I'm Tang Tang, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me, talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
On June 25, 1950, the Korean Civil War broke out.
After a long period of tense military confrontation and a series of small-scale armed conflicts, the armies of the north and the south deployed on both sides of the 38th parallel finally ignited the powder keg of war on this day to resolve the issue of reunification by force.
1. Stalin's accident
The large-scale military operation across the 38th parallel began at 4:20 a.m. (local time) on the same day. At this time, Beijing time was 3:20 on the 25th, Moscow time was 22:20 on the 24th, and Washington time was 14:20 on the 24th.
On 28 June, the KPA entered Seoul (present-day Seoul). On the same day, the DPRK Military Commission issued an order to increase the field pay to all KPA personnel fighting south of the 38th parallel, with the following standards as follows: 50 percent increase for generals and officers, 100 percent increase for non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers, and 50 percent increase for non-military personnel.
At the beginning of the war, the Korean People's Army was in full swing, but there were also hidden worries in victory. Judging from the initial results, the main drawback was the failure to achieve the goal of encircling the Seoul area and annihilating a large number of the ROK army's living forces.
The South Korean troops retreated south, and although they were in a disadvantageous position, there had not yet been mass surrenders and captures.
What is even more serious is that the United States decided to intervene militarily after the war began, and the Korean civil war quickly escalated into an international war.
The nature of the war has changed, and so has the outlook.
The rapid, high-profile, and forceful involvement of the United States in the Korean civil war greatly surprised the Soviet leaders.
Originally, Stalin agreed to take military action on the premise that the United States would not intervene in the war on the peninsula.
During his visit to Moscow in April 1950, Kim Il Sung made the following analysis of the issue of US intervention:
Politically, the United States had no intention of intervening in the civil war in China, which was more important to it, in order to save its ally Chiang Kai-shek, and it was inferred that the United States would not intervene in the smaller, more insignificant North Korea to save Syngman Rhee and his regime in South Korea.
Militarily, South Korea is not at all an opponent of North Korea because of its weak military strength, and the KPA can quickly resolve the war once war breaks out.
At that time, it was estimated that the war could be resolved quickly for four reasons:
(1) North Korea will achieve a military victory in three days, (2) 200,000 South Korean Communist Party members will revolt, (3) South Korean guerrillas will support the KPA in the fight, and (4) the United States will not have time to prepare for intervention.
Stalin agrees with the above analysis and estimates, and according to the declassified archives, it was the fact that he saw the US National Security Council Document NSC 482, which was stolen by Soviet intelligence through special means.
The highly classified document unequivocally placed North Korea outside the U.S. Pacific defense circle, and Stalin believed it to be genuine. Based on these circumstances, Stalin made the judgment that even if a war broke out on the peninsula, the United States would not send troops to intervene.
2. The arrogance of Stalin and Kim Il Sung
When Khrushchev was in power, he irresponsibly fabricated that the Korean War was decided by Stalin and Mao Zedong.
In this regard, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen confronted the leaders of the CPSU in Moscow in September 1960.
Peng Zhen pointed out:
The Central Committee of the CPSU knows very well that this issue was decided by you and the DPRK leaders, and only informed us after the decision was made, so how can it be said that it is us? Before you made the decision, Comrade Mao Zedong had put forward his opinion, saying that if war is launched, it will not only be a question of South Korea, but also an issue involving the United States; it is not a question of whether South Korea can get its hands on it, but whether North Korea can keep it. This shows that Comrade Mao Zedong was unequivocally opposed to war in Korea. As a matter of fact, Comrade Mao Zedong was against it, so why must it be said that Comrade Mao Zedong and Stalin made a decision together, what is the purpose of your doing this, and what is your intention?
Deng Xiaoping went on to say to Peng Zhen:
It is to prove that the Chinese are born "belligerent" and "aggressive." These facts make us feel strange.
The main reason why China's leaders, with Mao Zedong at the core, did not approve of a war in Korea because they had always had a more objective and cold understanding of US military intervention.
As early as May 1949, when Kim visited China, Mao Zedong told him that once war broke out, "MacArthur could quickly transfer Japanese troops and weapons to Korea."
In May 1950, Mao Zedong asked Kim Il Sung during his talks:
Mao Zedong believed that since the Syngman Rhee regime was supported by the United States and Korea was very close to Japan, the possibility of US intervention could not be completely ruled out, and the DPRK should take this danger into account before taking action.
