than the cost invested by farmers. The grain must be bought from the hired peasants and the poor peasants, and those who used to be rich peasants but are now bankrupt are not harvested. Third, it is stipulated that the quantity of grain sold by grain sellers should be based on the purchasing capacity of the grain adjustment bureau and the needs of the grain sellers and the grain production limit, so as to prevent those who sell first from selling a lot and those who sell later cannot be sold because the grain adjustment bureau lacks funds. After adjustment, the grain dispensing bureau has developed smoothly in all parts of western Fujian. ["Circular of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian (No. 8) -- On the Question of the Grain Dispensing Bureau" (July 9, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 3, p. 349.] For example, Caixi District of Shanghang County founded a grain cooperative in 1930 to raise shares of 1 yuan per share from people with better economic conditions, and 1 grain cooperative was organized in each township, and a total of 8 cooperatives were organized in the whole district, with a total share capital of 1,810 yuan. The adjustment method of grain cooperatives is generally similar to that of the grain adjustment bureau, which organizes the purchase, adjustment and sale of grain and rice after raising shares. The difference is that the grain cooperatives pay more attention to the care of the families of the Red Army and the masses in special difficulties. When selling grain, priority should be given to the dividends and the people in need, and some cash can also be lent to the people in need, and the grain will be returned according to the amount after harvesting, without interest. [Zhao Xiaomin, Economic History of China's Revolutionary Base Areas, p. 198.] However, the problem of "poor scissors" in the Soviet zone has not been completely solved. From October 1930 to July 1931, the economy of the Central Soviet District was completely blockaded by the enemy, and few industrial products could be imported into the Soviet area, and the industrial products in the Soviet area were very scarce. The phenomenon of "scissors gap" has widened one after another in western Fujian, Jiangxi, northeastern Jiangxi, and other Soviet regions, and the prices of daily industrial products are high and the prices of agricultural products are low, with the result that the CPC and the workers and peasants are still facing the problems of economic hardship and lack of materials. [Xu Yi, ed., "The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas", p. 89.] During the period of construction and consolidation of the Soviet area, the CCP's interpretation and response to the problem of "scissors difference" were constantly adjusted in concrete revolutionary practice. In order to avoid the exploitation of the "scissors gap" and win over the vast number of peasants, the CPC implemented the policy of dividing the land among the peasants, but after the equal division of the land, it brought about a series of changes in the rural supply-demand relationship and the loan relationship, and the problem of the "scissors gap" was not fundamentally solved, and the CCP was faced with an even more serious problem of falling grain prices. In order to solve the problem of the "scissors difference" after the equal division of land, the CPC successively implemented policies such as limiting prices, preparing for the establishment of grain dispensing bureaus, and improving trade inside and outside the Soviet areas, so as to enhance the Soviet government's ability to control the materials of industrial and agricultural products, so that the problem of "scissors difference" in the Soviet areas was alleviated to a certain extent. Under the new war situation, the CCP shifted from a price policy to an attempt to establish a new circulation system, with a view to mastering wartime materials through the establishment of a circulation system, further stabilizing the exchange prices of industrial and agricultural products, and strengthening economic and military mobilization of the peasants. 3. The Response to the Problem of "Scissors Difference": Taking the circulation system as the starting point, the CPC realized that in order to eliminate the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the prices of industrial and agricultural products, it is necessary to further expand the circulation of commodities within the Soviet areas and between the Soviet areas and the white areas, especially to transport the industrial products produced in the white areas into the Soviet areas and the agricultural products from the Soviet areas to the white areas for sale. At the same time, it is necessary to give full play to the role of small businessmen and to prevent manipulation by middlemen; it is necessary to give full play to the enthusiasm of the masses and to emphasize the organization of the economy and trade under the guidance of the Soviet Government. Therefore, it is very important to establish a circulation system under the leadership of the CPC and with the broad participation of the masses. As a result, the CPC began to change its thinking, no longer starting from prices alone, but by adjusting a series of economic policies and establishing new channels on its own, so as to promote the common development of three types of commercial channels, namely, public commerce, private commerce, and cooperative commerce, and expand the channels for commodity circulation, with a view to eliminating the "scissors gap" between industrial and agricultural products and improving the relationship between supply and demand of industrial and agricultural products in the Soviet region. The second is to give play