David Zhang | The philosopher Immanuel Kant taught you how to get rid of the "love brain" - "the greatest charm of the opposite sex is your imagination"

This article comes from the official account: Fudan New Academic

Reading guide in this issue

Kant argues that both the concept of marriage for the purpose of procreation and the concept of marriage based on love misleads people about the nature of marriage and must be criticized. The first view of marriage is indeed a bit outdated in the eyes of modern people, but the second view of marriage is believed by many young people today, why should it be criticized?

In Kant's view, the love between men and women that people talk about every day, especially the "real infatuated passion" before entering into marriage, belongs to sensual love. The charm of the opposite sex begins with this sensory stimulation, but then it is the image of the opposite sex that has been "transformed" through the lover's own fantasies. Although fantasy can bring happiness, it is ultimately a kind of blind self-deception. In response to this self-deception, Kant bitterly commented that the daily life of "eight days after marriage" is enough for lovers to "regain their sight" and recognize the facts, and in this case, the stronger the "infatuated tendency" of men and women towards each other, the more unbearable the "dissatisfaction" or "pain" at this time. In view of this, Kant believed that taking love as the basis of marriage is tantamount to taking fantasy as the basis of marriage, and that it will eventually be a fate of constant self-disintegration and self-denial. The "sober master of the world" is none other than Kant!

In this tweet, we will elaborate on Kant's ideas one by one, and at the end of the article, we will point out what theoretical lessons these ideas can provide for us to think about modern marriage.

Marriage from the Perspective of Morality——— an Analysis of Kant's Theory of Marriage Based on Human Dignity

■ Author: David Zhang (School of Marxism, East China University of Political Science and Law)

■ Source: Fudan Journal (Social Science Edition), Issue 1, 2024

Kant's doctrine of marriage tends to receive less attention than other important topics in Kant's practical philosophy (e.g., free will, moral law, etc.). This is not so much because it is found difficult to derive useful lessons about marriage from a lifelong philosopher, but rather because Kant's discourse on sexual relations between men and women makes his doctrine of marriage vulgar, which is incompatible with his status as a noble moral philosopher. For example, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant describes "matrimonium" as "the union of two personalities of different sexes in order to possess each other's sexual attributes for life."

Regarding Kant's above views, his contemporary Hegel criticized Kant's view of marriage as one-sided and rude, because he reduced marriage to a "contract" arbitrarily signed by a man and a woman for the purpose of using each other's sexual organs. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács uses the perspective of the critique of capitalism to provide a materialist interpretation of Kant's "rude" view. He points out that Kant's view of marriage as the "possession of each other's sexual attributes" by men and women is merely an expression of the social reality that in capitalist society, the "materialized form" of commodity relations governs any relationship between people, and that as a result of this domination, man sees any of his mental and physical faculties as 'things' that can be "possessed and 'sold'". In contrast to Lukacs's social-critical perspective, the German scholar Emge pointed out from the perspective of psychology that Kant's starting point for his theory of marriage (Ausgangspunkt), such a concept as "sexual relations", is "what is hidden and suppressed" in Kant's inner life.

At first glance, the criticisms of the above-mentioned scholars can be found in some discourses of Kant's theory of marriage to a certain extent. However, if we look at the general ideological background of Kant's theory of marriage and its special research entry point and purpose, these criticisms will expose the drawbacks of one-sidedness or out-of-context. In this article, we will point out that Kant proposed his doctrine of marriage because, in his view, neither of the two conceptions of marriage that was prevalent in his time, the traditional view of marriage for the purpose of procreation, and the new concept of marriage based on love in the eighteenth century, could reveal the "real nature" of marriage as an object of practical philosophy; Kant believed that only by taking the two inherent human natures, sexual desire and human dignity, as the starting point of the study, can the real nature of marriage be clarified: the preservation of human dignity can be made possible without suppressing sexual desire. In addition, Kant rejects the image of the "strict moralist" that is usually imposed on him, further emphasizing that the uniqueness of marriage lies not only in the fact that it makes it possible to preserve human dignity, but also that it provides the necessary means of moral exhortation (i.e., "love", "dedication" and other emotional factors associated with marriage) to encourage people to respect the human dignity of others. The following will elaborate on each of Kant's ideas, and at the end of the article, I will point out what theoretical references these ideas can provide for us to think about modern marriage.

11111111111 11111111111111111111

1. Kant's view of marriage for the purpose of procreation

and a critique of the love-based view of marriage

When Kant conceived his theory of marriage, his theoretical hypothetical enemies were the two most popular views of marriage at the time:

One is the concept of marriage for the purpose of giving birth to offspring, and the other is the concept of marriage based on love. Kant argues that both conceptions of marriage mislead people about the nature of marriage and must be criticized.

