After the outbreak of the nationwide civil war at the end of June 1946, the hopes for the success of the Kuomintang-Republican peace talks in the past year had been lost, but neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Marshall, the US special envoy as the coordinator of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, was reluctant to declare the peace talks broken down, but continued to actively negotiate with the Chinese Communists. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to use the peace talks as a smokescreen to deceive public opinion, cover up his military offensive, and blame the Chinese Communists for the expansion of the civil war. Marshall refused to take the initiative to withdraw from the mediation in order to continue to implement the China policy of the United States to help Chiang Kai-shek oppose communism and curb the Soviet Union, but also demanded that Chiang make certain concessions and democratic reforms. This contradictory China policy eventually caused Marshall to gradually lose his impartiality and become An accomplice of Chiang Kai-shek. In order to help Chiang Kai-shek deceive, Marshall, who was getting older and more expensive, braved the scorching heat to climb Lushan Mountain, which was known as the "summer capital" eight times, between July and September, and shuttled between Nanjing and Muling, happily negotiating peace with the Kuomintang and the Republic of China. In this regard, the CPC delegation headed by Zhou Enlai was forced to continue to break with the US and Chiang Kai-shek deputies, expose their conspiracy to negotiate peace, and "regard negotiations as the work of educating the people."
one
While stepping up its military attacks on the CCP's liberated areas, the Kuomintang also accelerated the pace of dictatorship politically. On July 3, 1946, the Supreme Council of National Defense of the National Government unilaterally decided to convene a National Convention on November 12 of that year. Subsequently, Kuomintang agents assassinated Li Gongpu and Wen Yiduo in Kunming. At a time when public opinion was in an uproar throughout the country, Chiang Kai-shek went to Lushan Tonling on July 14 to "escape the summer" for two months. After Zhou Enlai learned that Li and Wen had been killed, he held a press conference in Nanjing on July 17, issued a solemn statement for the Kuomintang to expand the civil war and political assassination, and met with Marshall to demand a fair settlement of the Kunming incident. The next day, Marshall, accompanied by the new ambassador to China on his recommendation, Stuart Leiden, and others, made his first ascent of Lushan Muling Street from Nanjing at dusk. In his memoirs, Stuart Laiden described the scene of their first ascent to The Ridge: "We took a plane and ferry to Jiujiang for more than an hour on the road, crossed a field by car, and then took a palanquin up the mountain —a total of about five hours." The labor of the journey is self-evident.
Good Hanpo. The picture is from "Chinese Scene" edited by Wood Lian, printed by Shanghai Liangyou Book Printing Company, and republished in 1934.
That evening, Chiang Kai-shek hosted a banquet at Meilu and asked Marshall for his views on recent domestic events in China. Marshall, who was still outspoken in character, immediately "pointed out the signs of near-endless civil war and some transgressions of the government", and spoke very frankly of the two assassinations in Kunming and their harmful impact on American public opinion, which made Chiang Kai-shek extremely embarrassed. After that, Marshall felt that it was inconvenient to talk with Chiang Kai-shek and pushed Stuart Redden, who had lived in China for a long time and had a special "old friendship" with Chiang, to the forefront.
The first round of Lushan talks seemed to go well, and Marshall was extremely excited about the excellent performance of his new partner, and returned to Nanjing on the 22nd with Chiang Kai-shek's promise to negotiate with Zhou Enlai, but the outcome of the talks was not optimistic. Zhou told Marshall that the situation in front of him still cannot get rid of the three major shadows: first, the intensification of conflicts in various places, second, the problem of the yellow river blocking and re-embankment and relief; third, the recent assassination incident in Kunming has not been punished and prosecuted, and the terrorist activities of the Kuomintang secret police have further spread and escalated. This has aroused the attention and strong protests of democratic parties such as the Democratic League. Negotiations cannot take place in such an atmosphere. On 26 July, Zhou Proposed two ways to resolve the situation: First, to issue an unconditional armistice immediately, and at the same time to put into effect the agreements completed in June during the truce, especially in the northeast to stop the conflict and reissue the order for the truce in Guannei. Second, in accordance with the resolution of the CPPCC, the issue of restructuring the government was discussed, and then the issue of local governments was discussed. At the same time, Zhou Enlai feared that Chiang Kai-shek might announce in his personal name that the government would be reorganized, rather than through a comprehensive group of the Political Consultative Conference, indicating that Chiang Kai-shek's intention was to abandon the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference little by little.