Kim Il Sung answers:
It is unlikely that the United States will instigate Japan to enter the war, and even if the Americans send 20,000 or 30,000 Japanese soldiers, it will not change the situation of the war, but will only strengthen the fighting spirit of the People's Army; as for the direct participation of the United States in the war, it is even more impossible.
Mao Zedong, who had rich experience in the struggle against the enemy, still admonished:
I can't be the master of imperialism, we are not their chief of staff, we can't know what they are thinking, but it is always necessary to prepare.
According to Shi-cheol, Kim Il-sung was quite confident in his talks with Mao Zedong, convinced that the United States would not send troops, at least not in time, because North Korea would end the fighting in two or three weeks.
This is the same reason for his statements to Stalin.
When Mao Zedong asked Kim Il Sung whether he needed military support from China, Kim Il Sung replied confidently:
With North Korea's own army, coupled with the cooperation of the South Korean guerrillas, they can solve the problem on their own without the need for China to get involved militarily.
Yang Shangkun also has a similar account, he recalled in his later years that when Mao Zedong said that if the US military intervened, after crossing the 38th parallel, China would send troops to support North Korea in the name of volunteers, Kim Il Sung "politely declined," saying that "there is no need for China to send troops."
Later, Mao Zedong spoke about this in a telegram to Stalin, stating:
"When Comrade Kim Il Sung arrived in Beijing, we told him to pay serious attention to the possibility of foreign reactionary forces invading the DPRK. ”
3. In the name of the United Nations
After World War II, the United States became the world's number one power, far surpassing all other countries in the world in military and economic power, and once had a nuclear monopoly.
In the US national security strategic arrangement, there is no "internal affairs" of other countries in the strict sense of the word; as long as the United States considers that it has something to do with its own "security," any region in the world can be included in its sphere of concern and within its line of defense; whenever something happens, it will intervene in the way it sees fit, up to the point of sending troops to war.
The Chinese leaders have a deep understanding of the imperialist nature of the United States. Because of this, in the course of the Chinese Revolutionary War, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has always maintained a high degree of vigilance against possible US intervention, including military intervention.
Even when the Chinese revolution was developing most smoothly and the prospects for victory were already very clear, Mao Zedong and other leaders still fully estimated the worst possibility of the United States sending troops to intervene and included it in their overall battle plans, so that they would not be caught off guard and fall into a passive position when sudden events came.
Mao Zedong also viewed the possibility of US intervention in North Korea from this point of view.
It should also be pointed out that the US military intervention in the Korean Civil War was in a different form from the previous military intervention by Western imperialist countries, that is, under the banner of the United Nations.
This move was also not anticipated by the Soviet side, or even if it was expected, it was not taken seriously at the beginning, and no effective measures were taken to stop it.
The U.S. decision to intervene militarily coincides with its manipulation of the UN Security Council resolution to denounce North Korea as an "aggressor" and to support U.S. military action to repel the so-called "invasion" of South Korea.
This Security Council resolution has not only given the United States a "legitimate" package for its aggressive military intervention, but has also given it the banner of the "United Nations Army," under which it has been able to gather a group of allies and march into Korea to fight a war in the name of the "United Nations Army."
Regrettably, at the critical moment when the Security Council was discussing and adopting this resolution, the Soviet Union still refused to attend the Security Council meeting on the grounds that the issue of China's representation in the United Nations had not been resolved, and thus failed to exercise its vital veto power in a timely manner, thus enabling the resolution concocted by the United States to pass smoothly.
This caused a great deal of political passivity to the Soviet Union, the DPRK, and China.
Many researchers were puzzled by this move of the Soviet Union, and some even suspected that there might be some "conspiracy" hidden in it, when in fact it was a low-level mistake by Stalin.
In his memoirs, Gromyko, then the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, gave a simple explanation that was probably the closest to the truth.
He said that Stalin believed that the United States had used "provocative and even insulting rhetoric" against the Soviet Union and the DPRK in its letter to the Security Council on the Korean issue, and in a fit of rage, instructed the Soviet representative to the United Nations to boycott the Security Council meeting, thus giving up the opportunity to use the veto.
