The outstanding people in the army are generals and marshals. The main difference between the two is best reflected in the internal relationship, that is, to be good at making the general handsome. Most of the generals who are quick-talking, don't speak in a way, explode at the first point when they are unhappy, or fight without death, and when they charge, they still need to remind "where the command position is". Those who have experienced "leaving the team" or "planning to leave the team" (hereinafter collectively referred to as "leaving the team") are basically the kind of people who are not afraid of things and can cause trouble, often generals, and are generals with low emotional intelligence.
"Detachment" is commonly known as desertion, and in the non-war years it was also a serious mistake; in the special environment of the revolutionary war years, "leaving the team" was often regarded as a "defective revolution", and if you desert with a gun, you are basically shot. In the history of our army, there have been many "incidents of detachment," and the final handling of them has been dealt with differently because of the leader's policy level, wisdom, mind, ability, personality, environment, background, and many other factors.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="53" >, the dequencing event</h1>
Among the many incidents of detachment, Xu Shiyou is the most famous and the most widely spread, but Xu Shiyou is not the highest rank and position among them. For example, after the failure of the Sanheba division of the Nanchang Uprising, Lin Biao, who was the company commander at the time, felt hopeless about the future and left the team, because there were bandits everywhere who could not intercept and go out, and he returned to the team that night. Before leaving, he also advised Chen Yi to go with him, but Chen Yi refused, and after Lin Biao returned, Chen Yi asked him to "still return to his original company as a company commander" (quoted from "The Biography of Chen Yi", "The Biography of Chen Yi" Written by the Writing Group, page 28 and the note "Chen Yi spoke about this matter at the old comrades' forum in October 1971"). For example, at the critical moment when the breakthrough of the Anhui Incident broke through, Xiang Ying, deputy commander of the New Fourth Army (Note: actually serving as a political commissar), "temporarily wavered" and led the squad to leave the team for a day and a half, after which the Party Central Committee decided that "all military and political actions should be taken overall responsibility by Ye Junchang and Rao Yishi", and relieved Xiang Ying of his decision-making power (quoted from "The Biography of Xiang Ying", written by Wang Fuyi).
After the Long March of the Red Fourth Front arrived in Yan'an, Xu Shiyou planned to leave the army because of his dissatisfaction with the expansion of the separatist and the liquidation of Zhang Guotao, and when he was reported and isolated for examination, even in the face of Chairman Mao Zedong's personal visit, he dared to move roughly or threaten to use a gun when he was not convinced. Later, although he was infinitely loyal to Chairman Mao, he still found something to do from time to time. After the liberation of New China, new China advocated cremation, and the leaders of the state, from Chairman Mao down to the generals, signed the proposal to show their leading role, but Xu Shiyou directly refused to say, "I will not be cremated." Chairman Mao also tolerated this and "felt forgivable." At the time of his death, Deng Xiaoping instructed him to "proceed as such, not as an example", because Xu Shiyou was a "special person with a special character, special experience, and special contributions".
In handling the issue of Lin Biao and Xu Shiyou's departure from the team, because Chairman Mao and Chen Yi were both people of great wisdom, the incident was properly resolved. Lin Biao and Xu Shiyou were not much affected by this.
And Ye Daozhi's departure from the team is more tragic. Ye Daozhi, a native of Huang'an (now Hong'an), Hubei, was born in 1910. His early experience was comparable to that of Tao Yong and Wang Bicheng, and he also came from the Red Fourth Front. From July 1933, he successively served as the commander of the 93rd and 92nd Divisions of the Red 31st Army, and the political commissar of the 10th Division (division commander Chen Xilian). In the spring of 1938, he led Tao Yong and dozens of other cadres to the south, serving as the secretary of the provisional party branch on the way south. After arriving at the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army, he served as the deputy commander of the Fourth Regiment. When the New Fourth Army was first established, it was still imperfect in all aspects, and the style of the troops was very different from that of the Eighth Route Army. He was transferred from the commander of the Red Army division to the deputy commander (later political commissar) of the New Fourth Army, and a regiment was only 1,000 people, which was only equivalent to the size of the Eighth Route Barracks, and he felt that the position was low. The other four regimental personnel are all Fujianese, and their language and living habits vary greatly. This made Ye Daozhi very disappointed, so he worked negatively and often said strange things. Tao Yong and other comrades-in-arms advised him, but he could not listen. When his superiors learned of this, he was transferred to the military headquarters as the commander of the special service battalion. After being demoted, I was even more dissatisfied.
