Original title: 12 shots analyze the Warriors' ATO and key round tactics: The increasingly demon Cole
12 shots to analyze the Warriors' ATO and key turn tactics: the increasingly demon Cole
In this article, we will bring an analysis of some tactics in recent Warriors games, focusing on some of Kerr's exquisite ATO tactical designs after timeouts, as well as offensive coordination during key rounds.
Without further ado, let's go straight to the analysis!
The ATO after the timeout, the regular bottom-line cross tactic, was played differently by Cole:
Looking at the chart above, this is the tactics after a timeout in the second quarter of the Warriors vs. Hawks:
Fans and friends familiar with the Warriors should know that the various tactical changes after the bottom corner cross cover are a very important part of the Warriors' positional warfare tactics. Among them, there are many low-dislocation after cross-cover that has continued since the Durant to Wiggins period; Last season's playoff highlights featured Curry and Poole spinning in circles.
So while analyzing this ATO, we will also systematically inventory several bottom-line crossover tactics of the Warriors.
The whole principle or starting point of the tactic is that there is a crossover cover between two players on the bottom line, but we can see that the two players involved in the crossover are Jerome and DiVincenzo, two defenders.
Therefore, the focus of the entire cross is no longer the Warriors often play and after the front block and dismantle, the front line low position brought by the main grasp block dismantling quality is big and small; Instead, use cover, hang up defenders, pull out of position, get catch opportunities and follow-up space. Then, for the Warriors, the bottom line cross is also mainly divided into guards and guards (such as between the Splash Brothers) and guards and forwards.
Obviously, the specific tactical effect is different. Including the final tie against the Pistons, the bottom line Lamb's cross-focus is to get rid of the defense and catch the ball.
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In this ATO tactic here, the Warriors focus on placing the ball blocking and blocking positions relatively low, so as to form a better basket effect. As we can see from the picture, the upper line Warriors played 2 simple hand-to-hand catches, but the center of gravity of the entire tactic, Klay's eyes were all on the lower line.
The tactical surprise was when Jerome used cover to accelerate and pull away from his own defenders. At this time, receiving the ball, using cover, Looney will cause the opposing defender to make defensive communication errors very easily, and make mistakes in the change of defense and delay. The reason is precisely that compared to the traditional upper line with the ball block, this block after receiving the ball is closer to the threat distance, in the face of Looney's down and Jerome's throw, defenders are prone to mistakes in the first time. (Especially the Eagles who play 5 small in this game)
At the same time, the defenders who crossed cover at the beginning and hung up also affected the subsequent judgment of the defensive players in disguise.
Therefore, the whole attack eventually evolved into a chance for Rooney to get the ball near the basket, be able to get the ball in a deep position, and occupy a good attacking space. Although Mr. Lu's speed was indeed very slow, he still hit in the end.
Then this tactic has been played between Curry and Looney, including between Curry and Wiseman. In such cases, the Warriors will have a lot more processing, such as Curry being able to throw three-pointers directly, using speed to further compress defensive passes and empty passes, and Jerome-like processing.
Let's look at a baseline crossover, which belongs to the cover between defenders and strikers, that is, focusing on giving the striker's low back the opportunity to eat misalignment:
Payton and Wiggins crossed cover on the baseline, at which point the Heat chose to switch defenses, and Wiggins managed to get a chance near the basket. So if we carefully compare the details of these tactics, most of the Warriors' low back will choose this area near the left basket. Of course, this may also have something to do with the offensive habits of Durant and Wiggins.
So what this brings is that, usually, Wiggins will come from the right side to the bottom line and cooperate with the defenders who move on the left side. At the same time, when the Warriors want to play this crossover tactic, there is often a more obvious action of Green standing at 45° to deal cards, which has basically become a fixed routine of the entire tactic.
The whole tactic is completely consistent from the first layer of the front's cross to find the low position, the same defender and the striker blocking, the same left near basket requirements, the same Green 45° dealing.
But the difference is that in the last round, the defender and Wiggins chose to crouch directly in the bottom corner after covering.
