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At the end of 1948, with the defeat of the Kuomintang a foregone conclusion, the question of the departure and stay of the U.S. Embassy in China was put on the agenda.
In early November, Stuart proposed to the State Department that on the one hand, fully support the Kuomintang government, and on the other hand, consider the future, and if Chiang Kai-shek or his successor decided to lead the vast majority of government agencies to move south, the American embassy should accompany him.
However, he estimated that most of the KMT, which had become a rabble, would not be able to move southward smoothly, and the future relocation of the capital would likely resemble an individual flight. Under such circumstances, the U.S. Embassy should remain in Nanjing. After learning of the Kuomintang government's plan to flee south to Canton, he made a more specific suggestion that a senior embassy official be stationed in Canton, while he and most of his subordinates remained in Nanjing. He also told the State Department that other Western embassies in China would follow a similar approach.
1. The reason why the United States did not evacuate the embassy
In late January 1949, Acheson approved his proposal, and Minister Counsellor Lewis Clark was sent to Guangzhou to set up the "Canton Office of the U.S. Embassy."
However, the problem is not over. On the eve of the liberation of Nanjing, Acheson suddenly telegraphed to Stuart Leiden:
As soon as "the communist regime was firmly established in Nanjing," he immediately returned to the United States.
After receiving the telegram, Situ Leiden was quite dissatisfied, and tried to explain the reason for staying in Nanjing, and only then did he obtain the final consent of the State Council.
The main purpose of Stuart's stay in Nanjing was to safeguard US interests in China as much as possible.
According to Butterworth, director of the Department of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department, the area from the northeast to the lower reaches of the Yangtze River is the main area where American expatriates and their interests are concentrated, and if the US government wants to provide assistance and protection for it, it needs to have representatives who can deal with the Chinese Communist Party stay there.
Stuart Redden is considered the best candidate:
He is fluent in Chinese, knows and is even quite familiar with all the leaders of all factions in China, and as the former president of Yenching University, he "occupies the traditional position of a gentleman as a student in his relations with many Chinese", especially since nearly half of the students are in the Communist camp.
Stuart told the State Department:
The ideological and cultural influence of the United States is a big capital in the future struggle against the Chinese Communist Party, and the US embassies and other official institutions remaining in the CCP-controlled areas can "spread inspiring ideas and real news" in order to promote the Chinese people's resistance to "strict jurisdiction that does not tolerate heresy."
He also wanted to stay in Nanking to observe and try to influence the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Party. He argues that while the Chinese Communists will most likely "perpetuate their habitual atrocities" after taking power in the country, this may be due to a "self-expression" mentality at the beginning of their reign or a real misunderstanding of the United States.
Therefore, it is necessary to find out the intentions of the CCP leaders through conversations, and even try to dispel their misunderstandings and "paranoia."
In trying to influence the leadership of the CCP through engagement, the State Department is far less vigorous than Situ Leiden.
Understanding this distinction is important for a correct understanding of future developments, because only in this way will there be no confusion between some of Stuart's personal aspirations on the issue of dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party with the attitude and policy of the State Council, as some scholars have done.
2. Stuart Leiden's unauthorized behavior
As a matter of fact, Stuart had already had important disagreements with the State Department on several previous occasions and had repeatedly acted on his own initiative.
In the administration, he was one of the main figures who advocated more obligations for the Kuomintang, and did not approve of the policies laid down by his superiors to avoid getting too deep into the quagmire of China.
In June 1948, he suggested to Marshall that military advisers in China be given the strategic authority to command and supervise the Kuomintang forces, but this was ignored.
Two months later, he suggested increasing aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and when Chiang Kai-shek fell or was about to fall, he should assist the local powerful factions of the Kuomintang to fight against the CCP. Marshall politely dismissed this claim.
In late October, he demanded a significant increase in the number and power of American advisers to direct the civil war and the economy for Chiang Kai-shek.