Here, he met Chen Kang, commander of the Supplementary Battalion of the New Fourth Army (former commander of the 276th Regiment of the 91st Division) and Xu Changsheng, chief of staff of the Special Service Battalion (former deputy commander of the 276th Regiment of the 92nd Division), both of whom were his old subordinates, and both of whom had the idea of returning to the Eighth Route Army. On July 31, 1938, less than half a year before the New Fourth Army, the three men left the army without permission, carried pistols for self-defense, and went north to find the Eighth Route Army. Soon, the army chased after the soldiers, Xu Changsheng was killed, and Ye Daozhi was captured and shot as a traitor. Only Chen Kang escaped, returned to the 129th Division (division commander Liu Bocheng) and was punished, and then made many military achievements under Chen Geng and became a founding lieutenant general in 1955. It is said that General Chen Geng also bowed to Chairman Mao Zedong for Chen Kang's low rank. Shortly after Ye Zhidao was shot, Tao Yong took his place and led the Fourth Regiment to the front, where he also made repeated military achievements, and in 1955 Tao Yong was awarded the rank of lieutenant general.
Before Li Xiannian created the new Fifth Division of the Fourth Army in the yu'e border base area, there was also an incident of his subordinates leaving the team, and the person concerned was named Zhong Wei, who planned to leave the team and leave the political commissar of the third regiment of the Yu'e Advance Column of the New Fourth Army. Yes, he was the famous "little man" Zhong Wei in Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army, who was awarded the rank of major general in 1955.
Military biographical literature, even if only ten generals from the Fourth Field Army with military generals were drawn to write biographical literature, although Zhong Wei's rank was low, he was basically indispensable. In the words of the familiar "Bright Sword", because he is a "two-headed" and legendary person.
There are many introductions about Zhong Wei, basically "causing trouble" plus "making meritorious contributions". For example, Zhong Wei is "one of the prototypes of Li Yunlong in "Bright Sword" and the main prototype of Ding Wei." "Some people also say that Zhong Wei is China's Patton general, with a flamboyant personality, untamed, able to win battles, and a lord who does not let the leader worry. After provoking Li Xiannian, he was not finished, and later he hung up the number with Lin Biao, commander of the Four Fields, and even Chairman Mao.
Because of his outstanding military achievements, in early 1948, Lin Biao intended to promote Zhong Wei to deputy commander of the column. This would have been a good thing, but Zhong Wei was unwilling to do so after he knew it. Zhong Wei ran directly to Lin Biao and said, "I Zhong Weining is a chicken head, not a cow tail." Hearing this, Lin Biao was happy: "You boy, you still want to be promoted two levels in a row, go back, go back." Zhong Wei returned to the troops to talk about this matter, and others felt that it was probably hopeless to improve, and it might also provoke Lin Biao. Unexpectedly, a few days later, the orders of the superiors came down, and Zhong Wei was promoted to the commander of the twelfth column, and Zhong Wei became the only cadre in the Northeast Field Army (note: the predecessor of the Fourth Field Army) who was promoted from division commander to column commander.
In May 1955, the year before the whole army conferred the rank, the title award plan was announced, and after the Central Military Commission preliminarily examined and approved the list of lieutenant generals and major generals, the list was sent to the party committees of major units for comments. Zhong Wei, then chief of staff of the Guangxi Military Region, was even more upset when he saw that he was a major general, especially when he learned that his old subordinate Wen Yucheng was a lieutenant general in Siye, and threatened, "I will hang that sign on the dog's tail." After coming and going, these words reached Chairman Mao's ears, and Chairman Mao did not directly criticize Zhong Wei and others, but was unhappy and sarcastically said: "The boy has tears and does not flick, only because he has not yet arrived at the time of the title." However, Chairman Mao did not deal with Zhong Wei, but personally named him to use him in the position of chief of staff of the Beijing Military Region, which at least a lieutenant general could hold, "a low-ranking and high-ranking post."