First, let's look at the concept of marriage for the purpose of having offspring. This view of marriage has a long historical tradition in the West, dating back to ancient Greece. For example, Aristotle, in The Nicomachean Ethics, pointed out that one of the important purposes of the family community formed by husband and wife before the polis was to "reproduce". It is worth noting that when Kant criticized the concept of marriage for the purpose of procreation, he specifically addressed the definition of marriage proposed by the German natural law scholar Achenwall in his best-selling textbook "Natural Law". According to this definition, marriage is "a group of men and women established for the purpose of bearing and educating children (offspring)".

In response to Achenwal's above-mentioned view of marriage, Kant pointed out in "The Metaphysical Initial Basis of the Theory of Legal Rights" that if marriage is established or exists for the purpose of procreation and raising children (offspring), then marriage will "dissolve on its own" when the task of procreation and parenting is completed or stopped. Kant's argument against Achenwal's conception of marriage, while persuasive, is not new in the history of thought. For Augustine, while acknowledging that childbearing is one of the great benefits of marriage, has specifically stated that marriage "is not merely for the sake of childbearing, but also because natural society itself requires gender differences." Otherwise, it cannot be called a marriage in the case of elderly couples, especially those who have lost children, or who have not had children."

In Kant's critique of the concept of marriage for the birth of offspring, the truly original argument that poses a great challenge to the traditional natural law view of marriage is that he interprets "procreational and childbearing" under the category of "natural purpose" and denies that natural purpose can provide a basis for the existence of marriage. Natural jurists before Kant tended to hold that "childbearing and educating children" was necessarily a purpose given to man by nature, and that this purpose was promoted by marriage. Kant disagreed. With regard to "bearing and educating children", Kant prefers to say that it is "possible" (mag) "always a natural purpose", or a "speculative" (muthmaßlich) natural purpose. The reason why Kant expressed it this way has to do with his epistemological view of the purpose of nature. In his view, the purpose of nature, as an end, has the meaning of intention (Absicht), but this intention is not so much the possession of nature itself, but more precisely the appearance of "intention" through an analogie of the intellect, especially of the human intellect, which is, in the words of the Metaphysics of Morals: " The purpose of nature is understood as the connection between the cause and an effect, in which it is not even necessary to give the cause a reason, which is conceived after all to produce the effect by analogy with such a reason. According to this way of understanding the purpose of nature, the physiological/psychological structure (e.g., fear of death) and behavioural patterns (e.g., "mutual admiration of the sexes" at sexual maturity) as an integral part of nature seem to tend to indicate that nature has deliberately arranged these things for the sake of man's procreation and education. In this regard, Kant argues that man cannot assert on the basis of these phenomena that there is an objective necessity behind these arrangements as a natural purpose for the procreation and education of offspring, because the objective necessity of this relation cannot be found in nature itself; Thus, from Kant's philosophical point of view, any intellectual effort to assert that marriage is an appropriate form for the realization of a natural purpose (to produce offspring) and thereby justify the existence of marriage is based on an arbitrary assertion that lacks epistemological basis.

It is precisely because there is no necessary connection between the birth of offspring and marriage that Kant believed that the birth of offspring could not constitute the real essence of marriage.

Compared with the concept of marriage for the purpose of procreation, Kant wants to criticize another view of marriage, that is, the concept of marriage based on love. Although it does not have a long historical tradition, it is becoming more and more popular in the era in which Kant lived, especially among young men and women. This can be attributed in part to the fact that the employment opportunities provided by modern factories and the service industries that have developed with the development of cities have given not only young men but also young women the opportunity to economically free themselves from the control of the kinship family. Self-reliance undoubtedly provides material security for them to seek inner freedom and pursue a married life based on love.

Kant critiques the love-based view of marriage from a "practical anthropology" perspective. In Practical Anthropology and The Preliminary Results of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides love (Liebe) into three types: Sinnenliebe, Geschmacksliebe, and diemoralische Liebe des Wohlwollens. Kant argues that the latter two kinds of love are related to the form of the object of appreciation itself and the norms of moral agent's behavior, respectively, and should therefore be discussed in the field of aesthetics and morality. On the other hand, he attributes the love between men and women, which is talked about every day, especially the "passion of infatuation in the true sense" before entering into marriage, to the first type of love, that is, sensual love. For in his view, an important characteristic of love between a man and a woman is the sensory/sensory stimulation (Reiz der Sinne): the attraction of the face, voice, posture and even body fragrance of the opposite sex is undoubtedly an important factor in the proximity and even affection of both men and women.

In this regard, Kant further pointed out that although the charm of the opposite sex begins with sensory stimulation, it is the image of the opposite sex that has been "transformed" by the lover's own fantasy (Leidenschaft) that makes the lover truly passionate. It is worth noting that, for Kant, fantasy is similar to the regenerative imagination (reproduktive Einbildungskraft), i.e., both can form a representation of an object that is not present. But there is still a difference between the two: the operation of the regenerative imagination is governed by the "laws of experience, i.e., the laws of association", and thus appears to be an "unbridled" spinner of representation. When it comes to love, this kind of playfulness often causes lovers to "do whatever they want" to give each other some kind of opposite sex attribute that makes them obsessed, and this attribute either does not exist in the other person in reality, or exceeds the actual scale.