Marshall flatly refused, noting that this would put the United States on "the responsibility of encompassing the Chinese government" and "falling into a kind of enduring obligation that will in fact be impossible to get rid of."
At the same time, he also replied to Stuart's question about whether Chiang Kai-shek should be promoted to step down and Li Zongren and others should be replaced, saying that this would make it difficult for the United States to shoulder the responsibility of supporting the successor regime.
Despite this, Stuart Leiden took the liberty of intervening in the behind-the-scenes activities of the Kuomintang government's change of face.
After Li Zongren came to power, the State Council refused to make a commitment to support the Kuomintang's stubborn resistance, in view of the fact that the KMT's defeat was assured.
Although he was well aware of the State Department's policy, he suggested assistance and advocated a statement aimed at deterring the People's Liberation Army from crossing the river.
The disagreement between him and the State Department is also expressed in the question of whether to recommit to the peaceful settlement of the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The closer the Kuomintang government came to collapse, the more inclined he was to reopen peace talks and establish a "coalition government" as a last resort to preserve the Kuomintang's power.
But the State Department believes that this will give the United States a new, unfulfilled responsibility for the Kuomintang and will lead to the Chinese Communist Party finally taking full power peacefully.
After Marshall's mission to China, the State Department repeatedly stated that the US policy toward China was no longer to promote the establishment of a coalition government, but Stuart Leiden violated this spirit and openly declared in late February 1948 that the best way to resolve the China question was for the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to resume negotiations.
In March, Truman and the State Department announced that the United States was opposed to the establishment of a coalition government in China, but in June and July, Stuart still contacted the Soviet ambassador to China, Roshin, seeking joint mediation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and concealing the inside information from other officials of the State Department and the embassy.
Shortly before Li Zongren came to power, the State Council, in view of his repeated violations of policy, gave clear instructions in advance not to interfere in the KMT-CPC negotiations.
However, he not only had great hopes for Li Zongren's peace talks, but also secretly prompted some intermediaries to appeal to the KMT and the CCP for peace.
Similarly, on the issue of dialogue with the Chinese Communist Party, Stuart has shown and will continue to show a different attitude from Washington.
3. The motive for our party's contacts with the United States
On March 10, 1949, Stuart Leiden telegraphed Acheson asking for permission to meet with the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party at an appropriate time. It was a telegram that typically represented his fantasies and ambivalence.
On the one hand, he believes that the Chinese Communist Party's anti-American attitude is derived from communist ideology and "Kremlin incentives," and on the other hand, he believes that this is somewhat due to a misunderstanding of American motives.
If such misunderstandings can be eliminated or reduced, the way will be paved for a solution to the problems between the two sides.
To this end, he told Acheson that he was prepared to convey to the CCP leaders that the United States had only goodwill towards China, while at the same time teaching and intimidating them.
He said he would point out that if a "totalitarian state" is established in China, it is likely to be resisted by the Chinese people, and the resulting chaos will endanger U.S. security and world peace, in which case the U.S. government will "do everything in its power to restore the true freedom of the Chinese people."
If the Chinese Communist Party wants to avoid "human suffering and economic destruction," it should change its policy and cooperate with the United States for the "common good."
He actually thinks that the Chinese Communist Party is likely to accept this set:
"I will deal with the CCP not only as an official representative of the U.S. government, but also as a long-time resident here who is known for his consistent commitment to China's national independence, democratic progress, and close ties between the United States and China, primarily for the benefit of the Chinese people."
No matter how much they may disbelieve me, believing that I have come into line with the aggressive United States imperialism that they condemn in recent years, I expect that my past achievements and my rivalry with many of them will not be completely overlooked. ”
On April 6, Acheson called back and agreed that he would choose an opportunity to meet with the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. In view of the fact that it is not appropriate for the United States to explicitly assume its obligation to support reactionary forces in Chinese mainland, Acheson asked him to change his threats against the Chinese Communist Party to be more vague and instructed him to keep the meeting and its contents absolutely secret. Subsequent events proved that Acheson's consent was unreliable.