two
In the afternoon, Marshall flew to Jiujiang with these suggestions from Zhou Enlai and climbed Lushan for the second time to visit Meilu. Marshall mentioned to Chiang Kai-shek a series of recent incidents of undermining democracy, especially the assassination of Li Wen. In this regard, Chiang Kai-shek did everything possible to shirk his responsibility and informed Li Wen that the incident had ordered the handling of the relevant case. For Zhou Enlai's two methods, Marshall and Jiang did not discuss a way to deal with it, that is, they went down the mountain to Beijing on the 30th, leaving the infected Situ Leiden to negotiate with Jiang and recuperate.
Shilipu Airport in the northern foothills of Lushan Mountain. The picture is from "One Hundred Years of Jiujiang".
On August 1, as soon as Marshall arrived in Nanjing, Zhou Enlai described to him that the government continued to pursue the Chinese forces in northern Jiangsu, Shandong, and Shanxi. If these attacks continue, he said, the CCP will undoubtedly fight back and launch attacks in other areas as well, which will spread the civil war. Marshall asked Zhou to show a solution to the conflict. Zhou then listed three articles for the Kuomintang to choose from: "First, immediately declare a nationwide truce, all documents drafted before June 30 should be signed and published, and the issue of local governments should be left for future discussion; second, first agree on a way to deal with the most serious areas of conflict (such as northern Hubei, northern Jiangsu, and Shandong) to resolve the conflict one by one, and send executive teams to those places to settle the conflict one by one, so as to finally achieve all-round operations; third, military issues should be resolved together with political issues." Zhou said that if the government rejects all three options, it shows that the government wants to expand the civil war, and we have no way. The three armistice measures proposed by Zhou Enlai are reasonable and full of sincerity to save the situation. But Marshall disagreed. Because on this very day, after recovering from illness, Situ Leiden visited "Meilu" and proposed to Chiang Kai-shek the establishment of an informal committee with two members from each of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and chaired by him, specifically to discuss the composition of the National Government Committee to be established by the CPPCC resolution. Stuart Said that if an agreement can be reached on this issue, the armistice and other military and political issues will be solved. Jiang was quite interested in this new proposal and hoped that Marshall and Stuart Would discuss it in detail. Marshall deeply agreed with this, holding that since Chiang Kai-shek did not agree to the armistice issue, he should bypass it for the time being and start with political issues, mainly the reorganization of the State Council. In the context of the widening of the civil war, the cessation of the conflict should be the top priority, but Marshall tried to bypass the problem of the armistice and fantasized about solving the problem politically. On August 3, Marshall told Zhou Enlai about this "new idea", and Zhou did not object, but feared that the government would try to delay the start of political discussions while waging a full-scale civil war, arguing that while political discussions were underway, both the Nationalists and the Communists must simultaneously seek some kind of truce.
three
Zhou's reminder should be said to be pertinent, but Marshall was stubborn, insisting that a deal on political issues would clear the way for an armistice. In the afternoon, Marshall hurriedly flew to Jiujiang and ascended Lushan for the third time to meet Chiang Kai-shek.
Marshall's "new thinking" was right in Chiang Kai-shek's heart. The tripartite organization of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party, and the United States to discuss the reorganization of the government is in itself a violation of the CPPCC resolution and means that it is legal to recognize the Kuomintang's unilateral declaration of the convening of the National Convention. Moreover, since Chiang Kai-shek decided to convene the National Convention, he has been trying to use military offensives to pressure the CHINESE Communists to compromise on political issues. Marshall's proposal at this time to discuss the reorganization of the government was actually another concession to Chiang Kai-shek, objectively cooperating with the Kuomintang strategy. In organizing such a special committee, far from restraining the Kuomintang's military offensive, it is possible to obtain political benefits at the negotiating table that cannot be obtained on the battlefield. Therefore, on August 5, Chiang Kai-shek generously expressed to Marshall and Stuart Redden that he agreed to set up a five-member special group, chaired by Stuart Redden, to discuss the restructuring of the government. However, in return, the next day, Chiang Kai-shek told Ma and Si that before the negotiations, the CCP must accept the following five conditions within one month to six weeks: (1) give up the Suwan Liberated Area; (2) give up the Jiaoji Line; (3) give up Chengde and the areas south of Chengde; (4) the northeast should retreat to Heilongjiang Province, Xing'an Province, nenjiang Province, and Yanji by October 15; (5) Lu and Jin Provinces must withdraw from the areas occupied after June 7. Jiang stressed that if the Chinese Communists accept these conditions, he can arrange a ceasefire, and the five-member group can resume negotiations, otherwise there will be no way to talk about an armistice or a reorganization of the government.
