November 10, 1944 was a Friday. On the morning of that day, more than 200 ships were moored in Sidler Harbor, ranging from patrol boats to escort aircraft carriers, as well as infantry landing ships, tank landing ships, destroyers, and civilian cargo ships.
The Hood Hill was moored at Berth 380 near the Port of West Delor Center that day, about 4 miles from the entrance and 2.5 miles from land. The vessel is the first of eight AE-class ammunition carriers converted for the U.S. Navy, with a length of 460 feet (about 140 meters), a displacement of 14,000 tons, and a cargo load of 7,800 tons. The keel was laid in September 1943 and was originally commissioned as a cargo ship and was named SS Marco Polo. The Navy took over the ship and converted it into an ammunition carrier, which was returned to service in July 1944 and named the "Mount Hood" after the dormant volcano on Oregon's highest peak, captained by Lt. Col. Harold A. Turner.
Figure 2. The "Hood Hill" was first commissioned in 1943 as a civilian cargo ship "Marco Polo", and was taken over by the U.S. Navy shortly after its service and converted into an ammunition carrier
Many of the crew members Turner received were new recruits with no experience at sea, so he struggled to find qualified crew members. After an unusually short run-in and sea trials in the Chesapeake Bay, the "Mount Hood" docked at Norfolk Military Harbor, Virginia, loaded with 5,000 tons of explosives and ammunition. On August 5, 1944, the Hood Hill, whose cargo hold was stuffed, left Norfolk and sailed through the Panama Canal to the Admeralti Islands. On 22 September, the ship arrived at its final destination, Port Sidler, with two missions: to distribute the ammunition on board to other warships, and to recover unused ammunition from the returning ship.
On November 10, the Hood Hill was surrounded by nine mechanized landing craft (LCMs), which were the center of the loading and unloading activity. The small engine repair ship "Mindanao" was moored only 350 yards from the port side of the "Mount Hood", and the other repair ship "Argon" (which was also the flagship of the commander of the task force) was 1,100 yards from the "Mount Hood".
Disembarking, Captain Wallace and his escort boarded the 40-foot motorboat and headed for the beach at 8.25 a.m. On his disembarkation, Wallace noticed that the "Mount Hood" was recovering an aerial depth charge from a mechanized landing craft moored nearby.
Figure 3: A transport ship is hoisting an M2 light tank onto an LCM mechanized landing craft, similar to the operation of retrieving supplies from the boat, this photo was taken during the U.S. landing on Kuah Island
Captain Wallace, then 29, was a Georgian and had a pair of glasses on the bridge of his nose. Wallace graduated from Atlanta Technical High School and received his law degree from George Washington University in Washington, D.C., in 1941. After that, he married Mildred Virginia French and went straight to the Internal Revenue Service, where he worked in the estate and gift tax department, but before that he was registered as a reserve naval officer.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War, Wallace enlisted in the Army in 1942 and was assigned to work in the Naval Personnel Bureau. After a year in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, the Navy sent Wallace to Harvard's communications school, where he was sent to the Submarine Hunter Training Center in Miami, Florida, for training. In the summer of 1944, Wallace, who had already reached the rank of captain, was transferred to serve on the ammunition carrier "Mount Hood", which was also his first time at sea. In setting up the ship's communications department, he took advantage of his experience studying at an Ivy League-run communications school.
After disembarking at the docks, Wallace and his crew stepped off the steamboat and went about their business. Just as they were parting, one of the sailors exclaimed, "Look!" The crew turned their heads to see smoke billowing from the "Mount Hood" and flames rising into the sky. A few seconds later, a powerful blast blast threw them into the air and landed on the ground. It wasn't until exactly 12 seconds later that the terrible loud sound of the explosion of the "Hood Mountain" reached their ears. Even from two miles away, the crew could see the black smoke ejected from the explosion, flying in a zigzag way into the air. Captain Wallace reacted immediately, "Go back to the ship!" he shouted. He told the motorboat driver to immediately return to the scene of the accident at full speed. It took more than a quarter of an hour for the small motorboat to reach berth 380, but there was no sign of the boat on the surface of the sea, and no body was found. Wallace later wrote: "With nothing but debris around, the 'Mount Hood' and its crew of 350 disappeared." ”
Wallace commanded the small motorboat and sailed to the Mindanao, the closest ship to the accident site. As he approached the Mindanao, he was stunned by what he saw: the ship's port side had been hit by flying steel shards, and 33 irregularly shaped holes had been pierced through its hull, some as large as 3 feet × 4 feet. Wallace later learned that all 26 sailors on the ship's port deck were killed on the spot in the explosion, compared to the total death toll on the Mindanao of 82.
