General Peng, the only person in the world to beat the United States to the ground

In October 1950, when the "United Nations Army" composed of 16 countries led by the United States invaded Korea and approached the Chinese border, Peng Dehuai led the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea; under the strategic guidance of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao, after two years and nine months of arduous and bloody struggle, peng Dehuai led the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to resist us and aid Korea. Peng Dehuai became the first Chinese commander to defeat the US military, became a famous military figure at home and abroad, and even the opponent of the American general on the battlefield could not help but admire his command ability and boldness.

Peng Dehuai's outstanding military command ability in the Korean battlefield, we believe, is outstanding in the following aspects.

First, first of all, he has the courage and boldness of a great strategist and dares to make up his mind to go to war under the circumstance that the strength of the enemy and us is very different and the situation is very unfavorable to us

On June 25, 1950, the Korean Civil War broke out, and on October 1, Mao Zedong received a letter from Kim Il Sung asking for help, and on the same day, a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee was held to strongly advocate sending troops to aid North Korea. In response to the opinion of the majority of people advocating not sending troops, Mao Zedong said at the Politburo meeting on the 4th: "What you say is justified, but others are in a critical moment of national crisis, we stand by and watch, no matter what we say, we feel sad." Peng Dehuai, who was urgently summoned to Beijing for a meeting at the request of Mao Zedong, took a special plane to the Beijing airport at 4 p.m. on the same day and immediately rushed to the conference hall of the Zhongnanhai Yinian Hall. He listened to everyone's speeches, and also listened to Mao Zedong's last speech, but did not speak. On the 5th, Mao Zedong asked Peng Dehuai to talk alone. Peng Dehuai expressed his approval of Mao Zedong's decision to send troops, which strengthened Mao Zedong's determination to send troops. Mao Zedong confronted Peng Tan and appointed him as the commander of the Volunteer Army to lead troops to aid the DPRK and solicited his opinions. Peng said he obeyed the central government's decision. In the afternoon, Peng spoke at a meeting of the Politburo to discuss sending troops to aid the DPRK, saying: "It is necessary to send troops to aid the DPRK. If it is broken, it will at most be equivalent to a few years of late victory in the War of Liberation. If the US military is placed on the banks of the Yalu River and Taiwan, it can find excuses at any time if it wants to launch a war of aggression. Peng's speech aroused the admiration of the leaders and other generals attending the meeting, especially his fearless spirit of leading the army into the DPRK in the face of danger. The Central Committee originally decided to send Lin Biao to lead the army to fight, considering that he was the commander of the Fourth Field Army and was familiar with the first batch of troops to fight abroad, but he refused to go under the pretext of being sick. Therefore, Mao Zedong was very satisfied with Peng Dehuai's wish to bear the heavy trust. On the 13th, Mao Zedong summoned Peng Dehuai to return to Beijing from Andong to discuss the decision to send troops again. At this time, the capital of North Korea, Pyongyang, was in danger, and the Korean People's Army had only 50,000 people left. North Korea is in jeopardy. After consultation with Peng Dehuai and others, Mao Zedong decided that the plan of sending troops to aid the DPRK would remain unchanged, and it would not be possible to see death without salvation. General Manager Peng has made up his mind that he must fight and win if he wants to fight, and ordered the troops going abroad to complete their combat preparations in 10 days. Subsequently, General Peng commanded our army to launch three consecutive offensive campaigns, turning the tide of the Korean War. The enemy was crushed and retreated south of the 38th Parallel. Facts have proved that the CPC Central Committee's strategic decision on sending troops to resist US aggression and aid Korea on national security and The fate of Asia has been wise and correct, and it has also proved that Peng Dehuai played an important role in supporting and firmly upholding Mao Zedong's decision to send troops to aid the DPRK under the chairmanship of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Those of us who accompanied Mr. Peng into the Korean War deeply felt that Mr. Peng had the courage and courage of a great strategist and dared to make up his mind to go to war under the circumstance that there was a strong disparity between the enemy and our forces and the situation was very unfavorable to us, and it also lay in the fact that he possessed a high degree of patriotism and heroism. Ridgway, the second commander-in-chief of the US army that invaded Korea, an important opponent of our army on the Korean battlefield at that time, lamented in his memoirs that one of the major mistakes of the United States in the Korean War was that it underestimated the strength of the Chinese, because the United States took the action of crossing the 38th Line to attack Korea, believing that at that time, "no sober-minded commander" of China would send troops south of the Yalu River to fight. At present, American scholars recognize Peng Dehuai as such a sober commander. His achievements are becoming an eternal academic topic for Chinese and foreign scholars. Second, grasp the fighter plane, create the battlefield, and determine the operational policy in the light of reality

The main reason why Mr. Peng won the battle under the strategic guidance of Mao Zedong was that he was able to correctly grasp the fighter plane, create the battlefield, and determine the operational policy in light of reality.

