What is Wisdom?
There are five general ways of understanding wisdom in the philosophical tradition: (1) wisdom as epistemological humility,
(2) wisdom as epistemological accuracy,
(3) wisdom as knowledge,
(4) the mixed theory of wisdom,
(5) Wisdom as reason.
(2) Wisdom as the knowledge of accuracy
Socrates can be interpreted as providing an intellectual theory of epistemological accuracy rather than epistemological humility.
Poets, politicians, and craftsmen all believed that they possessed knowledge of topics that they were rather ignorant about.
One might say that when Socrates believed that he had knowledge, he only had it when he did.
Perhaps the self-confidence of intelligent people is limited to propositions that they possess knowledge, or propositions that they have good reason.
Perhaps, Socrates is best interpreted as holding such a theory of epistemic accuracy.
Epistemic Accuracy Theory 1: S is wise if, (if S knows p, then S believes that S knows p.) ）
According to (Theory of Cognitive Accuracy 1), a wise person is accurate about what she knows and what she doesn't know.
If she really knows p, she believes she knows p; If she believes she knows p, then she really knows p.
(Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 1) is consistent with Socrates' view that he is a wise man, and with Socrates that he did possess some knowledge.
(Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 1) is a plausible explanation for the view endorsed by Socrates, but it is not a plausible answer when seeking an understanding of wisdom.
Wise people can make mistakes about their knowledge.
Socrates, Maimonides, King Solomon, Einstein, Goethe, and every candidate for wisdom had false beliefs about what they knew and what they didn't know.
It is not difficult to imagine that a wise man has reason to believe that he has knowledge of certain claims, and it is not difficult to imagine that he may be proven wrong, perhaps long after his death.
If (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 1) is true, then one is not a wise person simply because one believes that he has knowledge when in reality he does not.
This seems wrong. It's hard to imagine that if (Theory of Cognitive Accuracy 1) is true, then anyone is or has ever been wise.
We can modify the theory of epistemic precision to solve this problem.
We can simply ask that the wise man is highly justified in his belief that he has knowledge.
In this way, people with bad luck in epistemology can get away with it.
Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2 : If for all p, (if S's belief in p is highly plausible, then S believes that S knows p), then S is the wise man.
(Epistemic Accuracy Theory 2) solves the problem of (Epistemic Accuracy Theory 1).
The Socratic method challenges people to make a case for their own views. When Socrates' interlocutor is asked speechless or falls into absurdity, Socrates gives his reasons.
One might say that by asking questions, Socrates did not reveal the adversary's lack of knowledge because their beliefs were wrong, but proved that the adversary had no reason to insist on the point they claimed to know.
Since none of the craftsmen, poets, and statesmen questioned by Socrates passed his questioning, one might say that they were shown to have knowledge and that their beliefs were even illegitimate.
Many philosophers are hesitant to interpret this in the Defense.
They would argue that a person's failure to defend his convictions under Socratic questioning does not mean that he has no reason to believe a proposition.
Many philosophers would say that having good evidence, or forming a belief through a reliable process, is enough to justify it.
Proving or showing the interrogator that a person is justified is another matter, not a sine qua non for being justified.
One might say that Socrates simply showed that craftsmen, poets, and politicians could not defend themselves in the face of his problems.
One might say that he did not illustrate that the beliefs of poets, politicians and craftsmen were unreasonable.
Since we know very little about the details of this conversation, it would be unfair to dismiss this interpretation on this ground.
Perhaps Socrates, through his fierce questioning, did show that craftsmen, poets, and politicians formed and maintained their own beliefs without sufficient evidence, or through an unreliable process of belief formation.
Socrates simply reported that they did not know everything they claimed to know.
Since we are not able to witness a real interrogation as we do in Plato's other dialogues, we should not reject (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2) as an explanation of Socrates' view of wisdom in the Apology.
Whether or not (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2) is Socrates' view, as an explanation of the meaning of "wisdom" is problematic.
Even if (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2) is exactly what Socrates meant, some philosophers would argue that a person may have reason to believe a proposition but not realize that he is justified.
If this is a situation that a wise person might encounter, then she may be justified but does not believe that she has knowledge.
If this is not possible, then this criticism can be avoided. There is no need to address this issue here, because (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 1) and (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2) would fall into another, much more philosophically thorny and controversial issue.
(Epistemic Accuracy Theory 1) and (Epistemic Accuracy Theory 2) have a similar, very serious problem.
Imagine that a person has very little knowledge. Suppose then what he knows is little or nothing important.
He may be the kind of person that no one will turn to him for information or advice.
Such people can be very cautious and think that they only know what they actually know.
Although he has an accurate understanding of what he knows and what he does not know, he is not wise.
This shows that (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 1) is flawed. As for (Theory of Epistemic Accuracy 2), imagine that he believes that he only knows what he has reason to believe.
He is still not a wise man. While the theory of accuracy does not adequately account for wisdom, it reveals an important point.
Perhaps a necessary condition for wisdom is that wise people believe that they possess knowledge only if their beliefs are highly reasonable.
Or, to put it more simply, perhaps the wise possess epistemically sound or rational beliefs.