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As soon as the US ground forces entered the Korean battlefield, Washington's strategists began to consider the question of whether to cross the 38th parallel in the future.
1. Do you want to cross the 38th parallel?
The State Council's Policy Design Committee initially recommended that "everything possible be done to limit military operations on the ground to areas south of the 38th parallel," but Secretary of State Acheson dismissed it as "passive" and "unrealistic."
According to Acheson:
It is not conceivable that the US military will be stopped when it advances to a line drawn by a cartographer on a map;
In a memorandum at the end of July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared:
"Judging from the military operations currently underway against the North Korean army, the 38th parallel is indistinguishable from any parallel"; the only reason to consider whether the US military crosses the 38th parallel and attacks northward is the possible intervention of Chinese or Soviet forces; if the communication line to North Korea can be destroyed to create an effective block, and if the timing is right, the US military will be able to achieve its objectives before the Soviet or Chinese forces take action.
On September 9, the U.S. National Security Council issued Document No. 811 (NSC 81/1), entitled "U.S. Operational Guidelines for North Korea," which determined:
The "United Nations Army" will cross the 38th parallel and eliminate the North Korean army, but this is premised on the premise that at the time of this action, the Soviet Union or China did not send a large number of troops to North Korea, nor did it threaten to launch a military counterattack against the "United Nations Army".
Considering that military operations north of the 38th parallel included the risk of a large-scale war with the Soviet Union or China, the document stipulated that US commanders must obtain the approval of the US president before putting the battle plan into practice, and that non-ROK troops should not be used in the border areas between the DPRK and the Soviet Union and China.
At the time of the issuance of Document NSC 81/1, the U.S. military was still cowering in the narrow area of the Pusan Ring of Defense Ring and endured wave after wave of attacks by the Korean People's Army. Under these circumstances, the decision-making level in Washington has begun to seriously study the issue of policy guidance for turning into a counteroffensive and crossing the 38th parallel.
Moreover, when considering this issue, they put forward the possible involvement of China and the Soviet Union as a basic assumption and the biggest constraint, and seemed to be aware of the crux of the problem.
What is puzzling, however, is that the document, in its analysis of the possibility of Chinese troops, only envisages that the Chinese military may be involved in operations south of the 38th parallel, either openly or covertly, but makes no mention of its possible actions north of the 38th parallel.
One possible explanation is that the U.S. policymakers are basing their judgment on this:
If China were to enter the war, the only time would be when the front was deadlocked on the Nakdong River, or at least when the U.S. troops landed at Incheon, and when the U.S. forces had advanced to the 38th parallel and north of it, China had effectively lost the opportunity to enter the war.
This wishful thinking has virtually set up a strategic blind spot for itself.
2. MacArthur's "Northward Plan"
On September 15, the U.S. 10th Army successfully landed at Incheon. On 25 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to Marshall, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, that MacArthur should be given an order to cross the 38th parallel without hesitation.
On the 27th, with Truman's approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially issued Directive No. 92801 to carry out military operations north of the 38th parallel.
On the same day, Bradley sent MacArthur a telegram for his own reading only, which read:
"We hope that you will not have any scruples tactically and strategically and continue to cross the 38th parallel north. If you think it is militarily necessary, you can cross the 38th parallel. ”
In this way, the decision-makers in Washington gave MacArthur the decision to attack north of the 38th parallel, which he could do as long as he deemed militarily necessary, and without being hindered tactically or strategically.
This authorization granted MacArthur's wish, and he immediately called back:
"The 38th parallel is not a problem in our military deployment ... Unless and until the enemy submits, I think our military operations can be carried out throughout the territory of Korea. ”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also telegraphed to him:
Regarding the advance north of the 38th parallel, "do not further explain or make a statement, let the action decide everything"; The government asks that reference to the 38th parallel be avoided as much as possible until we have completed the task of defeating the North Korean army."
On September 30, the 1st Army of the ROK Army took the lead in crossing the 38th parallel. On October 2, MacArthur gave the order to Walker, commander of the 8th Army, to cross the 38th parallel.
The Korean War thus entered a new phase.
Later, some people blamed MacArthur for the US military's crossing of the 38th parallel to expand the war, believing that it was his coercion that forced Washington to make the relevant decision, but this was not the case.
In fact, crossing the 38th parallel was a decision made by the highest military and political authorities in Washington, and MacArthur was only an executor with a higher initiative, and he did a lot of transcendence and improvisation in the actual implementation process.
MacArthur's plan to move north stemmed from two of his ideas:
One idea was for the 8th Army to carry out the main offensive along the west coast, in conjunction with an amphibious landing at Zhennampo or elsewhere southwest of Pyongyang;
Another idea is that the Eighth Army will carry out a land attack along the east coast and at the same time carry out an amphibious landing in the port city of Wonsan on the east coast, but the difference is in the direction of the main attack and the choice of landing sites, while the idea of creating a new encirclement posture by landing on the flank and rear and combining it with a frontal attack is the same.
