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Before and after the founding of New China, in accordance with US Secretary of State Acheson's policy of "supporting Chiang" again, the United States' support for Chiang's regime in Taiwan was limited to maintaining diplomatic relations, continuing to provide a small amount of economic aid, and allowing it to use its own funds to purchase arms from the United States.
However, Consul General MacDonald in Taipei demanded a change in this policy.
1. Whether to support Chiang Kai-shek's argument
In November 1949, he made several telegrams to the State Department, proposing to immediately send a US military advisory group to Taiwan and provide large-scale economic assistance.
The military's demand for a change in policy is far stronger. MacArthur was always dissatisfied with Washington's attitude toward the Kuomintang.
In mid-November, he asked to send a staff team of the US Far East Air Force to visit Taiwan. The State Department initially objected and persuaded the War Department to ask him to dispel this idea, but MacDonald took the initiative to arrange for the group to visit Taiwan with the Kuomintang authorities, so that the State Department had to accept the fait accompli.
In early December, MacArthur secretly discussed the Taiwan issue with Fred Glenser, director of the Joint Staff Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Tracy Warris, deputy secretary of the Army, in Tokyo, and advocated that the United States declare its obligation to defend Taiwan and provide Taiwan with a large amount of military aid.
Army authorities in Washington are also actively considering measures to aid Taiwan, including sending a military advisory group and stationing a U.S. fleet in Taiwan.
Acheson's biggest challenge came from the military's top leadership, Secretary of Defense Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Compared with Acheson, they were more optimistic about the Kuomintang's ability to resist and placed more emphasis on their "moral responsibility" to Chiang Kai-shek.
While they are not yet willing to use the U.S. military to protect Taiwan, they believe that other forms of military support are desirable. Johnson was particularly pro-Chiang, so much so that he later became a member of the "Outside China Aid Group".
Another factor that determined Johnson's actions was the struggle for power with Acheson. The ambitious politician was extremely jealous of Acheson's prominence and wanted to weaken his opponents through controversy over China policy.
Five months ago, together with the chiefs of staff, he strongly opposed the publication of a white paper and declared that he would compete with Acheson on "future China policy" in the future.
Now, they thought it was time for a contest, and MacArthur's attitude strengthened their confidence. In mid-December, Johnson sent a memo about Taiwan written by Wallis, who had just returned from Tokyo, to Truman, who was on vacation.
At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-examined Taiwan's strategic value and Taiwan policy, and as a result, on December 23, it formally proposed to Johnson that MacArthur immediately send a quartermaster investigation mission to Taiwan, and then provide military aid to Chiang Kai-shek in accordance with the results of the investigation.
Johnson then submitted this proposal to the National Security Council, and on the morning of 29 December, Acheson had a face-to-face confrontation with the chiefs of staff, and Acheson said that Taiwan's fundamental problem lies in the incurable decay of the Kuomintang, so even if the military's proposition is implemented, it can only delay its "fall" for a short time.
"First, we will once again embroil America's prestige in yet another defeat in full view; and, more importantly, we will stir up hatred of foreigners among all Chinese and pour it out on ourselves." We will run the risk of giving the Soviets the opportunity to sue us in the Security Council and be seen throughout Asia as supporters of this discredited, rotten Kuomintang government. ”
He also used the Sino-Soviet contradictions as an excuse to say that strengthening the United States' support for Chiang Kai-shek would only make the United States replace the Soviet Union as the enemy of the Chinese people. At the same time, he stressed that the United States must face up to the reality that "there is no longer a Chinese base to resist communism" and "do everything in its power to strengthen China's neighbors," especially to curb communist expansion into Southeast Asia.
2. The "victory" of the State Council
In the afternoon of the same day, the National Security Council met under the chairmanship of Truman, and after listening to the respective views of Acheson and the military leaders, Truman affirmed the current policy that Acheson upheld.
The military was not willing to be frustrated. The Ministry of National Defense leaked the information to the press immediately after the meeting of the National Security Committee. Two days later, the above-mentioned top-secret instructions of the State Council on the propaganda policy on the Taiwan issue were transmitted from the "General Committee of the League" in Tokyo.
Pro-Chiang Senators Nolan, Smith and Taft, as well as former President Herbert Hoover, seized the opportunity to attack the State Department and demand military protection for Taiwan, which was reported and commented on by major newspapers.
In order to clarify the position of the administration, Acheson proposed the issuance of a presidential statement and presented a contribution. Truman consulted with some White House aides and Johnson and was ready to refuse, but Acheson persuaded him to change his mind.
On January 5, 1950, Truman issued a statement on Taiwan. The statement acknowledged that Taiwan had been returned to China, declared that the United States had no intention of obtaining privileges or establishing military bases on Taiwan "at this time", nor did it intend to use its armed forces to intervene "in the present situation", and would not provide military assistance to Taiwan.
The words "at this time" were inserted by Truman on the advice of military leaders (probably Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), so much so that the White House had to hastily withdraw copies of the statements that had been sent to reporters in advance so that they could be added.