In light of this, Kant argues that to see love as the basis of marriage is tantamount to taking fantasy as the basis of marriage, and thus a self-contradictory thing as the basis of marriage. For fantasy, although it can bring "the most mesmerizing pleasure" to lovers, it is ultimately a kind of blind self-deception, and in response to this self-deception, Kant bitterly commented that the daily life of "eight days after marriage" is enough to make lovers "regain their sight" and recognize the facts, and in this case, the stronger the "infatuated tendency" of men and women towards each other, the more unbearable the "dissatisfaction" or "pain" at this time. It can be seen that fantasy in love is not only the "source of happiness", but also the "source of pain".

In order to further reveal the contradictions of love, Kant also started from his theory of "sensual pleasure". According to this theory, any pleasure that comes from the senses is in fact a "lifting emotion" of life, in contrast to pain, which is "an emotion of some kind of disorder" of life. These two emotions often alternate in the state of human health, and in fact it is precisely because of the alternation between them that they are felt by the subject. That is to say, without prior suffering, one cannot perceive the pleasure that follows, and the more intense the prior suffering, the more the happiness that transitions from it will make one feel the "upliftment" of life, and vice versa. Based on this view, Kant believed that if lovers have been living in the sweetness of love, then in the long run, there will also be discomfort. Constant sweetness is the absence of pain, and this lack implies a form of "negative suffering": that is, "boredom", "emptiness in terms of the sensations perceived by the person who is accustomed to the alternation of sensations". Pain is disgusting, but emptiness is sometimes harder to bear. Therefore, lovers who "strive to enrich their desires with feelings" will instinctively feel that "it is better to do something to hurt themselves than to do nothing", and sometimes it may hurt the other person. It is in this context that it is not difficult to understand why Kant commented many times when talking about love: "The end of the pain of love is at the same time the end of love". It can be seen that one of the paradoxes of love is that the person who falls in love wants to seek pleasure in love, but whoever seeks the sweet feeling of love must accept and even seek the pain of love.

It is precisely because of the above contradictions contained in love that Kant believed that if marriage is based only on the subjective feeling of love, then marriage, like its foundation, will inevitably escape a fate of continuous self-disintegration and self-denial. Based on this, Kant denied the possibility of love as the real essence of marriage.

11111111111111

2. The real nature of marriage

It is about preserving human dignity

As stated at the beginning of this article, Kant's purpose in examining marriage is to reveal the real nature of marriage, that is, to reveal what should be attributed to marriage at all times. This way of examining marriage is reminiscent of Plato's way of discussing ideas. For example, in the Republic, when Plato discusses the idea of justice, he does not examine justice in the context of its relationship with other external things, but asks what justice is in itself, or what justice should be in any situation. Although Kant's approach to marriage is similar to Plato's way of discussing ideas, there is an important difference between them, that is, in Kant's quest for the real nature of marriage, it is not to look for some objectively existing idea of marriage outside or above man, but to find the answer in the constant and unchanging nature of man himself. In Kant's view, if there are certain immutable human natures which make the creation and continuation of marriage inevitable, then from these natures can be deduced what the real nature of marriage is.

Is there a human nature, then, that makes the birth and continuation of marriage inevitable? Kant's answer to this question is yes. According to him, these natures are: (1) man's desire for the satisfaction of sexual desires, or "sexual love" in Kant's words;( and 2) respect for one's own human dignity. Let's look at the former first.

Kant believed that the pursuit of the satisfaction of sexual desires, like the cherishing of one's own life, is a kind of "original" nature that is difficult to separate from man. In addition, the satisfaction of sexual desires can bring about the "strongest sensual pleasure" that can be obtained from external objects compared to other sensual desires. Thus, Kant pointed out that without this "original" impulse of desire, men and women would not be close to each other. In this sense, and only in this sense, Kant argues that the first group formed in human society, marriage, "arises by instinct." At the same time, however, Kant emphasized that marriage is not only made possible by sexual desire, because forms of union between a man and a woman, such as extramarital concubinage, can also satisfy sexual desires, in which case marriage is superfluous, and therefore there must be something other than sexual desire that makes marriage necessary. So, what is this other thing? The answer to the question, Kant argues, lies in the further study of sexual desire itself.

