Source: Global Times
For a long time in the past, some smaller countries in South Asia have been on the fringes and blind spots of the strategic vision of Washington's political elites, especially in the field of military cooperation, which has rarely aroused the "excitement" of all parties. But the recent uproar over whether Nepal joined the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP), and although the Nepalese government eventually decided to say "no" to the U.S., in recent years the Pentagon's military tentacles have begun to spread frequently to small south Asian countries. This is not only a sign of the accelerated layout of the US version of the "Indo-Pacific strategy", but also flashes behind the heavy ghost of the US strategic competition with China.
As early as the Trump administration, one of the characteristics of the US "Indo-Pacific strategy" was that security was given priority and the economy was secondary. This is evident from the fact that in 2019, the US Department of Defense, rather than the State Department, took the lead in throwing out the "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report". In the report, the Pentagon proposes a "3P strategy" :P prepareness, partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region. Among them, in the development of "partnership", in addition to emphasizing "strengthening the alliance with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand" and "consolidating the US-India defense partnership", the United States also clearly proposed to "seek emerging partnerships with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal".
Subsequently, the Pentagon's contacts with the military leaders of these small South Asian countries began to increase significantly, military training, equipment assistance, etc. were launched one by one, and Sri Lanka and Bangladesh successively peddled the SPP plan valued by the United States. Objectively speaking, the overall results are not as expected, especially the SPP plan was rejected by Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and other countries for various reasons, the United States returned sadly and somewhat embarrassed, but it still successfully reached the tentacles into these small South Asian countries that are classified by Washington as the scope of the implementation of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", especially in the opening of the "Status of Forces Agreement (VFA)" negotiations with Sri Lanka, and the signing of the "Defense and Security Relations Framework" between the two ministries of defense with the Maldives. Perhaps encouraged by this, the Trump administration released ahead of schedule the "Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework" document, which should have been declassified as early as 2043. The document emphasizes the need to "strengthen the capacity of emerging South Asian partners, such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, to promote a free and open order" and "to build a new initiative modeled on the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative with South Asian partners to improve awareness of the oceans, interoperability and data sharing with the United States."
After more than a year of brewing, the White House officially launched the Biden version of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" document on the basis of the Trump version in February this year, which will become a cornerstone document that will reshape the direction of the US "Indo-Pacific Strategy" in the next decade. The document portrays China as "seeking to build a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region and seek to become the most influential power in the world", and with the primary goal of responding to the so-called "China challenge", it claims that it is determined to strengthen its long-term position and investment in the "Indo-Pacific" region, and will focus on every corner of the region. The outside world has paid attention to the fact that compared with the Trump version, although the Biden version continues to "sprinkle foreign", claiming to build an "Indo-Pacific security alliance and partnership network" with a comprehensive deterrent strategy in the security field, indicating that it will promote the "incremental resource flow to the Indo-Pacific" in the next 12 to 24 months, move the "focus of security assistance back to the Indo-Pacific", enhance "deterrence and anti-coercion capabilities", etc., but does not mention the names of any small South Asian countries, but only refers to and pronounces as "South Asian partners".
This seemingly subtle change in the Biden administration is not that the United States has stopped valuing small countries in South Asia on military security issues, but perhaps it is a strategy of deliberately lowering expectations and trying to get around after reviewing the successes and failures of recent years, which includes many considerations for the United States to promote security cooperation with small countries in South Asia in the future.
On the one hand, it is not difficult to see from a series of US policy statements on China that although the Biden administration claims not to seek a new Cold War with China, it emphasizes the need to "shape" China's surrounding environment to force China to "change its behavior." South Asia is an important part of China's periphery, the geographical location is special, and the small countries in South Asia are all cooperators of the "Belt and Road" initiative, which is naturally one of the natural priorities of the United States to "shape China's periphery". Bilateral military relations can not only effectively pull political relations, but also support and support economic relations, and Washington will only strengthen and not weaken on this issue. In Nepal, for example, if the Millennium Challenge (MCC) economically increases U.S. control and influence over Nepal, the SPP, which the United States originally expected, could bring the two sides closer to security ties at the military level.
On the other hand, the long-term friendly relations between China and small South Asian countries may have made the United States realize from the lessons of the past that "singing high notes" will instead "hit the nails." All along, China and small countries in South Asia have a wide range of military cooperation, multi-level military cooperation, military exchanges, personnel training, weapons and equipment and other fields of remarkable results, which is not only in sync with bilateral political, economic and trade cooperation and other cooperation, but also the true embodiment of China's foreign policy in the field of military cooperation such as not bullying the small, not bullying the weak, and mutual respect. For example, although Bangladesh is relatively backward in the economy, due to the high cost performance of Chinese equipment, especially without any political conditions, from tanks and fighters to ship missiles, nearly 70% of the main combat equipment of the Bangladesh three armed forces comes from China. In terms of personnel training, China's cooperation with small national defense affairs in South Asia has also yielded fruitful results. In the past 20 years alone, more than 110 generals of Sri Lanka's three armed forces have been trained in the Chinese army, and the Sri Lankan army even has friendly organizations such as the world's first Alumni Association of China National Defense University.
Based on the above factors, it is not difficult to understand that when the United States has the conditions to provide military assistance and negotiate bundled military agreements in recent years, it is not difficult to understand that when the United States has provided military assistance and negotiated bundled military agreements, it is not difficult to understand that they have finally rejected them out of consideration for safeguarding national interests and traditional friendship with China. At present, the United States is posing everywhere to compete with China in a malicious manner, but if it continues to advance in a high-profile manner, it may deepen the hegemonic image of public opinion and people in relevant countries that the United States is "luring into the alliance" and forcing it to "choose sides." After the SPP incident in Nepal was exposed, the rapid boiling of public opinion in Nepal has become a "lesson from the past". (The writer is Director and Researcher of the Research Department of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, Tsinghua University)