The Communist Party of China also has a desire for dialogue with the United States. The Communist Party of China believes that on the premise of persistently opposing the basic policy of opposing the United States and sweeping away its influence in China, it can make certain contacts with the United States and even strive to reach certain understandings.
The CCP seems to have estimated that the collapse of the Kuomintang government may bring about some changes in US policy toward China that can be exploited.
In late January 1949, World Knowledge, which reflected our party's views on international issues, published an article arguing that after Acheson became secretary of state, the basic US stance on the China issue would remain the same, but there would be some changes in strategy.
The article refers to U.S. policy toward China as a "wait-and-see policy," saying that this is mainly because the situation in China has forced U.S. policymakers to consider new ways to deal with the Chinese revolution, and one of the new ways may be to influence the new China with economic exchanges.
The implications of this estimate are obvious.
As a matter of fact, Yao Yilin, minister of industry and commerce of the North China People's Government, sent a meeting with US Consul General in Beiping at the end of April, and took the initiative to propose that the liberated areas of North China exchange goods with Japan, which was under US occupation, and expressed the hope that Sino-US trade would return to the pre-war level.
In the following month or so, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Qiao Guanhua, Zhang Hanfu, and others also directly or indirectly told the US side that economic exchanges and economic cooperation could be carried out on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and that the CPC was prepared for dialogue with the United States in principle and tactically.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, noting the fact that the embassies of the United States and other Western countries did not flee south with the Kuomintang government, announced on April 30 through a spokesman for the People's Liberation Army Headquarters:
"The Military Commission of the Chinese Revolutionary Revolution and the People's Government are willing to consider establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and this relationship must be based on equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. If a foreign government wishes to consider establishing diplomatic relations with us, it must sever ties with the remnants of the Kuomintang and withdraw its armed forces in China. ”
4. Huang Hua's contact with Situ Leiden
When the Communist Party of China liberated major cities such as Beiping, Tianjin, and Nanjing, on the one hand, it protected all law-abiding Americans, and on the other hand, it did not recognize the official status of US embassy and consulates, and treated them as ordinary American nationals in legal theory.
At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party does not rule out using the U.S. embassies and consulates as informal channels for contact with the U.S. side when necessary, allowing the Nanjing and Beiping consulates general to communicate with Washington in code, and sometimes lowering the tone of its criticism of the United States.
The CCP took special care of Situ Leiden personally.
The day after the liberation of Nanjing, more than 10 PLA officers and soldiers broke into Situ Leiden's residence out of curiosity. The Nanjing Military Management Commission immediately said through some well-known figures in society that similar incidents would not happen again. Liu Bocheng, director of the Military Management Commission, later met informally with Fu Jingbo, Situ Leiden's personal secretary, and apologized for this.
In addition, when the situation was not stable in the early days of the city's entry, the CMC imposed strict security protection on all foreign diplomats, especially Situ Leiden.
In early May, apparently at the behest of Situ Leiden, Fu Jingbo took the initiative to contact Huang Hua, director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Division of the Nanjing Military Management Commission. Huang Hua, who had studied at Yenching University and was a classmate of Fu Jingbo, had previously held the same position in the Beiping Military Management Commission, and was transferred to Nanjing, mostly to facilitate dialogue with Situ Leiden.
During the conversation, Huang Hua strongly criticized the US policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek in suppressing the Communists, and said that he did not recognize Situ Leiden's official status. Nevertheless, he accepted Fu Jingbo's proposal and agreed to visit the "old principal," and from mid-May to early June, Huang Hua had several conversations with Situ Leiden and Fu Jingbo in his personal capacity in accordance with the instructions of the CPC Central Committee and the Nanjing Municipal Party Committee.
During this period, Stuart thought that the Chinese Communist Party was anxious to obtain diplomatic recognition and economic assistance from the United States to the people's government.
He hoped that through the conversation, the CCP would feel that it was possible to make progress on both fronts, and therefore took the initiative to make a request so that he could obtain the maximum concession from his advantageous position.