In Kant's view, sexual desire, as an animal instinct of human beings, is special compared with other animal instincts of human beings (such as looking for food to satisfy hunger when hungry, drinking water when thirsty, etc.), in that it is not aimed at some external general object (such as vegetables, fruits, springs, etc.), but refers to a special object, that is, the human body. Thus, when men and women satisfy their desires through sexual intercourse, they are in fact simultaneously using their respective bodies as objects or "tools" (Werkzeug) for the pleasure of others, for the pleasure of others, for the sake of sexual desire, or, in Kant's words, "subservience" to external objects. However, Kant believed that man, by his very nature, is not subordinate to any external object, and that no external object has a natural right of "domination" over man to use him purely as a tool or means. Thus, in Kant's view, the use of one's body as a tool for the pleasure of others, driven by sexual desires, is tantamount to doing something that "degrades" (erniedrigt) one's own nature. This "nature" is sometimes referred to as "human nature" and sometimes as "dignity" in different passages of Kant's texts, and although there are subtle differences, the two terms together express in Kant the idea that is inherently embedded in human reason, which Kant, in his characteristic philosophical terms, expresses as follows: man should not be seen as a mere means, but must be regarded as an end, or in Kant's words in the Metaphysics of Morals: " Human nature is a dignity in itself, because man cannot be used by anyone (neither by others nor even by himself) as a mere means, but must at all times be used as an end at the same time, and it is in this his dignity (personality) that he makes himself superior to all other beings in the world who are not human beings, but who may be used, and therefore above all things. ”

With regard to the debasement that the satisfaction of sexual desires may cause to human nature, Kant also emphasized that man's perception of this derogation is not the result of the edification of human civilization, but the result of his nature. Perhaps referring to the research materials on primitive tribes of the time, Kant pointed out that in a society in which culture was barely developed, people, especially women, already felt a kind of "timidity" (Scheu) or "shame" (Scham) because of the possible harm that sexual behavior could cause to "human dignity", and this "shame" continued into the married life of civilized society. This is because even though marriage provides a "justification" for the couple's sexual behavior, the husband and wife still feel the need for a "hidden" kind of words or actions related to the sexual act within the marriage. This need for "concealment" can be used as "sufficient evidence" in Kant's view to prove that it is a shame for man to surrender one's body for others to satisfy sexual desires.

From the above analysis, it is not difficult to find that the two natures of human beings, namely sexual desire and respect for human nature, are in a contradiction. The satisfaction of sexual desires causes an inevitable sense of "shame", and the complete elimination of this shame inevitably inhibits an irrepressible instinct. Is it possible to resolve this contradiction caused by human nature? In Kant's view, the answer to this question depends on the answer to another question: since the satisfaction of sexual desire causes the debasement of human nature, and sexual desire itself cannot be suppressed, the only possibility of resolving the contradiction lies in whether a mechanism can be found to minimize the derogation of human nature. On the latter question, Kant answers in the affirmative, with the following arguments:

Men and women are ashamed of the satisfaction of their sexual desires because they use a part of their body, the sexual organs, as a "tool" or object for the enjoyment of the other for the satisfaction of their sexual desires, and this idea of "tools" arises because men and women see their sexual organs as an object that can be separated from their own unity for other purposes (i.e., the satisfaction of the sexual desires of others). In Kant's view, this kind of "detachment" is impossible in reality, because at all times, any part of the human body and other attributes of the human being (such as the mental state of the person, the concept, etc.) always constitute an "absolute unity", that is, the "Person". From this, Kant further deduced that when men and women use their sexual organs as tools for others to use, they have to some extent inevitably given their full personality to each other, and thus can also be said to be a loss of personality in a sense. Therefore, in Kant's view, solving the problem of shame in the process of satisfying sexual desires is to some extent transformed into how to solve the problem of giving or "losing" personality.

As the German scholar Kirsten pointed out in his famous book The Good Order of Freedom, Kant seems to have referred to Rousseau's idea of "l'aliénation totale" in his "Theory of the Social Contract" in his thinking about solving the above problems. According to Rousseau, when each person transfers "all his rights to the whole collective" and its members, then each person will actually gain the equivalent of everything he has lost, and thus not what he has lost. Similar to Rousseau's idea, Kant pointed out that if, in the course of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, both parties responsibly agree to give each other their full personality, everything they have given to the other, then in this case the personality that each party has given to the other is regained or "reconstructed", because when the other party agrees to cede to himself or herself, he or she actually acquires everything that was previously ceded to the other. So how can this "dialectic of personality transfer and personality regain" be realized?

In Kant's view, marriage is essentially a solution to these problems, because when a man and a woman are formally married and willing to stay together for a long time, they make the following two promises to each other:

First, always be true to each other when it comes to sexuality. This means that the use of the sexual organs is limited to the husband and wife to the exclusion of third parties, and the transfer of the personality continuum connected to the sexual organs is likewise limited to the husband and wife to the exclusion of third parties. In Kant's view, this use of sexual organs, which excludes third parties, and the form of transfer of personality, ensure that the transferor can completely regain his personality. It is for this reason that Kant believed that marriage could not have any other rational form than monogamy.