Many years ago, the author saw a number of legendary versions of "Zhong Wei" on the Internet: he said that he was depressed because of a certain grudge, so he took a guard squad with weapons, his daughter-in-law and a group of 10 people to break away from the New Fourth Army, went north to look for the old troops of the Eighth Route Army, slept all the way, endured hunger, camped for thousands of miles, and when he saw his old superior Huang Kecheng, he was already a bunch of people called Hanako. Huang Kecheng was greatly distressed and gave him a good rest, saying, "Since you have come back, first take a good rest, then temporarily replace the principal of the Kang University Branch School", and then at his resolute request, he let him lead his troops to the front line, and when zhong Wei's commendation for his military achievements in northern Jiangsu was reported, Li Xiannian and the other commanders of the Fifth Division learned that Zhong Wei had already left the army... The whole process is very tortuous and bizarre.
In Zhong Wei's official resume, there is such a sentence: "Successively served as the political commissar of the second and third regiments of the Yu'e Advance Column of the New Fourth Army, and the acting principal of the Fifth Branch School of the Northern Jiangsu Anti-Japanese University...", these two positions of office were in the Yu'e Border Region and the Northern Jiangsu Liberated Area, and the geographical location was thousands of miles away. In the "middle zone" of these two posts, there is a hidden "black history" of Zhong Wei's activities of trying to "break away from Yu'e and advance and lead the team to the Fushan Mountains in southern Hubei" alone. Like Li Xiannian, Zhong Wei was originally one of the cadres who went south from Yan'an to the New Fourth Army, but the difference was that Li Xiannian was the supreme leader of this unit. In online articles, it is often said that Zhong Wei and Li Xiannian have a "bad relationship", in fact, whether it is the process of Zhong Wei's departure from the team or the relationship with Li Xiannian, these statements have great problems.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="101" > second, Li Xiannian "second entrepreneurship"</h1>
Li Xiannian was known to the masses of Dabie Mountain, and his nickname "Li Carpenter" was actually more widely known. He led the crowd to participate in the jute uprising, was the political commissar of the 30th Army of the Red Fourth Front during the Western Expedition to Sichuan and Shaanxi, accompanied Zhang Guotao to the south and north during the Long March, and was later ordered to participate in the expedition of the Western Route Army. After the defeat of the Western Route Army, Li Xiannian led the remaining left detachment of more than 1,000 people to reach Xinjiang through hardships and dangers, and returned to Yan'an as an "establishment" after the beginning of the War of Resistance. After arriving in Yan'an, affected by the defeat of the Western Route Army and the separatist mistakes of liquidating Zhang Guotao that was carried out at that time, the General Political Department arranged for the military political commissar of that year to be the battalion commander of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and was demoted to the sixth rank in a row! When the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, it was generally demoted and resettled, and it was very common to be demoted to two or three levels, but there were really not many demotions of six grades. Chairman Mao had a very good and deep impression of Li Xiannian when he was meeting the maogong division, and when he heard the news, he went to Li Xiannian and asked, "I heard that I want you to go to the 129th Division to become a battalion commander. Li Xiannian replied, "Yes." Chairman Mao said, "This is so unfair! Chairman Mao did not agree to the work arrangements of the General Political Department for Li Xiannian, and instead sent him to the four detachments of the New Fourth Army in Dabie Mountain, Gao Jingting, as chief of staff, and then entrusted him with a heavy responsibility according to the situation, but in the end he was unable to make the trip.
Later, at the end of November 1938, Li Xiannian, together with some cadres led by Zhu Lizhi, one of the members of the Central Plains Bureau designated by the CPC Central Committee and director of the Organization Department, marched behind enemy lines in the Central Plains and went to Zhugou Town, Qishan County, Tongbai Mountain, and left Li Xiannian to work in the Party Committee of the Yu'e Border Region. The predecessor of the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army did not form a basis for the formation of the Red Army or the Eighth Route Army, but was gradually developed and expanded by the "snowball" of the Yu'e Independent Guerrilla Detachment, the Yu'e Advancing Detachment, and the Yu'e Advancing Column, and gradually developed into a division of 10,000 people, so that people who did not understand the situation even regarded the Fifth Division as a "united front unit."
