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In February 1951, an unusually fierce battle broke out on the Korean battlefield, which made the US military reluctant to mention it again.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the volunteers used tenacious will and exquisite tactics to suppress the American army, and after three battles, both sides suffered damage to each other and began to accumulate strength.
After careful consideration, Peng Dehuai determined the timing of the battle, and a battle that the United States did not want to mention again began.
So, how did this battle break out, and what was the final outcome of the battle?
Fourth Campaign
At the beginning of 1951, the Volunteer Army launched the third campaign on the Korean battlefield and subsequently occupied Seoul.
However, compared with the U.S. Army, the Volunteer Army was relatively poor in mobility, and with the suppression of the U.S. Army's air power, our supply lines were seriously controlled, so after the end of the third campaign, our army chose to retreat.
Because the U.S. military could not predict the movements of our army, and did not know the subsequent combat goals of our army, they did not rush to pursue, and at this time, the U.S. military was also arguing over the issue of whether to stay or not, and both sides ushered in a temporary respite.
Although the combat effectiveness of our army in the Korean War was strong, it was indeed much inferior to the US army in terms of hardware, especially after three battles, the personnel losses were very large, and we needed new soldiers to replenish them.
How to enable the second batch of soldiers to smoothly enter the Korean War and replenish the strength of the front line has also become a key issue.
Therefore, after a period of recuperation, the Fourth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea broke out.
It was also in the fourth battle that there was a much-talked-about battle, the Hengcheng counterattack, which can be called a textbook interspersed with roundabout operations.
On January 25, 1951, under the command of Li Weiqi, the United Nations forces began to suppress the Volunteers from the east and west fronts, intending to press the Volunteers back to the north of the 38th parallel.
In the face of the menacing United Nations Army, our army quickly made a relevant strategy, that is, "the west tops the east and the east is opposed".
In the area south of the Han River on the western front, it resisted the offensive of the United Nations forces, insisted on defense, and dragged the large forces of the United Nations forces to attack.
In the eastern front, they chose to lure the enemy deep and seize the opportunity to counterattack the United Nations forces, and in this way, besiege the main forces of the United Nations forces on the western front from the flanks and force them to retreat.
After the strategy is formulated, although the general policy will not change, the specific situation will depend on the changes on the battlefield.
Just when the Western Front was vigorously suppressed by the American army and the defense was extremely difficult, an opportunity to solve the United Nations forces quietly appeared.
It turned out that because on the western front, after we resisted the United Nations army to the death, the United Nations army on the eastern front saw that the volunteers were relatively weak on the eastern front, and carried out a large number of troop build-up in the two areas of Hengcheng and Topingli.
These two areas have actually rushed into the line of defense of our army, and judging from the battlefield map, these two parts seem to be protruding, and there is a certain detachment from the rear of the United Nations army, and such a prominent triangular part is easily attacked by three sides.
If we can eat the United Nations troops in these two places, it will not only greatly relieve the pressure on our army, but also quickly seize the opportunity to let the second batch of volunteers who have entered the DPRK come to the front line smoothly.
But the strength of our army can only eat one of them at this time, so why did Mr. Peng choose the United Nations Army in the Hengcheng area at that time? After choosing this direction, how did we completely eat it?
The battle of annihilation of Hengcheng
During the fourth battle of the Korean War, our army had a fierce confrontation with the United Nations forces, which made the US military reluctant to mention it again.
In 1951, when the fourth battle of the Korean War broke out, our army set the strategic policy of "countering the west to the east", and after the battle began, it found a very good opportunity to counterattack the United Nations forces.
At this time, the United Nations forces were massing in two areas of the Eastern Front, which had already entered our defensive lines, so if they could eat one of them, it would be very helpful for our army's follow-up battles.
So, how did Mr. Peng make his choice at that time, and how did this battle go?
After carefully studying the two places in Hengcheng and Topingli, Mr. Peng made a decision to eat the United Nations army in Hengcheng.
The core reason for making this choice is that although the United Nations forces assembled in Hoengseong are more numerically than those in Topyeong-ri, they are all South Korean troops at the front, and their combat effectiveness is not comparable to that of the US military.
In addition, the United Nations forces in Hengcheng are in a state of motion, not completely stable, and have more protruding areas than Tohei-ri, which is more likely to be flanked, which is a good thing for us, and it is relatively easy to eat them.
Moreover, if we can eat this part of the United Nations army, our army can expand to the southern front, and if we can't eat it and the battle is lost, we can also control the Hongchuan area, which will be very helpful for the subsequent battle.
Of course, although in the process of consideration, Mr. Peng did not win the first defeat, but in fact, in terms of the strength of our army, the probability of the Hengcheng area being annihilated by us is quite large.
On February 9, 1951, our army had already begun to assemble, and Deng Hua asked all the 40th and 66th armies, the main force of the 42nd army and one division of the 39th army, a total of 9 divisions, to concentrate on the United Nations forces in the Hengcheng area.