But in this round, we can see from the above picture that the Warriors added a layer of tactical content, arranging Looney's fixed-point cover at the free-throw line. Then after Poole crossed Wiggins, he could get rid of the defender, accelerate, and use Looney to cover and get a three-point chance at the top of the arc. The tactical principle here can be referred to in Spanish demolition or elevator doors.
Especially in the face of a big player like Jokic who is not easy to defend, we can see this offensive routine, and when he realizes that Jokic is not just to defend Rooney, but indirectly to watch over Poole, it is too late to make a change of defense. This requires rotation of defenses in other areas to further break up and dismantle the Nuggets' defenses.
And this is what the whole tactic looks like in the end: Wiggins low out of the first layer of chance; Poole took cover to pop up a second layer of opportunity; The Klay defender was forced to switch to Poole, resulting in Klay being briefly emptied to get a pass route and a chance for a third-tier route. Therefore, for Green's dealings this time, he has a choice of attack from 3 angles at the same time.
This is also Green's job is not the so-called random No. 4 position can be replaced, but also where the Warriors' offense is delicately coordinated, and there are a lot of changes and second chances in tactics.
So, when it comes to Green's (Iguodala in the photo above) dealing, we have to mention another bottom-line crossover tactic for the Warriors:
Looking at the chart above, there is no specific combination for this type of tactic, and usually two players with excellent projection ability will contact the bottom line. The whole strategy is focused on playing on both sides and on catching three-point opportunities in corners.
As we can see from the picture, after Porter and Curry cross, Looney and Wiggins will ambush in two 45° respectively to make a fixed cover wall in advance, and the player who deals cards at the top of the arc needs to capture cross-cover, get rid of the defender, and use the second cover through speed to seize the three-point opportunity.
Similar to the picture above, some defensive players all go to the outside Curry, and the cover wall is disassembled and smooth, which belongs to the subsequent change of tactics.
Another interesting ATO, the gaggle tactic "played badly" by the warriors, has some different changes:
Looking at the picture above, when the Warriors put a player in a low position to respond, a player 45° as a fixed cover wall, and a pitcher arc ambush ready to cover, I believe that fans and friends familiar with the Warriors already know it. This is the Warriors can appear more than 7 times in a game, and Kerr personally did the analysis in the offseason, the Warriors' signature gaggle tactic.
Let's take a look at gaggle tactics before the tactical changes:
Green has his back in the low position, Looney 45° as the wall, and Poole moves to Green's side as a pitcher, moving with Wiggins to make a cross run at the top of the arc. We can find that in this defense, in order to limit the Warriors' passing to a certain extent, the Nuggets used a change of defense, allowing Gordon to switch to Poole when facing Wiggins and Poole. But this also led to the subsequent acceleration of Poole's accelerated escape and the use of targeted cover, making it difficult for Gordon to catch up with the attack.
Therefore, the entire mating loop is reflected in the details of this type of crossing. Meanwhile, for Green, if the Nuggets don't change defenses quickly against a crossover at the top of the arc, it will produce a new offensive option in the middle of the split.
Let's take a look at the gaggle tactical changes after this ATO tactic:
The main difference is that this tactic also incorporates the use of three-point points from the bottom corner of the opposite side. Compared to the previous traditional round, this round adds three points to the first cross-roll player who stands in the bottom corner of the opposite side. As a result, a strong side three-point opportunity is not made, and the player with the ball in the low post turns to the face frame, attracting the defense to shrink and then use the other side.
Of course, we can also see it as a small change in the presence of the Warriors, improvising for the players.
However, from the point of view of this tactical presentation. When the Warriors use Kuminga, a player with a greater degree of damage from the low post, they can consider adding this improvisation to their own offensive follow-up moves to further enrich the approach.
Let's take another look at the Warriors' offensive tactics in key rounds recently:
Look at the picture above, this is the Warriors' sideline serve tactic in the last 9.5 seconds of the Hawks game, and we all know the result of the entire offense: Klay missed the serve this time, Poole rushed to cover it, and the ball was accidentally passed into DiVincenzo's hands and hit the tie.
So what the author wants to talk about here is the last serve tactic, although it did not score, but this is also a sideline ball tactic for a shot. (Because we all know that in these kinds of key rounds, the ball is successfully sent to the key player, and the key player gets a good shot, which is already very valuable)
Let's start with the starting position, a 1-3 position method commonly used by many teams.
