It's dangerous and embarrassing: American and British warships in the Red Sea can fight but can't win

Daily Telegraph article by Tom Sharp, 27 April 2024

Now the whole world knows that the British Royal Navy destroyer "Diamond" shot down a Houthi ballistic missile flying towards an American merchant ship this week.

Now, life aboard the Diamond is full of pride, dedication and exhaustion. Pride is because the task was completed exactly as required. Focus because they haven't done the task yet.

At the same time, fatigue also follows. "Six hours at work and six hours off work" a day, with a maximum of five hours of sleep at a time, is tiring enough, even in high-risk environments. The crews would be tired of the general alarm bell waking them up from their precious rest time because there was another missile in the air, and they needed to go to the action station, and, on the way to the action station, they would still be thinking, "Is this missile coming at us?"

The most recent was two days ago. The Houthi ballistic missile was flying to the USS Yorktown, flying the American flag, but was shot down by an Aster missile from Diamond. The cooperation between the US and British Royal Navy is still excellent.

However, Diamond's brilliant record has already been covered elsewhere in this article, so I will look at this event from a broader perspective, but sadly, it is not so rosy. In fact, this could be an example of winning a war and losing it.

The ultimate goal of the Houthis is to undermine freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and surrounding waters, deplete the opposition's resources, and improve its internal standing. They are achieving all three.

The ultimate goal of the Allies was to restore freedom of navigation. But it failed.

There are a large number of statistics to prove this, but the main thing is that traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal has fallen by 50% from the "normal" level and has stabilized at this level. This has a direct economic impact on us. In general, larger, more valuable vessels such as container ships and gas carriers are avoiding the Suez Canal in large numbers, while smaller, more insurable vessels such as bulk carriers are still avoiding the Suez Canal, in addition to ships from countries such as Russia and China avoiding the Suez Canal because they believe they are not attacked.

In short, in the first quarter of 2024, a small militia with a geographical advantage, an acceptable level of intelligence gathering, an average ammunition supply that seems inexhaustible, and knows how to avoid excessive escalation of the situation, has blocked a strategically important waterway by 50% despite the size of the coalition forces. And if measured by money, and not by the number of hulls, it could be more.

At the same time, the situation has not improved. One led by the United States, the other by the European Union, and the madness of two actions in parallel remains. The number of deployed warships has not increased, in fact, if any, it is decreasing. The Houthi counterattack has been slow and steady, but only two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, have contributed troops.

The rate of fire fired by the Houthis is at least lower than at the beginning of the year, but this may have something to do with the lack of ships to shoot at, rather than the weakening effectiveness of counterattacks. It could also be because of their intelligence gathering and weapons transfer ships. The notorious MV Behshad, which is currently docked in Iran. It could be important, or it could just be that the bad guys need a break too. In any case, at the same time as the attack on the Yorktown, the US military exchanged fire with four other drones, which the Houthis claimed were fired at the "Israeli vessel" MSC Veracruz. The matter is far from over.

The restoration of freedom of navigation requires that the Houthis stop firing. There are three possibilities for this. First of all, because they chose to do so. After all, they have always claimed that a ceasefire in Gaza would trigger this action. Many are skeptical, not to mention that the current Houthi missile attacks against the shipping industry are not the first time. In fact, the Houthis began their missile strikes more than a decade ago, albeit on a much smaller scale. It probably won't stop there.

Second, the Houthis may revert to past levels as a result of diplomatic efforts or Iranian persuasion/orders. This still seems to be the most likely path to success. Obviously, it has not yet been cashed in.

Finally, it is possible to cease fire by cutting off the Houthi supply lines (there are dozens, but all from one place) and punitive strikes to keep them from firing. This is much harder than most people realize, and it is impossible to do it without exacerbating the conflict. Because of this, the United States, the only country that can use hard power to suppress the Houthis, has chosen to give up. You can strongly disagree with this backward tilting gesture, but that doesn't change the facts.

Things can't go on like this forever. At the moment, the basic operations to maintain the tasks of our ships are in place - command and control in Bahrain, hull rotation, replenishment of missiles and ammunition, provision of base port support in Gibraltar. As always, it shows the value of the UK's overseas network.

But what are the needs? Will there be another Type 45 frigate (like the "Duncan" to replace the "Diamond" this summer, or will we send a frigate (like the "Iron Duke" to replace the "Diamond"? Or, will the "Diamond" leave without replacement, as some countries have begun to do?

I don't know, but I do know that costs are climbing every way you look at it.

We can't just walk away. The shipping industry will eventually make adjustments (albeit with higher freight and insurance rates), but it will be a disaster from a messaging point of view: the world's most powerful navy combined will not be able to defeat a broken militia, and if they get stuck, they will give up. From Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to the present, the consequences of such a policy can be imagined.

It seems that the Houthis will never stop on their own, and we cannot fight them, because that would escalate the situation. Therefore, the only real solution is to put pressure on Iran through diplomatic means, and if necessary, to take tough measures. By the way, this is not meant to strike them - the period of military career I spent in the Middle East program convinced me that it was a bad idea. It's impossible to know what's going on in these channels, but it's clear that they're not working at the moment. In fact, Iran's missile and drone attacks on Israel show that the direction of the arrow is wrong.

It is conceivable that if you are a pessimist, it is quite possible to think that given the general situation, and the fact that Iran is getting closer to having nuclear weapons, events on the shore will force an escalation, whether deliberate or miscalculated, when the tolerance of the United States and its allies for more aggressive measures will rise.

However, for now, the strategy of the South Red Sea seems to be a hope, and this is by no means a good thing. The Diamond and the other ships did a great job there, but they would also look at their watches, wondering how long they would have to hold out in dangerous places, fighting hard without any chance of winning.