In 1939, the Japanese army occupied the "Meilu" villa in Muling. Image from "Old Photos of Jiujiang"
Chiang Kai-shek's proposal of such harsh conditions as a prerequisite for the armistice and change of government is nothing less than a letter of forced surrender to the Chinese Communists, and at the same time, it is also a problem for Marshall, who is already very accommodating to Chiang Kai-shek, to send a problem and convey a message: Either withdraw from the mediation or go into the water with me and do a big job. Marshall, who had been through mediation for a long time and had rich political experience, seemed to realize this, so he did not dare to see Zhou Enlai directly, and Situ Leiden, who had just joined the army and although his enthusiasm for mediation was high, he was ignorant and ignorant went down the mountain on the same day and relayed Jiang's conditions to Zhou, but Zhou Jingzhi refused, and Zhou Jing told Situ Leiden: "Jiang forced me to be even more harsh than when Marshall directly broke through, which proved that he had no good intentions for Situ Leiden and that he had a difficult problem." Stuart Redden smelled it, his face was red, and he was speechless. Zhou made a judgment in his talks with Stuart Layden: "Jiang seems to be dragging the United States toward a big fight situation", "and the United States may also let Jiang fight for a while and then talk."
On August 8, Marshall went down the mountain. On the second day, Zhou went to ma to point out the seriousness of the situation and hoped that Ma would put pressure on the Kuomintang and urge Chiang Kai-shek to cease war. On the 10th, Zhou again met with Ma and Stuart Layden, stressing the seriousness of the situation, and reiterating the three armistice measures proposed by him on August 1, urging the US side to make a choice as soon as possible. Under the pressure of Zhou Enlai, in the face of the emergency situation in which the Kuomintang troops frantically attacked the liberated areas of the Chinese Communists, Ma and Si actually issued a joint statement, declaring that the Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communists had come to a standstill and that it would be difficult for the United States to mediate. Marshall wanted to take advantage of this and withdraw to return home, leaving Stuart Redden perfunctory, maintaining the status quo and watching the movements. The joint statement seems to be putting pressure on both sides in form, but in fact it is letting the Kuomintang fight hard, which is exactly what Chiang Kai-shek intended. The cooperation of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek is becoming more and more tacit.
In view of the emergence of the new situation, Zhou Enlai decided to intensify the pressure on the United States in the negotiations, expand diplomatic activities, force the US side to either actively stop the civil war, or withdraw all US troops, stop all aid, and mobilize public opinion to liquidate the US policy toward China, expose the essence of its aid to Chiang Kai-shek's civil war, and expose its "mediation" scam.
shop
On August 15, Zhou Enlai went to Marshall and pointed out that Chiang's five conditions were "a line of civil war dictatorship" and expressed the attitude of the Chinese Communists: An armistice does not talk about new conditions, and our side is willing to cease war at any time; politically, it also advocates restructuring the government through consultation. Local administrative issues could be discussed during the consultations. After the reorganization of the government, a unified and united National Congress was convened. At 3 p.m. on the same day, Marshall flew to Lushan for the fourth time. On August 16, Ma urged Chiang to cease the war, but Chiang said the Communists' goal was to overthrow the government and gain power, saying he did not believe that the Chinese army would cease hostilities after the government issued an armistice.
Zhou Enlai, Marshall, Zhu De, Zhang Zhizhong, and Mao Zedong inspected communist troops at Yan'an airport. Pictured from Marshall Envoy Hua, Zhonghua Bookstore, 1981 edition.
Chiang even asked Ma that if the Nationalist government included minority party representatives and other prominent figures and expanded it, not including the Communist Party, would the United States see this as a sincere move toward a coalition government? The strategically minded Marshall warned that China's long lines of communication and border mountains would facilitate the Communist Party's use of guerrilla tactics, and a long and brutal war would inevitably lead to the collapse of the country's economy and even "lead to Communist Control of All Of China." He warned Chiang that the Communist Party must be included in the members of the State Council and that a real reorganization should be carried out. On the 19th, Ma Chiang held another meeting. Chiang insisted that he was willing to continue to do the proposed actions on the establishment of the State Council, and that he would only agree to an armistice until an agreement was reached on the issue of the State Council. After the talks, Ma immediately called Zhou Enlai: Chiang Kai-shek did not think it was necessary to issue an armistice order again, and what was needed now was an armistice for the Chinese Communists!
