Ching-yo-ling
Abstract: On November 21, 1960, in the "Golden Triangle" region of Myanmar, a joint Sino-Burmese border survey and guard operation between the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Defense Force broke out, and the Chinese People's Liberation Army crossed the border line to pursue the remnants of the Kuomintang who fled to Burma. This is a little-known cross-border operation in the history of our army's operations. Why did China and Burma conduct joint border surveys? Why did they conduct joint operations? Why did the targets of the guard operations be the remnants of the Kuomintang army? What were the results of the war, and what was the significance to China and Burma? This article will explain them one by one.
After the British occupied Burma, they seized the opportunity to invade and occupy Chinese territory and create contradictions on the Sino-Burmese border
After the British invaded and occupied Burma in 1885, they took advantage of the fact that the border between China and Burma was not very clear, and took the opportunity to invade and occupy Chinese territory. After Myanmar's independence, Western forces took advantage of the Sino-Burmese border issue to sow discord between the Chinese and Burmese peoples.
The border between China and Myanmar is more than 2,000 kilometers long, and the British colonialists created border conflicts in three sections.
The first section of the undetermined boundary is a section of the Wa Mountains. In the two treaties signed between Britain and the Qing government in 1894 and 1897 on the Sino-Burmese border, this section of the border was not demarcated for a long time in view of the contradiction in the relevant provisions. The British colonizers wanted to create a fait accompli, so they sent troops to attack the Banhong and Ban Lao areas in 1934, but they were resisted by the local Wa people and failed.
In 1941, taking advantage of the difficult period of China's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Britain closed the Yunnan-Burma Highway as a pressure, and on June 18, 1941, the Kuomintang government demarcated a border favorable to the British side in the Wa Mountains by means of an exchange of letters, and included a piece of land under the jurisdiction of Banhong and Ban Lao into British territory. This is the so-called "1941 line".
The second section of the undetermined boundary is in the Mengmao Triangle at the confluence of the Nanwan River and the Ruili River, covering an area of about 250 square kilometers. The border issue in this area is also known as the "Nankan issue". This area is Chinese territory, which has been expressly recognized by the British in treaties in the past. However, in 1897, Britain acquired jurisdiction over the territory of China in the name of "perpetual lease". After independence, Myanmar inherited a "perpetual lease" relationship with the region.
The third section of the undefined boundary is the section north of the Jiangao Mountains. This border has never been demarcated in the past, and neither country was in charge of it at the end of the Qing Dynasty. At the beginning of 1911, the British armed forces invaded the Pianma area and created the "Pianma Incident". The British move provoked a backlash from China. Under pressure, the British government officially recognized Pianma, Gangfang, and Gulang as belonging to China in a note dated April 10, 1911, but continued to occupy the area.
Since the Sino-Burmese border issue has a long history and the issue itself is very complicated, the new Chinese Government has adopted a cautious attitude when dealing with the Sino-Burmese border issue.
In June 1954, at the invitation of Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Premier Zhou visited Burma. The prime ministers of the two countries held talks and issued a joint statement, agreeing to guide the handling of relations between the two countries under the guidance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
From October 25 to November 4, 1956, Premier Zhou held four talks with U Nu, who was visiting Beijing, and issued a joint communiqué, announcing that the Chinese and Burmese governments had reached an understanding. From the end of November 1956 to the end of 1956, Chinese troops withdrew from "the area west of the '1941 line', and Burmese troops withdrew from the Pianma, Gangfang, and Gulang areas." Before the end of 1956, the Chinese and Burmese governments completed the withdrawal of troops, providing a good start for resolving the Sino-Burmese border issue.
On October 1, 1960, China and Burma formally concluded the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, which enabled the Sino-Burmese border issue to be resolved in a reasonable and acceptable manner to both sides.
The China-Myanmar Boundary Treaty demarcates the undefined section from the Jiangao Mountains to the western terminus of the China-Myanmar border. This section of the boundary is completely demarcated in accordance with the traditional customary line, except for the Pianma, Gulang and Gangfang areas, which originally belonged to China. In the treaty, the Burmese side agreed to return to China the Pianma, Gulang, and Gangfang areas that belonged to China that had been occupied by British troops.
The "Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty" also reasonably resolved the complicated issue of the Mengmao Triangle, and the two sides decided to abolish the "perpetual lease" relationship maintained by Burma over the Mengmao Triangle belonging to China, and the Chinese side agreed to hand over this area to Burma; in exchange, and taking into account the historical relations and the integrity of the tribes, the Burmese side agreed to assign to China the areas west of the "1941 line" of the Banhong and Banlao tribes belonging to Burma in accordance with the provisions of the 1941 exchange of letters between the Chinese and British governments. In the treaty, the Chinese Government, in accordance with its consistent policy of opposing foreign privileges and respecting the sovereignty of other countries, formally renounced China's right to participate in the operation of the Burmese furnace mining enterprise, as stipulated in the 1941 exchange of letters between the Chinese and British governments.