Second, when the other person is in trouble, whether it is due to sex or other reasons, he has an obligation to help in any way he can. In Kant's view, this second promise is actually an extension of the first. Because when a husband and wife do not appear to each other in the form of a simple tool for satisfying sexual desires, but in the form of a whole personality, and the other person can only rebuild his personality with the help of this personality, then the focus in the life of the couple will not only be the satisfaction of sexual desires, but also health, "happiness" or "destiny", which are closely related to the overall personality of both parties.

In relation to the above promises, Kant also pointed out that if the fulfillment of these promises depends only on a subjective factor (such as love), then the fulfillment or failure will depend on the subjective judgment of the individual, which will ultimately put the whole process of "personality transfer and personality regain" in an extremely unstable state. Based on this, Kant believed that in order for the "transfer of personality and the restoration of personality" to proceed smoothly, the fulfillment of the promise between husband and wife must be based on something objective. On this question, Kant believed that the legal right with the nature of objective restraint is suitable to play this role, because the rights and obligations involved in the legal right are definite, and the basis for their performance is based on the clear agreement of the rights and obligors in advance, rather than the subjective state of mind after the fact. It is in this context that Kant pointed out that marriage must necessarily take the form of a contract with a legal nature, the content of which involves the commitment between the man and the woman mentioned above, and gives the other party an objective legal basis to demand that the other party fulfill the promise in the event that one party fails to fulfill the promise. On this basis of legal rights, Kant also specially conceived a concept of legal rights that was controversial in academic circles, especially in legal circles at that time, that is, the legal right of marriage as a "personal legal right in the form of things" (dasauf dingliche Art persönliche Recht). The reason why this concept of legal power was controversial was that scholars at the time believed that human beings (such as husband and wife) had personality, so legal rights relating to their bodies and related aspects should not appear in the form of things. In fact, Lukacs's critique of Kant, quoted at the beginning of this article, is also aimed at this aspect, that is, Kant sees the human mental or physical faculties as a "thing" that can be "possessed" like a commodity.

These critiques seem to have a basis in Kant's own texts, but they would be biased if they were examined within the overall framework of Kant's theory of the legal rights of marriage. Kant did say in the Metaphysics of Morals: "When a personality is acquired by another personality as an object at the same time, that personality in turn acquires that personality", and in Kant's quote quoted at the beginning of this article, Kant calls marriage "the union of two personalities of different sexes in order to possess each other's sexual attributes for life". However, it is worth noting that Kant also pointed out that only subjects or personalities with free will can enjoy legal rights, while objects cannot enjoy legal rights "over a personality" because they are not subjects and do not have personality. In this regard, the German scholar Ebbinghaus believes that in Kant, husband and wife cannot be regarded as things in principle, and if they really enjoy a kind of reciprocal legal right to each other as Kant conceived, then what does the "form of thing" mean in the "personal legal right in the form of things"? On this issue, the two German scholars, Kirsten and Koenigsi, gave an explanation that is more in line with Kant's text. They believe that the "form of things" here does not refer to the specific treatment of one party to the marriage as things, but refers to a form of legal power similar to the right in rem. There are two main reasons why it is said to be "similar": first, the legal rights enjoyed by husband and wife over each other are similar to property rights and have exclusivity, that is, with the help of this legal right, husband and wife have the right to require all other persons to stop interfering with or infringing on the relevant rights and interests of the parties to the marriage (these rights and interests involve sex life or property, etc.). Second, the use of each other's sexual organs by husband and wife during sexual life, like the use of other objects, must be premised on "possession", but the possession of sexual organs is not actual "possession", nor is it possession in the sense of ownership in rem. Since a person is not an object, it is in principle impossible to be the object of possession or ownership of by others. Based on this, Kant believes that the use of each other's sexual organs by husband and wife is similar to the use in the sense of "usutendi freundi" (right to use the proceeds) in the property right, but the use is not premised on "actual" possession first, but first and foremost on the premise of "intellectual" possession at the level of legal norms;

In addition to the above-mentioned particularity of "form of thing", the "personal legal right" in "personal legal right in the form of thing" also has a unique meaning different from that of personal legal right in general sense. If the personal legal rights in general involve a specific legal payment (for example, in a sales contract, one party requires the other party to perform a specific act at a specific time and place), then the personal legal rights involved in marriage, as the German scholar Konisi put it, focus more on the entire "state" of the will of the husband and wife. This state of affairs does not give rise to a specific, one-time act, but to all the acts agreed upon in the marriage contract (e.g., the duty of fidelity, the duty of mutual support, etc.).