to the role of private industry and commerce in invigorating the economy inside and outside the Soviet zone. In 1931, the First National Congress of the Chinese Workers' Peasants' and Soldiers' Soviets was convened, which formulated a policy of protecting commercial freedom and promoting private commerce, and demanded that the Soviet government should adopt an open attitude towards trade exchanges between the Soviet and the White areas and supervise the trade exchanges in the non-Soviet areas. ["Economic Policy" (December 1, 1931), Jiangxi Provincial Taxation Bureau et al., eds., Selected Historical Materials on Industrial and Commercial Taxation in the Central Revolutionary Base Areas (1929.1-1934.2), Fujian People's Publishing House, 1985, p. 62. The Soviet government also adopted a flexible policy, rewarding private businessmen to seek commercial relations in the White Zone, encouraging private business in the necessities of life, regulating and promoting the circulation of goods in the Red and White Zone with taxes, and enlivening and developing the economy of the Soviet Zone. [Zhang Xueying and Su Juncai, eds., The History of the United Front in Western Fujian (New Democratic Revolution Period), Xiamen University Press, 2016, p. 78.] The second is to give play to the role of private industry and commerce in invigorating the economy inside and outside the Soviet zone. In 1931, the First National Congress of the Chinese Workers' Peasants' and Soldiers' Soviets was convened, which formulated a policy of protecting commercial freedom and promoting private commerce, and demanded that the Soviet government should adopt an open attitude towards trade exchanges between the Soviet and the White areas and supervise the trade exchanges in the non-Soviet areas. ["Economic Policy" (December 1, 1931), Jiangxi Provincial Taxation Bureau et al., eds., Selected Historical Materials on Industrial and Commercial Taxation in the Central Revolutionary Base Areas (1929.1-1934.2), Fujian People's Publishing House, 1985, p. 62. The Soviet government also adopted a flexible policy, rewarding private businessmen to seek commercial relations in the White Zone, encouraging private business in the necessities of life, regulating and promoting the circulation of goods in the Red and White Zone with taxes, and enlivening and developing the economy of the Soviet Zone. [Zhang Xueying and Su Juncai, eds., The History of the United Front in Western Fujian (New Democratic Revolution Period), Xiamen University Press, 2016, p. 78.] Most prominently, the CCP emphasized the extensive establishment of various types of cooperatives to promote economic circulation in and outside the Soviet Union. In July 1930, at the Second Congress of the Communist Party of China in western Fujian, Lu Wali, a representative of the Fujian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, believed that in order to solve the painful problem of "scissors difference", "the establishment of production cooperatives, credit cooperatives, and grain cooperatives can only be solved considerably, and the fundamental solution can only be achieved by expanding the struggle outward, striving for the victory of the national revolution, and making the whole of China our workers and peasants" ["How to Solve the Problem of "Scissors Difference"" (July 8, 1930), "Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives" Series 2, p. 152. 】。 In addition to the military and political expansion of the struggle, it is also necessary to expand the struggle economically. Therefore, the development of cooperatives and the promotion of commodity circulation have become an extremely important strategy. In the process of specific development, cooperatives also have many problems. For example, production cooperatives have hardly developed, most credit cooperatives do not seek benefits from the side of the poor masses, and most consumer cooperatives are like private or merchant businesses for profit, "just in the name of a cooperative" ["Circular of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian No. 1 - On the Development of Commodities Circulated by Cooperatives" (December 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 4, Internal Distribution, 1983 edition, p. 417. ["Economic Problems in the Soviet Regions" (December 7, 1930), Ganzhou Municipal Finance Bureau and Ruijin Municipal Finance Bureau, eds., Selected Financial Historical Materials of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Internal Distribution, 2001 edition, p. 505. 】。 As for the import of industrial products and the export of agricultural products, the cooperatives also did not take care of or discuss and plan in depth. Moreover, cooperatives have even occasionally cracked down on businessmen, so that businessmen have withdrawn their hands and closed down their businesses, with the result that the phenomenon of "scissors difference" still cannot be solved considerably, and the rural economy is still extremely difficult. ["Circular of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian No. 1 - On the Question of the Development of Cooperatives to Circulate Commodities" (December 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 4, p. 417.] In addition, the various cooperatives were not registered with the government, so the Soviet government had no way of knowing the number of cooperatives and the state of their business. On December 1, 1930, Zhang Dingcheng, Chairman of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian, and Luo Shouchun, Minister of Economic Affairs, signed and issued a circular on the "Concerning the Development of Cooperatives Circulating Commodities", pointing out that after the victory of the agrarian revolution, western Fujian should develop