The strength of the United Nations forces in the Hoengseong area includes one division of South Korea and one regiment of the US army, and our army actually has a certain advantage in combat strength.
Our task is to annihilate all these UN forces in the fastest possible time, without giving the enemy time to react.
On 11 February, our troops were approaching the Hoengseong area and were ready for battle within a radius of about 33 kilometers from east to west.
In order to catch the opponent by surprise, we first launched a fire rush on the opponent, and then launched an offensive.
The rapid attack of fire caused the opponent to fall into a certain amount of confusion, and under Deng Hua's arrangement, two regiments were suppressed head-on, and one regiment was interspersed with the enemy's rear position, smoothly dividing the enemy team.
The U.S. military has never seen such a way of fighting, so as soon as the battle began, the United Nations forces fell into the tactics of our army.
At that time, the 40th Army had been circulating such a slip of the tongue: 18 hits, 19 looks, and 120 circles around the regiment, which is the truest portrayal of this battle.
And the other teams were not idle at the moment, and after the ranks of the United Nations forces were divided, our team carried out a total encirclement of the United Nations forces.
The terrain of the Korean region is mainly woodland, so if our encirclement is too loose, it is very easy to be breached or missed, so we must tighten the encirclement.
So, after the battlefield was divided, how did we contain the enemy army, and how did this battle affect the subsequent Korean War?
Get the win
During the fourth battle of the Korean War, our army planned to encircle and suppress the United Nations forces assembled in Hengcheng, and the first battle made the American army completely frightened.
After the outbreak of the Hengcheng counterattack, our army's tactics caught the opponent by surprise, and the United Nations forces were quickly divided by us, but it was not a simple matter to annihilate them all.
Because of the terrain, if our encirclement is not tight enough, it is possible for the other side to complete the breakthrough.
So, how did we annihilate these enemies after the division of the battlefield was over, and what impact did this battle have on the Korean battlefield?
After the division of the United Nations forces by us, the 42nd Army of the Volunteer Army has already besieged the designated position.
In the early morning of February 12, after annihilating a company and a battalion of the enemy, the 42nd Army captured Shangwu Anli and Shizidong, and successfully joined the 118th Division of the 40th Army.
After the two armies completed the convergence, we completely cut off the 8th Division of the South Korean Army from Hoengseong.
The other 39th Army's 117th Division chose to go into battle lightly, marched 30 kilometers in a short period of time, and arrived at the predetermined location ahead of schedule, directly blocking the rear road of the South Korean 8th Division, and also resisting the road where Hoengseong came to support the team, so that the South Korean 8th Division was completely controlled by us.
After basically completing the task of comprehensively dividing the enemy's forces, we also carried out the method of division and encirclement when we annihilated, focusing on attacking the local artillery, so that the enemy's infantry would lose heavy fire support and would not be our opponent at all.
In the early morning of February 13, the curtain came down on the city, and the results of the battle were very gratifying, after statistics, our army successfully annihilated more than 12,000 enemies, and captured 7 tanks, more than 500 cars, artillery, guns, etc. in the battle.
After the victory, we also fought back against Tohei-ri, but this time the battle was not as smooth as that of Yokojo, and the number of UN troops in Tohei-ri was more than expected, reaching more than 6,000 men.
In addition, the fortifications here are also quite well constructed, so although we managed to press the enemy to a narrow area of 2 square kilometers for annihilation, the opponent's resistance was very strong and the annihilation operation was not completed in time.
At this time, the local reinforcements had already felt that we had lost the opportunity to annihilate and retreated, and the counterattack and encirclement work in Tohei-ri was not completed.
However, because the goal of the Hengcheng counterattack has been completed, so for our army, the initial goal has been achieved, although the battle of Toping-ri was not smooth, but it still helped the defending team on the Western Front a lot, and also made the United Nations Army unable to harass us anymore, and the second batch of volunteers successfully entered the DPRK, supplementing the lack of combat power on the front line.
The Battle of Hoengseong brought tremendous pressure to both the U.S. Army and the South Korean Army, especially the South Korean Army, and some of the surviving soldiers once developed a fear of the Volunteer Army.
During the battle, many South Korean troops were frightened and retreated directly when they saw the appearance of our army, and we became the heavenly soldiers and generals in their hearts.
The Hengcheng counterattack became a nightmare for the United Nations Army, because during this combat period, the U.S. troops were beaten and had no power to fight back, so this battle was not mentioned much, and it was not famous.
However, the tactics and strategies of the Hengcheng counterattack have always been talked about by everyone, and they can be called a textbook interspersed with roundabout operations!
This article was originally written by "Insight History", and has been opened for rights protection on the whole network, and may not be reprinted without authorization, and infringement must be investigated.
Resources:
The Fourth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea
"Hengcheng Counterattack: A Textbook Interspersed with Roundabout Operations"