In the end, MacArthur blended these two ideas into a new one:
The 8th Army under the command of Walker was the main attacker, passing through the area near Seoul, breaking through the 38th Parallel after completing offensive preparations on the south side of the 38th Parallel, and then attacking northwest along the axis of Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang to capture Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea; the 10th Army landing at Inchon under the command of Almond was reloaded from the ports of Incheon and Pusan, and rounded to the east coast by sea, where it made another amphibious landing at Wonsan, and then marched north to the Yalu River and the other to the west on the north side of Pyongyang, and joined the 8th Army in North Korea rendezvous, cutting off the KPA retreat.
When advancing to the Dingzhou-Ningyuan-Hungnan line (about 160 kilometers away from the 38th parallel), the ROK army completed the sweeping task from the north of the line to the border area.
It can be seen that MacArthur's attempt was to take Pyongyang as the main objective, to attack from the east and west, to combine a frontal attack with a flank and rear landing, to first seize Pyongyang and Wonsan, destroy the center of gravity of North Korean resistance, and encircle and annihilate the remnants of the KPA, and then the ROK troops to the north to complete the task of "clearing and sweeping."
3. Why was the "Northward Plan" MacArthur's defeat?
Researchers of American war history have criticized MacArthur's plan on two points:
First, it was used inappropriately by the 10th Army, which did not let the 10th Army, which had entered the vicinity of the 38th parallel, take advantage of the situation, and take a shortcut to take Wonsan directly by land, but reloaded it on a ship and went to Wonsan to land after making a big circle at sea, wasting valuable troops and time;
Second, the northward advance troops were divided into two parts that were not connected with each other, resulting in the separation of the eastern and western fronts, opening a big gap to the enemy, and laying the groundwork for subsequent defeat.
Bradley commented:
MacArthur had a plan for the worst of battles. Instead of ordering the 10th Army to pursue and drive northward, he sent the 10th Army to carry out a second amphibious landing at Wonsan on the east coast of Korea. This meant stopping all pursuits, pulling the 10th Army back from the front, reloading it onto ships, and by long sea to the 2nd landing site.
As a result, the main task of attacking Pyongyang to the north fell on the shoulders of the exhausted 8th Army. The army group had to be reorganized and replenished before it could attack. Moreover, as can be seen from the map, the landing at Wonsan is unnecessary. The ROK 1st Army was rapidly advancing north along the east coast of Korea, and had captured Wonsan long before the 10th Army landed.
MacArthur had his own explanation for this:
The reason why he did not use troops in the vicinity was because the tall and steep Taebaek Mountains had blocked the two major battlefields in the east and west of North Korea, so he had to separate Walker's 8th Army and Almond's 10th Army.
Bradley refuted MacArthur's explanation with a scathing statement:
In fact, this logic simply does not hold water. ... The end result was that MacArthur created a logistical supply nightmare for the roads in southern Korea and Pusan in Incheon in the name of improving logistics. The enemy himself could not devise a more brilliant plan to delay our pursuit.
... In short, MacArthur lost a crucial opportunity to pursue the operation, which brought combat operations to a near standstill for three weeks; he sent the 10th Army to accomplish a trivial task while entrusting the main task to two ill-prepared troops, which he dispersed both his forces and his command; and artificially caused serious blockages in the logistical supply lines at a critical moment when logistics supplies were playing a pivotal role in combat operations.
It is unlikely that even the enemy could have devised such a brilliant plan to delay our pursuit. If a major in the Command Staff College had taken this approach to solving the problem, he would have been ridiculed by everyone and thrown out of the classroom.
Bradley, of course, was putting on an "afterthought".
At the time, as Ridgway put it, no U.S. general had expressed strong opposition to MacArthur's plan, and "simply because no one at the time had doubts about the man's judgment or foresight."
Since MacArthur had just performed a military miracle at Incheon, at this moment, "even if he suggested that a battalion should walk from the water to Wonsan, there would probably be people willing to give it a try."
Researchers of American war history generally believe that MacArthur's design of the US military's combat operations after crossing the 38th parallel was a major failure in his military career.
This is where his decline in the Korean battlefield began.
4. The stubborn resistance of the North Korean army and the northward advance of the American army
In the face of the northward offensive of the "United Nations Army", the remnants of the Korean People's Army did their best to organize resistance.
On 1 October, the Supreme Command of the People's Army decided to divide the defense line of the 38th Parallel into two parts, the east and the west, with the East Coast Defense Command headed by Cui Yongjian in charge of the eastern front and the Front Command headed by Kim Chaek in charge of the western front.