1． Grasp the fighter plane of the decisive battle of a major strategic battle

On October 8, Peng Zonglin was appointed commander and political commissar of the Chinese Volunteer Army, leading the army to fight abroad. On the same day, General Peng went to Shenyang to listen to a report by Park Yi-woo, the DPRK Minister of Internal Affairs, on the enemy's situation. On the 10th, Mao Zedong telephoned mao Zedong and suggested: Originally, it was planned to send 2 armies and 2 artillery divisions first, but it was feared that it would be difficult to concentrate superior forces when the iron bridge of the Yalu River was bombed, and it would lose fighters, so it was decided to gather all 4 armies and 3 artillery divisions in the south of yalu Jiangnan, wait for the opportunity to annihilate the enemy, and changed the original plan. Mao Zedong sent a telegram on the 11th to agree to General Peng's deployment. On the 19th, General Peng led a staff officer, two guards, and a radio station into Korea for the first time, and 260,000 troops crossed several crossings to enter Korea at several crossings on the same day, completing the deployment of the campaign and creating a favorable layout for the implementation of the first campaign. From October 8 to the 19th, when the army went abroad to complete the preparations for the battle, it took only 12 days, of which Peng Zong traveled to Beijing, Shenyang, and Andong (Dandong) three times. After Peng entered the DPRK, he met with Prime Minister Kim Il Sung on October 21, day and night. Kim Il Sung was full of gratitude, tightly held Peng Dehuai's hand and said that the volunteer army came in time, and Chinese people were real friends!

After the victory of the first battle, MacArthur still misjudged that our troops abroad were only 60,000-70,000 troops, and still deployed his main forces on the south bank of the Cheongcheon River and the area south of the Battle Ridge, preparing to launch a general offensive to end the Korean War before "Christmas", advancing through the north of Chosin Lake with 5 divisions and then going west; with 8 divisions and 2 brigades going north from the Cheongcheon River, with a total strength of more than 220,000 troops, the two armies planned to meet south of the river boundary, surround and annihilate the volunteer army and the people's army in northern Korea, and seize all of Korea before the Yalu River was frozen. Mao Zedong telegraphed Peng Dehuai to pay attention to the possibility of the enemy launching a counteroffensive against us. After General Peng clarified the situation, he seized the fighter plane at the right time to carry out a decisive battle, launched a second campaign, and painfully annihilated a part of the ace troops of the invading army, turning the tide of the Korean war.

By January 1951, the volunteer army had won three consecutive large-scale offensive operations abroad, killing, wounding and capturing more than 70,000 enemy troops, and expelling the enemy from the Yalu River to the vicinity of the 37th Line. At this time, Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK Razovaev and some comrades believed that the US military was preparing for a comprehensive retreat, advocated taking advantage of the victory to pursue, and drove the invading army out of Korea with a single blow. General Manager Peng held that although the enemy has been dealt a heavy blow by us three times, the main force has not been weakened, the reserve force is very strong, and the technical equipment still occupies a great advantage; our army is quite tired, especially the reduction of personnel is very large; with the southward shift of the front, the logistics and transportation of our army has been extended to 500 to 700 kilometers. Under the condition that there has been no fundamental change in the strength of the enemy and ourselves, it is obvious that the time for a decisive battle is not ripe. To this end, resolutely stop the pursuit. Mao Zedong agreed with him. The instructions may adopt the principle of winning quickly if you can win quickly, and slow victory if you can't win quickly.

The practice of the Korean battlefield shows that we must not delay the fighter planes, nor can we blindly blindly attack, fail to pay attention to the objective situation, be eager to win, and take risky actions, which will lead to fiasco.

2． Carefully create a battlefield for strategic battles and decisive battles

Creating a battlefield for carrying out a campaign is to make full use of the spatial factors of war and the basic condition for realizing the war goal of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy. Before the volunteer army entered the DPRK, Mao Zedong instructed Peng Dehuai to consider fighting and the geographical environment against the enemy army with highly modern equipment, and pay attention to creating a battlefield conducive to our army's annihilation of the enemy. Mr. Peng's usual considerations in creating a battlefield in Korea are: (1) conducive to the realization of strategic intentions. (2) It is conducive to crushing the enemy's combat attempts. (3) It is conducive to achieving the combat objectives of the war of annihilation. (4) Conducive to the development of the next campaign. The core of this is whether it can annihilate the enemy in large numbers and develop victory.