In 1941, the Anhui Incident, the New Fourth Army suffered heavy losses, so the central government decided to implement a unified leadership, unified reorganization of the Central China New Fourth Army into 7 divisions and an independent brigade. Among them, the Yu'e Advancing Column was the Fifth Division, and on February 18, Li Xiannian was appointed as the commander of the Fifth Division and the political commissar, Ren Jianbin as the director of the political department, and Liu Shaoqing as the chief of staff. In the winter of 1943, Zheng Weisan was transferred as a representative of the Central China Bureau, but did not announce his political commissar order, because Zheng Weisan was more senior, served as secretary, and the fifth division respected him and called him "an old man".
In August 1945, after the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Fifth Division of the New Fourth Army grew from scratch to a central plains brigade with 50,000 strong soldiers, which was a brilliant achievement of Li Xiannian's "second entrepreneurship" after he went south from Yan'an to the Central Plains, showed his extraordinary revolutionary vigor and work ability, and also reflected Chairman Mao's unique vision of Li Xiannian.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="102" > third, Zhong Wei's "rebellion" began and ended</h1>
In such a heroic group, why did Zhong Wei, the regimental political commissar who was an old Red Army and a party member, try to get out of the team?
Zhu Lizhi stayed in the Central Plains for nearly three years, returned to Yan'an in March 1940 for a meeting, and then Ren Jianbin served as the director of the Political Department as the acting secretary of the Military and Political Committee and the political commissar of the Yu'e Advance Column, and acted for more than a year until the formation of the Fifth Division. During the battle of Dawu Mountain, the three regiments of Zhong Wei's political commissar were ordered to hold on to Sifang Mountain and fight fiercely with the enemy for four days and four nights, Li Xiannian ordered the three regiments to hold out until 12 o'clock in the evening to cover the retreat of other troops, and Xiao Jiuyuan, the leader of the third regiment, and Zhong Wei, the political commissar, organized the retreat of the troops at 5 o'clock, leaving a squad for the battalion instructor Ren Ziheng and ordering them to persist until dusk. After dusk, Ren Ziheng retreated according to the order, causing the enemy army to hit The front of Li Xiannian's command post, which was almost surrounded and destroyed by the enemy. After the battle, Ren Ziheng was arrested and prepared to enforce battlefield discipline. After ren zhibin ordered li linzhong, the minister of defense, to talk with Ren Ziheng, he learned that he was ordered to retreat, and immediately released Ren Ziheng and began to investigate the cause.
Comrade Ren Zhibin handled the "Zhong Wei incident" throughout the process. In "Ren Qianbin in the Eight Years of the Central Plains" (Hubei People's Publishing House, December 1998, 1st edition, page 79), Ren Qianbin recalls this process throughout the process:
Zhong Wei, political commissar of the Third Group, did not listen to the command when marching on the Great and Small Wushan Mountains, did not request a report, and withdrew his troops without authorization under the enemy's strong attack, causing the enemy to hit Li Xiannian's command position and making Comrade Xiannian almost in danger. Secondly, Zhong Wei also talked to people privately and spread words that were extremely unfavorable to unity. He not only talked to other comrades, but he actually talked to me alone, because I was also a member of the Red Army. At that time, I told him what Comrade Liu Shaoqi had said to me in Zhugou about Comrade Li Xiannian and severely criticized him for not going around talking nonsense. ”
"I was very clear and alert about this, so I had to take this kind of thing seriously. Therefore, at the meeting of the heads of the regiments held by the Military and Political Committee, I proposed to carry out the struggle against undesirable tendencies among cadres. I say: Any revolutionary camp, a revolutionary army, a revolutionary party, is consolidated and strengthened from the constant struggle against undesirable tendencies. Waging the struggle against undesirable tendencies among cadres is a basic link in the whole struggle against undesirable tendencies. Today, in the advancing column of our New Fourth Army, there are indeed quite a few undesirable tendencies that need to be corrected. For example, in the last battle against The Great and Little Goku Mountains, individual comrades disobeyed the command, almost causing serious consequences, which was absolutely unavoidable and had to be severely corrected, so he was criticized without naming names. ”
