In December 1952, the headquarters of the 38th Army in North Korea welcomed an uninvited guest: Zhang Zhen, chief of operations of the General Staff.
His intention was very direct, to investigate the defeat of the 38th Army in the battle of Baima Mountain.
Two months have passed since this battle, but the shadow in the hearts of the officers and men of the 38th Army has not faded. The fact that it was able to attract the attention of the General Staff shows the seriousness of this defeat.
1. Where did the soul man go?
Briefly talk about the background of the battle at White Horse Mountain.
The Battle of Hakuba Mountain took place from October 6 to 15, 1952, and lasted for 10 days.
The battle was an integral part of the numerous skirmishes of the Volunteers' autumn tactical counterattack in 1952. Since the end of 1951, after the Volunteer Army completely stopped the deployment of the Sixth Battle, it completely entered the rhythm of positional warfare and no longer sought to use the large corps to annihilate the enemy in the movement.
The facts of the fifth battle tell both sides that neither has the strength to help the other in the movement, not even the American forces, which have strong air and mechanized superiority.
The two sides invariably switched to small-scale raiding operations, supplemented by strong, strong, and hundreds of kilometers of positions for defense.
In the summer and autumn of 1952, the U.S. military carried out a tentative offensive, using battalion-level tactical units to attack the positions of the volunteers.
How should the volunteers deal with it? Waiting for people to come and attack us, do we dare to rush over and hit them?
The Volunteers had certain conditions at this time, because the coastal defense landing project presided over by Deng Hua played a great role, and the transportation of our army's rear was basically not a problem, and the grain and ammunition were transported to the front unimpeded, not only did the number of artillery pieces close to that of the US army (but our army has more small-caliber artillery and mortars, and less heavy firepower such as large-caliber howitzers and tanks, and in terms of firepower, it is still far weaker than the US army), but also transported tank regiments to the front line, and the heavy firepower kept up. These are days of affluence like never before.
Therefore, Deng Hua and Yang Dezhi (then the second deputy commander of the Volunteer Army) discussed, we can't always wait for the enemy to attack us, we are too passive, we must also take the initiative to fight the enemy. After some deliberation, the decision to hold a tactical counterattack was decided. Because the main period was in September 1952, it was called the Autumn Tactical Counterattack.
The so-called tactical counterattack war is to use a limited number of troops, basically units below the regimental level, to carry out sudden and powerful attacks with the enemy's battalions, reinforced companies, or even platoon-level combat units, as well as the positions they are holding, with the dual goal of effectively killing and injuring the enemy's vital forces and seizing the front-line positions.
The counterattack was divided into two batches, the first batch was fought by three armies, the 12th Army, the 39th Army, and the 68th Army were the main forces, and the fighting was very smooth, especially the artillery fire played a very good role. Yang Dezhi was very excited when he recalled it decades later, saying that our army's artillery fire was "rarely seen in domestic combat for decades", and "made people feel as if the whole ground was shaking under their feet." ”
In the second batch, 4 armies were added, namely the 15th Army, the 38th Army, the 40th Army, and the 65th Army, and together with the 3 armies in the first batch, a total of 7 armies were put into tactical counterattacks.
The situation of other armies will not be listed for the time being, only the 38th Army. In fact, the 38th Army also participated in the first batch of counterattacks, and the "Pork Chop Mountain" defended by the US army was played in a decent manner and smoothly.
Everyone thought that the second batch of operations would go as smoothly as the first batch, but the battle was still being prepared, and all kinds of signs of trouble had already begun to appear.
In the second batch of battles, because he had figured out the enemy's situation and had a clear understanding of his heart, Shiji's determination was obviously greater than that of the first batch.
Where?
First, the first group gave the decision to launch the battle to the armies, because they did not know the situation at the front and let the armies set their own time to start fighting, so the time of each army was not the same, whether it was before or behind. The second group asked the departments to start fighting on October 6 after they were ready. What is this called? It's all under control, and it's all about playing with momentum.
Second, the number of troops invested has increased, and all seven armies on the front line have been pressed. We are not afraid that the enemy will attack us.
However, the situation of the 38th Army was actually slightly different from that of several other armies, and the old army commander Liang Xingchu was transferred.
