Let's take a look at the ratio of military strength in the Soviet-German war: the maximum strength of the two sides in the Soviet-German war was 12.8 million of Germany's 7.8 million Soviet troops, which was about 6 to 10, which means that a German soldier had to deal with at least two or so Soviet soldiers in order to maintain the balance of power on the front. Manstein once recalled that the German army's victories on the Eastern Front, such as the Battle of the Crimean Peninsula, mainly relied on "weight and quality", the so-called weight refers to the advanced degree of German army's technical weapons, especially artillery, and the so-called quality refers to the combat quality and discipline of German soldiers, grass-roots officers and sergeants, and the only thing that does not prevail is "quantity." It can be seen that the source of soldiers is important to Desan.
Let's look at the war situation in 1943; With the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the annihilation of Germany's elite Sixth Army means that the Soviet Army has freed up more than 500,000 mobile troops on the Southern Front, and if the German army loses 1.5 million people during the entire battle, it means that the Soviet Army has freed up 3 million troops.
At the same time, it means the bankruptcy of Germany's "Blue Plan", according to the requirements of the "Blue Plan", first of all, in terms of resources, the German Army Group South passed through Ukraine, directly into the Caucasus region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, grabbed the oil fields that accounted for 70% of the Soviet Union's oil production at that time, and solved the dilemma of lack of oil for tanks and tanks. Then strategically, it passed through the Caucasus and further penetrated into the Middle East, where it first cut off the passage of American supply ships to the Soviet Union, and then cooperated with the Afrika Korps commanded by Rommel to take the entire Middle East in one fell swoop, forming a scorpion-shaped offensive layout against the Soviet Union.
Considering that Stalingrad was the last major city of the Soviet defense line in the Caucasus direction, if the Soviet Union lost it, the German army would gain the entire Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as the oil on them, and Germany would not be trapped in resources, and it would be unknown whether the United States could win such a Germany. The 6th Army is the main chain of the Blue Action Plan, and its breaking directly leads to the undoing of the entire Action Plan.
In the Battle of Stalingrad, the Axis powers lost a total of 60 troops, including: 300,000 German troops, 150,000 Romanian troops, 70,000 Italian troops, 50,000 Hungarian troops, and about 50,000 Soviet surrender troops. The proportion of German casualties was very high (around 96,000 captured). After the Battle of Stalingrad, the German army completely lost the strategic initiative on the Soviet-German battlefield, as the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, General Zeitzler, said: "Our loss of 250,000 officers and soldiers in Stalingrad is equivalent to breaking our backbone on the entire Eastern Front." “
In 1943, for the German-Italian-Japanese Axis camp, with the further expansion of the scale of the war, the more abundant resources, technology and industrial advantages of the Allies gradually began to exert force, and the balance of victory and defeat in the war had begun to tilt in favor of the Allies. In the European theater, the Soviet-German battlefield on the Eastern Front The German army lost one after another in two key battles, the Battle of Moscow in 1941 and the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 The Anglo-American Allied forces on the Western Front had gradually gained air supremacy, the number of troops invested in Germany's strategic bombing had gradually increased, the scale and intensity of the bombing had steadily increased, and Germany's military, Economic and industrial targets have been bombed more and more fiercely, and what is even more disturbing is that the possibility of the British and American allies landing in Western Europe to open up a second battlefield is also increasing; on the North African battlefield, the Allied forces have successfully landed in French North Africa and formed a flanking attack with the Allied forces in Tunisia, and the complete defeat of the German and Italian forces in North Africa is not far off; in the Atlantic theater, the naval breakthrough operations of German submarines are entering the climax, but with the increase of Allied antisubmarine forces and the improvement of tactics, the losses of German submarines are also increasing sharply and are beginning to go to a low point; in the Pacific Theater, Japan has suffered heavy defeats in the Battle of Midway and the Battle of Guadalcanal, the loss of men and equipment was difficult to compensate, and the Allies had already begun to switch to a strategic counteroffensive. As a result, some of the Axis vassal states such as Romania, Hungary, and Finland began to show signs of vacillation, and Turkey gave up its intention to join the Axis powers in declaring war on the Soviet Union. Faced with such a difficult situation, Hitler was naturally desperate to win a crucial victory in the summer offensive of 1943. In March 1943, the Germans reoccupied Kharkov, the last German victory on the Eastern Front. Manstein and Hitler pointed out that our troops were limited and could not fully block the Soviet offensive. Our only chance is to make full use of our army's superiority in command and ability to fight well by virtue of mobile and flexible defensive tactics.