After this meeting, Comrade Zhong Wei did not go to reflect on himself and review his mistakes, but on the contrary, he consulted with a few people to break away from the Yu'e and advance into the column, and lead the team to the Mufu Mountains in southern Hubei to go out to carry out activities alone (Note: Ren Jianbin's recollection here is wrong, Zhong Wei was searched out of the map to draw the route to northern Jiangsu, not Hunan), which is somewhat of the nature of a splittist force, which is the most taboo in the revolutionary contingent. This question was later exposed by the comrades of the Third Regiment. ”
After Zhong Wei's matter was exposed, Comrade Xiannian found it difficult to deal with. Because he was of the Red Fourth Front, and Zhong Wei was of the First Front, if he first came forward to solve this problem, he was afraid of causing misunderstandings between the old comrades of the First Army and the Fourth Front. Under these circumstances, in order to maintain the unified leadership of the troops and stop the split, I consulted with Chen Shaomin and Wang Han (who was already deputy director of the political department of the column at that time) and suggested that a few of us should come out and speak and solve this problem. Because I am not only a cadre of the army on the one hand, but also the acting secretary of the military and political committee and the political commissar of the column, I speak more weightily. ”
After such a study, we held a meeting of cadres in late July to rectify ideological style and military discipline in Yangquan, Jingshan, and Yangquan. From August 1, a meeting of military and political cadres was held at the Peng Family Ancestral Hall at the southern foot of Baizhao Mountain in Anlu, with cadres at and above the regimental level participating in the focus on solving Zhong Wei's problem. I presided over the meeting and I made a special speech on overcoming bad tendencies. At the meeting, everyone spoke out all of Zhong Wei's problems and made serious criticisms. The meeting lasted for about 10 days, and finally a decision was made on the handling of the Zhong Wei issue: First, expulsion from the party and dismissal of his post; second, reporting to the Central Plains Bureau. (Note: Ren Jianbin's recollection here is wrong, and the decision at that time was: Zhong Wei was expelled from the party for one year and changed to a teacher in the camp school)
"We promptly reported this decision to the Central Plains Bureau, and Comrade Liu Shaoqi replied with a telegram and did not express any position on the expulsion from the party (Note: There are omissions in Ren Qianbin's recollection here, Liu Shaoqi did not express his position, but expressed his dissent), only let us send Zhong Wei to the Central Plains Bureau for him to deal with. Later, following the instructions of the Central Plains Bureau, we sent a company to send Zhong Wei to East China. (Note: Ren Jianbin's recollection here is wrong, Zhong Wei later ran away on his own and did not send troops to escort him.) ）
In 1986, Xiao Jianzhang and his wife Tong Hongying bid farewell to President Li Xiannian and his wife Lin Jialin at Wuchang Station
Comrade Xiao Jianzhang, who was the instructor of the guard company at li Xiannian's side at the time, also wrote in his memoir "Footprints of the Times" (Hubei People's Publishing House, December 1997, 1st edition, page 28): "Commander Li turned the crisis into safety, and we were also out of danger. Although the casualties of one of the platoons I brought were larger, the surviving comrades were unusually emotional. After the battle, in accordance with the wartime reward and punishment regulations, Xia Shihou was promoted to regimental commander, the former commander of the three regiments was criticized, transferred to work, and the political commissar was dismissed from his post and investigated..."
Ren Qianbin recalled that he was old, there was no problem with the overall context, and there were some memory deviations. Mainly Zhong Wei plans to go after leaving the team and the way to reach northern Jiangsu.
