Yan Wei: Identity politics and the difficult problem of Afghan state construction
Author: Yan Wei, Deputy Director and Professor, Institute of Middle East Studies, Northwest University
Source: Contemporary World, No. 10, 2021; Contemporary World
WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue
Statue of the late Afghan Hazara leader Mazari, who was killed by Taliban militants in 1995. (IC photo image)
The afghan Taliban ("Atta") was able to rise again and seize power thanks in large part to the long-standing social conflict in Afghanistan and the identity politics shaped by it. After coming to power, Atta continued to use identity politics to build the legitimacy and social foundation of his rule. But this entrenched and inclusive identity politics will affect the stability of the Atta regime, and other political forces are likely to collude with external forces, making it more difficult for Afghan society to reconcile and integrate into the international community.
Members of an Afghan tribe in an artwork. (Panoramic photo)
Tribal politics and the beginnings of the Afghan state
Identity politics has become a common phenomenon in the political picture of the contemporary world, reflecting the changes in the relationship between the state and society, and this problem is particularly prominent in Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries. In a narrow sense, identity politics in the West seems to be a new phenomenon that has emerged in recent years, with a major emphasis on political behaviors imposed by marginalized groups based on specific gender, ethnicity, and religious identity. For Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, identity politics has long been embedded in the process of state-building, which is both a way of governance and a unique form of social resistance. In the process of state construction in the Middle East, identity politics plays different roles such as building order, strengthening division and deconstructing order.
Afghan society is highly divided, with different families, tribes, ethnic groups and sects forming concentric circles and belonging to a typical "sectarian society". In this kind of society, individuals have multiple identities, and the importance of these identities varies from era to era. In Afghan culture, the term "qaum" refers to social organizations of different sizes and levels, from family to ethnic group, and to a certain extent belongs to sectarianism. Historically, during the imperial and imperial periods, Afghanistan's complex sectarian forces were in a state of high degree of autonomy, and the control of the central government over them was very limited, mostly nominally "indirect rule".
The establishment of the Durrani dynasty in 1747 marked the founding of Afghanistan, but the question of how to construct a stable social order remained in the context of sectarian divisions and a high degree of social pluralism. The rulers of the Durrani dynasty, although following the system of the Persian Afshar dynasty, still relied on tribal societies to maintain and construct dynastic rule. In this context, tribal societies, while maintaining autonomy, gradually formed a hierarchical system, and tribal identity became a key element in determining political power and behavior. Specifically, the rulers of the Durrani dynasty all belonged to the Pashtun Durrani tribal confederation, of which the Popolchai, Barakchai, Arikchay and other tribes based on Kandahar were in a dominant position, not only with political privileges, but also with a large amount of land and tax exemption privileges, the former two even monopolized The Afghan power for a long time; the Gilchai tribal alliance, which also belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group, was in a secondary position, and the non-Pashtun tribes were inferior. But Afghanistan's ethnic identity was weak during this period, with tribal identities dominating based on specific geographical and kinship.
The social basis of durani rule was tribal society, and its legitimacy was derived from tribal political culture. The founders of the Durrani dynasty were formally elected by tribal assemblies, and the king was to some extent the head of the tribe, not only had no absolute authority, but was also heavily dependent on tribal society militarily, and had to agree with the tribe on important matters. Thus, the Durranian dynasty nationalized the tribe and tribalized the state, establishing the authority and social order of the state on the basis of tribal society. However, there are serious flaws in this mode of governance: first, the division of tribal society and the dependence of the state on tribal society, resulting in the inability of the state to build a strong centralized system, which has led to the formation of a "strong society- weak state" in Afghanistan, which further strengthens the tribal identity; second, tribal politics makes individuals in a state of "aphasia", hierarchical sectarian groups become the basic participating units of politics, and to a large extent deepens the rift in society; third, due to the dependence of the state on tribal society and "weak states" "The reality is that it is difficult to develop on its own, and it is necessary to introduce external forces to balance tribal politics." Tribal politics thus became an unavoidable problem in the construction of the Afghan state for more than 200 years.
There are structural contradictions between tribal politics and the modern nation-state. Thus, after the Durrani dynasty, successive rulers of Afghanistan were faced with the dilemma of how to transcend tribal politics while maintaining the legitimacy of their rule. Tribal identity is the inseparable social foundation of Afghanistan, but state-building needs to transcend tribal society. From the mid-to-late 19th century to the 1970s, Afghan rulers tried two models that transcended tribal politics: one was "strong integration," that is, completely getting rid of tribal politics and building a modern state based on democratic politics and Islamic politics; the other was "weak integration," that is, seeking a balance between tribal identity and modern political identity, and advancing state construction on the basis of continuing tribal society. Both models attempt to break the pattern of "strong society-weak state" by introducing external forces, and both try to dilute tribal political culture with new identities.