On August 20, Ma descended the mountain and flew to Nanjing. On the 21st, Situ Leiden was ordered by Ma to pander to Chiang Kai-shek and again mentioned to Zhou Enlai the matter of politically reorganizing the government. Zhou immediately demanded that three issues be clarified before the talks: After the discussions on the reorganization of the government, the KMT could guarantee the abandonment of the Five Articles of August 6, an immediate truce, and the negotiation of the establishment of a state council in accordance with the CPPCC resolution. He also said that if these three points are not guaranteed, the negotiations will only facilitate the Kuomintang to delay time. Situ asked Marshall and told Him that he did not dare to judge the above questions. On the 22nd, Situ once again proposed the establishment of a five-member informal group to talk about the restructuring of the government. Zhou pointed out to Situ that he grasped the center of the "armistice" and expressed two points to Situ: First, the informal group met to discuss whether the Kuomintang could guarantee an immediate truce after the reorganization of the government; second, it was better to hold an informal group meeting while holding an armistice. Otherwise, the negotiations will drag on. Situ, of course, unable to answer, conveyed this to Marshall, and suggested that Ma ask Chiang to appoint members of the Kuomintang side of the five-member group and to take as many steps as possible to pave the way for the formation of the State Council and the beginning of its work.
five
On August 23, after meeting with Zhou Enlai, Marshall hurried to Lushan for the fifth time.
In August, while the US side gradually showed its vicious appearance in the "mediation", it also took more serious steps in aiding Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war, preparing to sell the surplus wartime supplies worth $2 billion to the Kuomintang at a low price. Zhou Enlai was very indignant; on the one hand, he telephoned Marshall and, on the other hand, he held a press conference, demanded an immediate and unconditional truce, implemented the CPPCC resolution, strongly condemned the dual China policy of the United States, thoroughly exposed the deception of the Kuomintang and the United States in peace talks, and pointed out that the Kuomintang and the United States are "now talking about restructuring the government, and if they do not find out, they may drag on for several months."
Marshall, Soong Mei-ling, Chiang Kai-shek. The picture is from Shi Yonggang and Lin Bowen's "Biography of Song Meiling", Writers Publishing House, November 2008 edition.
At Muling, Ma and Jiang were casually haggling. In response to Zhou Enlai's public statement, Chiang claimed that there was no need to issue an armistice order, because it was stipulated in the January 10 armistice agreement, and all that was needed was for the Communists to stop fighting. As for the CPPCC meeting, he said that this organization has fulfilled its mission because it has reached agreements on various CPPCC resolutions. Although he believes that it is necessary for the CPPCC Comprehensive Group to resolve some of the details involved in the implementation of the CPPCC resolutions, there is no point in convening the CPPCC meeting again.
On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek refused to give assurances about the ordering of an armistice, but on the other hand, he still wanted to play with the conspiracy of peace talks. On the 27th, Jiang suddenly agreed to propose a candidate for the Kuomintang side of a five-member informal group headed by Stuart Leiden, who was selected by Song Ziwen, president of the Executive Yuan, to go down the mountain to participate in the negotiations on the reorganization of the government, and claimed that the State Council would be established immediately after the negotiations were completed. Chiang Kai-shek's sudden gesture was obviously aimed at deceiving the United States in order to facilitate the smooth conclusion of the negotiations on the sale of surplus wartime materials between China and the United States, so as to please Yu Ma and Si.