Zhong Wei was quite dissatisfied with this decision, so he found the commander of the three regiments and three battalions and prepared to join him in the new fourth army headquarters of northern Jiangsu to complain to the leaders. However, Zhong Wei's plan was known to the column, so the tone of the column's report to the Central Committee, the Central Plains Bureau, and the New Fourth Army Headquarters became more and more severe, and the telegram to the Central Committee on August 29 suggested "imprisoning him", and the telegram on August 31 said that "Zhong Wei has been shaken politically, and a few days ago he secretly instigated the three battalion commanders of the three regiments to defect and flee to Hunan to create a situation independently", which is directly defined as a rebellion, which is the origin of the rumored "Zhong Wei once wanted to defect".
Late one night in November 1940, Zhong Wei fled with his wife, children, and Wang Yongfu, a veteran soldier who specialized in transporting and keeping documents from the regimental headquarters, the grooms of the three regiments, and 8 soldiers from the regimental guard squad who sympathized with him. After all the while, he finally arrived at the New Fourth Army Headquarters in Yancheng in early February 1941.
Seeing Acting Commander Chen Yi, Zhong Wei cried on the spot. Chen Yi also joked about Zhong Wei: "How did you, a deserter, escape to me?" In fact, from Chen Yi's words, we can know that the matter will be satisfactorily resolved. After listening to Zhong Wei's appeal, the leaders at all levels of the New Fourth Army believed that the problem was not so serious, so they appointed Zhong Wei as the acting principal of the Fifth Branch of the Kang University. Later, under the circumstances of the Japanese and puppet sweeps and the increasingly dangerous situation of the New Fourth Army, Zhong Wei was appointed as the commander of the four detachments of the New Fourth Army's Northern Jiangsu Military Region. Zhong Wei returned to his command post and eventually became a generation of famous generals.
From the recollections of Ren Qianbin and Xiao Jianzhang, as well as other historical materials, it can be seen that the claims on the Internet about this matter are wrong.
First, there is no doubt that Zhong Wei made a mistake in this battle.
Second, it was not Li Xiannian who dealt with Zhong Wei, saying that Li Xiannian and Zhong Wei had a bad relationship, there was no evidence, in fact, it was just that Zhong Wei saw Li Xiannian's heart. In fact, Li Xiannian avoided the matter in consideration of the issue of unity between the First And Fourth Fronts. Li Xiannian is a person who attaches great importance to unity, and doing a good job in unity between the cadres of the original Army and the Fourth Front Is an important issue in many units. The Zhong Wei incident has always been handled by Ren Qianbin, acting political commissar of the column.
Moreover, it is important that at the beginning, the mistake of the three regiments in retreating early in the battle of Da and Xiao WuShan was not dealt with very seriously, but only criticized without naming names, which showed Li Xiannian's broad mind. The retreat of the three regiments led to a direct attack on the command post by the enemy, and Li Xiannian was almost killed. Even if he was furious and said something very heavy, it was reasonable. However, Li Xiannian proceeded from the overall situation, and the grass-roots division of troops in those years made the cadres of the First And Fourth Fronts Army have a grudge, and the policy level of senior generals is higher and much better, but the thinking of middle- and low-level cadres is not understood, which requires a long-term process. Zhong Wei knew that he had made a big mistake, he did not expect Li Xiannian to have such a big heart, afraid of the new account and the old account together, and it was reasonable to talk to his former colleagues. But the severity of this mistake exceeded that of the mistake in the battle, affecting the unity of the troops and rising to the organizational level.
Under these circumstances, Li Xiannian still insisted on attaching importance to the overall situation, fearing that it would affect the relationship between the First Army and the Fourth Front, and he himself evaded it.
Third, in fact, Zhong Wei's departure from the team was caused by various misunderstandings. At that time, the three regiments had been fighting fiercely for four days and four nights, and the fighting was very bitter, and the regimental commander and the political commissar considered it from the perspective of their own troops, and they were a little resentful, and it was normal to want to leave the battle and save the troops as soon as possible. They themselves did not expect that an early retreat would lead to a big mistake.