Kant's willingness to defy the great criticism of the academic community and do everything possible to discuss marriage from the perspective of "personal legal rights in the form of things", which he called "a new phenomenon in the legal sky", is of course related to his own view of legal rights. In his view, the object of legal power is the external behavior of human beings and their external freedom, and when marriage involves the use of each other's sexual organs by husband and wife and the restriction of related external behaviors, it naturally becomes the subject of discussion in the doctrine of legal power. However, Kant's legalization of marriage should not be interpreted as Kant's attempt to turn marriage into a "cold" legal contractual relationship, or, in Hegel's words, quoted at the beginning of this article, "to the form of mutual exploitation according to contract". Because, as pointed out above, the legalization of marriage plays only a role in Kant's function, that is, to ensure the complete "transfer and regain" of each other's personality between husband and wife through the legal constraints that are not affected by subjective emotional factors, and to ensure the complete "transfer and regain" of each other's personality between husband and wife, in fact, is to resolve the contradiction between sexual desire and respect for human nature, so as to make "complete human nature" (Menschheit in ihrer) without suppressing sexual desire Integrität). In Kant's view, it is precisely this possibility that reveals the inevitability of marriage and its very nature.

1111111111111111111

3. Moral exhortation in marriage

Kant's moral philosophy is often thought of as a doctrine of "obligation for the sake of obligation", so he is often regarded as a strict moralist. And when Kant pointed out that the real nature of marriage is related to the moral aspect of "human dignity", and has nothing to do with factors such as procreation and love, it seems to reaffirm Kant's image of a strict moralist. Everything seems to be morally related in the end, and only morally. In the case of the image of this harsh moralism, it seems difficult to necessarily associate it with a particular methodology. For if we compare Kant's theory of marriage with Fichte's theory of marriage, we will find that Fichte, in examining the nature of marriage, although similar to Kant, also studied marriage from the point of view of sexual desire and human dignity, or in Fichte's terminology "morality", two inherent human natures, and then regarded marriage as "a relationship which must be completely regulated by the unity of nature and reason". But Fichte does not seem to be as "harsh" as Kant, because Fichte, while emphasizing the moral dimension of marriage, does not absolutely oppose love and morality, thus excluding love from the essential prescriptiveness of marriage. In Fichte's view, love is not a mere subjective feeling, but "the only link between nature and reason", because love makes people give themselves for the sake of others, which is similar to the moral law that requires that "people should forget themselves for the sake of others". Based on this, Fichte argued that marriage must also be "based on obedience out of love."

Fichte's view of love and its relationship to marriage is clearly different from Kant's. As analyzed in the first part of this article, Kant sees love between a man and a woman as an unstable and contradictory emotion that begins with sensory stimulation and is later transformed by fantasy, and therefore cannot be the basis of marriage. Moreover, in Kant's view, even if love has the kind of "selflessness" that Fichte pointed out, this "selflessness" has nothing to do with the moral law, because what the moral law requires is an obligation that can be clearly recognized by reason, while the "self-forgetfulness" of love is often based on a vague, even a sense of self-deception without self-awareness.

From Kant's above views on the relationship between love and marriage, it should not be hastily concluded that Kant seems to be more in line with the image of a strict moralist than Fichte. For it is worth noting that Kant himself was opposed to strict moral doctrines or moral practices. In Practical Anthropology, for example, he criticizes the strict "purist" virtue advocated by the Cynics, or the "virtue" of "mutilating the body" advocated by the hermits. Kant argues that they are all disgusting "distorted images of virtue" that are detached from "humanity" ("humanity"), and that virtue itself becomes problematic when so-called virtue is contrary to humanity or, in Kant's figurative terms, when virtue is "abandoned by the three goddesses of beauty". It is in this context that Kant discusses extensively in Practical Anthropology the things that make marriage seem "seductive", such as love, civilized and decent married life, and so on, which seems to be in stark contrast to his serious discussion of the nature of marriage and the dignity of human nature in The Metaphysics of Morals.

Kant's dual treatment of marriage should not be seen superficially and simply as a compromise or compromise with the mediocre doctrine of marriage, but rather as a theoretical extension of his profound moral doctrine: although the essence of morality has nothing to do with sensual desires, but only with a priori predicate imperatives, even though becoming a "morally good man" depends on "a revolution in the mind" But man is after all fragile in the determination of his will, and is susceptible to the temptation of sensual desires, so that it is often difficult to launch a revolution of ideas, and even if it is initiated, the fruits of the revolution are difficult to sustain under the constant attack of the "principles of evil." It is for this reason that Kant argues that before human reason is not strong enough to guide human behavior alone and continuously, it is necessary to mobilize the "motive of physiological (sensual) stimuli" as a "temporary substitute for reason to cause excitement" and finally to bring about the formation and maintenance of the revolution of ideas. In Kant's entire system of practical philosophy, these contributing factors include not only the deterrence and coercion of legal power, the drive of "devilish" "selfish preferences", and the support of the ethical community, but also factors such as marriage. Moreover, among these contributing factors, marriage occupies a unique place.