The Truman statement marked the end of a period in the evolution of US policy toward Taiwan. Since late 1948, the U.S. government has been looking for ways to prevent Taiwan from being controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, only to find itself at the end of its rope.
However, the possibility of US military intervention has never been ruled out. The above-mentioned reservations in the Truman statement reveal the Administration's consistent position.
In 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff twice stressed to the NSC that "future events that lead to war itself" (i.e., a war or military crisis that is considered to endanger the strategic positions of the United States in East Asia) could make open U.S. military action against Taiwan desirable.
The State Department is fully aligned with the military on this issue.
Acheson's draft presidential statement already included the qualifier "in the present circumstances," and although the immediate insertion of the words "at this time" aroused his displeasure, it was only because he feared that retracting the original copy from the hands of reporters would arouse suspicion.
Explaining to the press and members of Congress, Truman's statement, he said that if the US military is attacked in the Far East or aggression occurs there, "the United States must be completely free to take whatever action is necessary for its own security in any region."
Although Acheson and military leaders believed that war was unlikely in the foreseeable future, they did retain the option of American armed forces to prevent the CCP from occupying Taiwan.
Xinhua News Agency, reporting on Acheson's explanation, commented:
"Acheson's words clearly reveal that the US imperialist conspiratorial plan to occupy Taiwan by armed force is not dead hearted," and that it can carry out this plan as long as it deems it necessary in the future.
In less than half a year, this was confirmed.
4. A strategic turn
The first half of 1950 was a very important period for the United States' East Asian strategy, and it was a crucial transitional period in which the transformation of the United States was brewing.
At the end of December 1949, the National Security Council, after determining that it was impossible to prevent the Chinese Communist Party from taking control of Taiwan, quickly determined the overall strategy of containing Sino-Soviet communism in East Asia.
This strategy divides two lines of containment in East Asia:
The first is the "defensive ring" of the western Pacific, which includes Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines, and the second is the Sino-Soviet periphery in the eastern part of the Asian continent, which mainly includes South Korea and Southeast Asia. Taiwan is effectively excluded from the two lines of containment.
On the western Pacific front, the United States will directly assume the responsibility of containment, and the US military will resist any external attack; on the mainland front, the United States will mainly strengthen the local non-communist forces through political and diplomatic support and economic and military assistance, and these forces will do the containment for the United States and will not be engaged in the US armed forces.
However, in the first half of 1950, a series of major events occurred in East Asia and the United States, and the distinction between these two lines of containment became blurred.
In Beijing, the repossession of U.S. barracks led to the withdrawal of all U.S. officials in China, completely dashing its hopes of retaining its foothold in China, and further intensifying Sino-American hostilities.
In Moscow, the leaders of China and the Soviet Union concluded a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which deprived the current US policy on East Asia (especially its policy toward Taiwan) of the important argument of promoting Sino-Soviet splits, and also strengthened the concerns of US policymakers about the close cooperation between China and the Soviet Union and the joint expansion of communist forces.
In Southeast Asia, Vietnam's war of resistance against France flourished with China's strong assistance, and the U.S. continental containment line was in danger of rupture.
In the United States, with the rise of McCarthyism, it is clear that the administration would be politically responsible if it retreated further in East Asia.
Then, stimulated by the situation in East Asia and the world, the Truman administration formulated a new global strategic principle in a state of panic, that is, to do everything possible to prevent "the failure of the liberal system in any place" and to greatly expand its armaments in an effort to bridge the gap between American military capabilities and their global needs.
The impact of this new global strategic principle on the US East Asian strategy is obvious.
At the same time, calls within the administration for a change in the Taiwan policy are becoming stronger and stronger. In the eyes of many high-ranking officials, preventing the Chinese Communist Party from occupying Taiwan has a bearing on the fundamental interests of the United States in East Asia and the world. All of this meant for the U.S. government that it had to succeed in preventing any part of East Asia from losing to the Communist Party after Chinese mainland. Under such circumstances, it seems that sooner or later the "defensive belt" of the United States will be pushed forward to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and even Indochina.
5. The overall East Asian strategy of the United States
In March 1949, Louis Johnson replaced James Forrestal as Secretary of Defense. When he took charge of the Pentagon, he quickly concluded that the United States lacked an overall East Asia policy. On 10 June, he submitted a memorandum to the National Security Council criticizing the government's approach to dealing with the increasingly serious situation in East Asia.
He believed that it was necessary to develop a "well-thought-out and comprehensive plan" aimed at curbing communism in Asia.
This was accepted by the National Security Committee. However, it is clear that the kind of plan that Johnson is asking for can only take shape after the question of who will fall into Taiwan's hands in the US government's calculations can take shape.
In October, a policy of being prepared to allow Taiwan to "fall" was established.
On this premise, on 23 December, the Executive Secretary of the NSC presented his report, "The US Position on Asia" (NSC Document 48/1).
On 30 December, the day after Acheson had foiled the military leadership in person, Truman presided over the discussion of the report, which was slightly revised and formally adopted as Document 48/2 of the National Security Committee. This is the overall strategic program of the United States in East Asia.