The task assigned by the Supreme Command to the defending forces of the 38th Parallel was to stubbornly resist the enemy's attack, gain time, and cover the withdrawal of the main forces of the People's Army blocked in the south to the north of the 38th Parallel.
According to the information available to the US military, the KPA's defense along the 38th parallel consists of three zones:
The first zone is a forward position built along the 38th parallel, with a depth of about 500 meters, the second zone is composed of a series of interconnected defensive positions 3~5 kilometers north of the back edge of the forward position, and the third zone is a stronghold defensive position built on the basis of favorable terrain in the north of the third zone.
The main defensive direction was in the direction of Kaesong-Saliwon-Pyongyang, and the defensive forces along the front were divided into four divisions: the 19th, 27th, 43rd and 17th Panzer Divisions. The first three divisions were reorganized from the newly formed independent brigades, and all of them were untrained recruits, while the 17th Panzer Division was even more nameless, and its equipment and personnel did not even reach the level of a regiment.
The U.S. 8th Army was responsible for the frontal attack, and the main offensive task was undertaken by the 1st Army.
In early August, the 8th Army established two corps-level command structures, the 1st Army and the 9th Army, with John Kurt as commander of the 1st Army and Frank Milburn as commander of the 9th Army.
By the time the U.S. forces switched to the counteroffensive, only the 1st Army Command had full field command functions. While assigning the task of the main attack to the 1st Army, Walker felt that the commander of the army, Kurt, acted cautiously and lacked the positive and decisive spirit that was most valuable for the offensive, while the commander of the 9th Army, Milburn, was considered to be "resolute, brave, and naturally motivated", so he changed the generals and transferred the posts of the two army commanders to the second echelon: Kurt to the 9th Army, responsible for commanding the second echelon, and Milburn to the 1st Army, assuming the command responsibility of the main attacking force.
The effect of this change will be immediate. Milburn commanded all units of the 1st Army to turn into a counteroffensive from the Nakdong River, and after completing the breakthrough, they advanced all the way, driving 260 kilometers straight to Seoul and Suwon, and joined up with the 10th Army that landed at Incheon.
By 6 October, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24th Division (attached to the 27th Brigade of the British Army) and the 1st Division of the ROK Army under the 1st Army had reached the starting area of the attack near the 38th parallel.
Milburn argues:
"To enter North Korea to fight is to pursue the Yalu River." The short pause near the 38th parallel is only for the purpose of obtaining supplies and adjusting the deployment, and once the 38th parallel is crossed, it should be pushed forward in one go, and the opponent should not be given time or opportunity to reorganize its forces and organize its defense.
To this end, he issued an order not to attack but to pursue the troops of the 1st Army, and ordered his headquarters to "first encircle and annihilate the enemy in the northern area of Kaesong with all their might, and then pursue Pyongyang as the goal."
5. The process of the fall of Pyongyang
At this time, the Korean People's Army was powerless to stop the ferocious offensive of the "United Nations Army," and the defensive positions along the 38th parallel were quickly broken through. The northward advance of the "United Nations Army" developed so rapidly that it was described in the history of the war as a "march of race speed."
In particular, the ROK troops under the command of the US military are even more energetic at this moment, and they can run 40 kilometers on rugged and steep mountain roads in a day at the earliest.
According to the history of the war, during this period, the various units of the ROK army "marched forward bravely day and night as if venting their anger", and in order to strive for "the honor of landing Pyongyang first", "advanced on foot along the dangerous roads in the mountains... Faster than the U.S. troops attacking in vehicles along the road."
In particular, the 1st Division of the ROK Army adopted the tactics of "endless offensive" and canceled a small break on the way except for a big break every day to cook a meal.
The troops continued to advance day and night. Bai Shanye, the commander of the division, proudly recalled that the speed of the division at that time was "faster than the speed of the German armored forces in World War II when they launched a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union," which enabled him to "surpass the American troops in a high-intensity march day and night" in the race against the 1st Cavalry Division, which was the first to attack Manila and Tokyo in the Pacific War.
On October 14, U.S. forces encircled the 19th and 27th KPA Divisions at Jincheon, north of Kaesong.
This battle not only opened the way to Pyongyang, but also almost exhausted the backbone fighting force on which the KPA relied to defend Pyongyang.
The Battle of Jinchuan had an important impact on the outcome of the war. Mao Zedong, who was far away in Beijing, was extremely concerned about this battle.
At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 14th, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai, who was still in Moscow to discuss with Stalin about the entry of Chinese troops into the Korean war.
At that time, Mao Zedong estimated:
"The DPRK units under the command of Kim Il Sung that are still capable of fighting are resolutely facing the enemy on the 38th parallel"; The U.S. Second Division plans to open near Jinchuan and prepare to gain a foothold. Based on this, it seems that the United States has not yet made a final decision on whether and when to attack Pyongyang."