Liang Xingchu served as the commander of the 38th Army from May 1949 to May 1952. After the 38th Army entered the DPRK, it participated in the first four battles, experienced the defeat in the first battle, the army commander was scolded, to the first war to recover, and was given the glory of the "Long Live Army" by President Peng, and it was Liang Xingchu who made great contributions with the 38th Army, and it is not an exaggeration to call him a soul figure.
And the second batch of offensive of the tactical counterattack in the autumn is about to be launched, especially in the face of a target that is not easy to fight, the leadership of the 38th Army is going through the process of Liang Xingchu's departure and the new leadership is adapting to the adjustment.
All these factors are intertwined, and they all add variables to the course of the battle.
2. Did the 38th Army underestimate the enemy?
In March 1952, Liang Xingchu returned to China for treatment, and at the same time was promoted to the acting commander of the 20th Corps, but did not take office. In August of that year, he was reappointed deputy commander of the West Coast Command and presided over the anti-landing work.
The 38th Army was appointed by Deputy General Jiang Yonghui as the acting commander. Jiang Yonghui was also a tiger general, the first commander of the 112th Division, promoted to chief of staff of the 38th Army in August 1949, and promoted to deputy commander before entering the DPRK. It stands to reason that he is also very familiar with the situation of the 38th Army, but unfortunately, not long after Liang Xingchu returned to China, political commissar Liu Xiyuan also returned to China, and the 38th Army actually became a situation in which the acting army commander and deputy political commissar were in charge.
This had a considerable impact on the combat readiness of the 38 Army.
This is not a denial of General Jiang Yonghui's ability, the adjustment of the leadership group and the adaptation of the state of the troops need to have a process of running-in, even if a fierce general serves as the chief officer, there must be a necessary process, after all, being a deputy is not the same as really being a chief officer, this is the law.
Probably Zhiji also noticed this situation, and repeatedly asked the 38th Army if it was ready before the start of the battle, and if it didn't work, it could postpone the start of the battle.
But under this kind of questioning, which unit is willing to admit that it can't, and the 38th Army made it clear that it could start fighting on time on October 6. It is also inconvenient for Shiji to deny it excessively, but only urged the 38th Army to make key preparations in three aspects:
First, the artillery should enter the position early enough in order to launch fire coverage in time to destroy 70% of the enemy's ground targets (this is the basic data obtained by the Volunteer Army through previous combat experience).
Second, the infantry was prepared in advance for continuous blasting. In order to continue to fight improvised fortifications that cannot be knocked out by artillery fire during the impact.
Third, the starting point of the infantry attack should be as close as possible to the enemy's position, so as to reduce the casualties of our infantry when charging and reduce the difficulty of the attack.
This is all the experience gained in exchange for blood during the first tactical counterattacks.
However, according to the telegram sent by the Zhi Division to the All-China Volunteer Army and to the Military Commission, the 38th Army did not carry out strict and thorough implementation of these three aspects.
Could it be that the fighting style of the 38th Army has become sloppy? The answer is definitely no. The quality of the 38th Army, whether it was in the past, in Korea, or later when it returned to China, has always been second to none in the sequence of our army group army, and there will never be a situation of carelessness.
The author thinks that probably the 38th Army has a certain idea of underestimating the enemy, believing that the troops in front of it are only the 9th Division of the South Korean Army, and the US troops are on the second line. The first batch fought so beautifully, and the second batch of attacks had to make a great contribution.
If Liang Xingchu had been still there at that time, would he have insisted on fighting steadily and steadily?
The 38th Army's main attack was on Mt. Baekba (394.8 Heights) and Mt. Arrowhead (281.2 Heights) north of Cheorwon, which were outposts north of Cheorwon, defending the strongholds of the U.S. and South Korean forces in Cheorwon and the supply lines to Seoul. The defending enemy was the ROK 9th Division (3 regiments and a 51st regiment).
Before the 38th Army launched the attack, there was a defection of Tanakajiao, so many people summarized the reason simplistically, saying that the attack on Baima Mountain changed from a surprise attack to a strong attack, which led to the final defeat. This is only one of the reasons for the defeat, and we have to find the reason more from the 38th Army itself.
The 38th Army actually did all the three preparations supervised by the Zhi Division, but it was not solid enough.
For example, to shorten the impact distance of infantry, let's take some details.