the social economy, reduce the phenomenon of "scissors difference", solve economic difficulties, and strive for the future of socialism, so the development of cooperatives and circulating commodities is the most urgent central task. The circular not only demands that governments at all levels attach great importance to the work of cooperatives, but that the plenary committees, congresses, and standing committees should focus on the work of cooperatives and discuss plans from time to time, and in particular, the Ministry of Economic Affairs should regularly manage the work of cooperatives; it calls for extensive mobilization among the masses so that the masses can understand the significance and importance of cooperatives, so that the masses will automatically rise up to organize cooperatives, support cooperatives, and expand cooperative organizations and concentrate capital as much as possible; at the same time, they should mobilize the masses to subscribe for shares voluntarily and expand the shares of cooperatives; and also demand that cooperatives that conform to the norms be established in accordance with the Organic Law on Cooperatives, otherwise they should be abolished immediately。 ["Circular of the Soviet Government of Western Fujian No. 1 - On the Question of the Development of Cooperatives to Circulate Commodities" (December 1, 1930), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, vol. 4, p. 417.] In 1931, the CCP continued to promote the development of cooperatives and the promotion of commodity circulation. The economic policy formulated by the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviets required the Soviet Government to give vigorous support and support to the cooperatives. ["Economic Policy" (December 1, 1931), Selected Historical Materials on Industrial and Commercial Taxation in the Central Revolutionary Base Areas (1929.1-1934.2), p. 62.] The Provisional Central Government also set up the People's Commissariat of Finance of the Central Committee, established a top-down financial management system, and began to establish a financial system for the Soviet region as a whole. In the process of establishing a financial system and adjusting the commercial policies of the Soviet areas, the Provisional Central Government emphasized the use of cooperatives to tap the economic resources and invigorate the commodity market in the Soviet areas, establish commodity exchange relations between the Soviet areas and the white areas, and obtain the commodities needed by the Soviet areas. The Provisional Central Government successively promulgated the "Provisional Regulations on the Organization of Cooperatives" and the "Outline for the Work of Cooperatives" and other guiding documents for the development of cooperatives. The CCP emphasizes the commonality of all kinds of cooperatives, which are class organizations used by workers, middle peasants, poor peasants, hired peasants and other classes to resist the exploitation of commercial capital, and are the way for the agrarian revolution to continue and deepen, which is conducive to improving the living standards of members, regulating the phenomenon of "scissors difference", promoting the development of the socialist economy and raising the cultural level of members. ["Outline of the Work of Cooperatives of the People's Commissariat of the Central Financial Department" (Excerpt) (September 19, 1932), Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, vol. 2, p. 75.] In practice, a variety of different models of cooperative development have been formed in the Soviet region. First, consumer cooperatives. The consumer cooperatives mainly deal in daily necessities such as salt, foreign oil, tobacco, straw paper, foreign fire, and sugar, and provide cheap goods for the peasants to prevent profiteers from raising prices. After the establishment of the Provisional Central Government, new regulations were put into place on the business of consumer cooperatives, emphasizing that consumer cooperatives are committed to providing consumer goods for their members, among which ordinary rural consumer cooperatives mainly deal in salt, foreign fire, cotton cloth, and other commodities needed by the masses; and consumer cooperatives in military organs mostly deal in daily necessities such as toothbrushes, tooth powder, shoes, foreign fires, towels, and soap, as well as cultural articles such as books, newspapers, paper, pens, and ink, which are needed by the personnel of the organs. Second, trade cooperatives. Selling cooperatives mainly sell farmers' bulk products, such as paper, straw sandals, timber, cotton thread, shiitake mushrooms, tobacco leaves, etc. The CCP stresses that the cooperatives should pay attention to the sale of certain bulk agricultural products, such as tea oil, paper, tea, rice grains, beans, tobacco leaves, etc. However, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that, first, it is necessary to find out the market price and the price in various places, so that it can wait for the market price or transport it to a place where the price is high; second, when the price is low, it must be hoarded and not sold, and the money from the sale of goods by the members must try to borrow money to pay for their use; third, it must make good negotiations with banks or credit cooperatives so that they can borrow money with or without collateral if necessary; in addition, it also stipulates that when the sales cooperatives purchase peasants' native products, they should be higher than the market price, and they cannot stipulate uniformity. ["Outline of the Work of Cooperatives of the People's Commissariat of the Central Committee of Finance (Excerpt)" (September 19, 1932), Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, vol. 