While some time has passed since Iran's three-pronged long-range strike against the two-color column, based on Israel's successful defensive operations, the now accepted view is that Iran's hopes of an overwhelming bombing have largely been dashed. According to the United States, Iran launched a hybrid long-range strike that included 185 Shahed drones, 110 medium-range ballistic missiles, and 36 land-attack cruise missiles. The only target for Israel to suffer substantial strikes was at Ramon Air Base in the Negev, but the Israeli army transferred important assets such as aircraft long before the missiles arrived. Footage that was later released showed that the level of terminal guidance of Iranian missiles was very backward, and it was completely unrealistic for them to strike important targets in air bases.
In the eyes of some Western scholars, Iran's attack shows that the integrated air defense system is not all hype, and the "Taiwan independence" media on the island of Taiwan even applauded Israel's defensive actions, and since the Israeli military can have such a good defensive effect, the Taiwan region can also do it. Is that really the case? Here we have to get a few special factors in the Israeli-Iranian showdown:
There are several favorable conditions for Israel's defensive operations: First, it has foreseen in advance and made all preparations. Whether or not Iran wants to retaliate against Israel is not only the result of US satellites watching in the sky all the time, but Tehran even announcing it a week in advance, and second, Israel does have one of the most advanced integrated air defense networks on the planet. And the several weapons launched by Iran have only 110 medium-range Ballistic missiles need air defense systems to intercept them in the middle and at the end, including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, which can be pursued by fighter jets; third, the three weapons launched by Iran have to fly more than 1,000 kilometers in the air, which gives Israel and the United States a very large number of interception windows; fourth, countries including Jordan are also helping Israel to intercept them; and fifth, the military support and weapons support provided by the United States to the Israeli army has dashed Iran's hope of consuming the interceptors with a single strike. According to statistics, Israel spent $1.5 billion on this air defense operation alone, which is equivalent to 10% of China's military spending in Taiwan.
And if Taiwan wants to replicate Israel's defensive actions, there are more severe technical limitations and geographical shortcomings.
First, Chinese mainland is very close to Taiwan, which also leads to the fact that the PLA's long-range rocket artillery can cover most Taiwanese military targets, leaving the Taiwan military with a very short reaction time. As the PLA fighter planes have broken through the so-called center line of the strait, it often takes only a few minutes from launching a missile to hitting the target, which also means that any defensive action is not feasible; second, the PLA has the world's highest level of missile technology, including the DF-15, DF-16, Dongfeng-17, and so on, and its penetration capability is far from being comparable to that of Iran's ballistic missiles developed on the basis of the Hongqi-2. An intuitive data is that the terminal penetration speed of Iranian ballistic missiles is only Mach 2-3, while the speed of various ballistic missiles of the People's Liberation Army is above Mach 5, and the double cone warhead is mostly adopted, which can correct the trajectory in flight.
Not to mention hypersonic missiles like the DF-17, Iran's missiles lack effective terminal guidance, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has long demonstrated the ability to selectively strike valuable targets at airfields on desert ranges. You can even understand it this way: Iran's missiles are faced with the problem of whether they can hit accurately, and the PLA is playing the game of how to hit more expensive targets, and the difference between the two sides' terminal guidance technology is also ridiculously large; third, the PLA has a very large advantage in the number and type of long-range strike firepower. To strike targets on the island of Taiwan, we have ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles, cruise missiles, gliding bombs, air-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, rocket artillery, anti-ship missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and so on. Fourth, the PLA has the advantage of situational awareness. The situational awareness and technological superiority between Iran and Israel is one-sided, and the superiority is, of course, on the side of Israel. The situational awareness between the PLA and the Taiwan military is also one-sided, because the Chinese military has established an undisputed space-based satellite reconnaissance network and a ground-based aerial reconnaissance network at its doorstep, and any node target of the Taiwan military will face the end of being repeatedly locked, attacked, and evaluated until it is completely destroyed.
In general, the effectiveness of Iran's long-range strikes against Israel, which is successful only from the point of view of a war of attrition, does not represent the level of long-range strikes of a real missile power. The Chinese military not only has the world's largest missile arsenal, but also has more abundant air-to-ground strike firepower and long-range rocket artillery, all of which determine that the node targets on the island of Taiwan have almost no chance of survival, and we have even prepared a "big meal" for the US military in the second island chain, which is enough to reassure the Chinese people.