<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="5" > Four Field General Series 26: Zhong Wei (II</h1>).
Author: Mast
The Battle of Dongye Sanxia Jiangnan's patron tun is probably the most talked about and the most individualistic battle in all of Zhong Wei's stories. Many articles say that Zhong Wei ignored the headquarters telegram, disobeyed the order 3 times, and finally "mobilized" Lin Biao. The whole story is full of ups and downs and fascinating. However, the author consulted the history of the Four Fields and the memoirs of the relevant combatants and found that what was described in the story was not entirely true, but mostly based on some facts. It should be said that in the battle of Paoshantun commanded by Zhong Wei, the "mobilization" of the no. 101 chief was not false, and the "disobedience to the order" was untrue. Today I will talk about this battle.
(1) Seize the fighter and act decisively
From the end of 1946 onwards, the enemy army in the northeast adopted the strategy of "first south and then north", concentrated superior forces, and attacked our weak south Manchuria base area four times in an attempt to occupy southern Manchuria first and then turn back to deal with our army in northern Manchuria. The Northeast Democratic Coalition Army, on the other hand, took a tit-for-tat confrontation and adopted the strategy of "defending the south and attacking the north", crossing the Songhua River south three times and taking the initiative to attack.
On March 2, 1947, the Battle of the Second Lower Jiangnan ended, and the Northern Manchurian troops of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army withdrew to the north of the Songhua River for recuperation. The 87th and 88th Divisions of the enemy 71st Army pursued our army and marched north of the Songhua River on March 7. Dong Zong immediately mobilized his forces and prepared to annihilate this enemy force. Seeing that the situation was not good, the enemy army retreated to Jiangnan and went to the area of Nong'an and Shantun. In response, on March 8, The Eastern Commandery ordered the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Columns and the Independent 1st Division to fight in The Three Lower Jiangnan. The goal of this southward operation is to annihilate the enemy in motion, and the specific targets of the operation should be determined according to the battlefield situation. This is the big principle.
The 2nd Column ordered the 5th Division to cross the river first, advance in the direction of Paoshantun and cooperate with the 1st Column to block the enemy army in the area north of Paoshantun. On the afternoon of March 9, the 5th Division found that the enemy's 88th Division's large troops were retreating from Paoshantun to Dehui. Zhong Wei decided to stop the eastward advance, pursue and annihilate this fleeing enemy on the spot, and annihilate 1 battalion of the enemy in the Jiangjiadian and Wangjiadian areas.
At this time, both the enemy and us were in motion. At that time, The Eastern Commandery judged that the enemy's 4 regiments were concentrated in Paoshantun and that it was not easy to fight, so he changed his deployment, used some troops to contain the enemy at Paoshantun and the main force entered the Dafang area in the east, preparing to destroy 2 regiments of the enemy's new 30th Division. Therefore, at 16:00 on March 9, the Eastern General Headquarters sent a telegram ordering the troops to advance in the direction of Dafang.
Zhong Wei
At about 2:00 a.m. on the morning of the 10th, the 5th Division learned from the captured prisoners that when the enemy 71st Army withdrew to the south, it left more than 900 people in the 2nd Battalion of the 264th Regiment to which it belonged, stationed at the Yongsheng Burning Pot Compound southeast of Shantun to cover the main retreat of the 88th Division of the 71st Army. In this regard, Zhong Wei, commander of the 5th Division, immediately convened a meeting to study and decided not to advance east for the time being and annihilate the enemy on the spot. Immediately while laying out the attack, the enemy situation and the deployment of the 5th Division were reported to the column and the Eastern Commandery.
(2) Encircle the main points and attract reinforcements from the enemy
After receiving the report, Liu Zhen, commander of the 2nd Column, thought that it was possible to mobilize the enemy to help and create a reinforcement fighter, so he immediately agreed to the battle plan of the 5th Division. At 5 o'clock, Dong zong also called back to the 5th Division to agree to annihilate the enemy on the spot, but immediately after the battle, it was necessary to rush to the big house. Later, the Eastern General Electric Ordered the Departments to carry out the 16:00 telegram order on the 9th, and marched in the direction of the large house, requiring them to arrive at the designated place 1 hour before dusk, of which the order for the 5th Division was to advance east to the area south of Dehui.
There is a question here, and the 2 telegrams of the Eastern Commandery seem to be contradictory: in the previous telegram, it had agreed that the 5th Division would "annihilate the enemy on the spot", so why did the latter telegram ask the 5th Division to move east? In fact, there is no contradiction: the enemy army surrounded by the 5th Division has only 5 companies, and the battle should be resolved quickly, so the follow-up telegram of the Eastern Commandery is still asking the 5th Division (after settling the battle) to move east.
Zhong Wei's combat deployment was: to surround and attack the Yongsheng Pot compound with 13th and 15th regiments, and the 14th regiment was responsible for blocking the reinforcements, and then began to prepare for the attack. In accordance with the principle of "four fast and one slow", it is planned to start the attack at 8 o'clock that night, and the preparation time is as long as more than 10 hours.
