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"Mao Xuan" (Volume I) The Long March of the Great Strategic Shift of the Central Red Army

author:Yang Gu reads the classics

Is today's article related to "Mao Xuan", of course, it has something to do with it.

But how much does it matter?

Let's put it this way.

Just like the chairman said: the Long March is a manifesto, the Long March is a propaganda team, and the Long March is a seeder.

Manifesto: It symbolizes the firm revolutionary conviction of the Red Army and is a revolutionary manifesto

Propaganda Team: Along the way, the ideology of the Communist Party was propagated to the broad masses of the people

Sower: It is precisely because it is a propaganda team that the masses become the seeds of revolution

The great strategic shift of the Central Red Army was a turning point in the Chinese revolution, shattering the illusion of the Kuomintang reactionaries trying to destroy the Red Army and preserving the basic strength of the Red Army.

Therefore, although the Chairman of the Central Red Army did not select articles for inclusion in his "Anthology" during the Long March of the Central Red Army from October 1934 to October 1935 in the "Selected Works", one cannot ignore this period of history.

"Mao Xuan" (Volume I) The Long March of the Great Strategic Shift of the Central Red Army

Figure 1

Break through the four blockades and fight bloody battles on the Xiangjiang River

The great strategic shift of the Central Red Army was strictly confidential.

Although the Kuomintang troops arranged four blockades, they did not know in which direction the Red Army broke through, and the troops deployed on the first blockade in the southwest of the Central Soviet Region were not strong.

On the night of October 21, 1934, the Red First Army broke through between Wang Mudu in Gan County and Xintian in Xinfeng County.

On October 25, all passed through the first blockade line set up by the Kuomintang army.

In early November, the Central Red Army successfully passed through the second blockade in southern Shonan.

In mid-November, the third blockade line was crossed in southern Shonan and entered the Xiaoshui and Xiangshui areas.

After Chiang Kai-shek judged the Red Army's intention to advance westward, he immediately deployed "chasing and suppressing" and intercepting it, in an attempt to "annihilate the Red Army in the area east of the Xiangjiang River and Lishui."

On November 25, the Red Army decided that the Red Army would rush to cross the Xiangjiang River from Quanzhou and Xing'an in Guangxi, which was the fourth blockade line of the Kuomintang troops.

On November 27, the vanguard of the Red Army successfully took control of the crossing. However, because the team carried too much weight and moved too slowly, before the large army could cross the river, it was pinched by the superior enemy forces that had just arrived.

At this point, the main force of the Central Red Army broke through the blockade of the Xiangjiang River and jumped out of the encirclement, making Chiang Kai-shek's plan to destroy the Red Army on the east bank of the Xiangjiang River fail, but the Red Army itself paid a heavy price, from more than 86,000 at the time of departure to more than 30,000.

"Mao Xuan" (Volume I) The Long March of the Great Strategic Shift of the Central Red Army

Zunyi Conference

After the Battle of Xiangjiang, the Red Army suffered heavy losses, and the commanders and fighters began to think about the defeats several times since the five anti-five 'encirclement and suppression', and the Red Army was even forced to leave the Central Soviet Region, and now it is almost on the verge of desperation.

Judging from the results of the four anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, the vast number of cadres realized one after another that this was caused by rejecting the correct line represented by Chairman Mao and carrying out the wrong line, and there was a marked increase in suspicion, dissatisfaction, and a positive demand for a change of leadership among the troops.

This sentiment, with the increasing loss of our army, reached its peak after the Battle of Xiangjiang.

At this critical juncture, Chairman Mao proposed to the Politburo that the troops should abandon their original plan, change their strategic direction, and immediately turn west to Guizhou, where the enemy's strength was weak. (The original plan was to join the Red Second and Sixth Armies to the north, Figure 1)

At this time, Bogu and Li De were already dejected by the defeat of the Xiangjiang River, and the command task of the Red Army had been transferred to Premier Zhou.

The Prime Minister endorsed the Chairman's idea.

Later, from intercepted enemy intelligence, it was learned that in order to prevent the Central Red Army's plan to meet with the Second and Sixth Armies of the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek gathered six times the strength of the Red Army, built four defensive pillbox lines, and waited for the net.

Huagesi commanded the Central Red Army to win the initiative, which not only completely disrupted the original deployment of the Kuomintang troops, but also won successive battles, and the appearance of the troops was completely new.

At this time, the morale of the Red Army was extremely high, and the clothes were neat.

The troops wore new uniforms.

The fatigue state in Shonan has been swept away.

On January 6, 1935, the Central Red Army crossed the Wujiang River and advanced towards the Qianbei region centered on Zunyi.

Zunyi, bordered by Loushan Mountain in the north and Wujiang River in the south, is the political, economic and cultural center of northern Qianbei.

