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Mr. Ren
Editor|Mr. Ren
In 1978, Tan Zhenlin, who was the political commissar of the East China Field Army, visited the Huaihai Campaign Memorial Hall to review the glory days of the past. The martyrs' relics and battle maps displayed in the memorial hall could not help but make Tan Zhenlin feel a lot of emotion.
However, at the end of the visit to the memorial hall, when Tan Zhenlin saw the introduction of the overall results of the Huaihai Campaign in the memorial hall, he couldn't help but sink his face. After walking out of the memorial hall, Tan Zhenlin angrily left eight words: "The merit of greedy for heaven, shameless and evil!" ”
(Tan Zhenlin)
So, what exactly made Tan Zhenlin angrily leave these eight words? Is there something else behind this? How should we evaluate the outcome of the Huaihai Campaign today?
The East China Field Army is a partial division?
What caused Tan Zhenlin's anger was the introduction in the Huaihai Campaign Memorial Hall at that time: the Central Plains Field Army played a vital role in the victory of the Huaihai Campaign, and the East China Field Army was a "partial division" unit that cooperated with the Central Plains Field Army.
So, in the Huaihai Campaign, was the East China Field Army really a "partial division"?
(Group photo of the generals of the East China Field Army)
First of all, the "main force" and the "partial division" on the battlefield are both relative concepts. To say which unit is a "partial division", it is necessary to look at its comparison with another unit. Looking at the overall situation of the Liberation War, Chairman Mao and other Central Military Commissions planned to use the Northeast Field Army as the main force, and other field armies to contain the Nationalist troops, giving the Northeast Field Army the opportunity to develop and grow, and then enter the customs to unify the whole country in one fell swoop.
Therefore, from the perspective of the overall situation of the Liberation War, if the Northeast Field Army is the main force, then the other units are probably partial divisions. Especially after the end of the Liaoshen Campaign in 1948, the size of the Northeast Field Army was as high as one million, exceeding the combined personnel of the other three field armies, and it was truly the number one force of the People's Liberation Army.
However, if we narrow the perspective to a battle: especially the Huaihai Campaign, and look at the comparison of the strength of Nakano and Huano, we will obviously find that it is obviously unfair to call the East China Field Army a partial division of the "Central Plains Field Army".
Before the outbreak of the Huaihai Campaign, the Central Plains Field Army, under the command of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, leapt thousands of miles into the Dabie Mountain, opening the prelude to the strategic counteroffensive of the Liberation War. Due to the harsh combat environment of Dabie Mountain, the size of the Central Plains Field Army was sharply reduced to 100,000 after advancing to Dabie Mountain, while the battles of Laiwu and Jinan commanded by Chen Yi and Su Yu were successively victorious, and the number of soldiers of the East China Field Army on the eve of the outbreak of the Huaihai Campaign had risen to 360,000.
Therefore, judging from the size and number of troops, it is obviously difficult to agree that the East China Field Army, which had 360,000 people, was a "partial division" in a battle, and that the Central Plains Field Army, which was only about 100,000 people at that time, was the "main force".
Of course, if we only look at which unit is the "main force" and which unit is the "partial division" only from the size and number of troops of the troops, it is not comprehensive, and the contribution of each unit on the battlefield is also a factor that must be taken into account - then, what is the contribution of the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army in the Huaihai Campaign?
It is undeniable that the Central Plains Field Army played a vital role in the military operations of the Huaihai Campaign. After the Huaihai Campaign officially began in November 1948, the Central Plains Field Army, under the command of Liu and Deng, decisively occupied Su County, contained the Kuomintang's traffic choke, and provided the necessary conditions for the subsequent Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army to encircle the Huang Baitao Corps and annihilate the Huang Wei Corps.
However, these contributions alone are not enough to assert that the Central Plains Field Army was the "main force" of the Huaihai Campaign, and the East China Field Army was the partial division of the Huaihai Campaign. Because in terms of war contribution, the contribution of the East China Field Army was no less than that of the Central Plains Field Army: first, the 4th and 8th columns of the East China Field Army attacked the Longhai Railway and fired the first shot of the Huaihai Campaign; Secondly, the East China Field Army pursued and annihilated Huang Baitao's corps, creating favorable conditions for a series of military operations such as the subsequent siege of Huang Wei's corps and the capture of Du Yuming.
Therefore, if we want to discuss whether the Central Plains Field Army made a great contribution in the Huaihai Campaign or the East China Field Army made a large contribution in the Huaihai Campaign, it is actually difficult to distinguish between the two units.
Finally, in order to evaluate which of the two forces in the same war is the "main force" and who is the "partial division", it is also necessary to look at which unit is responsible for the main command on the battlefield. In this regard, the Central Plains Field Army was indeed superior - after Chairman Mao decided to establish the Huaihai General Former Committee, Deng Xiaoping, who was political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army, assumed the post of secretary of the General Former Committee, after which the former committee members were Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin.
Although Deng Xiaoping was the main person responsible for the entire Huaihai Campaign, from the specific command of the Huaihai Campaign, Su Yu was indeed the actual firm executor of the battle - whether it was the East China Field Army taking the lead in attacking Longhai Road, driving Huang Baitao's corps, or besieging and capturing Du Yuming, it was Su Yu's handwriting.
Therefore, whether Deng Xiaoping made a large contribution in the entire battle or Su Yu made a large contribution in the entire battle, the fairest answer is that the two were equally divided.