2, p. 76.] Third, buy cooperatives. Purchasing cooperatives emphasized bulk wholesale outside the Soviet districts, and then transported the wholesale commodities into the Soviet districts and distributed them to the consumer cooperatives for sale. The CPC stresses that when purchasing cooperatives, we should pay attention to: First, we should understand the needs of the cooperatives and the masses in various places, and we must try our best to buy them at the source when purchasing them, so as not to be exploited by wholesale companies; second, we generally buy goods according to the vouchers of various cooperatives, but when we see that the market will send goods, we can anticipate in advance the amount that the cooperatives and the masses will need to purchase in large quantities, and we cannot mechanically wait until the report arrives to procure; third, when buying goods, we must explore the market and buy them wherever they are cheap; fourth, we can hire workers to open factories to manufacture products, such as buying cooperatives that can burn lime, digging coal, etc.; in addition, it is also stipulated that a handling fee may be charged for the purchase of cooperatives, but they cannot arbitrarily raise the price to make money; when there are a lot of goods in a certain source place, a special person can be set up in that place to explore the market and purchase the village. ["Outline of the Work of Cooperatives of the People's Commissariat of the Central Financial Committee (Excerpt)" (September 19, 1932), Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, Vol. 2, p. 77.] Fourth, credit unions. Credit cooperatives are mainly engaged in currency storage and financial lending. In order to alleviate the difficult situation in which the peasants had no way to obtain loans, to meet the turnover needs of agricultural production funds, and to prevent the peasants from selling grain at low prices, the CPC organized the establishment of state and local banks, as well as the peasants' credit cooperatives (lending houses for the poor), and began to form a set of credit systems in the revolutionary base areas. Credit cooperatives shoulder the heavy responsibility of providing funds to production cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, grain cooperatives, and so on to support the rapid development of these newly-born new democratic economies with socialist elements. [Xu Yi, ed., "The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas", p. 227.] The establishment of banks and credit cooperatives has played an important role in regulating finance, waging an economic struggle against the enemy, preventing the expansion of the "scissors gap" between industrial and agricultural products, and safeguarding the interests of workers and peasants. Fifth, grain cooperatives. Grain cooperatives are grass-roots grain organizations that specialize in grain staking and price adjustment. Under the guidance of the Grain Adjustment Bureau of the State Grain Organs, the grain cooperatives assist the peasants in organizing grain harvesting, storage, purchasing, dispensing, and collection, pay attention to regulating grain prices to resist market price fluctuations, and provide peasants with agricultural production materials to help them develop the agricultural economy. ["The Relationship between the Grain Adjustment Bureau and the Grain Cooperatives" (July 4, 1932), Documents on the History of the Revolution in Western Fujian, Vol. 7, Internal Edition, 2006 edition, p. 277.] In the summer of 1932, in order to prevent grain prices from falling, the Provisional Central Government also launched a special campaign of grain cooperatives, mobilizing the broad masses to take shares in the establishment and development of special grain cooperatives, which were limited to all major counties by the end of October, and it was necessary to ensure that every township had an organization of grain cooperatives, and through grain cooperatives, grain prices could be further regulated, the phenomenon of "scissors difference" should be reduced, the exploitation of commercial capital such as merchants and rich peasants should be resisted, and the enemy's blockade should be broken through, so that the agrarian revolution could be deepened and continued. [Xu Yi, ed., "The Long History of Finance and Economy of the Central Revolutionary Base Areas", p. 135.] Deng Zihui believed that the organization of grain cooperatives would be of great benefit to the revolution in the Soviet areas. This is because after the establishment of grain cooperatives, grain can be purchased, stored, and exported through grain cooperatives instead of entering the market, which can reduce the problem of falling grain prices when they are put on the market, limit the soaring price of grain when there is a shortage of green and yellow, reduce the manipulation of rice prices by businessmen and rich peasants, restrict the development of commercial capital of businessmen and rich peasants, maintain and raise grain prices, and also help increase tax revenues. Deng Zihui also stressed that grain cooperatives are economic organizations in which the middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired peasant classes resist the exploitation of commercial capital such as merchants and rich peasants, and are the deepening and continuation of the agrarian revolutionary struggle, and the economic mobilization for consolidating and developing the Soviet areas. In terms of the prospects for the development of the revolution, grain cooperatives can form a broad mass mobilization and are also a foundation for taking the road of socialist revolution in the future. ["Developing Grain Cooperatives and Consolidating the Economy of