The movement of the main force of Dongye and the action of Zhong Wei and the 5th Division disrupted the entire battlefield situation and produced two effects: on the one hand, seeing the arrival of Dongye troops, the enemy's two regiments in the Dafang area withdrew to Dehui at 3 p.m. on the same day, and Dongzong's plan to annihilate the enemy in Dafang fell through; on the other hand, after the enemy in the Yongsheng Pot compound was surrounded, the enemy 71st Army immediately sent the main forces of the 88th and 87th Divisions to reinforce Shantun by Dehui, which created conditions for Dongzong to provide reinforcements. Seeing the appearance of reinforcement fighters, Lin Biao, while mobilizing the main forces of the 1st Column, the 2nd Column, and the 6th Column, immediately attacked the Dehui area; at 20:00, he telegraphed to the 5th Division that "I hope to boldly and resolutely annihilate the enemy who supports the mountain and do not worry about reinforcements."
At 20:00 that night, the 5th Division launched an attack on the Yongsheng Pot compound on time. The defending enemy used more than 100 bunkers built in advance to resist unusually tenaciously. After 4 hours of fierce fighting, the battle was not resolved until 24:00 in the evening, and the enemy was completely annihilated.
At the same time, the main forces of the 1st Column, the 2nd Column, and the 6th Column rushed to the Dehui area to encircle or pursue the 87th and 88th Divisions of the enemy 71st Army. At dawn on the 12th, the enemy's 88th Division and 87th Division were completely annihilated, and the three-down Jiangnan operation was over.
After the war, the Eastern General Headquarters commended the 1st Division of the 1st Column and the 5th Division of the 2nd Column for their outstanding performance in the Three Lower Jiangnan Operations. Let's see how the two commendation orders are different: Dong Zong believes that the 1st Division's "spirit of maneuvering bravery and resolutely carrying out orders is particularly commendable and commendable", and that the 5th Division "deserves praise and development for this kind of combat enthusiasm and mobility". That is, to reward the 1st Division for its mobility, bravery and resolute execution of orders in the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy's 71st Army, and to the 5th Division for its "enthusiasm and mobility" in seizing the enemy at the mountain.
(3) Lin Zong was "mobilized", but did not disobey
On February 11, 1947, at a meeting of cadres at and above the division level of the Eastern General And Northern Manchurian Army, Lin Biao stressed in his speech that while resolutely carrying out the order, he demanded that "when the temporary situation changes, when it does not hinder the intention of the entire superior, it should be arbitrary and arbitrary", that is, "standing on the general intention of annihilating the enemy and flexibly handling the situation without hindering the coordinated action of the entire unit." Throughout His military career, Lin Biao has always emphasized the combination of "resoluteness in carrying out orders and flexibility in specific situations."
It should be noted that the patron Did "mobilize" Lin Biao, but did not disobey the order:
It is said that Lin Biao was "mobilized" because Zhong Wei "encircled the point," that is, seized the enemy who was backing the mountain, attracted reinforcements from the 71st Army, and thus created a fighter for reinforcement; and Lin Biao keenly grasped this fighter, quickly adjusted the deployment, mobilized the main force, and carried out the "fighting and aiding" operation. Up and down to achieve a big victory. According to the battlefield situation at that time, if there was no Zhong Wei's "encirclement point" in the backing of the mountain, the three lower Jiangnan would basically be a crushing battle, and it would not be possible to have such a big victory. This is the reason why the Eastern Commandery commended the 5th Division: the 5th Division did not achieve the greatest results in the Battle of the Three Lower Jiangnan, but the "encirclement point" of the 5th Division played a key role in the entire campaign.
Saying that there was no disobedience to the order was the 5th Division's battle plan to attack Paoshantun, first, it did not hinder the intention of the Eastern Commandery, and second, it was agreed by the 2nd Column and the Eastern Commandery from the beginning. It is only reported while laying out the operation, which belongs to the category of mobility. As for the fact that the 5th Division did not carry out the telegram that Dongzong later asked it to go east, it was a matter of understanding the telegram, and Zhong Wei did not disobey the order.
The commendation of the 5th Division by the Eastern General Headquarters fully embodies Zhong Wei's combat style: First, he is highly motivated in combat and typical "militant elements"; second, he is mobile and flexible; under the general principle of implementing the general principle of the headquarters' intention to annihilate the enemy, he does not stick to orders and dares to fight battles without orders. These two points are completely in line with Lin Biao's command principles, and lin Biao also appreciates them very much. Zhong Wei was later directly promoted from the commander of the 5th Division to the commander of the 12th Column, which was related to the Battle of Paoshan tun.
Finally, it should be said that the so-called military orders are like mountains, and Lin Biao emphasizes the premise of "flexibility in specific circumstances" and is "the resoluteness of carrying out orders." Therefore, to say that "Zhong Wei rejected Lin Zong's telegraphic order 3 times" during the battle of Paoshantun is completely exaggerated or deductive.
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