After making a mistake, it is normal to be worried in their hearts, but the cadres of the three regiments have grievances in their hearts. Ren Qianbin was a kind of cadre who had a particularly strong party spirit during the revolutionary war years, and it can be seen from the conversation between Zhong Wei and him that he told Comrade Liu Shaoqi about Li Xiannian's evaluation. But such people often have no leadership art, and in his view, the three groups make mistakes, that is, to admit their mistakes. Zhong Wei was a very stubborn person, and to deal with a cadre like Zhong Wei, we must first go along with the hair, first recognize that the three regiments really fought bitterly, and then turn the words sharply: No matter how bitter the fight, we must not violate battlefield discipline. Then I said that Commander Lee was not very angry, but I was very angry and lost the face of the first army. But you have to lift it up and put it down gently, for example, tell Zhong Wei again, you should find Commander Li to report it well, admit your mistake, and make a review, and this matter will be forgotten. Tough and soft, people like Zhong Wei eat this set.
However, it is obvious that Ren Qianbin is a black-faced political work cadre, who only recognizes principles in his eyes, and must admit his mistakes in three groups without comforting him. Zhong Wei certainly did not eat this set. So the more it gets, the stiffer it gets. Therefore, in the first step of the treatment, it was a bit too heavy, and the punishment of expulsion from the party for one year was given. This punishment was certainly unacceptable to Zhong Wei in an era when the older generation regarded party membership as life.
Therefore, Zhong Wei had the idea of going to the military department to complain (he was looking for the old chief Huang Kecheng at that time) and put it into action. But from the disciplinary level, the nature of this mistake is more serious than the first two mistakes, this is already an act of detachment, it is a deserter, others can not determine where Zhong Wei will go, in the harsh war years to be characterized as a traitor, is common. However, from the perspective of the New Fourth Army's Yu'e Advancing Column Column, although the characterization is heavy, it has not risen to the level of contradiction between the enemy and ourselves to deal with. It should be known that Ye Daozhi was arrested and returned from the team, and Tao Yong pleaded with Ye Ting, and Ye Ting drove Tao Yong back with a word: "If you take a gun and desert, you will be shot wherever you go, this is iron military discipline." ”
Zhong Wei was not shot, and his care was not tight, and he was finally able to escape smoothly.
Fourth, as a bystander, both the Central Plains Bureau and the New Fourth Army can see more clearly than the parties concerned. The cause of the Zhong Wei incident was a mistake in the battle, and if serious consequences were caused, it would not be too much to shoot him, but fortunately Li Xiannian was safe and sound, and under the circumstance that Li Xiannian himself was unwilling to investigate the matter too seriously, the mistakes of the three regiments should be correctly guided on a strict basis. On this erroneous premise, Zhong Wei made further mistakes, privately linked up, and spread erroneous remarks against Li Xiannian. Subsequently, because of Zhong Wei's stubborn temper and the anger of some leaders of the column, things became deadlocked, but the more serious the noise became. In fact, as long as you master the art of leadership, it is easy to resolve. Therefore, the Central Plains Bureau and the New Fourth Army Headquarters adopted the practice of making big things small and avoiding the loss of the revolution because of a momentary will. This is undoubtedly a more sophisticated way of handling.
Revolutionaries are not all perfect, and revolutionaries have an intrinsic demand to continue the revolution. Revolutionaries should allow mistakes, and they should allow them to correct them. When our descendants recount revolutionary history, we do not engage in historical nihilism, infinitely enlarge the contradictions in some work, and deliberately exaggerate the so-called "contradictions," "grievances," and "right and wrong" to win attention. Revolutionaries are also ordinary people, and the purpose of quoting in detail here on the face of this event is to restore history to its original appearance and make the ancestors more flesh and blood.
The author of this article: Liu Jingzi, "This is the war" to join the author, without the author himself and "this is the war" permission, may not be reproduced, violators will be investigated for legal responsibility.
Editor's Profile: Wang Zhengxing, former officer of a field unit of the People's Liberation Army, has served in infantry detachments, headquarters, logistics departments and other units, is committed to the study of war history and tactics, and has a unique understanding of military tactics and non-war operations. His book "This is War" was recommended in two issues in May and June 2014 by Phoenix TV's "Eight Minutes of Open Volume" column. His public account name is also "This is war", welcome to pay attention