Therefore, no matter from which angle you look at it, it is not objective to blindly praise the Central Plains Field Army under Deng Xiaoping's command at that time as the "main force" and to call Chen and Su's East China Field Army a "partial division", and it is no wonder that Tan Zhenlin, who personally participated in the Huaihai Campaign, felt indignant.
What is the reason that makes the memorial call Huaye a partial teacher
The outstanding contributions made by the East China Field Army in the entire Huaihai Campaign were not only known to Tan Zhenlin. The evaluation of the East China Field Army as a "partial division" by the Huaihai Campaign Memorial Hall in 1978 is really strange.
At that time, the Huaihai Campaign Memorial Hall called the East China Field Army a "partial division" for two main reasons: First, Su Yu, who personally commanded the East China Field Army and participated in the Huaihai Campaign, was very humble and low-key on weekdays, and he himself was not willing to count the credit for a battle on his head.
Su Yu's humble character can be seen from his story of "two words as commander, one as a marshal", after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War in 1945, the Central Military Commission intended to make Su Yu the commander of the Central China Sub-Bureau Military Region. Su Yu twice resigned from the post of commander of the Central China Military Region, insisting that his old superior Zhang Dingcheng be the commander, and he himself was subordinate to the deputy post.
Before the Huaihai Campaign began in 1948, Chairman Mao, considering the war situation in the whole country, wanted to transfer Chen Yi to central China and let Su Yu replace Chen Yi as commander of the East China Field Army. Su Yu said to Chairman Mao: "Chairman, the East China Field Army cannot do without President Chen!" Under Su Yu's repeated insistence, Chen Yi was still appointed commander of the East China Field Army, and he only acted as commander.
In 1955, when the Chinese People's Liberation Army conferred the title for the first time in history, Chairman Mao and other Central Military Commissions intended to confer the rank of Marshal Su Yu, but Su Yu resigned many times, Su Yu said: "I myself am a shallow talent, and I can make meritorious achievements on the battlefield and have the merits of other bosses and troops, how can I be awarded the rank of marshal and let me be at the same level as President Chen?" ”
Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai were deeply touched by Su Yu's humble character, and Chairman Mao once said of Su Yu: "It is rare that Su Yu, a commander of two resignations and a marshal of one resignation, is always much better in attitude towards rank than those who cry and make trouble twice." Zhou Enlai added: "Su Yu resigned from the rank of marshal, but the rank of general must still be deserved. Chairman Mao said: "Yes, and he is still the first general!" ”
In September 1955, after the first award results of the Chinese People's Liberation Army were announced, Su Yu was at the top of the ten founding generals, so the Republic had the beautiful talk of "Su Yuzhen General".
But even after winning the rank of general, Su Yu did not lie on the merit book and enjoy himself from then on, but was always cautious in his words and deeds, maintained a humble character, and continued to shine for the country in the position of chief of the General Staff.
However, in the 50s of the 20th century, Su Yu's life and career still experienced a lot of setbacks. At a work meeting, Su Yu was criticized for having a serious "individualistic tendency," "asking for power from the Ministry of National Defense," and "affecting the modernization of national defense," because of his speech during a foreign affairs visit. Due to the pressure of the historical situation at that time, Su Yu was forced to admit all these "charges".
On the occasion of the Lushan Conference in 1959, it was suggested that Su Yu seize the opportunity of the Lushan Conference to seek an opportunity to restore his reputation, but Su Yu politely declined. Su Yu said: "I will never use the storms of history to achieve the ups and downs of my life, and I believe that my revolutionary practice in the past ten years is the best proof of my loyalty to the party and the people!" ”
Unfortunately, due to various historical reasons, Su Yu was not rehabilitated for a long time until 1978. Regarding Su Yu's command of the East China Field Army, the battles he participated in were often underestimated in historical evaluations, which was one of the important reasons why the Huaihai Campaign Memorial unjustly called the East China Field Army a "partial division".
How do future generations evaluate the Battle of Huaihai
In 1979, Su Yu, who was 72 years old, visited Ye Jianying and pleaded with Ye Jianying to speak out for the unfair treatment he had received at the 1958 conference and restore his reputation. For Su Yu, who is indifferent to fame and fortune, his personal reputation may not matter, but the evaluation of the East China Field Army in later generations is very important to this general who cares about the people's soldiers.
In the end, Ye Jianying agreed to Su Yu's request, and the rehabilitation of Su Yu was officially launched. Unfortunately, before the results of the rehabilitation were finally announced, Su Yu died of illness at the age of 77. In its obituary, the Central Military Commission praised Su Yu as a "proven communist fighter and outstanding military strategist," which was credited with restoring part of his reputation. In 1994, Liu Huaqing, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, openly admitted in his article "Remembering Comrade Su Yu" that his evaluation of Su Yu in 1958 was a mistake, and Su Yu's historical status was officially restored from then on.
With the restoration of Su Yu's reputation, the historical contribution of the East China Field Army in the Huaihai Campaign was also fully recognized. In the "History of the National Liberation War of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" published in the 90s of the 20th century, the book commented that the Huaihai Campaign commanded by Su Yu dealt a "fatal blow" to the main forces of the Kuomintang, in contrast, the Liaoshen Campaign was a "heavy blow" to the main forces of the Kuomintang. At the same time, the book also affirmed the main position of the East China Field Army in the Huaihai Campaign. Since then, both Su Yu and the East China Field Army have been objectively and impartially evaluated.
To this day, people still talk about the causes and consequences of the Huaihai Campaign. The reason why this battle is still unforgettable is not only because it promoted the founding of New China, but also because the revolutionary spirit of the revolutionary predecessors in this battle inspired generations of people.