On August 28, the day after Marshall's descent, on August 28, Stuart, who was rather naïve politically, did not hesitate to act as a messenger to Chiang Kai-shek and Marshall, conveying Chiang Kai-shek's above-mentioned proposal to Zhou Enlai and demanding that an informal group of five members headed by him be held as soon as possible to discuss the so-called reorganization of the government. Zhou Enlai immediately and unceremoniously pointed out to Situ: "The informal group has already declared defeat before it has met, because the Chinese side has no sincerity in the truce and still wants to realize the five points by force, which can be proved as soon as the talks are held." He also solemnly pointed out: "At that time, we will declare that the Mediation between Malaysia and The Division has completely failed, the Chinese side still insists that the dictatorship of the civil war remain unchanged, and if the United States does not change its policy, it will only have the Executive Department and its group dissolved." Monday's sharp words greatly embarrassed Situ.
land
On August 29, when Zhou Enlai and Marshall met, Ma was forceful and tried to defend Jiang. In order to expose Chiang Kai-shek's deception and the beauty's deception, Zhou Enlai agreed to set up an informal group of five people in order to retreat, but asked Marshall to obtain a clear answer from Chiang Kai-shek to the three assurances made by the CCP on August 21. At this point, Marshall was speechless, so he had to drive another trip, and on August 30, Marshall flew to Muling for the sixth time.
In 1946, Stuart Leiden, Chiang Kai-shek and Marshall were photographed in Muling. Pictured from Li Yuesen's Biography of Stuart Leiden, China Radio and Television Publishing House, January 2004.
On August 31 and September 2, Marshall visited Meilu twice. During the talks, Chiang Kai-shek did his best to circumvent the military issue. He told Marshall that he had sent Kuomintang secretary general Wu Tiecheng and interior minister Zhang Lisheng to the five-member group. Marshall felt that instead of following Zhou Enlai on military issues that Chiang Kai-shek did not like, it would be better to join Chiang Kai-shek and dwell on political issues for some time, so he discussed in detail with Chiang Kai-shek the issue of preparing a draft constitution under the arrangements of the CPPCC and discussed the method of realizing a National Convention based on a universal basis rather than a unilateral basis. On September 3, Marshall returned to Nanjing to discuss with Zhou Enlai the issue of organizing a five-member group to reorganize the Nationalist government.
But at this time, the attitude of collusion between the United States and Chiang Kai-shek has become clear. On September 5, Zhou visited Ma and Si, expressed one more concession, and agreed to the informal group talks on the method of restructuring the government, but demanded that three points must be clarified: (1) Is the reorganization of the State Council committee handled in accordance with the procedures for the resolution of the CPPCC? If so, the CPPCC Comprehensive Group should make a final decision; (2) After discussing the method for reorganizing the State Council, does the government agree to order an armistice immediately? (3) Has the government waived the five demands? In response to the government's order of an armistice, Ma and Sijun said: "Now there is no certainty to get such a guarantee." "Turnaround and propose: can it be guaranteed by the United States? Ma and Si replied in unison: "This kind of guarantee is impossible at present." However, with regard to the implementation of the armistice, Ma believes that a three-person meeting is still needed to resolve it. Zhou asked: "What if the government still insists on the ccp's demand that five or at least one region be ceded at the three-member meeting?" Marz: "This is a very possible situation. The US side could not and did not want to guarantee that Chiang Kai-shek had ordered an armistice and abandoned the five demands, but had also persuaded the Chinese Communists to participate in the five-member informal group to negotiate the issue of restructuring the government, indicating that Ma and Si had completely lost their qualifications as mediators, completely sat on Chiang's bench, and became Chiang's accomplices.
Seven
Mei Jiang has publicly performed the double reed. On September 6, Marshall went up to Lushan seven times and sent Chiang Kai-shek all the records of the five-member group of people who had discussed with Zhou for review.
Jiang's answer to Zhou's last two points was, of course, negative. After that, the two did not talk deeply, but held a series of tea parties and bridge battles at meilu villa, as well as a Mid-Autumn Festival moon viewing and picnic with Pokou. Before Marshall came down the mountain, he thought that he would always bring something to Zhou Enlai, so he met with Jiang again. Chiang agreed that the military issues would be discussed in a three-person panel, and the National Government Committee would resolve the local government issues in Jiangsu. Chiang said that stopping the conflict depends on whether the Communist Party proposes a list of its delegates to the National Convention, and that the Constitution Drafting Committee should begin its work as soon as the State Council meets. Chiang hinted that the Executive Yuan would not be reorganized until the National Convention was convened, and that it would not abandon the areas occupied by the Nationalist government since January 13 and June 7.
In 1946, Zhou Enlai and Stuart Layden were on the front lawn of the U.S. Embassy in China. Pictured from Li Yuesen's Biography of Stuart Leiden, China Radio and Television Publishing House, 2004.
