GF Fund, hit the muzzle of the gun

Just when a number of public funds were inspected by the securities regulatory bureaus in other places, GF Fund took the lead in "self-destructing".

Recently, a resignation letter from a departing employee of GF Fund was widely circulated on the Internet, and the whole content was very vigorous, attributing the reason for his resignation to the "three deadly sins" of the general manager of the department, and bombarding him with "whether it is personal management ability or professional ability or even professional ethics, it is unbearable".

In the face of such accusations, GF Fund has remained silent so far, and what is interesting is that the content of this supervision on-site inspection is very comprehensive, including but not limited to daily business, integrity publicity, training, party and government construction, etc., it is really difficult not to let people "sit in the right seat".

In fact, GF Fund's troubles go far beyond that. In the past two years, its top fund managers have failed one after another, and even made "low-level mistakes" in some investment choices that are difficult for the public to accept, and no reasonable explanation has been given so far.

This giant, with assets under management of more than 1.18 trillion, can no longer load ostriches.

Employees "self-destruct"

The wind of rectifying the workplace has blown into the fund circle, and this resignation letter of thousands of words is mainly aimed at "tearing" department leaders.

In the letter, the employee bluntly stated that the resignation was due to dissatisfaction with the general manager of the department, and according to the employee, the manager had three major problems:

First, professional ability is insufficient

As the general manager of 70% of the public offerings in the management department, he is not clear about the basic concept of the product. The luck component of past results is a little bit greater.

Second, the management ability is insufficient

, less than four regular meetings a year. The departmental assessment is all about personal preferences, not about the results, but about who is more obedient.

Third, the appointment and assessment are very arbitrary.

about

Employees are responsible for the product from start to finish, and take it directly

Take the credit of the employees, and say that the replacement will be replaced.

The full text is full of depressed emotions, and the truth of the matter may not be known, but the real investment level of the general manager of the department is well documented.

Synthesis of the various information disclosed in the resignation letter,

It is almost clear that the general manager of the department is Yang Zhe, the general manager of the fund asset allocation department.

The name Yang Zhe sounds a little unfamiliar, but the "stable happiness" that used to be managed by the Bank of Communications Fund is very out of the circle.

In the 2018 bear market, the product had a high debt content, not only dodging the decline in the stock market, but also recording a positive return of 5.52% during the year.

In June 2021, Yang Zhe resigned from Bank of Communications to join GF and was quickly promoted to general manager of the asset allocation department of GF Fund.

However, after joining GF Fund, Yang Zhe's investment level did not maintain the previous level.

According to the data, Yang Zhe currently manages a total of 9 FOFs, with a total management scale of 5.887 billion yuan, accounting for 71.43% of the total scale, of which 7 products are in a state of loss.

Is it all to blame for the sharp drop in A-shares? Judging from the data, it lacks sufficient convincingness.

Among the 9 products managed by Yang Zhe, 6 have underperformed the benchmark since their establishment.

To put it simply, it does not reach the "passing line", and the active management ability is not as good as the passive index performance.

Among them, 4 products have a maximum drawdown of more than 25%, taking the largest GF Core Preferred Six-Month Holding as an example, in November 2021, Yang Zhe took over the management of the fund, with a total return of -21.05% and a maximum drawdown of 31.24%.

This is even more puzzling, because as mentioned above, Yang Zhe is famous for bond investment, what kind of bond investment strategy can the drawdown exceed 30%?

It is no wonder that the resignation letter said that the luck component of "stable happiness" back then was too large, in other words, the performance of the products that Yang Zhe is now managing may be more representative of his real investment level.

So take stock,

The professional ability of this general manager of the department is indeed somewhat "unacceptable".

Top class "stupid"

If Yang Zhe's performance is that GF Fund has looked away, then GF Fund has looked away a bit more often.

Today, the most famous fund manager of GF Fund is Liu Gexiang, who was once known as the "top stream of 90 billion", who joined GF Fund in 2017 and is currently the general manager of the growth investment department of GF Fund.

Speaking of which, Liu Gexiang's overturn on Guolian shares is somewhat "stupid".

It is said that as early as the fourth quarter of 2020, Liu Gexiang entered Guolian shares with a heavy position, and the two funds under his management were among the top 10 shareholders, and after continuing to increase their positions significantly, by the fourth quarter of 2022, their 5 funds were all heavily invested in Guolian shares, holding a total market value of nearly 4 billion yuan.

Since November 2022, the market's doubts about Guolian shares have slowly struck, and the Shanghai Stock Exchange's inquiry letter to Guolian shares has also caused panic in the market, funds have fled, and the stock price has fallen twice in November and December.

It's just that in the face of continuous falling limits and plummeting stock prices, Liu Gexiang was unmoved and still held high positions.