The first is to take the preemptive strike by attacking instead of defending, so as to contain the Soviet army's advance. In that case, the sooner the offensive should be launched, the better, before the Soviets recover their forces, especially the number of tanks. The first step in the offensive had to divide the Soviet troops in the Kursk bulge and destroy their reserve armored forces ready for battle. Then the entire armored forces of our army marched southward, sweeping the Soviet defense line in the southern Ukrainian region. The offensive must be launched in early May.
The second option is better, that is, to wait and wait for the Soviet army to attack, and they will definitely launch an attack on our forward positions in southern Ukraine, with the goal of destroying our forward positions in the northern part of the Black Sea. As soon as the enemy began to attack, our troops took the initiative to retreat. Then concentrate forces in the Kiev area to launch a fierce attack on the attacking northern flank of the Soviet army, and in one fell swoop take the forward positions of the Soviet army in the south.
Therefore, with the Battle of Kursk, the Battle of Kursk, I think that the Germans achieved a tactical victory, and the number of Soviet troops they eliminated was much higher than their own losses. However, the Battle of Kursk lost the last elite units of the German army. As a result, the German army completely lost the initiative on the Soviet-German battlefield after the battle. Judging from the strength of the battle, the German army did not achieve its expected strategic goals, and it should be regarded as a defeat for the German army. The last strategic reserves of the German army were exhausted, and the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front was ....... That is, Germany did not achieve its strategic goals. After that, Germany could no longer play a replica of the Kharkov operation, because there were no reserves.
The most important thing is the destruction of the Sixth Army, Zuo Zongtang famously said, "A soldier who is trained is not as good as a soldier who has fought for a long time." It is also necessary to practice skills without practicing courage", emphasizing the importance of courage to combat effectiveness. It is true that courage is an important manifestation of the fighting spirit and is also a key link in military training in peacetime. However, the difference between a "trained soldier" and a "soldier of a long war" is not just "courage"? The German 6th Army, formerly known as the German 10th Army, was formed in October 1939 as one of the German armies that destroyed Poland. By the beginning of 1940, the 10th Army was reorganized into the German 6th Army, which had four infantry corps and one panzer corps. The entire group army had 12 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions, and nearly 200,000 men. Hitler's most elite core troops, the soldiers not only possessed excellent military qualities, but also belonged to the young, strong and experienced group of people between 20 and 30 years old. The 6th Army was the most well-equipped and most heavily armed assault group in the German army, and the discipline and offensive ability of the German army were also unquestionable. In addition, the lack of "instructors" and veterans who are still many veterans of excellent recruits has caused a serious decline in the quality of Germany's follow-up soldiers. In fact, there are only a few elite troops in each country, and the victory of a war depends on these few elite troops, so you can understand why we had to eliminate Zhang Lingfu's integrated 74th Division even at a huge cost in the War of Liberation, and Chiang Kai-shek cried bitterly after knowing that the integrated 74th Division was destroyed. A blow to morale.
In addition, the main reason for the failure of the German defense on the Eastern Front was that it could have concentrated its forces on important points, but was forced to defend a long defensive line. In this way, the initiative in the war is lost forever. I don't think the Soviets can be dragged down by holding on alone, but it is possible to turn the tide if we adopt flexible defensive tactics, shorten the defensive line, and free up troops for an effective counteroffensive.
