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The limitations of the Zemecha movement, the shortcomings of farmers' associations, the rigidity of land reform measures and the drag of the civil war have led to the gradual emergence of problems in land reform, two typical of which are the outbreak of famine and the coercive measures of agricultural marketing companies.
The change in the original intention of land reform, the shortcomings of the peasant associations themselves, the increased insecurity of land use, and the loss of a large number of young workers due to the civil war led to a massive famine in Ethiopia in 1984-1985, and the death toll was incalculable.
In times of famine, farmers began to look to the government for relief assistance, including imported grain from abroad, tax exemptions, and food aid.
But the junta responded disappointingly, not only by responding passively to famine, but also by launching "resettlement" and "villageization" programs without the knowledge of the people, and by continuing to increase military investment in order to win the civil war, allocating most of the resources needed for the country's development to military purposes.
The establishment of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) has made farmers' lives even worse. Although its goal is to macro-regulate grain, farmers must regularly pay them a prescribed amount of grain, the purchase price of grain is set by the agricultural marketing companies themselves, usually below the market price, and farmers are not allowed to sell grain freely in the market.
Even when much of Ethiopia was in the midst of famine, the agency still made regular food payments from farmers, much to their dissatisfaction.
In the middle and later stages of the reform, due to the irrational distribution of land, the corruption of officials, and the government's negative handling of the land issue, peasants became increasingly close to Amhara oral poetry, and they became more adept at expressing their dissatisfaction with land reform and the regime in the middle and late period, as well as fears of famine or other disasters in the future.
The cause of the problem
A series of reform announcements issued by a military regime in an authoritarian manner without consultation with any group in the country can easily become a dead letter, especially if the content of the announcement is as ambitious as the above.
The implementation of the land reform was strongly obstructed by the reform opposition of the central government, some local officials, clan elders, and the aristocracy left over from the Selassie period, coupled with the shortcomings of the reform itself and the wear and tear of the civil war, which caused the peasants' lives to fall into the abyss again as soon as they began to improve.
Limitations of the Zemecha movement
Although the student groups involved in the Zemecha movement contributed to the establishment of farmers' associations, their lack of practical experience, lack of understanding of local realities, and lack of basic understanding and respect for the values of the farmers they work with caused dissatisfaction among farmers in many areas.
In some areas, farmers have even complained to the central government about the students sent to the local area, on the grounds that they are eager to achieve results without understanding the actual local situation, and constantly urge the local farmers, which makes them unwilling to engage in agricultural production. The behavior of these students also ended up with bad consequences.
In one revelation, some students involved in the Zemecha movement were brutally murdered by peasants for desecrating religious symbols of a village in southwestern Ethiopia. Although few end as horrific as this one, the Zemecha headquarters continues to receive petitions from a number of farmers' associations demanding the withdrawal of students from their own districts.
The students' efforts to advance the farmers' association process are a rather controversial issue. It is ironic that some surveys show that agricultural cooperatives in many areas care less about students than some government officials.
Finally, the Zemecha movement did not receive military support because the Eritrean conflict, Somali border protection and the royalist uprising had dispersed the Government's power. Moreover, the local police, who are generally allied with the established elite, are not trustworthy.
As a result, the movement is largely constrained and policy implementation is inadequate.
The drawbacks of farmers' associations are apparent
The disadvantages of farmers' associations are first of all in terms of their internal income distribution. According to the survey, the cooperative has an investment fund and a reserve fund to cover the cost of purchasing seeds and fertilizers, taxes and other administrative expenses.
However, these costs can only be considered after the payment of wages to farmers, who are more concerned with their personal share than with the proceeds for rural projects, improved crop varieties and irrigation techniques.
The second is the weakness of the peasants' concept of collective production. The expectation of the 1975 agrarian reform that peasants would gradually turn their gaze to collective farms as they gained experience and collective benefits from the process of collective labor has been dashed. It turns out that farmers prefer to cultivate their land as individuals with little or no disturbance.
Third, land reform did not destroy people's values of loyalty to relatives and clans, which sometimes affected solidarity among members of agricultural cooperatives. Some agricultural cooperatives resist redefining land boundaries on the grounds that it could threaten the interests of certain clans.
In exceptional cases, peasants formed peasant associations within their own clans, especially in the Saul and Jigesa tribes. The growing narrow clan values in parts of Ethiopia are also not conducive to integration among agricultural cooperatives.