Figure 4. The fate of the small engine repair ship Mindanao is undoubtedly one of the best testimonies to the devastating consequences of the explosion of the Mount Hood: 26 sailors and 56 other crew members on the port deck of the Mindanao were killed in the explosion, and investigators counted 33 holes in the hull of the Mindanao that had been punched by the debris fragments that had been blown away
Wallace and his men felt powerless in the face of all this, so he sent the steamboat back to the dock to wait for further orders. At the docks, Wallace was told to stay here and that he would be asked to be a witness to an official commission of inquiry that would soon be formed. Unbeknownst to Wallace at the time, he was the only surviving officer of the "Mount Hood".
Ships outside the harbor are also assessing the damage caused by the explosion. After the "rain of metal fragments" stopped falling in the sky, the crew of the repair ship "Argon" counted a total of 221 pieces of "Mount Hood" scattered on the deck. Captain T. Escott Lieutenant Colonel H. Escott said: "By the time we recovered from the power of the explosion, the 'Mount Hood' was completely shrouded in thick black smoke and could not see anything worth reporting. ”
Ships 2,200 yards away were damaged in varying degrees in the explosion, including the escort aircraft carriers Petrov Bay and Saginaw Bay, the destroyer Jan, four escort destroyers, and several cargo ships and maintenance vessels. Small ships such as landing craft suffered even more damage, with several small boats sinking in the explosion, many more damaged beyond repair, and several crew members killed in the explosion. The only thing to be thankful for was that there were no large combat ships moored in the harbor that morning.
Figure 5. After the explosion of the "Hood Hill", the small engine repair ship "Mindanao" became the "focus of attention" of many small boats to salvage people who fell into the water. The Mindanao, which was moored 350 yards from the "Mount Hood", and the seven minesweepers moored next to it were seriously damaged in the explosion
When divers dived underwater into the harbor to examine the wreckage of the "Mount Hood", they found no wreckage, only a few pieces of free hull fragments, and no debris larger than 16 feet × 10 feet in size. Divers were surprised to find that an explosion had "dug out" a trench 50 feet wide, 300 feet long, and 40 feet deep on the sandy seabed. Suffice it to say, the "Mount Hood" practically ceased to exist.
In just a few days, the U.S. Navy set up a commission of inquiry to find out the cause of the tragic disaster, which killed 432 people and injured 371. The members of the committee, headed by a Navy Colonel and two Navy lieutenant colonels, will review all the facts, study the images taken at the scene, and question those who witnessed the accident in various ways. The hearing was held on board the USS Sierra destroyer Supply Ship USS Sierra of the US Navy.
The first task of the Commission of Inquiry was to establish the situation in Port Sidler and the role played by the "Mount Hood" when it was anchored there. The investigation found that the "Hood Hill" was the "main source of ammunition of all kinds" issued in the area, and recovered ammunition from various types of ships anchored in the area. The Committee notes that there are four designated anchorages for ammunition vessels in the western part of Port Sidler, but these anchorages are not used. After adjusting the anchorage position of the "Hood Hill" twice, the port management finally placed it at berth 380 in the central waters of the port. This central location is more convenient for landing craft and barges transporting ammunition back and forth. The water depth at the anchorage of the "Mount Hood" is about 120 feet (about 36.6 meters).