Gromyko wrote: "This time Stalin was emotionally motivated and did not make the best decision. ”
Before the Korean War began, Mao Zedong made a different estimate of the U.S. military intervention than the leaders of the Soviet Union and North Korea. After the war began, US military intervention turned from a possibility into a reality, and Mao Zedong and Stalin's opinions on the dangers arising from this and the countermeasures were also very different.
4. Do you want to send a consultant?
Stalin was deeply disturbed by the intervention of the United States that went far beyond what he had anticipated.
According to declassified Russian archives, on July 1, he called Ambassador Shtkov to North Korea and asked him to immediately report the following to Moscow:
(1) Does the Korean People's Army Command intend to move forward, or has it decided to suspend the advance?
(2) How do North Korean leaders view the U.S. Air Force attack on North Korea, and are they frightened, or are they continuing to hold on?
(3) Does the North Korean government intend to publicly protest against the attacks and armed intervention?
Stalin noted:
The Korean People's Army must resolutely continue its offensive, because the sooner South Korea is liberated, there will be fewer opportunities for foreign interference. He asked Shtkov to inform Kim Il Sung that the Soviet side would fully fulfill the application of the North Korean side for the supply of ammunition and other military supplies.
For Stalin, the bottom line was clear throughout: it was necessary to ensure that the Soviet Union was not involved in a direct military confrontation with the United States. From the very beginning, he completely ruled out any possibility of directly intervening to help North Korea in the war. As for providing military assistance to the DPRK, he has also adopted a selective and restrained approach. He agreed only to indirect support in the form of the supply of ammunition and other military supplies, and prudently avoided all measures and actions that could lead to the direct involvement of the Soviet Union in the war.
This was reflected in Stalin's attitude towards the dispatch of Soviet military advisers to the Korean front.
There is such a record in the Russian declassified archives:
On 3 July, Kim Il-sung met with Shtkov, pointed out the grim situation at the front, and asked the Soviet side to give guidance to the DPRK side on "how to better organize the command of the army in this complex environment"; he asked the Soviet side to send two military advisers to each of the two newly established KPA fronts (one serving as advisers to the commander of the front army and one to the commander of artillery), and to allow the Soviet general military adviser Vasilyev and the officer team to accompany the front command to Seoul and be stationed there permanently.
A few days later, Kim Il Sung sent another telegram to Stalin through Shtkov, requesting permission to use 25~35 Soviet military advisers in the Korean Front Command and the two front commands, on the grounds that "the military cadres of the mainland have not yet fully mastered the art of commanding a modern army."
Stalin was extremely dissatisfied with the Soviet ambassador's failure to accurately ascertain the intentions of the Soviet leadership and his direct transmission of the DPRK's proposal to his home country without dissuasion.
He sent a telegram to Shtkov to reprimand:
"Your behavior is not correct, because you promised the North Koreans to send them Soviet advisers without asking us beforehand. You should understand that you are representatives of the USSR, and not of the DPRK. ”
Stalin instructed:
The Soviet military adviser was not to be moved to Seoul with the KPA forward, but to remain in Pyongyang, and other military advisers could be sent in the number required by the DPRK, but "they should be dressed in civilian clothes and sent to the front staff and front units as Pravda reporters."
He also gave Shtkov a death order that he was "responsible for ensuring that our advisers do not fall into the hands of the enemy."
In order to carry on the war and at the same time avoid setting himself on fire, Stalin took two measures:
The first is to constantly cheer up the DPRK leaders, strengthen their determination, and urge them to speed up the offensive so as to shorten the duration of the war, not give the United States a chance to expand military intervention, and strive to end the war before the US intervention factor is fully fermented;
The second is to turn its attention to China and remind and encourage China's leaders to consider preparing to provide direct military support to North Korea, including sending troops.
5. Fanaticism and calmness
China's leaders are not surprised by the U.S. military intervention, because it was expected. At that time, the question that needed to be considered was: What impact would the US military intervention have on the Korean war situation, and whether the United States would take further action?
On 2 July, the day after the US ground forces entered the Korean battlefield, members of the CPC Central Committee's leading collective -- Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Liu Shaoqi -- held an afternoon discussion on the situation in Korea. After the meeting, Zhou Enlai met with Soviet Ambassador Roshen to convey the views of the Chinese leaders formed during the discussion, focusing on the dangers of US military intervention.