After the Central Red Army broke through the Wujiang River, it liberated the important town of Qianbei on January 7.

Chiang Kai-shek received a reconnaissance report from the Air Force that the direction of the Red Army was unknown after entering the Zunyi area, which objectively provided conditions for the rest of the Central Red Army.

At this time, Comrades Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian informed Comrade Bogu that he would make a summary report on the fifth anti-'encirclement and suppression' at the meeting and inform Premier Zhou to prepare a deputy report on military issues.

From January 15 to 17, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was held at the General Headquarters of the Red Army in Zunyi City.

Members of the Politburo included Bogu, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Chen Yun; alternate members of the Politburo were Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, and Kaifeng; responsible persons of the Red Army Headquarters and various corps included Liu Bocheng, Li Fuchun, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Peng Dehuai, Yang Shangkun, and Li Zhuoran; Deng Xiaoping, secretary general of the Central Committee; Li De, military adviser, and Wu Xiuquan, an interpreter; and 20 people attended the meeting as observers. (Most of these twenty people are not very familiar to everyone)

The meeting was chaired by Bogu and made a summary report on the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

Bogu made some reviews of military command errors, but mainly emphasized various objective reasons.

Premier Zhou made a deputy report, pointing out that the main reason for the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign was the mistakes of the military leadership, and he took the initiative to assume responsibility.

Subsequently, Zhang Wentian made a joint speech on his behalf with Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang, sharply criticizing the "leftist" military line.

"Mao Xuan" (Volume I) The Long March of the Great Strategic Shift of the Central Red Army

summary

Chairman Mao made a long speech at the Zunyi Conference, pointing out: The reasons for the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and the serious losses of the Great Transfer were mainly the purely defensive line in the military, which was manifested in adventurism when attacking, conservatism when defending, and escapism when breaking through encirclement.

The fact that the chairman won victories in the previous four anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns when the enemy was strong and we were weak refuted Bogu's excuse for using objective reasons such as the enemy's strength and weakness to justify the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

At the same time, it systematically expounded the strategy and tactics suited to the characteristics of China's revolutionary war and the direction of future military operations.

At the most critical juncture of the Chinese revolution, the Zunyi Conference, in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism, independently resolved the organizational problems of the Party Central Committee, ended Wang Ming's "leftist" dogmatic rule in the Central Committee for four years, established Chairman Mao's leading position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, and "followed its own path," thus saving the Party and the Red Army.

The strategic shift that the Red Army was forced to carry out was very thrilling, I wrote about the battle and experience from the Central Soviet Region to Zunyi in a few strokes, and it was almost impossible to have a personal experience of the situation at that time without depth, the reduction of more than 50,000 personnel on the bank of the Xiang River, written on paper is a string of cold numbers, but in fact, one by one fresh lives have since passed away from the world, and it is impossible to return.

When the Red Army left Ruijin, the central authorities stipulated that children and women could not be transferred with the army, so Chairman Mao fostered Mao Mao, the child of Comrade He Zizhen, in the Central Soviet Region, and his whereabouts are unknown.

During the Long March, it was suddenly attacked by Kuomintang aircraft. In order to cover the wounded, Comrade He Zizhen was blown up all over his body, bleeding and passing out, and he suffered 17 injuries all over his body.

I write about the experience of Comrade He Zizhen not for the sake of praise, I mean as a woman, especially the lover of the chairman, in the process of transfer, maybe she received some preferential treatment, but even then she was seriously injured and fell to the ground, so what about more ordinary fighters? And what about the comrades on the front lines of the battle in the depths?

War must be cruel, especially in the case of absolute disadvantage, take apart the word "cruel", "mutilated": flesh and blood, fragmented; "Cool": extreme, very, tyrannical to the extreme.

Words can show less than one ten-thousandth of the real situation.

My education from an early age told me that the Communist Party of China led the Red Army and the people of all ethnic groups throughout the country to defeat the reactionaries, overthrow imperialism, and establish New China through arduous struggle.

And then what? Is there anything special about simply reading the above line?

Therefore, the process of omitting in the middle of the text is the meaning of our reading history and savoring the classics.

I can't help but think of the inscription drawn up by the chairman for the "Monument to the People's Heroes":

Over the past three years, the people's heroes who died in the People's Liberation War and the People's Revolution have been immortalized!

Over the past thirty years, the people's heroes who died in the People's Liberation War and the People's Revolution have been immortalized!

Since then, in order to oppose internal and external enemies, fight for national independence and the people's freedom and happiness, the people's heroes who died in successive struggles have been immortalized!

Next: "Mao Xuan" (Volume 1) The Great Strategic Shift of the Four Crossings of Chishui Surprise Soldiers

We look forward to your attention, likes, and comments, and let us follow Chairman Mao in the wind and waves.

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