Figure 6. Before the explosion of the "Mount Hood", it was moored near the center of Sidler Harbour, an excellent anchorage near Manus Island. A violent explosion completely destroyed the ship
Captain Wallace told the Commission that at the time of the explosion, the Mount Hood was carrying approximately 3,800 tons of high explosives, including "a large amount of damaged ammunition". He also claimed: "Some of the ammunition has been corroded, and I myself remember seeing some pyrotechnic agents, the date of production of which dates back to 1915." ”
First Class Seaman Lawrence Gaschler told the Commission that he was supposed to be on the morning of the accident aboard the Mount Hood, unloading with the crew of the landing craft carrying the ammunition, but that he had been temporarily selected to guide a small boat to transport an officer from the escort aircraft carrier USS Omani Bay to another ship in the harbor. He testified: "I have the impression that we had just passed the 'Mount Hood' when it exploded. There was a flash of light and I could feel the heat. Just a second later, a violent shock came down on us. The wave of air shook the officer and knocked me unconscious. When I woke up, there was debris in the water all around me. ”
At the time of the explosion, marine mechanic Lew Cowden was on board the escort destroyer USS White Hearst. "At the time of the explosion, we were heading out into open water," he recalled. They told me that we were too close to receiving supplies and that we were passing by (the "Mount Hood") on the way out. As soon as I went down the ladder to the stern, the explosion pushed me back. I ran forward to the amidship deck. The air was filled with smoke and fine dust. I was told that we were not too close to the point of the explosion to be visibly affected by the explosion, but not far enough away that the debris from the explosion was blown onto our ship. ”
Figure 7. The explosion of the "Hood Hill" shook almost the entire port of Sidler. When the smoke cleared, it was found that the "Hood Mountain" had been completely blown up, and all the people on board had been killed
Not all eyewitness testimonies are credible. Edward L. Ponichtera, an aviation ordnance engineer who was working on the beach near Mount Hood, claimed that he saw a twin-engine Japanese bomber drop two bombs on the Mount Hood, and that "each bomb hit the Mount Hood directly." He also said, "I can clearly see the 'Rising Sun' emblem on the plane." Carl Hughes, a sailor aboard the freeship SS William H. McGuffey, claimed to have seen an enemy pocket submarine cruising in the sea near the "Mount Hood" and firing two torpedoes.
With the help of survivors of the USS Mount Hood aboard the small motorboat commanded by Captain Wallace, the committee's investigators pieced together the types of cargo on board prior to the explosion: ammunition ranging from 7.62-millimeter machine-gun rounds to 14-inch shells used on battleships, as well as everything in between. In addition, dozens of 100-pound bombs were stored in the cargo hold of the ship, and 1,000-pound aerial bombs were stored in a small deckhouse on the main deck. Cabin 5 contains rocket bodies and rocket engines, most of which are in a damaged state. In total, the ship was loaded with almost 4000 tons of ammunition.
Subsequently, investigators turned to assessing the crew of the "Mount Hood" and whether they were responsible for the accident. They argued that the ship's sailors were generally "inexperienced" and, perhaps more crucially, "the lack of leadership of the 22 officers," which led to lax discipline on board. "This is reflected in the rough and careless handling of ammunition," the Commission of Inquiry noted. ”
Figure 8: A fire at the city gate affected pond fish, the YMS wooden-hulled minesweeper affected by the explosion of the "Hood Mountain".
A total of 133 witnesses came to the Commission of Inquiry to testify, supported by dozens of physical evidence. As the only surviving officer of the "Mount Hood," Captain Wallace was twice summoned to testify by the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission of Inquiry spent a month gathering all the evidence. Eventually, on 14 December 1944, the Commission published its findings, which stated: "The investigation revealed the following unsafe conditions and practices: rough handling of ammunition everywhere on board; Fuses and detonators were grouped together in a single cargo hold, in a clear violation of the regulations governing the transport of military explosives, the safety regulations for the handling of ammunition were not prominently posted and there was a general lack of guidance on safety measures for crews, the ban on smoking was not enforced, and there was evidence that the ammunition received on board was certainly problematic and should have been dumped in deep water for destruction. ”
The final conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry was: "The explosion was caused by the forces or mechanisms of the 'Mount Hood' itself. "If Captain Turner survives, then he and his senior officers will be held accountable. The Commission of Inquiry had to admit that they did not know the exact cause of the disaster, and they could only guess, much to the dismay of the three members of the leadership (one colonel, two lieutenant colonels). With regard to the claims of Japanese bombers or pocket submarines, the Commission of Inquiry firmly stated that there was no evidence of such attacks by enemy weapons and therefore did not consider them.