One fast defender falls at the back and three players fall in the bottom line in the front. The advantage of this is that it completely opens up the vertical space of the entire stadium, and in some teams' lore tactics, it will involve ambush players in the back court suddenly accelerating away from the defense and getting a shot after receiving the ball.
And the 3 people at the bottom line of the front court, looking at the position at this time, Klay ambushed under the basket. The typical front is a fake running position, which is used to tear the line of defense and induce defenders; Green's fixed-point cover wall hinted that Clay would move there. The confusion of the entire downline landing is DiVincenzo's running position, and the defender mistakenly thinks that this is a tactic in which the bottom line player uses the fixed point to cover the near side to catch the ball.
In the recent Raptors vs Bucks overtime game:
When the Raptors were behind, the flat-line ball tactics they tried had the implication of catching the ball at the back. When Anunoby got the ball up front, we barely noticed VanVleet being in ambush at the back. Then it suddenly accelerated and received the ball, but the Bucks ended up with decent delays and defenses (which also related to the three-point level of other Raptors players).
And in the second half of the Warriors' tactic, which is the real core content, Klay's running:
We can see that DiVincenzo pretended to catch the ball after pretending to catch the ball, and suddenly made a sideways fixed-point cover. The purpose of this cover is also to hang the defenders who are longitudinal and want to make up on the left side. As a result, he and Green formed a two-person block at a right angle within a small range, which created a vacuum range at a bottom corner in disguise.
It can be found that although there is little space in the bottom corner, DiVincenzo's longitudinal blocking and Green's lateral blocking just form a good catch-and-shoot opportunity. This also gives the touchline ball an excellent serve. Although the Hawks player eventually came up to the defense, Klay still got a shot that was not much affected.
At the same time, we can see DiVincenzo and Green dismantling shortly after the block, one moving to the upper line and the other preparing the cardboard. This may also have something to do with the fact that there is more time left to attack and can be reprocessed.
Let's take a look at the Warriors' pretty brilliant sideline tactic against the Pistons, a bold and beautiful goal:
In the analysis of the article of the day before yesterday, we learned that this tactic that Cole used in the G6 in 19 years was used by Green Army Major Marshal Stevens. Therefore, the author of this article will not do too much analysis of the sub-tactics, to briefly talk about a few key points.
First, this tactic is developed by two layers of cross-cover and a fixed-point cover as the underlying logic:
From the perspective of two layers of cover, the cross cover of Lamb and Poole on the bottom line and the cross cover of Clay and Lamb (before the launch), so we can also see Poole's position as the point of second fixed-point cover. The purpose of the two layers of cover is to get Lamb and Klay off the defenders and get follow-up opportunities, respectively.
In particular, Lamb's escape from cover is a key part of the entire serve. We can see that at this time, after Hays encountered cover and changed defenses, it was a process of chasing Lamb with his back to the serve. Then this also gives the Warriors the point of being able to hit the ball to Lamb by hanging high when the passing route is empty.
Of course, although this has a certain tactical logic, it is still a "tightrope walking" operation that licks blood from the tip of the knife. In such a pitch diagonal passing operation, not only the technique and quality of the pass must be taken into account; It also relies on cover quality and a game in which once Hayes glances back at the serve, there is a high probability of being tackled.
Let's talk about the specific tactical basis on Clay's side:
First of all, we can see that in the first crossover with Lamb, a piston side of the change of defense was created. This is why many lore tactics favor crosses before receiving the ball, which can change players who move slower than the initial match in front of them (most teams use a change of defense to ensure that the last ball is not lost), thereby enhancing the collateral effect of subsequent set-point cover.
In the follow-up, when Clay used Looney to cover and hang up his defenders, it was clear that Stewart's reaction was somewhat inexperienced. The original intention is that after observing the large diagonal pass, I want to directly defend the operation of the receiver.
Of course, let's look at the offensive and defensive performance of the G6 in 19:
In fact, we can find that Ibaka also went to pounce the direction of the pass after observing the large diagonal pass on the sideline. But it reacted quickly, immediately moved to Curry's potential receiving position, and interfered well.