Documents 48/1 and 48/2 of the State Security Committee were jointly drafted by the secretary of the National Security Committee and representatives of the State Council and the Ministry of National Defense, and the opinions of the State Council played a major role.
The document analyzes the situation in East Asia:
The victory of the Chinese Communist Party was of great significance to the Soviet Union, and "it can be assumed that in the near future, the influence of the Kremlin on the Chinese Communists, as well as the Chinese Communist Party's control over China, will become more and more solid, and China will represent a political asset for the Soviet Union to achieve its global goals"; Equally important, East Asia was in the throes of great upheaval, providing an unprecedented stimulus and favorable conditions for communist expansion, and the United States was in danger of losing any foothold on the continent.
The document stresses that the domination of East Asia by the Soviet Union or the Sino-Soviet alliance would pose a serious threat to US security. Thus, the basic goal of the United States in East Asia was to contain the "further encroachment of communism" and "gradually weaken and eventually eliminate the Soviet Union's superiority in Asia until the Soviet Union could not threaten the security of the United States and its friends from this region." ”
However, the United States has limited resources and capabilities, so the current global strategic concept is that in the event of a hot war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the United States will "carry out a strategic offensive in the West and a strategic defense in the East" and "ensure the East with a minimum of military manpower and materials," and the strategic defense will succeed in order to throw the main forces into the "West." Similar principles apply to the Cold War.
Proceeding from this premise, the document lays down the basic strategy and policy for containment in East Asia.
The defense of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines would continue to be undertaken by the United States, and under no circumstances would they fall into the hands of the Communists.
For the Asian continent, "efforts must be focused on the forces available — with the exception of the United States Armed Forces — in areas where the United States will maximize the results of its efforts." ”
Specifically, the United States will provide political support and economic and military assistance to selected non-communist countries there, and encourage regional cooperation in order to complement and strengthen their resistance to "communist aggression and subversion."
The document also argues that the United States should pay full attention to the fight for Asian nationalism and strive to rid it of the influence of communism, but at the same time take care of the colonial powers, "our Western allies."
The document affirmed the China policy that was being implemented at that time.
On the one hand, it is necessary to avoid recognizing the new China, and on the other hand, it should be recognized that it is inappropriate to adopt a more hostile attitude towards China than towards the Soviet Union.
"In the event that the United States does not recognize it, recognition by other friendly countries will affect the bargaining position of the United States."
In the economic field, the United States does not provide government assistance to New China, does not encourage private investment in China, and does not allow the export of military supplies to China. However, limited exports of non-military strategic goods should be allowed under the premise of strict control, and export restrictions should not be imposed on non-strategic materials.
On the Taiwan issue, the United States should continue to use diplomatic and economic means to hinder the CCP occupation, but this is likely to fail, and the military has reiterated that it should not use American troops. Therefore, the United States may have to "say goodbye to Formosa (Taiwan)."
6. Truman's Speech
In the spirit of the NSC's Documents 48/1 and 48/2, Acheson made a famous speech at the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.
Focusing primarily on pro-Chiang public opinion inside and outside Congress, he sought to further clarify the Administration's position and defend it as effectively as possible, following Truman's statement of 5 January.
He said that the most powerful force in Asia at present is nationalism, which is consistent with the interests and traditional policies of the United States, but fundamentally contradicts communism, which is an instrument of Soviet imperialism. He then spoke alarmistly about "the Soviet Union seizing the four northern provinces of China," saying that this was the most noteworthy and important fact in the relations between Asia and the outside countries.
"We must not allow any of our words and deeds to obscure this truth. No amount of propaganda can obscure it. The only thing that can hide it is our reckless stomach foolishness...... We must not lead the righteous indignation, anger and hatred that the Chinese people will inevitably develop from the Russians to ourselves. It would be foolish to lead it to ourselves. ”
Having thus defended the administration's policy toward Taiwan, he announced his military strategy in East Asia. He said the U.S. "defensive ring" in the western Pacific runs from the Aleutian Islands through Japan and the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippines. Taiwan and South Korea are not included.
He also said that the United States does not provide protection for the security of areas outside the "defensive belt" and that if these areas are attacked, "it must rely first on the people who are being attacked to resist, and then on the obligations of the entire civilized world under the UN Charter." ”
It should be noted that the Truman administration did not completely exclud the use of American armed forces outside the "defensive ring".
It stressed this point in the case of Taiwan. NSC Document 48/1 states that the western Pacific island chain is only a "bare minimum" from where the United States can use a variety of means, "without the use of large amounts of U.S. armed forces," to shrink communist-controlled areas, or to "strategically develop" important areas of the Asian continent.
In his speech at the National Press Club, Acheson stressed that the multilateral intervention obligations of the United States under the United Nations are by no means unreliable. It can be said that the overall strategy of the United States in East Asia has included the possibility of US military intervention in the Asian continent and the Taiwan region from the very beginning.
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