Following the Taliban's announcement of an interim Government, the situation in Afghanistan has become increasingly stable. Girls from Kabul enter school on September 22, 2021. (IC photo image)
Identity conflict and the deconstruction of the Afghan state
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, afghanistan's political changes have been heavily influenced by tribal politics. But as the modernization process progressed, Afghan society gradually diverged and extended to a pluralistic social and political identity. In addition to the traditional family and tribal identities based on blood and geography, the concepts of ethnic, religious, socialist, liberal democracy and other identities with modern ideological overtones have sprung up one after another, and they are not independent and distinct from each other, but are mixed and contradictory. This weakened Afghanistan's national identity and legitimacy of the monarchy, sparking serious social conflicts that ultimately led to the deconstruction of the nation-state. In addition to traditional familial and tribal identities, afghanistan's identity politics has seen a triple fault line.
The first is the prominence of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict. In the Islamic world, religious beliefs are an important cultural basis for dividing social groups. But in the transition from traditional empires to modern states, nationalism based on specific social groups became an important basis for the construction of national identity. Since the end of the 19th century, Pashtuns have firmly held the right to rule Afghanistan, constructed national identity with their own culture and national concepts, and promoted the Pashtunization of the country in areas such as language, culture and historical memory. In this context, other ethnic groups have been suppressed by the Pashtuns, and ethnic hierarchies have developed in Afghanistan. This has led to a growing identity of Afghan minorities, accompanied by rising and intensifying conflicts between different ethnic groups.
The second is the struggle between religious identity and secular politics. Since the 20th century, Afghan rulers have been influenced by Western culture and the Turkish Mustafa Kemal Revolution, gradually promoting the secularization of society. Especially in the 1950s and 1970s, when Afghanistan's secular education and secular legal system were basically established, and the status of women was greatly improved, this period became the "golden age" of the country in modern times. But at the same time, Islamism, which is in direct opposition to secularization, is also emerging in Afghanistan under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, and religious movements represented by the "Ustaz" (the predecessor of the Islamic Promotion Association and the Islamic Party) oppose the secularization reforms promoted by the Afghan government and demand that the country be governed by the traditional religious spirit.
The third is the contradiction between liberalism and Soviet-style socialism. In modern times, Afghanistan's economic development and finances have been dependent on external resources, particularly foreign aid. Especially during the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States competed to win over Afghanistan, providing it with huge amounts of aid and ideological infiltration. On the one hand, a large number of Afghan intellectuals went to Europe and the United States to study, infected by Western liberalism, and opposed the autocratic monarchy; on the other hand, some Afghan officers and bureaucrats were trained in the Soviet Union, influenced by Soviet-style socialism, and also opposed the "feudal" rule of the king. Since then, social elites influenced by Western liberalism and Soviet-style socialism have fought fiercely over which path to choose for Afghanistan.
These three identities are in a sense the result of social construction, and as socio-political changes, especially social conflicts, intensify, they, together with tribal and local identities, constitute a complex picture of Afghan identity politics. But these identity differences are not distinct, but intertwined. There are clear tribal and ethnic differences in religious identity and socialist conception. For example, the political Islamic movement "Ustazi" in the late 20th century was divided into two factions due to ethnic composition, and eventually split into the Islamic Promotion Association (ethnic minorities) and the Islamic Party (Pashtuns). The Soviet-influenced socialist party, the People's Democratic Party, divided into three major factions based roughly on ethnic affiliation. Thus, in the second half of the 20th century, the unity of Afghan society was gradually deconstructed, the differences in social identity were continuously strengthened, and the entire society appeared mosaic and highly antagonistic. In the late 1970s, the identity fragmentation of Afghan society eventually led to serious socio-political conflicts, leading to social rifts and the deconstruction of the state.
During the Soviet occupation, the internal conflict in Afghanistan was ostensibly an ideological struggle between Soviet-style socialism represented by the People's Democratic Party regime and Mujahiddin (a mujahideen), but it masked deep ethnic tensions. The People's Democratic Party regime was the first time in history that it was truly dominated by ethnic minorities, and most of the Soviet garrison in Afghanistan came from the Republics of Central Asia and shared the same origins as the Afghan minorities. Most of The mujahitin factions have specific ethnic or tribal backgrounds, most of which are Pashtuns. For example, the social basis of the six resistance parties in the "Seven-Party Alliance" is Pashtuns. If the social conflicts in Afghanistan during the period of resistance to Soviet occupation still had some religious anti-secular character, when the Popular Democratic Party regime collapsed, Afghanistan fell into civil war between different ethnic groups. Resistance movements based on specific ethnic groups and geographies have degenerated into warlords vying for central power. After the rise of the Atta, minorities in these forces united as the "Northern Alliance" against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, which remained largely a clash between ethnic groups. External forces are looking for specific ethnic groups in Afghanistan as proxies, exacerbating social divides. It can be said that in the context of the Afghan civil war, the identity of specific ethnic groups and tribes has become more prominent, becoming the basis for individuals to obtain public goods and security guarantees. In the event of this, Afghanistan's state authority tends to deconstruct and its national identity continues to weaken.