So let's look at this footage, and we can also find that it is very similar to the Warriors' signature gaggle tactics in terms of core ideas:
Both are a player passing the ball in a low post, a player covering at 45°, and a pitcher using cover to complete the shot.
For Cole, this season has clearly enriched his tactical reserves in key moments. Judging from these two games, familiar fans and friends should know that the Warriors like to serve on the near side when serving on the sideline, resulting in a quick pinch and barely shooting. But the two recent tactics, a creation of an empty position in the bottom corner and a creation of a 45° three-point opportunity on the opposite side, are very beautiful.
After chatting about some good tactics in recent times, I want to talk a little about two Warriors players:
One is Green and the other is DiVincenzo.
For Green, I would like to highlight his recent defensive recovery, compared to his mid-to-upper mid-range performance at the start of the season (which also has something to do with the increased pressure caused by poor defense in other positions on the team), Green has recently recreated some of the DPOY top of last season's injury during his five-game winning streak.
Due to the length of the specific content, the author will not say more. Here the author chose a lens to see the picture above:
In this round, the Hawks wanted to play a Collins Strong-Lamb strategy low on the strong side.
We pay attention to Green's entire movement: from closing in the bottom corner, to moving to the basket, ready to do protective protection, and turning back to command Klay to remind him of the strong side to the weak side of the cross three-pointer, Okongu is also empty; Green then jammed Collins off the line, forming a two-man clip shot without the ball, cutting off the low single; Okongu was cleared after the free throw line was inserted, received the ball, faced the frame single, Green returned to the initial position, and successfully defended.
A rather beautiful defensive round, the judgment of the situation on the field, the opponent's thoughts, the command of teammates and, finally, his own solo defense ability were all displayed. This is an excellent sign of Green's recent defensive resurgence.
Let's talk about DiVincenzo again:
My personal opinion on DiVincenzo's recent performance is that he is becoming more and more familiar with the Warriors' tactical coordination and some improvisations on the court.
Look at the shot above. It's essentially another gaggle tactic, and yes, the Warriors really like it. Green lowered his back to the wall, DiVincenzo made the wall 45°, and Clay prepared to run. However, in the process of making the wall, DiVincenzo suddenly changed to an internal cut after a fake cover, which successfully disrupted the Hawks' defense and caused problems with the change of defense.
This is what we call familiarity with basic tactics and some improvisational performances that come out of your way.
In other words, DiVincenzo has been able to play more and more in the passing system. Let's take Wiggins as an example, the Warriors' tactical system is very complicated for a new player. This contains a large number of established tactics; With many splashes, dream-chasing temporary matching ideas, and random opportunities under a large number of empty-handed runs.
Therefore, when Wiggins first joined the team, he also had a bad fit. Fans and friends familiar with the Warriors may remember that in the first two years of Wiggins' arrival, from time to time there were some iron-blooded turns and retreats after taking the ball, and now we basically can't see such a shot (there are similar operations after the tactics are played).
A fan friend asked me before: Wiggins is so efficient this season, can he increase his shot?
The author does not think that it is very necessary. Because for Wiggins' shot this season, the author can say without exaggeration that all of his shots are reasonable and within the tactical arrangement. That means Wiggins has fully understood the Warriors' tactics, knowing when to stand on threes, when to cut open, and when to block. This can also be seen in disguise the reason for the increase in its shooting percentage after special training in the offseason.
Excellent tactics, reasonable shots, and offseason additions. Can you not play well?
In the Warriors, in fact, the only ones who really have the unreasonable firing power outside of tactics are Curry and Klay, and a small number of Poole (still to be discussed).
For Cole:
"This old boy has become more and more demon recently, and the more he looks at it, the more pleasing it is";
"Last season's playoff journey was not a losing streak, and the adjustment from game to court was wonderful; The season also strengthens the previously weak tactical handling of key balls";
"After the recent establishment of rotations, strengthening the defense, and that players' meeting, the team is finally on track";
"For the adjustment of the team, the adjustment on the field, the control of tactics, it really has a taste of casual play";
"Warriors fans should be lucky that their head coach is Steve Kerr."
"When praising the Warriors' history of 4 titles in the past 8 years, don't forget him"...