The prime ministers of China and Myanmar exchanged notes and reached an understanding on the details of the border residents. The two sides have agreed that the inhabitants of the areas transferred by one side to the other side shall be recognized as residents of the other side to which they belong, and if the resident has any objection, he or she may declare within one year that he or she has chosen the nationality of the original side and move into the territory of the original side within two years; The exchange of letters also provided for meetings between local officials on the border between the two sides to resolve local problems at the border.
The peaceful and reasonable settlement of the Sino-Burmese border issue has become an example of harmonious coexistence among the peoples of Asian countries. However, both governments are worried about whether the border demarcation between China and Myanmar will proceed smoothly, because the remnants of the Kuomintang army have already occupied several Taiwanese territories in the border area of China.
In the early days of liberation, the remnants of the Kuomintang fled to Burma and caused trouble in the Sino-Burmese border area
Why do we still have to guard the Sino-Burmese border demarcation? This was caused by the remnants of the Kuomintang army occupying the border territory of Burma.
At the beginning of 1950, under the fierce pursuit of the People's Liberation Army, more than 800 remnants of the 709th Regiment of the 237th Division of the Eighth Army of the Kuomintang, under the leadership of the regiment commander Li Guohui, fled from Yunnan to the "Golden Triangle" area of Myanmar's opium-producing area. On April 20, they walked out of the forest to Xiao Mengbang in Tachili City, eastern Burma, where they met more than 600 men from the 278th Regiment of the 93rd Division of the 26th Kuomintang Army.
Tan Zhong, deputy head of the 278th Regiment, discussed with Li Guohui and contacted Taiwan, asking for instructions on his future whereabouts and requesting assistance in materials and equipment. With great difficulty, the damaged radio station was repaired, and Taiwan was finally contacted. But the call back from the boss chilled their hearts: "Your ministry is looking for its own way out." ”
In the face of cold callbacks, Li Guohui and Tan Zhong planned not to return to Taiwan, based on the "Golden Triangle" and seeking development. Li Guohui and Tan Zhong pulled up a team, which was called the "Revival Force". They divided the troops into three parts: one part was used to cultivate land and build houses, the other part was trained in mountain warfare, and some part was engaged in horse caravan transportation and engaged in the opium business. Soon, the team of more than 1,000 people grew to more than 3,000.
At this time, the Burmese government wanted to completely annihilate the Kuomintang "Baath Force" that had invaded its territory. On the morning of June 16, the Burmese army attacked. The "Baxing Army" withstood the attack of the Burmese army, repelled the Burmese regular army of nearly 10,000 people, recaptured Mengguo, and captured the city of Tachili in one fell swoop, and the Burmese army suffered a crushing defeat.
Soon, a note from the Burmese government came, promising that the "Baath Force" could stay in Burma, but that it would have to evacuate Tachili and along the highway, and that overseas Chinese representatives would be exchanged for Burmese prisoners.
When the news of the victory of the "revival forces" reached Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek was extremely surprised that there was still such a capable "national army" on the Sino-Burmese border. He immediately summoned Li Mi, commander of the Eighth Army of the Kuomintang, and ordered him to go to the "Golden Triangle" to command the old army.
In February 1951, Li Mi came to the headquarters of the "Revival Force" in Burma to comfort and appease the old department, renamed the "Revival Force" as the "Yunnan Anti-Communist National Salvation Army", and airdropped weapons, equipment and supplies from Taiwan. Subsequently, Taiwan sent another 800 officers and intelligence personnel to northern Burma to augment Li Mi's troops. By January 1953, Li Mi's army had expanded to more than 18,000 people, and was organized into one headquarters, one headquarters, four military regions, three divisions, and 12 columns, and its area of activity was even several times larger than that of Taiwan.
The Burmese government could not tolerate the long-term entrenchment of the country by foreign armies, and later organized several encirclement campaigns, all of which failed. There is no choice but to complain to the United Nations about the crimes of the "Republic of China" and its backer, the United States. Southeast Asian countries jointly protested at the UN Security Council and condemned the Taiwan authorities and the United States for violating Myanmar's sovereignty.
The Chinese and Burmese armies joined hands to encircle and suppress the remnants of the enemy
In October 1960, the Sino-Burmese border issue was finally resolved peacefully, and China and Myanmar began joint border survey. At this time, the Burmese government submitted a request to the Chinese government to jointly encircle and suppress the remnants of the Kuomintang.