the Soviet Area" (August 30, 1932), Collected Works of Deng Zihui, People's Publishing House, 1996, pp. 41-42.] Under the impetus of the Provisional Central Government, since 1932, the cooperatives in various localities have developed rapidly, which has adjusted the phenomenon of "scissors difference" to a certain extent, reduced the poverty of the masses, and adjusted the finances of the Soviet districts to a certain extent. During this period, the CCP also placed special emphasis on the normative, organizational, and mass nature of the development of cooperatives. Deng Zihui held that it is necessary to mobilize the masses in their entirety, and to push it down from top to bottom, from the joint meeting of county chairmen, the joint meeting of districts, the meeting of township representatives, to the meetings of the peasants' trade unions and the poor peasants' leagues, all the way to the voters' meetings, and send people everywhere to make reports and then elect a preparatory staff to solicit members, and then the members hold a meeting to elect a clerk to collect the shares and start business. ["Developing Grain Cooperatives and Consolidating the Economy of the Soviet Areas" (August 30, 1932), Collected Works of Deng Zihui, p. 43.] The Provisional Central Government laid down the general principles, methods, and methods of the various types of cooperative organizations in the Soviet area as a whole, and further distinguished the business of different cooperatives, such as consumer cooperatives, which was conducive to strengthening the standardization, massification, and specialization of the organizational system and business operations of various types of cooperatives. Cooperatives and businesses in base areas have also initially formed collective economic organizations with socialist elements. This new form of economy, together with the public-run business with a socialist character, has brought about qualitative changes in the mode of economic organization and economic relations in the base areas, and together constitute the rudiments of the new democratic economy. ["The Long History of the Financial and Economic History of the Revolutionary Base Areas: The Period of the Agrarian Revolution", p. 830.] However, the supply of daily industrial goods such as salt, cloth, and medicine in the Soviet area must still be taken from the cities of the white area, and the source of funds for industrial necessities must also depend on the export of grain, rice, wood, bamboo, tea oil, tung oil, paper, wood, and other agricultural and sideline products from the Soviet area. In the struggle against "encirclement and suppression," the economic blockade in the Soviet areas was also intensifying, and it was often impossible to bring in daily necessities from outside, and it was very difficult to transport agricultural and sideline products out of the Soviet areas, so the problem of rising prices of foreign necessities could not be fundamentally resolved. [Fu Fengxiang, editor-in-chief: "History of Transportation in Jiangxi Soviet District", p. 133.] In the war against "encirclement and suppression", the development of cooperatives was also directly affected by the war. For example, in 1932, the western Soviet region of Hunan and Hubei was "encircled and suppressed" by the Kuomintang, and the cooperatives were forced to stop all economic activities; in early 1933, more than 1,000 consumer cooperatives in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces were faced with difficulties brought about by the comprehensive economic blockade and were unable to operate. In addition, the general cooperatives do not have much capital and are not operating well, and in some localities the cooperatives have been reduced or even suspended due to the Soviet government's loans, which has further aggravated the phenomenon of "scissors difference" in the prices of industrial and agricultural products in the Soviet areas. After 1933, the CCP was faced with more severe military "encirclement and suppression" and economic blockade and military financial problems, and the Soviet areas were faced with more difficult difficulties in the transportation and sales of industrial products, and the problem of insufficient supply of industrial products continued to expand. With the advent of the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" War in 1933, the Provisional Central Government called for "using all its strength to help the Red Army at the front to fight". The solution to the problem of "poor scissors" in the Soviet zone was also subordinated to the operational needs of the Red Army at the front. A new trend has emerged in the prices of agricultural products in the Soviet region, and the CPC's response to the problem of "scissors difference" has formed a new trend. First of all, the price of grain and rice is different from the previous downward trend, and the agricultural products in the Soviet region are in short supply under extreme resource pressure, showing a new trend of continuous rise. In March 1933, the Provisional Central Government received reports from various localities that there were serious phenomena such as grain shortages, soaring rice prices, and the lack of money and markets in many places in the Soviet region, especially in the vicinity of the Red Army garrisons and hospitals, and there was a great shortage of grain. With the unfolding of the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" War, the supply of grain in the Soviet areas exceeded demand, and the embargo policy was implemented in various regions. For example, counties A and B draw their own boundaries and hinder the flow of grain. The reason for the embargo on rice grain varies from region to region and from person to