General Jiang Yonghui's book "The 38th Army in Korea" recorded this incident with a large amount of pen and ink.
The starting line of the 38th Army's attack was 1,600 meters away from the position of the South Korean army, and in order to shorten the distance of the infantry's attack, the 38th Army mobilized the soldiers to collectively think of a way, and finally formed a consensus to lurk at night and ambush in the weeds in front of the enemy's position. The soldiers gathered the wild artemisia grass, crushed it, and repeatedly smeared the juice on their coats, hats, and towels.
In order to test the effect before departure, two tests were also done. On one occasion, they lined up in an open area, and when the US military reconnaissance plane flew, everyone did not move, but the US military did not find out. Another time it was on the ground, and if the frog didn't bark, it proved to be a good effect, and this time it turned out to be good.
The 38th Company of the 340th Regiment of the 114th Division of the 340th Army then quietly advanced and hid in front of the enemy position. Passing by a small ditch, the company commander ordered everyone to wet their bodies in case the enemy's artillery fire ignited and burned us.
It can be said that these details are more in-depth than Shiji considered.
After Gu Zhongjiao defected, he confessed to the Korean army about the time of our army's attack, and also confessed that our army wanted to release water from Penglai Lake, but he obviously didn't say anything about what was lurking before the battle. This is also the author's opinion, the rebellion of Guzhong Jiao is not the whole reason for the defeat of the 38th Army, it can only be said to be an important reason.
The ROK army did not find the 38th Army lurking, but just aimlessly fired some cold cannons and fired incendiary bombs in front of the battle. Unfortunately, Liu Wanfa, a battalion commander of the 340th Regiment, who was commanded by the front of the team, was also ambushed in the grass and was killed by a cold artillery shot by the South Korean army. A small number of fighters were burned by fire, but the casualties were minor.
Judging from this incident alone, it seems that the 38th Army does not underestimate the enemy, on the contrary, it is still very well prepared for the offensive.
However, with the launch of the general offensive on October 6, some unexpected situations began to appear, exposing the inadequacies of the 38th Army's various preparations.
III. Reflection
The infantry charge was effective, taking several heights north of the main peak of Hakuba Mountain that night, and on October 8, the main peak was taken. But then something happened that surprised the 38th Army.
1. I didn't expect that the will to fight of the South Korean infantry was so tenacious, and they counterattacked again and again, and our army had an unstable foothold after taking the main peak and several high grounds, and was driven down.
The change in the ROK army's will to fight is mentioned in the fourth volume of the ROK edition of "The Korean War": Why was it so hard now that it was crushed by the volunteers at the touch of a button? Because Syngman Rhee was extremely reluctant to cease fighting at the 38th parallel, but wanted to fight until the Yalu River unified the whole of Korea, he instilled this idea in the ROK army. In addition, the ROK army was ashamed to be looked down upon by the US military, and when it learned that the US 3rd Division was assembled south of Cheorwon and was ready to come up to replace it as usual when the ROK army could no longer stand it, the ROK 9th Division conveyed the order of the division commander that it must no longer leave "the shameful record of having the US military fill the theater after we were defeated." This was another great encouragement to the ROK army's fighting spirit.
According to its war history, the Volunteer Army carried out 12 waves of strong attacks, and the South Korean Army also carried out 12 waves of counter-attacks, and finally recaptured the main peak of White Horse Mountain. This intensity was rarely seen in previous battles with the South Korean army.
2. I can't imagine that the South Korean army can always maintain a strong impact. Our army continuously invested a large number of troops, and the 114th Division was also invested after the 112th Division could not be moved, but the South Korean army was still able to continuously attack.
What's the secret?
Kim Jong-wu of the 9th Korean Division adopted the method of rotating operations, not allowing one battalion to fight for two days and nights in a row, and then replacing one battalion when it reached a certain level, so as not to wipe out the entire battalion, and this method enabled all battalions to regain a certain combat effectiveness after rotation. Moreover, its rear is relatively safe, and the artillery fire of the volunteer army cannot hit it.
After Kim Jong-wu took over as division commander, in view of the fact that the division's combat effectiveness was not particularly strong, he ordered the troops to conduct tactical training, especially shooting training.
As a comparison, after Zhang Zhen went to the 38th Army for investigation, one of the few defects he put forward was that the training of recruits in the 38th Army was very insufficient, and they would not use submachine guns before they went into battle, and they needed to study temporarily.