As a matter of fact, the Burmese side wanted to ask the Chinese border guards for help as early as after the encirclement and suppression of the remnants of the Kuomintang army was frustrated. Since 1957, the Burmese border guards have repeatedly begged or hinted that they hope that the Chinese border guards will enter Burma to assist them in fighting the remnants of the Kuomintang army, but the cross-border military operations are not up to the border guards and can only wait for the decision of the highest decision-making levels of the two sides.
The Chinese government is not indifferent to the remnants of the Kuomintang entrenched in Burma. As early as May 1959, Chairman Mao instructed Huang Kecheng, secretary general of the Central Military Commission and chief of the General Staff, to arouse vigilance and prepare to deal with possible chaos on a piece of information "about Chiang Kai-shek receiving the commander-in-chief of the remnants of the Kuomintang army in Burma and ordering him to prepare to harass Yunnan." After Chairman Mao's instructions, the Central Committee and the Military Commission were highly vigilant against the remnants of the Kuomintang entrenched in the "Golden Triangle" region of Burma, and formulated an emergency plan.
In April 1960, after Zhou Enlai concluded his visit to Burma, he listened to Lu Ruilin, deputy commander of the Kunming Military Region, report on the situation of the remnants of the Kuomintang army who had fled into Burma, and pointed out that the Burmese National Assembly had ratified the Sino-Burmese Friendship and Non-aggression Treaty that had just been signed and the Sino-Burmese agreement on the border issue between the two countries.
From June 27 to July 5, 1960, the Sino-Burmese Joint Border Committee, established in accordance with the Sino-Burmese agreement on the boundary issue between the two countries, held its first meeting in Yangon, the capital of Burma, to discuss the specific details of the necessary survey of the border, the erection of new boundary pillars, and the revision and replacement of old boundary pillars. On the issue of guarding the boundary survey, the Burmese Government explicitly requested assistance from the Chinese Government, and the two sides discussed the issue of China and Burma joining hands to strike at the remnants of the Kuomintang in Burma.
In early November 1960, representatives of the military composed of the General Staff and the Yunnan Provincial Military Region and the Burmese Army held a meeting of the special group on security issues of the Sino-Burmese Border Joint Committee. On 4 July, the two sides jointly signed an agreement on the issue of boundary survey and guarding, which clearly stipulates that the remnants of the Kuomintang troops entrenched in the work area of the Fourth Survey Team and posing a threat to the survey and pile erection work will be captured, annihilated and eliminated by the Chinese and Burmese troops. In order to carry out guard combat missions, China can enter the territory of Myanmar for 20 kilometers as needed. The operation to clear the remnants of the army should be carried out at the same time, tentatively around late November 1960.
After the agreement was signed, the Kunming Military Region drew up a guard combat plan, using 3 battle groups and 22 commandos to attack 16 strongholds of the remnants of the Kuomintang army. Then, the plan was sent to the Central Military Commission and the General Staff for deliberation.
Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou paid close attention to this, and several veteran commanders and Luo Ruiqing, chief of the General Staff, successively participated in the deliberation of the combat plan.
The focus of attention of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou was on the international political impact of the out-of-country war, whether it would cause panic and uneasiness in other countries in Southeast Asia? Will they use China as an excuse to attack the remnants of the Kuomintang and show off their force? Therefore, they have tried to keep the intensity of the attack down and mark the 20-kilometer sortie area with a red line.
In the course of deliberating the operational plan, the Central Military Commission and the General Staff Department identified the strongholds of the remnants of the Kuomintang army in Mengwa, Mengyu, and Pedalmai as key targets for attack, and also drew up a list of six army and division-level officers of the enemy to be captured and destroyed.
The Sino-Burmese joint border survey and guard operation later formed two phases: the first stage was for the Chinese People's Liberation Army to fight within the red line; the second stage was to cross the red line to relieve the siege of the Myanmar National Defense Force.
On the evening of November 21, 1960, the first phase of the battle began. The 22 commandos of the People's Liberation Army quickly moved towards the 16 strongholds of the remnants of the army. According to reconnaissance, five of the enemy's army and division-level officers requested by the General Staff Department to focus on capture and destroy were near the red line.
According to the plan, the battle was supposed to start at 6:30 a.m. on the 22nd. However, this mountain and jungle warfare, which is very unfamiliar to the PLA, did not go according to plan. The 16 strongholds that were attacked were opened at 4:50 a.m. at the earliest, and exchanged fire at 7:50 a.m. at the latest.
Due to the surprise of the PLA's pounce action, only two of the 16 pounce points were missed, and the pedal selling stronghold that was fired at the earliest had the best record, completely annihilating the defending enemy, and Meng Baoye, commander of the second division of the enemy's First Army, was killed. At 5:40, the battle of Manonai began, and although the stronghold was empty, Li Tai, the commander of the Fifth Division of the enemy's Fourth Army, was killed in the pursuit.
The remnants of the army did not dare to fight, and at the slightest contact, they broke and fled into the depths of the dense forest, and soon retreated outside the red line area. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had no choice but to stop the pursuit at the red line because it had an order not to cross the red line to fight.