Taliban personnel sit on a cement wall in Kabul depicting the head of former Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood on August 28, 2021. (Xinhua News Agency photo)
Identity politics and the failure of The Reconstruction of the Afghan State
In 2001, the U.S. war in Afghanistan overthrew the Atta regime, creating a difficult problem for Afghanistan to rebuild its state. Among them, how to deal with the pluralism and fragmentation of Afghan social identity for decades, and the corresponding division of local forces, has become the primary task of national reconstruction. With the intervention of the United States and other Western countries, Afghanistan has tried to transcend ethnic conflicts, religious identities and tribal divisions with political recognition of ethnic status, secular democratic politics and totalitarian politics, making Afghanistan a model for "democratic transformation" in the West, but there is a huge tension between Afghan reality and Western ideals.
Political recognition, which primarily refers to the political recognition of the status and cultural rights of a particular ethnic group or denomination, was a core element of Western multiculturalism in the late 20th century. After the establishment of the State of Afghanistan, the policy of national assimilation and Pashtunization has long been implemented, and the political status and cultural rights of ethnic minorities have not been recognized. During the ruling period of the People's Democratic Party, it began to promote the status of ethnic minorities and set the language of ethnic minorities as Chinese. Since the reconstruction of Afghanistan in 2001, under the leadership of Western countries, the Afghan government has recognized the political status of ethnic minorities and cultural rights such as language. The new Afghan Constitution, promulgated in 2004, clearly stipulates that the Afghan nation, including 14 ethnic groups, including Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and Turkmen, has its own language; This means that the status of other minority languages is officially recognized by the Afghan Government, and ethnic identity is thus recognized and protected.
But there is a tension between the political recognition of ethnic status and the construction of the Afghan state. Western countries have tried to transcend ethnic politics with secular liberal democracies, transplanted democracies into Afghanistan, and established a centralized system with a strong presidential system. Although the Afghan government prohibits participating in elections and forming political parties in a specific ethnic and tribal capacity, Western-style electoral politics in Afghanistan has been alienated into ethnic politics. In fact, most elections in Afghanistan are conducted on ethnic borders, and voters often choose the leaders of their communities. This has further deepened social barriers and made the community the most important political and social identity in Afghanistan.
In fact, there is a logical paradox in itself between the recognition of ethnic status and the rejection of participation in politics as an ethnic group. This institutional model not only does not really resolve the contradictions between different ethnic groups, but makes the Afghan regime the focus of ethnic political competition, and its legitimacy is gradually lost. Ethnic minorities, because of their demographic disadvantages, were unable to gain an advantage in electoral politics, while the Pashtuns once again seized political dominance and gradually took control of power through the centralized system of strong presidents, marginalizing minorities. However, both Pashtuns and minorities are dissatisfied with the existing distribution of power. The former believes that the new regime represents the interests of ethnic minorities and is a "puppet" regime supported by the West; the latter believes that the "Northern Alliance" with ethnic minorities as the main body is the key to overthrowing the Atta regime and establishing a new government, but they are gradually marginalized politically. Therefore, the Western democratic system did not resolve ethnic conflicts, but further "secured" ethnic identities, providing opportunities for Atta's re-emergence.
In addition, the Afghan Government has sought to transcend tribal decentralization traditions with totalitarian politics and to replace tribal identity with citizenship. With the support of Western countries, Afghanistan has tried to establish a grassroots government in the tribal areas, weakening the traditional autonomy of the tribes and thus eliminating the living space of Atta. But Afghan tribal societies have long opposed State intervention and see autonomy as an "honor." The Afghan government's centralized reforms, far from weakening tribal societies, have further strengthened tribal identities and have been resisted by tribal forces. Against this background, Atta once again used religious banners and Pashtun discontent to mobilize tribal societies against government rule. It can be said that the identity conflict and the resulting social rift are the deep reasons for the failure of Afghanistan's reconstruction and the re-emergence of Atta.
