Since the Chinese Volunteers terminated the layout of the Sixth Campaign in 1951, the Korean War entered a stage of positional warfare dominated by defense. The U.S. military tried to break the situation with the help of many exploratory offences in the summer and autumn, but failed to do so, and instead tasted bitterness; especially during the autumn counteroffensive, the 38th Army faced many challenges and lessons under the adjustment of the new leadership.
1. Changes in the will of the South Korean army to fight
During the Korean War, the morale of the South Korean army was a cause for concern. Sometimes vulnerable, sometimes reluctant to bear pressure, but occasionally resilient. In order to adapt to these differences, Kim Jong-ng implemented strategies such as rotational operations and intensified training to enhance the strength of the troops. In contrast, the 38th Army of the Chinese People's Volunteers still had deficiencies in the training of recruits and preparations for combat, and its shortcomings were exposed in actual combat, affecting the performance of combat effectiveness.
In the Korean War, the ROK army's offensive operations showed obvious advantages in organization and efficiency, especially in the use of elaborate combat rotation tactics to maintain the combat effectiveness of the troops. However, on the side of the Volunteer Army, although they were equipped with weapons and equipment such as tanks, due to insufficient pre-war preparations and lack of actual combat experience, they were unable to exert the expected offensive power, and the situation fell into passivity. This discrepancy ultimately led to an unfavorable situation on the battlefield, which put the 38th Army in a difficult position.
2. The challenge of the tank forces of our army In the Korean theater, the use of tank tactics was a key issue. However, our army was challenged with many difficulties in the Battle of White Horse Mountain. Although the tank was supposed to have a strong surprise capability, unfortunately, the lack of pre-war preparation and the lack of actual combat experience greatly reduced the actual effect. The ROK army underestimated the strength of the tank units of the volunteers, and the volunteers did not fully exploit the advantages of tanks.
In the Battle of Baima Mountain, our army's tank units failed to achieve ideal combat results due to various factors, which seriously affected the course of the war and our army's strategic layout.
3.38 Army's tactical lessons The Battle of Baima Mountain was a painful lesson for the 38th Army in the Korean War, due to the stubborn resistance and clever use of tactics by the ROK army, coupled with the defects of the army, the 38th Army was unable to turn the tide after all, and could only withdraw from the battle. The campaign exposed many problems in the army and triggered a deep reflection on the strategy of improvement.
The higher-level command organs lacked guidance and support for the 38 th Army, and the army was facing severe difficulties due to the transfer of key personnel at critical times. In this regard, the 38th Army should draw lessons from past experience and make full preparations for possible future challenges through intensive training and enhancement of combat effectiveness.