It was not until the spring of 1961 that the Burmese army began to carry out the "Battle of the Mekong" against the remnants of the Kuomintang army. The Tatmadaw mobilized nine battalions of about 10,000 men and advanced along the west of the Mekong River from southwest to northeast. Liu Yuanlin, deputy commander of the Eighth Army of the Kuomintang, was known as an "expert in jungle guerrilla warfare." He adopted the tactics of "luring the snake out of the hole and luring the Burmese army into the narrow and low-lying area of Wang Nankun to ambush it." In order to break up the offensive of the Burmese army, he first feigned defeat and retreated. The Burmese army fell into Liu Yuanlin's trap and was squeezed by the remnants of the Kuomintang army in the narrow mountain road from Wang Nankun to Manglin. Long-range artillery is difficult to exert its power, the tactical movements of aircraft are limited, and the Tatmadaw is isolated.
At this time, Chen Yi was visiting Myanmar. The Burmese side proposed to ask the Chinese People's Liberation Army to cross the red line and travel more than 100 kilometers south to assist the Burmese army in combat. Chen Yi reported to China. On the 19th, the Burmese side received a reply from Beijing: We are willing to participate in the discussion of this joint operation.
On the afternoon of 21 January, representatives of the Burmese military flew to the headquarters of the Chinese commando unit in Mengyu and asked the Chinese People's Liberation Army to cross the red line, attack the important strongholds of the remnants of the Kuomintang army, Mengbaili and Jiangla, and defeat the remnants of the 3rd and 5th armies in order to rescue Wang Nankun and Manglin from being trapped in the Burmese army.
The Burmese demand was quickly transmitted to Beijing, and the General Staff immediately studied it. Luo Ruiqing, chief of the General Staff, said: "During our visit to Burma, Myanmar told us all about the victory, and now they have urged us to enter the war several times, which shows that they are now in a difficult situation." I thought I was going to go as soon as possible, and I had to send favors early. If the Burmese side suffers a big loss and suffers heavy losses from Chiang's remnants, it will have opinions on our side. Internationally, the Burmese side is not afraid, but what are we afraid of? ”
At the same time that Luo Ruiqing's opinion was reported to the central government for decision, the Kunming Military Region received Luo Ruiqing's deployment: "According to the information provided by the Burmese side, the enemy is about 4,000, and we use 8 battalions and two plainclothes teams. There are two battalions and two plainclothes teams in Mengbai, two battalions west of Mengbai, and two battalions in Soyong, and the focus is on Mengbai. ”
At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 22nd, the Kunming Military Region received Luo Ruiqing's instructions from the War Department: "We have agreed in principle to cooperate with the Burmese army in combat, but we need time to prepare, and our army will dispatch as quickly as possible." Please ask the Burmese army to bite the enemy at Manglin and Wang Nankun, so as to wait for our army to move south to cooperate and annihilate it. In the afternoon of the same day, Premier Zhou approved the operational plan for Chinese troops to cross the red line to rescue the Burmese army. At 15 o'clock, Luo Ruiqing asked the War Department to notify the Kunming Military Region and strive to start the battle on the 25th.
The second phase of operations, which began on the 25th, was not as smooth as the first. Because they were not familiar with the terrain in the deep sections, it was easy to lose their bearings, and the primeval mountains and forests hindered the speed of the attack, while the remnants of the army, which had experience in jungle warfare and were familiar with the terrain, had some advantages, and the number of casualties of the PLA was higher than in the first stage.
When the remnants of the PLA who had withstood the first blow of the PLA escaped from the red line, they formulated the "Baoshan Plan" of fleeing when attacked by the PLA, resisting stubbornly while fleeing, and escaping under the cover of stubborn resistance. Therefore, when the remnants of the Kuomintang army learned the information that the PLA continued to attack southward, they took the initiative to abandon the siege of the Wang Nankun Burmese army, crossed the Mekong River, and fled to Laos, and the trapped Burmese National Defense Forces turned the corner.
In the two phases of the operation, the PLA annihilated a total of 740 enemy troops, killed two enemy division commanders, captured alive one enemy deputy division commander, smashed the nest of the remnants of the Kuomintang army that had fled Burma for more than 10 years, assisted the Burmese Government in liberating more than 300,000 square kilometers of land with a population of more than 300,000, and ensured the smooth progress of the boundary survey work.
The completion of the Sino-Burmese border demarcation task has satisfactorily resolved the Sino-Burmese border issue, which has not been resolved in the past 100 years. After the devastating blow to the remnants of the Kuomintang army, a scene of peace and tranquility appeared in the Sino-Burmese border areas, and the people of the two countries ushered in a new era of harmonious coexistence and friendly exchanges.