On the afternoon of September 10, Marshall returned to Nanjing, where he handed over the memorandum of discussion with Chiang to Zhou Enlai. Zhou disapproved of Chiang's proposal and opposed Chiang's attempt to link the cessation of the conflict with the Communist Party's proposal of a list of delegates to the National Convention. On September 11 and 12, Zhou Lianlian met with Ma and Si Lian, reiterated his consistent arguments on the COMMUNIST Party's position, and said that the CPC attaches great importance to the reorganization of the Executive Yuan and believes that the issue of the reorganization of the Executive Yuan must be dealt with at an early date in the CPPCC Comprehensive Group. Noting that the informal group of five had failed, it was again suggested that a three-member panel be convened to discuss the truce. In fact, this brought the peace talks back to the deadlock at the end of June. More than two months of negotiations and mediation proved to be in vain. In fact, Marshall himself has said many times that he is powerless against the situation in China and is ready to return to China, but he did not take the initiative to quit, but continued to rely on mediation until he degenerated to the point of co-starring with Chiang Kai-shek in a double reed play!
split open
At 6 p.m. on September 13, Marshall expressed to Zhou Enlai that he would urge Chiang Kai-shek to stop attacking the Liberated Areas and ascend Lushan for the eighth time, and the results could be imagined. On the 13th and 14th, Zhou Enlai transmitted two memorandums to Marshall, "appointed to represent the Communist Party of China and the 140 million people of the Liberated Areas," protesting the US policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek and aiding China, pointing out that since the June talks, "all devious and tortuous methods have failed in their experiments, and they have not made up for the difficulties of the time, and the militants have delayed time, blinded public opinion, expanded the war situation, and harmed the people." Therefore, he formally requested Marshall to immediately convene a three-member meeting to discuss the issue of truce and make up for the difficulties of the time. The only legitimate body for the armistice was the three-man conference, and Marshall, as the chairman of the three-man conference, naturally had the responsibility to convene a meeting immediately to discuss the armistice with both sides, regardless of the opinions of the other two parties. Ma dismissed Zhou's rationalization suggestions and remained silent. Bathing in the setting sun at Wulao Peak and eating a picnic, he proposed to Chiang Chiang a compromise proposal on the question of seats on the State Council that prevented the CCP from exercising its veto power, but that it was not reciprocally giving the KMT one less vote than the veto power. Jiang readily agreed to Ma's seemingly neutral plan, but cautioned Ma to be more strategic. Zhou Enlai expressed deep indignation at Marshall's carelessness, and decided to retreat into the future, temporarily breaking away from contact with the horse and forcing the horse to take a stand. On September 16, a memorandum of understanding was submitted to Marshall, that is, he left Ningfeihu categorically, indicating that he would temporarily withdraw from the political negotiations in Nanjing, would no longer engage in "meaningless" consultations with the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, and would not return to Nanjing unless Chiang Kai-shek and Ma agreed to reopen the military trio. This is a serious protest against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek's delay and sabotage of negotiations. Marshall knew the seriousness of the problem, returned to Nanjing Ninghai Road the next day, and then repeatedly lured Zhou to return to Ningbo, and even went to Shanghai to meet the driver. Zhou took a clear-cut attitude and was unmoved, launching a large-scale propaganda offensive in Shanghai to expose and criticize the truth about the US-Chiang Kai-shek peace talks at home and abroad.
Known as the "Xia Capital" of the Kuomintang, the Lushan Mountains and the East Valley area of the Lushan Mountains are full of clouds and waves. The picture is from "Old Photos of Jiujiang".
On September 29, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Kuomintang troops to launch a three-way onslaught on Zhangjiakou, one of the political and military centers of the Liberated Areas. On October 10, Marshall helplessly issued a statement, declaring that because the government does not trust the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Communists do not trust the United States, the "mediation" can no longer be carried out. On the 11th, the Kuomintang army occupied Zhangjiakou. The next day, Chiang Kai-shek triumphantly announced that the "National Convention" would be held as scheduled on November 12 of that year. At this point, the door to the peace talks was closed by the Kuomintang, and the truth of Marshall's eight trips to Lushan was revealed. As Liang Shuming, then secretary general of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League, said when he learned that Zhangjiakou had been trapped: "When you wake up, peace is dead!"
(Originally published in: "Party History Wenhui", No. 3, 2002; "Unity Daily", March 21, 2002, 03rd edition of "Literature and History Gallery".) ）