But at 5 o'clock in the morning of the second day, the news of the loss of Jinchuan reached Beijing, and Mao Zedong immediately telegraphed Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and Deng Hua:
"The U.S. and British puppet forces on the 38th parallel occupied Jincheon on the 13th and were preparing to attack Pyongyang. ”
After the Battle of Jinchuan, Mao Zedong realized that Pyongyang could not be defended and the entire war situation would deteriorate further, so he asked the vanguard of the Volunteer Army to be dispatched two days earlier than originally planned (October 19) to gain the initiative and prevent contingencies.
According to historical sources, the North Korean leader sharply criticized the panic and confusion displayed by the leadership of the leadership for failing to achieve its intended goal in defending the area near the 38th parallel.
Kim Il Sung noted at a party meeting:
"During the period of strategic retreat of the People's Army, some Party organizations, organs of political power, and Party functionaries were disorderly, disorganized, and undisciplined. When they retreated, they did not mobilize all possible forces to prepare for a retreat organizationally in time, nor did they organize and educate the people and the people's army in the revolutionary spirit of overcoming difficulties... Panicked by the enemy's attack, he lost the ability to command the party organization and subordinate organs ... and even deliberately create disorder and chaos. ”
On October 17, the U.S. military captured the Shari Won, opening the last barrier to defend Pyongyang, and the door to Pyongyang was opened.
In order to compete for the first success, the US and ROK units quickly flocked to Pyongyang, and the divisions of the ROK 1st Army Corps, which were advancing north along the central mountainous area, also made a detour from the northeast and quickly approached the city of Pyongyang. For a time, there was a scene of four ROK divisions (3 divisions of the 1st Army Corps plus the 1st ROK Division belonging to the 1st Army of the US Army) and 2 US divisions (the 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Division) rushing to Pyongyang.
On October 19, Pyongyang fell.
6. Fanatical northward expansion
On the same day, MacArthur issued Order No. 4, changing the plan for the 8th Army and the 10th Army to meet on the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, requiring Walker to command the troops on the Western Front (the 1st Army of the US Army and the 2nd Army of the ROK) and Almond to command the troops on the Eastern Front (the 10th Army of the US Army and the 1st Army of the ROK), to advance rapidly to the northern border by separate routes, and to push the original line of restriction of US operations from the line connecting Dingju and Ningyuan Hamhung (i.e., the "MacArthur Line") to the north to the line connecting Yicheon-Guindong-Pyeongwon-Seongjin (i.e. " New MacArthur Line").
Compared with the old line, the new line has been pushed forward by 30 kilometers in the west, 100 kilometers in the middle, and 160 kilometers in the east, and the nearest point is only 72 kilometers from the Yalu River.
In his order, MacArthur emphasized:
"Break through the enemy positions in a row, leave the enemy behind, and continue to advance north, north!"
On MacArthur's orders, the "United Nations Forces" advanced rapidly with the border as the target. In order to speed up the pace of the offensive, MacArthur ordered the 187th Airborne Regiment of the US Army to carry out airborne landings in Suchon and Sunchon, near the Cheongchon River, in order to cut off the retreat of the North Korean leadership organs and the main force of the KPA in one fell swoop and rescue the captured US personnel.
At noon on 20 October, 113 C-119 and C-47 transport planes airdropped the main force of the 187th Airborne Regiment to Sucheon, 45 kilometers northwest of Pyongyang.
Within hours, about 4,000 paratroopers, 12 105-mm howitzers, 600 tons of ammunition, 77 jeeps and tractors were parachuted into the intended battlefield. Since the main forces of the Korean People's Army and the organs of the head of the party and government, as well as thousands of US troops and other "United Nations Army" prisoners of war, had been transferred one step ahead of schedule to the north of the Cheongchon River, the airborne landing did not achieve the desired results.
On the day of the landing in Suchuan and Shunchuan, MacArthur personally led a group of senior officials and a group of reporters, including the commander of the Far East Air Force and the chief of operations of the Far East Command, as well as a group of journalists, to inspect the airborne landing site.
He boasted to the reporters accompanying him:
"We took the airborne operation by surprise, and it is estimated that about half of the total strength of the North Korean army, i.e. 30,000 people, has been surrounded... The enemy can only choose the only path to destroy them all or surrender. This operation is a masterful art, and the enemy has fallen into a trap. ”
On October 21, MacArthur returned to Tokyo and once again announced with great ambition: "The decisive end of the war is coming." ”
At this time, the military and political leaders of the United States and its allies all believed that on the Korean battlefield, there was no longer any force capable of having another decent contest with the "United Nations Army" led by the US military.
The remaining combat operations were only of the nature of "clearing and sweeping," and there were no more major battles to be fought.
(End of text)
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