Marriage is unique because, in Kant's view, the sexual, love and other factors involved in marriage exert an earlier and more direct influence on people than other contributing factors. Sex, for example, exerts its influence on people in an instinctive and impulsive way before the establishment of the political community and the formation of abstract ideas of interests. Moreover, sex, as a human nature, differs from the nature of self-preservation in that the latter is "concerned with itself" and thus sees all external things as mere means to the end of self-preservation, in the sense that Kant considers the nature of self-preservation to be "cruel". On the other hand, although "sex" is also originally aimed at the satisfaction of one's own desires, the realization of its purpose involves another subject, so it cannot be expressed as pure "selfishness", but vaguely involves a "sense of public welfare" (gemeinnützige empfindung) based on instinct and not on the upbringing of the political community. This feeling, combined with the purpose of sexual gratification, prompts one to learn to break free from one's own narrowness and to focus on others in a less obnoxious way.

On the other hand, it is the love associated with marriage that fights against the narrowness of the ego. As mentioned earlier, in the sense that love is a volatile, self-contradictory subjective feeling, Kant believes that it cannot be the basis of marriage. However, Kant did not deny the full value of love. In his view, the true value of love lies not in the fact that it can provide a short-term happiness, but in the fact that it can provide an opportunity for moral cultivation. To illustrate this point, Kant exemplified the rejection of a man in love, a scene that occurs from time to time in love.

When a woman is pursued by a man, it is easy to show a tendency to "refuse" at first. Kant argues that this rejection seems to be an instinct of women, who fear that they will quickly lose their "charm" and the "influence" that comes from agreeing to the other person's pursuit immediately. In this regard, Kant points out that while this rejection is annoying to the active pursuer, the wisdom of nature seems to be manifested in the fact that by means of this rejection "charms are respected, flattered [praised], and courtesy", and that this respect, compliment, and courtesy is in fact an important step towards moral edification, because they liberate man from the direct gratification of his own desires, such as "carnal love", and gradually learn to wait, respect, and treat the other in a "courteous" way. In this sense, Kant refers to this rejection as a "refusal of feminine, virtuous character" (Die buhlerische und die tugendhafte Weigerung).

In addition to the "rejection of virtue", Kant also discusses the "devotion" between husband and wife in marriage, the "magnanimity" of the husband to his wife, and the sexual "faithfulness" of the husband and wife in relation to each other. It is worth noting that Kant made it clear in his discussion of these topics that they may sometimes not only have nothing to do with virtue, but may even be contrary to "virtue", because in a sense they may not be the true expression of the heart, but only an "illusion" or even (unconscious) deception created by the man and the woman to each other: just as a woman's "rejection" of a man's show of affection may be motivated by some strategic necessity rather than a genuine rejection, so the man's courtesy, Politeness and magnanimity may also be a disguise for other, more insidious purposes, and the long-term sexual fidelity of husband and wife to each other is sometimes motivated not so much by scruples about each other's feelings as by cherishing the "reputation" of the individual or family.

Faced with these differences between the inner intentions of husband and wife and the outward behavior, Kant did not criticize them as a strict moralist, but on the contrary, he dealt with them quite leniently and wisely from the perspective of moral cultivation. Kant argues that while these differences appear to be in the form of a kind of mutual "deception" between men and women, they actually "deceive" brutal desires behind the subjective intentions of men and women. In the case of sexual fidelity between husband and wife, it is said that, while long-term fidelity may be motivated by a passion, the love of honor, this passion indirectly inhibits the individual's brutal tendency to satisfy his own sexual desires without restraint, thus preventing the other from being seen as a mere tool for his own ends. Kant argues that until reason is strong enough, in order to restrain brutal desires and prevent people from treating others as tools, obnoxious "violence" (Gewalt) such as the "mutilated flesh of the hermit" is powerless and must therefore rely on seductive "illusions of goodwill" or deception. In this regard, Kant profoundly observed: "Illusion sets limits on the boorish desires that [men and women] improve themselves and others by deceiving each other (hintergehen)."

It is on the basis of these considerations that Kant called love, courtesy, and other modes of life that come with marriage "moral cloaks" or "moral preparation and exhortation." These preparations and exhortations, while not morality per se, nor a substitute for the final, revolutionary decision of the individual, seem to be analogous to Plato's "ladder" of love in Diotima (Διοτιμα). Because they exhort people in an acceptable way, gradually elevate from sexual love to a love of good manners, and finally on this basis inspire men and women to look at each other in a non-instrumental way, to pay attention to each other's moral character and human dignity. In Kant's view, this concern for moral personality and human dignity is also a form of love, which Kant called "Menschenliebe", which transcends sensual factors such as "gender" and "age", and is embodied in "love for friendliness, affection, promoting the happiness of others and rejoicing in the happiness of others".

