As long as the troops were handed over to Lin Biao or Luo Ronghuan for command, Mao Zedong would be relieved, and if Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao cooperated and partnered, Mao Zedong would be even more at ease.
This is a high degree of trust and tacit understanding tempered between them in more than twenty years of brutal and fierce revolutionary struggle.
As Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao's teacher, Mao Zedong opened his heart to Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Luo Ronghuan died of illness, and the whole country was saddened, and Mao Zedong even issued a message that "who can be asked if the state has difficulties?" "The sad inner monologue.
However, as an outlier Lin Biao, the future treatment and ending are difficult to say.
Luo Ronghuan's first cooperation with Lin Biao was very early and the starting point was also high.
The specific cooperation time was June 1930, and the partners were the commander and political commissar of the Red Fourth Army, when Luo Ronghuan was twenty-eight years old and Lin Biao was twenty-four years old.
The Red Fourth Army was a unit created by Zhu De and Mao Zedong himself. At the Beitou Conference in February 1930, Zhu De and Mao Zedong served as the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Red First Army, respectively, and thereafter they no longer concurrently served as the commander and political commissar of the Red Fourth Army.
In the end, Lin Biao and Pan Xinyuan took over the baton of the commander of the Red Fourth Army and the political commissar of the Red Fourth Army.
The source of Lin Biao's participation in the revolution began with the Nanchang uprising troops led by Zhu De, and the source of Pan Xinyuan's participation in the revolution began with the autumn harvest uprising troops on the Border of Xianggan and Gansu led by Mao Zedong.
However, at that time, Pan was working on the border of Xianggan and the Fifth Red Army as a central inspector, and could not serve in the Red Fourth Army, that is, Xiong Shouqi acted as the secretary of the Military Commission.
On April 1, after the Red Fourth Army captured Nanxiong in Guangdong, Xiong went to Shanghai as a representative of the Red Fourth Army to attend the National Conference of Red Army Representatives. The former committee immediately re-selected candidates for political commissars of the Fourth Army.
As the political commissar of the Fourth Red Army, in addition to having the basic conditions of having a firm stand, having a correct concept, and having rich political work experience, he must also have a broad mind.
It is necessary to have a firm sense of principle, and on non-principle issues, it is also necessary to have a tolerant measure, and be good at forbearance and understanding.
So Mao Zedong targeted Luo Ronghuan. There is no doubt that Luo Ronghuan meets all the conditions for serving as the political commissar of the Red Fourth Army.
Mao Zedong admired Lin Biao's steadiness and flexibility in fighting, and especially affirmed that he was good at surprise and ambushing the enemy.
But he can't agree with his strong personality and unwillingness to listen to other people's opinions.
Since Lin Biao became the head of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, he has not had a good relationship with the party deputies of various sessions, and it is quite difficult for others to work with him.
Mao Zedong believed that Luo Ronghuan could improve his relationship with Lin Biao. Therefore, it was suggested that Luo Ronghuan act as the political commissar of the Red Fourth Army, and the former committee agreed to Mao Zedong's proposal.
After Luo Ronghuan took office, he devoted himself to the building of the troops, grasped the political work, military training, and supply work of the four armed forces in an orderly manner, and cooperated well with Lin Biao.
In addition to being responsible for operational command, Lin Biao simply did not pay much attention to the daily work of the troops.
During the period of anti-"encirclement and suppression," Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao cooperated with tacit understanding and led their troops to achieve major victories in succession.
Mao Zedong relaxed his heart, and he happily said to the comrades around him: "Luo Ronghuan is in the Fourth Army, is not he united well with Lin Biao?" ”
On July 1, 1931, Chiang Kai-shek launched the third "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Region. Three hundred thousand horses came from north to south, surging forward, and at once occupied almost all the central base areas.
Braving the scorching heat, the Red Army took a detour of thousands of miles, concentrating from the bottom of the base area in western Fujian to Ruijin and then to Xingguo Gaoxingping.
In the early morning of August 7, the Red Army completely annihilated a brigade of Shangguan Yunxiang's division in Liantang, and in the afternoon annihilated more than two regiments of the enemy Hao Mengling's division at Liangcun.
After the Battle of Liangcun, the main force of the Red Fourth Army turned to the east to fight Mao Bingwen's division stationed in Huangpi.
However, in the closing stage of the victory, the first discord during the cooperation between Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao appeared.
Lin Biao (front row, first from right)
At that time, the main departments that remained in Liangcun to clean up the battlefield were the Political Department, the Supply Department, and the Ministry of Health.