In short, the United States and other Western countries have tried to use Western democracy as the ultimate solution to afghanistan's internal identity conflict. But Afghanistan lacks a Western-like tradition of civil society. Horizontal distribution of religions, ethnic groups and tribes remains the most important criterion for determining the political identity of Afghan society. The combination of the two has led to a deformed political ecology in Afghanistan, where traditional ethnic and tribal politics are embedded in the Western democratic system, which strengthens traditional identities, which in turn leads to the failure of the political transformation of Afghanistan by Western countries.
In November 2012, Hazaras, one of Afghanistan's most oppressed groups, rested on the streets of Kabul between work breaks. (IC photo image)
The Atta regime has not moved beyond Afghanistan's entrenched identity politics
Atta has largely exploited the rift in Afghan society and the failure of the Afghan government to integrate with society to seize power under the banner of religious and nationalist ideologies. In other words, Atta is a practitioner of identity politics, playing the role of conservative religious power and spokesman for the Pashtun tribes. Today, Atta is facing similar problems to those at the beginning of Afghanistan's reconstruction 20 years ago. Whether the Atta regime can transcend specific religious and ethnic identities to build an inclusive political process is an important perspective on future developments in Afghanistan.
Atta has made it clear that he wants to build an inclusive political system, but his prospects are not optimistic. From the perspective of identity politics, Atta still represents the interests of Pashtuns and conservative religious figures, and does not go beyond identity politics: First, the Atta regime has not been able to get rid of the Pashtun regime's attributes. On 8 September 2021, Atta announced the emir and 33 members of the central government, all of whom were members of the Taliban, of whom only 2 were Tajiks and 1 Uzbek, all of whom were Pashtuns. Although Atta appointed several ethnic minority officials on September 21, the symbolism outweighed the actual significance. Former government officials and other ethnic minorities were excluded from the centres of power. Second, the Atta regime was based on conservative religious ideas and did not include secular ideas and secularists. The central figures of the Atta regime, almost all of whom have religious identities, have also revived its flag from the 1990s administration and abandoned the tricolor flag, which has been in use since 1929. Third, Atta is deeply influenced by tribal culture and reflects tribal attributes. There are three major factions within the Atta, representing the three major tribal confederations of the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Among them, the two tribal alliances of Durrani and Gilchai controlled the political power of Atta; the "Haqqani Network" from the Kalani Tribal Alliance had the advantage in the military field; and among the local factions of Ata, there was also a tribal divide.
As a result, Atta is exclusive and closed in identity and identity, mixing different identities such as Islamism, Pashtunism and tribalism. The Atta regime's approach to identity politics has largely returned to the old path of using specific identities to build legitimacy and maintain the foundations of governance.
From the perspective of the process of seizing power, the use of identity politics is the key to Atta's re-emergence and helps to strengthen its internal unity. But in the long run, identity politics poses a potential threat to the Taliban regime's rule. Domestically, if Ata does not bring into power minorities, secularists, marginal Pashtun tribes, and women, the foundations of its rule will inevitably be weakened and it will be difficult for Afghanistan to achieve true social reconciliation. From the perspective of the external environment, the above identity does not act alone in Afghanistan, and external forces often use identity politics to isolate the Atta regime, which seriously threatens the stability of the Atta regime. In the future, whether the Atta regime recognizes the status of ethnic minorities and whether it can truly protect women's rights will become the focus of attention in Afghanistan and even neighboring countries.
Atta's identity transformation dilemma is the result of a long history in Afghanistan, and its logical starting point is how to construct a modern state in a highly diverse and complex society. In fact, identity and politics interact and are constantly changing. This leads to a paradox that is difficult to combine: the emphasis on pluralism often leads to the weakening of state power and the strengthening of traditional identities; the construction of the state with a specific identity will solidify identity, thus intensifying social conflicts. Both represent two paths for Middle Eastern countries to deal with identity politics: the pluralism and integration of identities, and the solidification and assimilation of identities. For the Atta regime, how to achieve identity transformation and accommodate a wider range of social groups is a real challenge.
This paper is a phased result of the major project of the National Social Science Foundation of China "Multidimensional Comparative Study on the Construction of Modern Peoples and States in the Middle East (Multi-volume)" (Project No. 20 &ZD240).
*Disclaimer: This article only represents the personal views of the author and does not represent the position of this official account
Think tank of the digital economy
Political Science and International Relations Forum
In order to better serve the construction of digital China, serve the construction of the "Belt and Road", and strengthen theoretical exchanges and practical exchanges in the process of digital economy construction. Experts and scholars from China's digital economy and the "Belt and Road" construction have established a digital economy think tank to contribute to the construction of digital China. Wei Jianguo, former vice minister of the Ministry of Commerce, served as honorary president, and well-known young scholars Huang Rihan and Chu Yin led the way. The Political Science and International Relations Forum is a dedicated platform under the umbrella of the Digital Economy Think Tank.