population. The people who are short of grain are afraid that there will be a large outflow of grain from the locality, and rice will be expensive during the period when there is a shortage of grain; the people who have surplus grain want to keep it for the future and sell it at a high price; the rich peasants and profiteers manipulate and seek profits, and even deliberately make trouble to make profits; and some Soviet governments in the base areas have implemented a policy of prohibition without inspection in order to ensure local grain supply. As a result, although there is a surplus of grain in some localities, the mutual adjustment of various districts and counties has been greatly hindered, resulting in an overall food shortage. ["In order to regulate the people's food and provide military rations—Order No. 39 of the People's Committee of the Provisional Central Government" (March 4, 1933), Selected Historical Materials of the Chinese Soviet Republic, p. 245.] The second is to form a new direction in response to the problem of "scissor difference". Under the dual influence of wartime food shortages and embargo policies, grain prices in the Soviet areas continued to rise. Judging from the trend of the "scissors difference" phenomenon alone, with the rise in grain prices, the price difference between industrial and agricultural products has eased. However, the prices of industrial and agricultural products were very high, and the economic difficulties faced by the Chinese communists and the people in the Soviet areas were even more severe than during the previous four anti-"encirclement and suppression" wars. In this regard, in the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, the CPC also further began to regulate and control the rise in grain prices and industrial product prices. With regard to the rise in grain prices, the Provisional Central Government stressed the need to educate and mobilize the families who had surplus food, so that they would not just want to raise prices and ignore the lack of rations for the troops at the front, but should mobilize them to promote the victory of the revolution by applying reasonable prices from the perspective of the interests of the whole. With regard to the rich peasants and profiteers who deliberately hoarded grain, or secretly manipulated grain prices, or even spread rumors and incite the masses, the Provisional Central Government stressed that the Soviet governments everywhere should lead the revolutionary masses to impose severe sanctions on them. ["In order to regulate the people's food and provide military rations—Order No. 39 of the People's Committee of the Provisional Central Government" (March 4, 1933), Selected Historical Materials of the Chinese Soviet Republic, p. 245.] Generally speaking, on the issue of regulating the people's food and providing military rations, the CCP stresses that the interests of the whole and the overall victory of the revolution are the first interests of all. In response to the rising prices of industrial products and in order to mobilize resources within the Soviet districts, on April 28, 1933, the Provisional Central Government decided to set up the People's Commissariat of the National Economy and the Ministry of National Economy at the provincial and county levels. The CCP demanded that the Ministry of National Economy take charge of the Grain Adjustment Bureau, the Cooperatives, the Foreign Trade Office, and other institutions to strive to improve the living conditions of the masses of workers and peasants, arouse greater revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses, and at the same time ensure the needs of the Red Army in order to coordinate the entire war mobilization. ["On the Establishment of the Ministry of National Economy" (April 28, 1933), Selected Historical Materials of the Chinese Soviet Republic, pp. 18-19.] As the war became more and more intense, it was of first great importance to increase the production of various industries in the Soviet area, expand domestic and foreign trade, develop the national economy of the Soviet area, and break the economic blockade of the enemy. In order to curb the double rise of industrial and agricultural products, the CCP has also further strengthened the construction of a material circulation system to strengthen the regulation and control of materials during wartime. In the construction of the circulation system of cooperatives, the CCP not only requires the establishment of a five-level organizational system of township branches, district cooperatives, county headquarters, provincial headquarters and central headquarters from the bottom up, ["Outline of the Development of Cooperatives of the People's Commissariat of the Central People's Commissariat of the National Economy" (June 1933), Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, vol. 2, pp. 82-83. It has also adopted different strategies in different regions to rectify and develop cooperatives, so as to improve and strengthen cooperative organizations. ["Outline of the Development of Cooperatives by the People's Commissariat of the National Economy of the Central Committee" (June 1933), Selected Historical Materials of China's Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, Vol. 2, pp. 85-86.] In this process, the CCP also strengthened political mobilization through the construction of material circulation channels, and trade unions, poor peasant leagues, township Soviet congresses, anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet mutual aid associations, township women's congresses, and lecture teams were able to carry out propaganda and education among the masses in connection with relevant economic issues and cooperative organization issues, and