As a result, he declared to Huang that the U.S. government hopes to eliminate tensions caused by "misunderstandings, worries, and suspicions" and restore Sino-American friendship. He drew Huang Hua's attention to the importance of his stay in Nanjing, and said that if the Kuomintang government fled to Taiwan, the U.S. embassy would not follow him.
He also claimed that the U.S. government "fully recognizes the right of the Chinese people to choose whatever form of government they wish."
When talking about reviving China's economy, he tentatively asked what he could do.
However, according to Stuart, in order to receive the goodwill of the United States, the Chinese Communist Party must inherit all the treaties concluded by the Kuomintang government, be willing and able to fulfill its "international obligations", and abandon "the Marxist-Leninist dogma that regards the world revolution and the overthrow of the capitalist governments as necessary."
He threatened that if the Chinese Communist Party pursues a policy dedicated to overthrowing the governments of other countries, the United States will treat it as "something beyond the purely China issue."
Stuart's hopes were not realized. In his first meeting with Fu Jingbo, Huang Hua stressed that when the time comes, the United States should take the first action to establish normal relations with New China.
Later, he pointed out to Stuart that whether or not the United States and New China could establish diplomatic relations depended on whether the United States stopped aiding the Kuomintang regime and severed ties with it.
He also demanded that the United States withdraw its Marines stationed in Qingdao.
On the economic issue, Huang Hua explained that it is impossible for the Chinese Communists to implement a policy of isolating themselves, and that New China is willing to engage in economic and trade exchanges with the United States, but at the same time he affirmed that China will control its own destiny without foreign interference.
5. Stuart Leiden's request for a visit to Beiping
Huang Hua's attitude made Situ Leiden feel that the Chinese Communist Party was "extremely sensitive to China's right to make its own decisions in the international arena," and by mid-June, Situ Leiden clearly felt that his contacts with Huang Hua had not been effective.
He knew that neither the State Department nor the situation in China would allow him to stay in China for too long.
Therefore, he was anxious to find another channel for dialogue with the CPC leaders and strive to change the CPC's policy before the establishment of the Central People's Government.
On 10 June, Chen Mingshu, leader of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, passed through Nanjing on his way to Beijing to participate in preparations for the new CPPCC.
He specifically asked the State Department to schedule his return to the United States after Chen Mingshu returned to Ningbo in mid-July, so that he could learn about the reaction of the Chinese Communist leadership.
The next day, he left for Shanghai and returned to his residence in Nanjing six days later. During this period, he met "very secretly" with a number of "politically active figures", including the NLD vice-chairman Luo Longji.
When he reported to the State Council on his visit to Shanghai, he only said that the meetings were of "great practical value" but did not disclose the details.
According to later Chinese press materials, he once asked Luo Longji to tell the CCP leaders that as long as they did not follow the Soviet Union, the United States could provide huge loans to China.
Situ Leiden not only tried to talk to the CCP leaders through certain intermediaries, but also tried to talk to them in person.
In early June, Fu Jingbo asked Huang Hua if it was possible to allow Situ Leiden to visit Beiping on the grounds that he had always celebrated his birthday at Yenching University, but Huang Hua did not reply at that time.
Situ Leiden immediately asked his acquaintance Zhou Youkang to go to Peking to inquire about the news. On June 26, Zhou returned to Nanjing, saying that he had learned that the CCP leaders had given him permission to go to Beiping. At the same time, Lu Zhiwei, the head of Yenching University, also wrote a letter to explain this point.
On June 28, Situ Leiden was confirmed by Fu Jingbo and Lu Zhiweixin's visit to Huanghua. Huang Hua immediately informed Situ Leiden in person that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai welcomed him to visit Beiping as the former president of Yenching University.
With regard to the dialogue with Situ Leiden in Peiping, the CPC was both active and cautious.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believes that although the contacts in Nanjing have not and are unlikely to change the US policy toward China, they seem to be effective on certain issues, especially on the issue of preventing US military intervention.