But Hitler never consulted his commanders on defensive plans and tactics. Hitler always demanded that the German army fight for every inch of territory, and threatened anyone who disobeyed with military punishment. No retreat is possible without his formal approval, not even on a very small scale. For example, when Tiperski succeeded Heinrich in taking command of the Fourth Army, he witnessed the value of flexible defensive tactics and the disastrous consequences of not being able to implement them to the fullest extent. "In March 1944, I commanded the Twelfth Corps, consisting of only three divisions, in Mogilev. The Soviets used 10 divisions on the first day of the offensive, and by the sixth day a total of 20 divisions had been raised. However, they only captured the first line of defense and were blocked in the second line. I took advantage of the temporary break to launch a counteroffensive by taking advantage of the moonlight to regain lost ground in one fell swoop, and our army's losses were relatively light. ”
In 1941, the German army was fully equipped and ready for winter operations, and also had the strength to compete with the Soviet army under such conditions, and a strategic retreat would not dampen morale. Our army has the ability to maneuver operations in winter. This will not only allow us to recuperate, but also allow us to launch a powerful counteroffensive. By 1943, the German army was overstretched on all fronts. tends to be defensive, but cannot be offensive instead of defensive.
The root cause of the defeat of the German army was that Germany often took futile actions, especially unnecessary defense at the wrong time and place, resulting in the loss of troops, all of which were blamed on Hitler. Some of our campaigns have no strategic significance. "If we had adopted mobile and flexible defensive tactics to pin down the enemy, the outcome of the Red Army's offensive after the Battle of Stalingrad at all stages would have been very different," Mandolfil said. I have had many successful uses of this tactic, even against superior opponents. ”
General Dittmar has a broader vision and a more unbiased position, and his views are interesting. As a German military commentator, his wartime radio commentary was surprisingly objective, far exceeding that of any other country's military commentary. What is even more remarkable is that he faces far greater restrictions and dangers to the press than the military commentators of the Western allies. I asked him how he managed to be so outspoken on many occasions. He told me that this was thanks to the leniency of the radio director, Fritsch. All I had to do was get through his censorship before I broadcast it. I sensed that he was deeply disappointed with the Nazi regime, so he was happy to express his true thoughts through the mouths of others. Naturally, there were some protests after the commentary aired, and Fritsch did everything in his power to protect Dietmar. "I always felt the noose around my neck getting tighter and tighter. ”
I asked Dietmar if the Germans could drag down the Soviets if they had adopted flexible defensive tactics. He replied: "I think it is possible, and the advantages of the flexible defensive tactic are obvious, but because of Hitler's opposition, our generals are unable to use this tactic properly. The General Staff is not allowed to give orders to organize the rearguard, and it is not even allowed to discuss the operational plan that should be adopted in the event of a retreat of our troops. Hitler forbade them to prepare any plans for retreat. In 1943, however, the General Staff quietly made some plans, and they distributed carefully worded directives to the units in the form of leaflets, although there was no written indication that these instructions came from the General Staff. ”
I asked Dietmar if the Germans had attempted a strategic retreat before the Soviet offensive in July 1943 and January 1945. He replied, "No." Because Hitler insisted on holding on, each time the end result was a complete breach of the defensive line. Some clever junior officers, despite Hitler's orders to fight for every inch of land at all costs, made some small retreats as far as they could. Some commanders clinged to Hitler's orders, and the result was nothing more than being divided and annihilated. Hitler's stubborn stubborn tactics were to blame for each of the catastrophic consequences. The worst was the Soviet offensive from the Vistula River in January 1945. At the critical moment, reinforcements that had been prepared to go up were transferred to rescue Budapest. "This force consisted of three of the most well-equipped armored divisions.
The bitter lessons of the early days of the war taught the Soviet Union the art of war, and the purpose of every campaign carried out by the Soviet army was very clear, that is, it was necessary to completely encircle and annihilate the enemy, not only to pursue a tactical breakthrough, but also to annihilate the main enemy group in a deep battle. In order to pursue a campaign-level victory, the Soviet army must form a powerful assault force, which can only ruthlessly weaken the forces in the secondary direction, that is to say, the deployment of the Soviet army emphasizes the primary and secondary, and strives for the greatest superiority in forces and weapons in the offensive direction.
Germany, on the other hand, as Dietmar said:
"The desperate tactics have been repeated again and again, and the pattern of the war has deteriorated. The old gap had not yet been filled, and the new gap was frequently urgent, and the passive response to the battle finally led to the destruction of the German army. ”