Finally, many leaders of agricultural cooperatives have abused their powers, abused their power for personal gain, and opposed reorganization, exposing their mismanagement of land resources and other problems.
Some peasants had to admit that they had joined the agricultural cooperatives only because the leadership of the agricultural cooperatives had asked them to do so, imposing the concept of class on them, and these so-called leaders did not raise the political consciousness of the peasants or stimulate their enthusiasm for production.
This approach is contrary to the original intention of land reform, which requires the improvement of the cultural and educational level, political awareness and innovation ability of Ethiopian peasants on the premise of major political work, and ultimately promotes the rapid development of agriculture, the country's pillar industry.
Rigidity of land reform measures
The initial goal of land reform was to abolish landlord land ownership, free peasants from feudal yokes, improve their lives, and cultivate independent, politically aware and innovative peasants.
It is undeniable that this did play an important role at the beginning of the reform, and the peasants' enthusiasm for production was greatly improved, and the agricultural productivity during this period was also steadily increasing. But the core of the reform was the transformation of feudal landlord land ownership into state land ownership, which was mentioned in several proclamations.
After the reforms, the state became the largest "landlord" in Ethiopia, gaining the most direct way to get close to the peasants and then extract profits from the land. State land ownership gives the military regime the sole power to distribute land, which is also a vital power in the eyes of the Ethiopian people.
Because of the cumbersome process of land allocation, the junta could not take matters into its own hands and decided to set up farmers' associations in the regions to help with this task. The farmers' association was ambitious at the beginning, but it was difficult to achieve fairness and justice in the process of land distribution due to the control of the central government, the intervention of local officials, and the threat of clan elders and established elites.
Some families with large populations have been allocated only a very small area of land, which is simply unable to meet the needs of the family; Other families, by bribing local officials and the leaders of farmers' associations, obtained land that did not match their family size, and they were able to not only feed themselves, but even have a surplus of food.
Although well aware of the seriousness of the problem, the military regime acquiesced to the existence of this gray area in order to consolidate its position and gain more economic benefits, which led to a decline in the favor and trust of the peasants.
When it comes to the use of urban land, the junta has an absolute say. People can choose to rent urban land, the rent is very high, in addition to the cost of management, cleaning and other fees, the nature of this part of the cost is very close to the current property fee.
The junta received most of the rent and extra costs, leaving only a few to government agencies and some urban intermediaries. The huge economic benefits brought by rural land and urban land have gradually lost their way, and they have gradually forgotten the original intention of land reform, becoming more and more greedy, and the dissatisfaction of peasants has become stronger and stronger, and the crisis has gradually become prominent.
The drag of the civil war
The civil war led the junta to allocate most of the resources (including land resources) needed for the country's development for military purposes. Under the banner of "everything for the front line of war", a large amount of human, material and financial resources urgently needed for development are wasted on the preparation and execution of war.
In terms of manpower, even after the end of the war with Somalia in 1977, the number of people in Ethiopia who had withdrawn from agricultural production for military purposes continued to increase. Data show that Ethiopia had more than 300,000 troops during the civil war, making it the largest armed force in black Africa.
In addition, the Ethiopian opposition commands an undisclosed but sizeable guerrilla force, estimated to be well over 40,000.
On the material side, the military regime has bombed rebel-held areas such as Vello and Tigray, where crops, infrastructure, villages and other means of livelihood have been deliberately destroyed to prevent the rebels from accessing food and other resources, or as a punitive action against farmers who support the rebels. Fearful of such bombardment, farmers preferred to farm at night.
Not only that, but soldiers often went to exploit the peasants. During the Civil War, soldiers were unpaid, and it was difficult for them to transport supplies through rough terrain and long roads. Therefore, Ethiopian peasants were asked to provide the soldiers with whatever they wanted.
In terms of financial resources, between 1975 and 1985, the cost of paying huge arms import bills amounted to approximately $5.435 billion, wasting the country's meagre foreign exchange earnings. Ethiopia purchased 25.1 per cent of the total number of arms delivered to sub-Saharan Africa during the same period.
It is enough to see that the military regime has done its utmost to win the civil war, and the energy and money spent on the implementation of land reform are very small.
bibliography
Zemenfeth Zieger, "The Political Economy of Land Degradation in Ethiopia," North-East African Studies, vol. 2, No. 2, 1995, p. 75.
2. Kidane Mengisteab, "The Nature of the Ethiopian State and Agricultural Crisis after 1975," International Journal of Comparative Development, vol. 24, No. 1 (1989), p. 24.