3. It is unthinkable that the tank regiments of our army did not play their due role.
The 4th Tank Regiment cooperated in participating in the battle and dispatched six tanks to fight, which should have had a surprising effect, but the preparations before the war were very sloppy, and they lacked actual combat experience, and their desire to fight was insufficient. Hit the Arrow Mountain and got stuck in the car five times on the way. Shiji criticized, "The results of the battle are so clumsy, we must strictly investigate the responsibility and make efforts to correct it." ”
When the South Korean army discovered the tanks of the volunteers, they were quite frightened at first, but they realized that they had not been fired by the tanks, so they showed great contempt, and their war history recorded that the tanks of the volunteers played a very small role.
4. I didn't expect that our army was impatient and hurried after the battle was launched.
There was no problem with the tactical quality of the 38th Army, and it did not put much effort into this area before the war. However, after the battle began, the situation was stalemate, and some commanders made impatient mistakes and wanted to quickly resolve the battle by striking and rushing.
In particular, when attacking Arrowhead Hill (281.2 heights), in the face of the relatively flat terrain of the enemy position, our army invested as many as two battalions, and Shiji criticized it as "really a herd tactic." Coincidentally, the South Korean army also had this view, saying that the volunteers attacked in a dense formation, and did not even do the basic evacuation, and were killed and injured by the barrage of the South Korean army. It can be seen that the 38th Army is eager to win.
As for the powerful support artillery fire of the US army, this was all expected by our army in advance, and there were corresponding ways to deal with it, and the defection of Gu Zhongjiao only made the response speed of the US artillery fire a little faster to the original extent, and to a certain extent, it was not the decisive factor in determining the victory or defeat of the battle at Baima Mountain. Kim Jong-go, commander of the 9th Korean Division, commented on the artillery fire of both sides, saying that the volunteers were very strong, and that "the artillery bombardment was no less than ours." There may be factors that exaggerate the artillery fire of the volunteers in order to show their own combat effectiveness
According to the history of the South Korean army, in addition to the bombs dropped by the US military, the artillery group of the 9th Army fired 185,000 shells.
According to Zhisi's post-war commentary, the 38th Army attacked two heights and consumed a total of about 21,675 rounds of shells.
The number of enemy artillery fire is 9 times that of our army. However, considering that the US artillery fire expanded the bombardment of the 38th Army in depth and the reserve impact ground line around the two heights, only a part of them were directly engaged in the highland counter-shock operation, and our troops poured all of them into the positions of the ROK army, so it can be said that the artillery fire of the two sides should be at the same order of magnitude for the infantry support.
In the two offensive battles of White Horse Mountain and Arrow Mountain, our army suffered relatively heavy casualties, with 2,802 killed and 4,069 wounded, with a total of 6,871 casualties. Compared with the estimated casualties of our army by the ROK army, the difference of 8,000 or 9,000 is not particularly large.
However, there is a big difference in the number of enemies destroyed. According to the Korean version of the war history and the U.S. military, the total number of South Korean casualties is about 3,500. The figures recorded by our army are recorded in the second volume of the 2011 edition of the Military Science and Technology "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" as more than 8,000, and the 2014 edition is further revised to more than 9,300, which seems to refer to Jiang Yonghui's "The 38th Army in Korea".
No matter how many enemies were annihilated, the 38th Army generally fought a battle that outweighed its losses, and the direct reason for its withdrawal from the battle on October 15 was that the three divisions were unable to fight again.
Jiang Yonghui later recalled that after the defection of Tanakajiao, if the 38th Army launched an attack immediately, the ROK army would not have had time to build fortifications, and it would have been difficult for the US artillery to be quickly mobilized, and it would not have been so difficult to fight later. Or it is also good to report to Zhiji to postpone the time of the attack, contain the main force of the South Korean army and the American artillery group in front of Baima Mountain, and create fighters for other brother troops.
It's a pity that the 38th Army chose the most undesirable way of fighting, launched an offensive step by step, and entered the enemy's rhythm to fight, and heavy casualties were inevitable.
As the superior command organization of the 38th Army at that time, the 3rd Corps did not play any role in guiding and reminding the 38th Army, and the soul of the army had just been transferred.