The focus of the first campaign to resist US aggression and aid Korea was to unexpectedly confront the invading army, gain a foothold, gain a firm foothold, and create conditions for subsequent development and victory. Within a few days after entering the DPRK, General Peng and his assistants, Deng Hua and Hong Xuezhi, deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army, formed a new judgment based on the new battlefield conditions, formulated the correct strategy, changed the original deployment, and determined the annihilation of the enemy in the movement north of the Qingchuan River.

In the second campaign, we chose to preset the battlefield near the Qingchuan River, and also considered the enemy's situation, our situation, the comparison of troops, and the terrain, which would help us to lure and annihilate the arrogant enemy, lure the enemy to go deeper, and carry out interspersed, divided, detoured, and encircled, and annihilated the enemy's living forces.

The creation of the battlefield is determined by accurately judging the strategic movement of the enemy. One of the 3 books that Mr. Peng put on the table and pillow in the Korean battlefield is macArthur's example of landing operations in World War II and his life experience material. Familiarity with the temper and disposition of enemy commanders and mastering the strengths and laws of the US military have always been topics that General Manager Peng often told his staff officers. In February 1953, seven U.S. divisions and two South Korean divisions assembled on the second line and stepped up landing exercises. The Central Military Commission and General Manager Peng judged at an appropriate time that the enemy might land on the hanchuan river on the west coast, the Qingchuan river to the Yalu River line area, and the Yuanshan area on the east coast, commanded and mobilized 6 corps and 19 divisions of the Volunteer Army, 1 corps of the People's Army, 2 other 7 divisions of the army, and two corps of the People's Army to make anti-landing preparations on the east and west coasts, and excavated a total of 720 kilometers of tunnel fortifications and 3,100 kilometers of trenches and communication trench fortifications. The United States found that the coasts on both flanks of our army had been heavily fortified, so they abandoned the landing attempt and were forced to resume armistice negotiations with us on April 26, 53, thus paving the way for the subsequent realization of the Korean armistice. 40 years later, American scholars came to China for academic exchanges, saying that in 1953, the Chinese army made anti-landing preparations, the construction of troops, weapons and fortifications was quite sufficient, and the United States did not dare to repeat the Inchon landing-style operation.

3． Proceeding from the actual conditions on the battlefield, the operational policy is determined

When our army entered the DPRK, the main target of combat was the US invading army, which not only had a high degree of modern technical equipment, but also had a long period of training and rich experience in actual combat. The commander's military quality is relatively strong and he has a certain spirit of seeking truth. In the face of such an enemy, General Peng, on the basis of understanding the overall strategic situation in the new battlefield, from the political, military, military, troop strength, posture, terrain, and other aspects, found out the key points affecting the course of the war, and determined the operational policy of our army. For example, before the volunteer army entered the DPRK, it was originally planned to adopt the operational policy of "combining active defense, position warfare, and mobile warfare, and annihilating and depleting the enemy's living forces with counterattacks, attacks, and ambushes." The first period was fought only defensive warfare. After the volunteer army entered the DPRK, General Peng, on the basis that the enemy had not yet discovered that our army had entered the DPRK, was dividing up the troops and rushing forward, and immediately made a decision, abandoning the original plan, and changing to the operational policy of annihilating the enemy in the movement, thus winning the first battle abroad.

After the initial victory, General Manager Peng conformed to the development of the battlefield situation and adopted the correct policy of focusing on mobile warfare and combining it with some positional warfare and guerrilla warfare, fighting the enemy back from the Yalu River to the 38th Line, reversing the tide of the war and laying the foundation for victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.

In June 1951, when the 3rd, 4th, and 5th battles stabilized the front near the 38th Line, there was a relative balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, and in the short term the enemy was unable to launch a large-scale attack, and it was difficult for me to annihilate the enemy's heavy army group, and the entire battlefield showed a stalemate. At the enlarged meeting of the Standing Committee of the Volunteer Army, General Manager Peng decided to adopt the policy of fighting a small war of annihilation against the enemy on the basis of chairman Mao's tactic of "knocking out the candy with zero knocks." Since then, our army has carried out the strategic change from mobile warfare to position warfare and entered the stage of fighting a small annihilation war. Our army became stronger and stronger, successfully crushed the enemy's many attacks, and also carried out many tactical attacks on the enemy's strong positions, until the campaign-scale attack annihilated and consumed the enemy in large quantities.