launched a series of revolutionary contests to strengthen wartime material mobilization and military mobilization. ["Decision of the Hunan and Jiangxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Issues of National Economic Construction" (October 22, 1933), "Hunan and Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Areas" Party History Data Collection and Coordination Group, ed.: "Hunan and Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Areas", CPC History Materials Publishing House, 1991 edition, pp. 738-739. In the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" War, the CCP faced a more severe shortage of materials than the problem of "poor scissors". In particular, after the price of grain continued to rise, the CCP weakened the strategy of eliminating the "scissors gap" in economic propaganda and mobilization, and put more emphasis on overcoming the dangers of war and resource difficulties, and drawing materials and funds for the front-line troops to meet the needs of the revolutionary war. Under the severe military "encirclement and suppression" and economic blockade, the CPC is still committed to building circulation channels for public, private, and cooperative enterprises, vigorously carrying out grain dispensing and material collection, expanding domestic and foreign trade, breaking the enemy's economic blockade, and stepping up fund-raising campaigns. These experiences in dealing with the rising prices of industrial and agricultural products and the problem of "scissors difference" have provided a certain amount of experience for the CPC to continue to carry out the rural revolution and economic struggle. ConclusionThe problem of "scissor difference" is a special phenomenon in the process of modern world economic development, and Europe, the Soviet Union, and China are all faced with the situation of rising industrial products and relatively falling prices of agricultural products in the early 20th century. However, for the CCP, which was waging revolutionary struggles in the countryside, the specific environment it faced in the Soviet areas was different, and it had no experience to follow in the exchange and price policy of industrial and agricultural products in the countryside. Therefore, the CCP's understanding, interpretation, and response to the problem of "scissors difference" in the Soviet area ran through the entire process of revolutionary struggle, and went through three different stages: at the beginning of entering the Soviet area, the CCP explained the phenomenon of "scissors difference", emphasized overcoming the exploitation and manipulation of middlemen, and focused on alleviating the problem of "scissors difference" through propaganda. In the process of consolidating and developing the revolutionary base areas, when explaining the problem of "scissors difference," the CPC stressed that it should proceed from the reality of the revolution and the needs of the peasants in the Soviet areas, face up to the plight of the peasants' production and life, and pay attention to strengthening the ability to regulate materials through price limits, so as to alleviate the problem of the "scissors difference" between industrial and agricultural products in the Soviet areas. In the later stage of the revolution in the Soviet area, with the increase in wartime demand and the intensification of material tension, the CCP's interpretation of the phenomenon of "scissors difference" decreased, and then turned to the establishment of cooperatives and other economic organizations and material circulation channels, and strengthened the direct transfer of materials, in order to solve the problem of revolutionary materials needed in the struggle against "encirclement and suppression". It can be seen that the problem of "scissors difference" faced by the CCP has changed with the changes in the external military and economic environment, as well as with the internal supply and demand of grain and rice and the changes in the mentality of the peasants in the Soviet area, but the core problem at different stages is the regulation and control of materials. In this process, the CCP has always faced multiple economic difficulties and pressures. In terms of industrial product prices, the CCP is in a state of blockade and can only try to bring in more industrial products through policies such as establishing cooperatives, developing public commerce, and developing private commerce, so as to alleviate the dilemma of soaring industrial product prices. In terms of the prices of agricultural products, there is also a deep-seated tension between the CPC and the masses. The lower the price of grain for the revolutionary ranks and the poor wage peasants, the better, and for the homesteaders and wealthy families who were allocated land, the higher the price of grain was more beneficial. How to strike a balance between different regions and different subjects, how to maintain the rationality of a series of policies after the establishment of political power and the equal division of land, and how to win the support of the peasants for the revolution all tested the fledgling revolutionary regime in the countryside. Therefore, the explanation, propaganda and response to the problem of "scissors difference" is not only a practical economic issue, but also a political issue. The CPC's experience in dealing with the problem of the "scissors gap" in the rural areas of the Soviet area provided experience for it to continue to explore the rural revolution and carry out economic struggle. About author:Li Yurong is an assistant professor at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University. Source: Soviet Area Studies, No. 1, 2024.
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