Admiral Chester Nimits, commander of the U.S. Pacific Theater and commander of the Pacific Fleet, agreed with the report, writing: "There is no question of negligence, and the technical mistakes made by the officers mentioned above (Turner and others) were errors of judgment due to the rush to fulfill the necessary commitments and continue the course of the battle." The fleet commander and admiral noted: "The urgency of war always requires the acceptance of certain risks. ”
In reaching its final conclusions, the Commission of Inquiry also noted two other accidents involving the explosion of an ammunition carrier, one on 21 May 1944 and the other on 17 July 1944. In the explosion on May 21, a tank landing ship docked in the West Gulf of Pearl Harbor was loading mortar shells for the upcoming Mariana Islands landing campaign, and a shell accidentally dropped hit the ammunition accumulated in the ship's hold, causing the tank landing ship to be blown up instantly, and the resulting fire quickly spread to other tank landing ships moored nearby to load ammunition. In the end, a total of 6 ships sank as a result of the accident, and 160 people were killed.
Figure 9: On May 21, 1944, a U.S. Navy ammunition ship exploded at Pearl Harbor, killing 160 people
About two months later, on July 17, another explosion occurred at the ammunition loading facility of the Navy ammunition depot in the Port of Chicago, California, capsizing the ship SS Quinault Victory and killing the ship SS E. A. Bryan. The accident killed 320 people, two-thirds of whom were African-American stevedores. At the time, both ships were docked at a jetty-style pier and loaded with ammunition from a long line of railway tankers. The official accident findings given by the Commission of Inquiry stated: "There was no deliberate, negligent, negligent or inefficient explosion in the Navy. ”
In response to the problems that led to this catastrophe, the Investigative Committee wrote: "The officers had little experience in loading and unloading, no experience in commanding soldiers, and no experience in handling explosives. They went on to describe the situation of the personnel engaged in loading and unloading, making little secret of the racist ideas in their conclusions: "They are unreliable and lack the ability to understand orders. "A few weeks later, when the authorities ordered the resumption of loading ammunition, many sailors refused, culminating in a massive court-martial trial, and those convicted of rebellion and sentenced to hard labor were called the "Chicago Harbor Fifty," who were not released until after the war amid public outcry.
Figure 10: Firefighters struggle to extinguish a fire during the May 21, 1944, attack on Pearl Harbor
In summary, over the course of seven months, three similar accidents caused serious damage to the ammunition supply lines of the US Navy, with a total of nine ships lost and 912 people killed. As a remedy, in March 1945, the U.S. Naval Ordnance Bureau sent a circular to the relevant commands, emphasizing that "bomb-type" munitions were vulnerable to accidental explosions. "Even an impact not to the extent that it is sufficient to cause a slight rupture of the ammunition box can cause an accidental explosion of 'bomb-type' munitions," the circular reads. Any notion that ammunition boxes are 'slightly dented' and not dangerous must be discarded altogether. "The circular also outlines a series of modified ammunition loading methods designed to reduce the risk of explosion, in particular how to handle dangerous goods. After the relevant regulations were strengthened, there were no similar disasters in the U.S. Navy during the war.
Figure 11.On July 17, 1944, another explosion occurred in the port of Chicago, California, related to the loading and unloading of ammunition, killing 320 people. Fueled by these three accidents, the US Navy issued new guidelines on how to load and unload ammunition
After testifying to the Commission of Inquiry, Captain Wallace was able to return to Arlington, Virginia, to be reunited with his wife and son. In his next military career, the U.S. Navy sent him to serve in the communications division of an aircraft carrier, which is exactly what he has been pursuing. For the next ten months, he fought in the Pacific theater, where he was promoted to lieutenant commander. Lieutenant Colonel Wallace retired from the army at the end of 1945 and returned to his old position in the Internal Revenue Service (later renamed the Internal Revenue Service). He retired in 1974 and died in 2012 at the age of 97.
As for the protagonist of the article, "Mount Hood" has not been forgotten by the US Navy either. In July 1968, at Bethlehem Steel's Sparrow Point plant in Maryland, the second U.S. Navy ship of the same name, named after the Oregon volcano, was launched. The ship was given the designation AE-29 and is the fourth Kilauea-class ammunition supply ship in the U.S. Navy. The second ship, Hood Shan Tou, went to Vietnam in 1972 and was awarded a "Battle Star" medal, and in 1991 it participated in the Gulf War. The second ship, Mount Hood, was decommissioned in August 1999 and sold as scrap metal in September 2013.