Based on the subjective judgment that "I do not depend on you, but you rely on me," the central authorities estimate that the United States is likely to establish and develop trade relations with New China.
Therefore, on the premise of upholding principles and retaining room for manoeuvre, it is acceptable to hold a high-level informal meeting with Stuart.
From mid-to-late June, there were some signs of loosening in the incident at the U.S. Consulate General in Shenyang, which the U.S. government had been concerned about.
During his activities in Shanghai, Situ Leiden had contact with the heads of relevant departments of the Shanghai Naval Management Commission, and his impression was that "the local authorities of the Chinese Communist Party are eager to develop international trade... Therefore, they are particularly eager to get along with the United States."
About a week later, Situ Leiden received a message from Chen Mingshu that he had had "completely satisfactory" conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and that he should not return to the United States too soon, which may have been related to the CCP leaders' preparations for a meeting with Situ Leiden.
It is also worth noting that Mao Zedong delivered a speech at the preparatory meeting of the new CPPCC on 15 June, declaring that the Chinese people are determined to handle their own affairs without foreign interference, and at the same time saying that as long as any foreign government is willing to sever relations with the Kuomintang and adopt a truly friendly attitude toward New China, "we are willing to negotiate with it on the issue of establishing diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty."
He also declared that "the Chinese people are willing to practice friendly cooperation with the people of all countries in the world and to restore and develop international trade undertakings."
Mao Zedong's intended audience undoubtedly included Situ Leiden, who was testing whether he could visit Beiping.
6. The attitude of the U.S. State Department
On June 30, Stuart called Acheson to report that Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had welcomed him to Beiping, saying that the benefits of the trip outweighed the disadvantages, and asking for approval.
In the nearly one month since he first proposed his visit to Beiping through Fu Jingbo, he completely concealed from the State Council his assumptions and arrangements on this matter, and it was not until he had reached a consensus with the Chinese Communist Party that he asked the State Council for instructions.
Obviously, he is worried that although the State Council has agreed in principle that he will choose the right time to meet with the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, it may still veto it in the end. From the very beginning, the State Department was relatively negative about his tentative dialogue in Nanjing.
From the liberation of Nanjing to the end of June, he continued to report on his direct and indirect contacts with the Chinese communists, but the State Council never commented on or gave instructions. What may particularly disturb him is that in mid-June, the State Department asked him to return to the United States to "report on his work" as soon as the consulate personnel in Shenyang were evacuated from China.
This is tantamount to saying that his detention in China has nothing to do with trying to influence the CCP's basic policies through dialogue.
Washington's policy is confrontation, not dialogue.
After the State Department received a telegram from Stuart, Butterworth believed that even if the trip to Peking was approved, it should be a prerequisite for the Chinese communists to immediately return the consulate personnel in Shenyang to the United States.
Davis, on the other hand, believes that it is not enough to force the Chinese Communists to make concessions on this issue, and that it is also necessary to stipulate that the main content of the Peiping talks is to reprimand the Chinese Communist Party leaders, and that the State Council will make the situation public to the world.
Key policymakers have taken a tougher stance. On the afternoon of July 1, Truman called Acheson and said that he was opposed to Stuart's trip to Beiping.
Acheson then instructed Stuart Layden not to visit Peking under any circumstances "according to the highest considerations."
He also told him that the main reason for this decision was precisely the unfavorable factors that Stuart admitted in his telegram, that is, the visit to Peking would not only expose the administration to fierce criticism from pro-Chiang forces inside and outside the Congress, but would also "greatly enhance the domestic and international prestige of the Chinese Communists and Mao Zedong himself" and cause other Western countries to deviate from the "united front policy" advocated by the United States against New China.
At least one thing is clear from the whole incident, and that is that the Truman administration has maintained a hostile stance against the Chinese Communist Party on the issue of Stuart's visit to Beiping.
(End of text)
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