11111111111111 1111111111111111111

IV. Aftermath: The Contemporary Enlightenment of Kant's Doctrine of Marriage

In today's society, both in the West and in the East, it is a social phenomenon that is obvious to all, that marriage, especially monogamous marriage, which is the mainstream form of marriage, is in serious crisis. On the one hand, the crisis is manifested in the increasing divorce rate in both metropolises and relatively conservative rural areas, which are prone to avant-garde culture shock, and on the other hand, it is manifested in the gradual acceptance of non-mainstream forms of marriage, such as contractual cohabitation, homosexual marriage, open marriage, and even non-marriage, which have a tendency to reshape the mainstream concept of marriage. It is undeniable that the modern marriage revolution is undoubtedly more satisfying to the individual's individual needs to some extent, but it also makes the marriage relationship arbitrary and fragile. In this regard, the American marriage expert Coutts once pointed out sharply: "The marriage revolution awakens personal turmoil. But we can't turn back the clock in our personal lives, just as we can't go back to petty agriculture and crafts in our economic lives. Since we cannot go backwards, we can only move forward, and on the way forward, Kant's theory of marriage may provide us with the following three points of guidance or enlightenment:

First, the primary concern of marriage is always the individual himself. In the long history of human marriage, marriage has been entrusted with various functions related to politics, society, religion, etc., and in these functions, the individual itself has been neglected to varying degrees: in ancient Greece, marriage became "sacred" because it helped to maintain the prosperity of the city-state, and in the Middle Ages, marriage was given a kind of "sacrament" because it involved the embodiment of the relationship between Christ and the church In the modern era of natural law, marriage gradually sheds its theological cloak but then sets itself an external natural purpose, while Hegel, in his philosophy of law, begins to focus on the subjective freedom of the modern individual, but in his philosophy of law, marriage or the family is ultimately incorporated as a link into a supposedly more perfect political and ethical life. In contrast to these ideas, Kant firmly pointed out that in order to understand marriage, it is necessary to "suspend" all "ideologies" about marriage, and to interpret marriage from the point of view of the real subject of marriage, that is, the individual, on the basis of understanding and respecting the individual and his nature, and only in this way can it be possible to understand what marriage is, what we should do in it, and what we can expect from it.

Second, while the individual occupies a central position in marriage, it should not be the product of the self-willed decisions of the individual. In today's society, some non-mainstream forms of marriage, such as gay marriage and open marriage, often seek to defend the inviolability of individual freedom. This defense seems to be theoretically supported by Kant's idea of individual autonomy. However, it is worth noting that while Kant emphasized individual autonomy, he also advocated that this autonomy should be based on respect for personality, respect for human dignity, and observance of moral laws, so it is not a kind of capricious or empty autonomy or freedom. In Kant's view, mere autonomy for the sake of autonomy and freedom for the sake of freedom is contrary to the rational principle of the individual, because, as the above analysis of love has illustrated, a seemingly autonomous decision in love may actually be based on a kind of self-contradiction and even self-deception. Therefore, when examining or trying to justify a new form of marriage, one should not stop at the empty argument of autonomy or freedom, but should start from a deeper ground, such as Kant's "human dignity" and its exhortation or cultivation, to explore the rationality and legitimacy of the new form of marriage.

Third, marriage needs to be guaranteed by legal norms, and legal norms need to be guided by moral norms such as respect for personality and human dignity. In today's legal theories and judicial practice in Western countries and in mainland China, the generally accepted view is that the adjustment and intervention of the law in the marital relationship provides an objective guarantee for the realization of the rights of both spouses and promotes the stability of the marriage; contrary to this generally accepted view, there is a controversial point that when determining the specific scope and extent of the protection of the personality rights and interests of spouses in the marriage law, people should consider what kind of moral norms or ethical norms should be taken into account, and to what extent they should be taken seriously. The reason for this controversy is that the legal personality involved in the Marriage Law is not a general legal personality (Person), but a legal personality with a certain identity (i.e., spouse) relationship; it is precisely in view of this particularity that it is impossible for the legal norms involving marriage not to have a special ethical or moral color, but this ethical or moral color may contradict the formal equality and "value-neutral position" advocated by the law itself. Therefore, how to find a universally acceptable balance between the requirements of formal equality in law and the unavoidable moral and ethical requirements has become a difficult problem in the theoretical research and judicial practice of marriage law. In this difficult question, Kant's theory of marriage and its related doctrine of legal rights provide useful implications: the concept of legal rights, which emphasizes formal equality, does not necessarily contradict moral or ethical norms. Because if moral or ethical norms meet the universal requirements of reason, such as not devaluing personality in the moral sense, or respecting human dignity, then moral or ethical norms can not only be related to the formal concept of legal rights in terms of the foundation of norms, but also play a guiding or guiding role in the process of positivizing the formal concept of legal rights. In Kant's view, this kind of guidance is not affirmative, but negative, that is, the specific provisions of legal power (including marriage legal rights) cannot violate the ultimate value of legal power, that is, the fundamental moral requirement of respecting personality and human dignity.

(For the full text and references, see Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), Issue 1, 2024, pp. 154-165, and the tweet in this issue is an excerpt with slight deletion and editing)