The Iranian-Israeli conflict in the Middle East will once again prove that without absolute strength, it is impossible to control the pace of war. In other words, you can decide when to start a war, but it's up to you when it ends.
Iran's first military operation against targets in Israel was codenamed "True Promise", and judging from the whole process, it has indeed fulfilled the "promise", interpreting this "codename".
For example, Iran said that it did not aim to hurt people, but only attacked military targets, and Iran did it because only one little girl was injured on the Israeli side, and Iran said that it was "a moderate strike", and it did because it was "widely announced" 72 hours before the operation, and it was announced "here and there" as soon as it was launched. But will Israel "cooperate" with Iran's "end here"?
After the "end" of Iran's retaliatory military operation, the Israeli side held three successive wartime cabinet meetings from the 14th to the 16th, and the final conclusion remained that it was necessary to "respond", but there was no "timetable".
Asked how to "respond" to Iran's retaliatory attack, IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari said: "We will respond in the way we choose, at the time we choose." It is clear that the "tempo" of the conflict is beyond Iran's control.
For example, if Israel were to attack Iran's airfields, missile bases, and even nuclear facilities a few times on the next day, Iran would certainly "shoot back." Otherwise, you will lose face externally and will not be able to account internally. Obviously, a "vicious circle" will be formed.
The reason why people often say "war carefully" is because the direction of war is inherently unpredictable, that is, you can decide when to start a war, but when to end it, you may not be at home. For example, the previous Kazakh-Israeli conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict were also the same.
On October 7 last year, Hamas implemented the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation against Israel, which led to the outbreak of the Kazakh-Israeli war. The course of more than half a year of fighting is enough to prove that Hamas has not only failed to control the tempo, but has also suffered heavy losses, and is now besieged in the last stronghold, Rafah, which is "unable to move" and can only hope for "international rescue".
Needless to say, when formulating the "Al-Aqsa flood" action plan, Hamas must have been carefully thought out and simulated in a sand table, and naturally full of confidence. Perhaps they will think that once the fighting breaks out, there will be a "siege" of Israel on the battlefield.
Perhaps, Hamas thought that Iran would personally enter the war, coupled with the operation of the bigger "financiers" behind it, maybe Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries would also join the war, but none of this happened in the end. Obviously, it was Hamas's "strategic miscalculation" that led to today's "dilemma". At the same time, it also shows that there are too many "uncertainties" in the war.
In fact, to a certain extent, the current situation of the Russia-Ukraine war also reflects the impact of "strategic miscalculation" and "uncertain factors" on the course of the war. For example, Russia had to escalate a "special military operation" into a "war" case.
Recently, some media broke the news that Putin originally planned to take Ukraine within one month, and after "recovering several pieces of "historical territory" in eastern Ukraine, he would hand over Ukraine to his daughter's "godfather" and Ukrainian opposition leader Dmitry Medvedchuk for "management". In that case, the "land" goal will be achieved, and relations with the West will be quickly eased without being subject to too severe sanctions.
However, it backfired. So far, Russia's "special military operation" has had to escalate into a "war" and has been subjected to sanctions of unprecedented scale and unprecedented in the Western camp. Although it is said that the sanctions have no effect, it is clear to whom the shoes are worn. There are two main reasons for this: one is the strategic "miscalculation" and the other is the lack of "absolute strength."
Judging from the failure of the Russian army's initial raid on Kyiv and the subsequent battlefield stalemate, it is clear that there are factors that underestimate the will of the Ukrainians to resist and overestimate their own military strength. This was clearly a "fatal" strategic miscalculation. And it is precisely this strategic miscalculation that directly leads to the emergence of "variables" in this war in which the United States and the West "intervened".
At the beginning of Russia's "special military operation", it was estimated that with the exception of then-British Prime Minister Johnson, including Biden, few Western leaders believed that Ukraine would be able to withstand the first round of Russian attacks without collapsing. To put it bluntly, the United States also began large-scale assistance to Ukraine after Ukraine blocked Russia's "three-plank axe".
To put it bluntly, the large-scale aid of the United States and the West to Ukraine is the turning point of Russia's "special military operation" and an unexpected "variable" for Putin, so that Russia loses control over the "rhythm" of this war. This variable is caused by two factors: "strategic miscalculation" and "lack of absolute strength". Judging by this round of Iran-Israel conflict, these two factors are equally "present"
Perhaps in Iran's view, it is just to support Hamas and Palestine, so if an attack is launched against Israel, Arab countries will support it, or at least be able to understand it. However, the reality is that Jordan and other Arab countries not only did not support Iran's actions, but were even directly involved in the interception of Iranian missiles and drones. To put it bluntly, this is a "variable" in war, and it is also a "strategic miscalculation."
Of course, if you have "absolute strength", you naturally don't care about "variables" and can always control the pace of war. It is obvious that Iran does not possess such "absolute power".
For example, in this attack, all 170 drones and 30 cruise missiles launched by Iran were intercepted outside Israel's borders, and only a few of the 120 ballistic missiles launched fell into Israel's territory.
As recently as the 17th, in response to Israel's possible retaliatory actions, the commander of the Iranian Air Force, Major General Hamid Wahidi, warned that if Israel dared to launch an attack on Iran, it would be a strategic mistake, and the Iranian army would strike at enemy targets in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, "especially the use of Su-24 bombers."
Treating the "Su-24" as a "trump card" to confront Israel, which has a top-notch defense system and advanced F-15, F-16, and F-35 fighters, and with the assistance of the United States, Britain, France, and even Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other American-style weapons systems, what are Iran's chances of winning? Anyone with a modicum of military knowledge knows that Iran has almost no chance of winning.
The world's military history has proven that the Kazakh-Israeli and Russian-Ukrainian wars are proving that the development of the current round of Iran-Israel conflict will once again prove that if you do not have absolute strength, you will not be able to control the pace of the war. Therefore, both large and small countries should "fight cautiously" and, in particular, not "make strategic miscalculations" because of hot-headedness.