This is a bit of a "bet".

, the Shanghai Stock Exchange has sent a letter of inquiry, but they are unmoved.

In April 2023, Guolian Co., Ltd. couldn't bear it first, and successively issued performance correction announcements, successively revised and lowered the revenue data for 2020 and 2022 and the forecast revenue data for 2023, which can be regarded as admitting that it has exaggerated and inflated financially.

At this time, something even more unbelievable happened, Liu Gexiang's 3 funds did not fall but increased their positions significantly, increasing by 6.877 million shares to 33.66 million shares.

What kind of operation is it that a top-tier fund manager bucks the trend and increases his position in a listed company that has already admitted financial fraud? Is this the legendary "fund manager knows himself better than a listed company"?

At the end of the year, on December 27, the doubts surrounding Guolian shares ended with the receipt of a warning letter from the Beijing Securities Regulatory Bureau and an investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.

The stock price crashed, falling 23% in 3 days, and the fourth quarter report of Liu Gexiang's fund also disappeared from Guolian shares.

Source: Waiji Decryption

From November 2022 to December 2023, the major financial problems of Guolian shares have come one after another, and the stock price has fallen sharply by nearly 80%, during which there are countless opportunities to sell and stop loss, but Liu Gexiang is unmoved to the end, such a magical operation is really incomprehensible.

It is estimated that

Liu Gesong lost at least 4 billion yuan on Guolian shares, and the 4 billion yuan was real money from the people.

Why are the people willing to choose to invest in funds? Isn't it because they feel that their level is not enough, so they hand over their money to more professional fund managers?

But if the so-called top fund managers in this market can't even see the financial fraud, and even increase their positions in companies with financial fraud, what is the difference between such a top fund manager and a gambler? What is the value of existence?

The original intention of the public fund is to "be entrusted by others and manage money on behalf of others", and the investor's money is lost so inexplicably, and GF Fund should at least give a reasonable explanation.

 Here comes the "butcher".

As soon as the leaves know the autumn, the rout of the GF Fund is comprehensive.

Some media have sorted out the active equity products whose performance has fallen by more than 50% since its establishment, and sorted out a list of "the number and scale of net worth". By the end of 2023,

GF Fund topped the list of "number and scale of net worth halved".

There are 6 products, with a total scale of 18.994 billion.

According to the statistics of the official account "Investment and Wealth Management", judging from the known data, the equity funds under GF Fund will almost be wiped out in 2023.

Last year, it lost 63.745 billion yuan.

According to Wind data, by the end of 2023, GF Fund has a total management scale of 1.18 trillion yuan, ranking fourth among public funds.

Such a strong contrast filled the hearts of the people who had lost many of their lives with resentment.

It is precisely because of this that the on-site inspection of the public offering by the securities regulatory bureau in another place has quickly become the focus of attention of all parties.

This may have a lot to do with Wu Qing, the current chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. He successfully dealt with the risk of brokerage in 2008, severely cracked down on the "rat barn", and was once called the "butcher of the brokerage".

After taking office as chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, Wu Qing continued to maintain a tough style. In response to reporters' questions at the two sessions this year, he said that "strong" and "strict" should be the focus of the next regulatory work.

On March 15, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "Opinions on Strengthening the Supervision of Securities Companies and Public Funds and Accelerating the Construction of First-class Investment Banks and Investment Institutions (Trial)".

Emphasis is placed on strengthening daily supervision, on-site inspections, and law enforcement accountability.

Soon, a number of public fund companies in Beijing, Shanghai and other countries were inspected by local securities regulatory bureaus.

It also requires access to the mobile phones of all core executives and traders, and off-site inspections have become a special feature of this round of supervision in the field.

The former "butcher of the brokerage" wants to move the knife against the fund that has been dissatisfied with the people for a long time, and I have to say that this is really good news.

When the era of great differentiation comes, public opinion is torn apart and information is overflowing. What you lack is not information, but professional judgment and analytical skills.

It's easy to get an idea, but it's not easy to master a methodology on your own.

Our research team painstakingly put together two reports summarizing how to track the key meetings and what to focus on.

Reference:

Jiemian News: A number of public offerings have been inspected by the securities regulatory bureau in different places, and cross-supervision in different places may become the new normal

Liu Gesong of the Guangfa Fund finally lost 4 billion yuan to clear his position after the Guolian shares were filed

Luwang: Wu Qing became the chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and was once known as the "butcher of the brokerage"

Salt pickers: Liu Gexiang and other main cadres "fell off the altar", and GF Fund ranked first in the industry in terms of the number of bases

Blue Whale Finance: Behind the "small composition" turmoil of GF Fund: Sixty percent of FOF performance underperformed the benchmark