Zhou Enlai pointed out:
Chairman Mao Zedong talked about the possibility of US intervention in several conversations with the DPRK leaders, but unfortunately he failed to attract their attention, and now it seems that US military intervention is on the trend of further expansion, and it is worrying whether the KPA can thwart US intervention.
If before the outbreak of war, China's leaders emphasized the possibility of U.S. military intervention, but after the outbreak of war and the use of force by force, China's leaders focused on the possible escalation of this action and the more serious harm it would cause. They advised the Soviet Union and, through the Soviet Union, to the DPRK that they should be aware of the greater dangers that had arisen and that might arise subsequently, and that they should take strategic precautions to prevent the situation from falling out of control as a result of the reversal of the situation.
On July 12, Li Xiangchao, deputy chief of staff of the Supreme Headquarters of the Xian People's Army and director of the Intelligence Bureau, came to Beijing with a letter from Kim Il Sung, and Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai met with him in Zhongnanhai on the same day.
After listening to the briefing, Mao Zedong talked about his views on the Korean war situation, pointing out:
U.S. imperialism is the most ferocious imperialism, and they will go to war for a long time and will throw more troops into North Korea. He asked the North Korean side if it had considered when and how to retreat, and suggested that Kim Il Sung order his troops to stop the offensive in order to preserve their main forces.
A detailed analysis of the situation at that time shows that the reason why many people underestimated the seriousness of the US military intervention was largely related to the poor performance of the US military in the early days of the war. Due to the light of the enemy and lack of preparation, the battle of the US ground forces in the first period of their entry into Korea was quite difficult, which naturally gave the impression that the US army was nothing more than that.
The first batch of "Task Force Smith" of the US army to be put into the battlefield was completely annihilated by the People's Army in the Osan area in the first battle. Immediately afterwards, the KPA successfully broke through the defense line built by the US army along the Jinjiang River and Xiaobai Mountain, and severely damaged the 24th Division of the US army. At that time, the main division of the American army was so badly beaten that the division commander, Major General Dean, himself disappeared on the battlefield and was finally taken prisoner.
When the news came, the views of all sides on the Korean war situation tended to be optimistic, and even Zhou Enlai once had the feeling that the combat effectiveness of the US army might not be as good as that of the army of Syngman Rhee in south Korea.
Even so, China's leaders believe that the United States will not easily admit defeat and abandon North Korea when it has begun a large-scale war mobilization, and that it will certainly adopt new escalation and risky measures to break the stalemate and turn the tide of the war. It has this intention, and it has this ability.
At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee in early August, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others analyzed the stalemate situation formed after the People's Army entered the Luodong River, and once again emphasized:
Under the current situation, the danger of US troops landing in the rear of the KPA has increased, and if the KPA cannot break through the defense line on the Nakdong River and US reinforcements come, a very unfavorable situation is likely to occur.
Contrary to the sober analysis of the Chinese leadership, the Soviet leadership remained unabated.
On August 28, Stalin sent a letter to Kim Il Sung through Shtkov, asking him not to be "disturbed by the lack of successive victories in the struggle against foreign interventionists" and to cheer up the North Korean leadership with the example that "Russia's situation during the armed intervention of Britain, France, and the United States in 1919 was much more difficult than the situation of the Korean comrades today."
In the letter, he wrote: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazzaville has no doubt that foreign interventionists will soon be driven out of North Korea"; When the revolution encounters difficulties, the most important thing is to persevere."
Stalin asked Shtkov to convey the contents of the letter to Kim Il Sung orally, in writing, but not with Stalin's name.
After listening to Shtkov's message, Kim Il Sung "repeatedly stressed that the letter was too good" and asked that the letter be read out in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the DPRK Party on the grounds that "some Politburo members are not in the right mood and it is good for them to understand the contents of the letter." Subsequently, Kim Il Sung wrote back to Stalin, expressing his confidence in winning "the final victory."
In fact, an even greater crisis is being bred on the Korean battlefield, and the United States is planning and preparing to launch a larger and more dangerous operation in the rear of the Korean People's Army.
The views of the Chinese leaders have not been heeded by their allies, and their foresights and apprehensions are evolving into harsh realities as the tide of the war has evolved.
(End of text)
If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply as soon as possible.