As they placed the wounded, took prisoners, transported guns, and were moving closer to the main force, the enemy Nineteenth Route Army caught up with them.
In this way, the Red Army was outnumbered and too late to evacuate, some prisoners and guns were retaken by the enemy, and some wounded members of the Red Army were also captured by the enemy.
After the war, Luo Ronghuan believed that as the secretary and political commissar of the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army, he should be responsible.
Later, at the meeting of the Military Commission of the Fourth Red Army held in Chenggang, a responsible person of the CPC Central Committee delegation attended.
At the meeting, the responsible person also raised the issue of the wounded soldiers, prisoners, and guns lost by Liangcun after the war, and asked the Red Fourth Army to conduct a profound review.
Luo Ronghuan took the initiative to take responsibility and made a strict review and self-criticism.
However, Lin Biao believed that there was nothing wrong with this, that the main force of the troops attacked according to the order, that the rear organs had no combat effectiveness, and that it was normal to suffer losses from the enemy's surprise attack.
Therefore, Lin Biao did not make a review at the meeting, nor did he speak a fair word for Luo Ronghuan, let alone share the responsibility for Luo Ronghuan.
After the meeting, Luo Ronghuan was dismissed from his post as secretary of the Central Military Commission and replaced by Lin Biao. Luo Ronghuan had no complaints about the unfair criticism he had received, and he never thought about it later.
On March 12, 1932, the Red Army was reorganized, and the Red Fourth Army and the Red Fifteenth Army were organized into the First Army, with Lin Biao as the commander-in-chief, Nie Rongzhen as the political commissar, Chen Qihan as the chief of staff, and Luo Ronghuan as the director of the Political Department.
In this way, the cooperative relationship between Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao ended, and they became a superior-subordinate relationship again, but they still knew each other very well, and there was a cooperative relationship that was not cooperative until March 1938.
During this period, Luo Ronghuan was demoted several times because of Mao Zedong, and he and Lin Biao were also divided.
In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, after the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army, Lin Biao was the commander of the 115th Division, and Luo Ronghuan was the director of the Political Department of the 115th Division.
In the spring of 1938, after Lin Biao was mistakenly wounded by friendly forces and left the 115th Division, Luo Ronghuan immediately took up the burden of the 115th Division, and soon after, rushed to the battlefield behind the anti-Japanese enemy in Shandong.
After eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Luo Ronghuan lived up to the expectations of the people and turned Shandong into the largest anti-Japanese base area in the country.
At the end of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, there were no Kuomintang and Communist forces in the entire northeast region. Mao Zedong, who had a strategic vision, was determined to take advantage of the geographical advantages of Shandong and Eastern Hebei to send our army to seize the "blank spot" in the northeast.
On August 10, 1945, just after Japan issued a note on surrender, Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, ordered Lü Zhengcao, Zhang Xueshi, Wan Yisuo, and Li Yunchang of the Eighth Route Army of the former Northeast Army to march toward Chahar, Rehe, and Liaoning the next day.
The Eighth Route Army advanced to the northeast
On August 26, in order to strengthen the strength of the Shandong Liberated Areas and prevent the "encroachment" of the Kuomintang, Mao Zedong personally wrote a manuscript and called Luo Ronghuan, secretary of the Shandong branch:
Comrades Lin Biao and Xiao Jinguang flew to Taihang yesterday for Shandong. Division of labor: Luo Ronghuan is the secretary and political commissar, Lin Biao is the commander, and Xiao Jinguang is the deputy commander.
If Luo has to recuperate due to illness, Lin will act as Luo's deputy, and Lin and Xiao will be members of the sub-bureau. The rest remain unchanged. ”
This was the second cooperation between Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao, but Luo Ronghuan had already accumulated fatigue and became ill, and the severe suffering of kidney disease not only caused him to be physically exhausted, but also inevitably affected his work energy.
Mao Zedong considered that Shandong could not do without Luo Ronghuan, and Luo Ronghuan had a lot of part-time jobs, and the burden was too heavy, which was bound to crush his seriously ill body.
Therefore, it was resolutely decided to transfer Lin Biao to Shandong and let them work together in Shandong to make the Shandong base area bigger and stronger.
At this time, the central government had not yet considered letting Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan enter the northeast.
By September, as the first batch of troops out of the customs had developed greatly in the northeast, Mao Zedong decided to invest a large number of cadres and fighters to "break into the Guandong".
On September 19, the central authorities sent Luo Ronghuan to work in the northeast, changed the Shandong sub-bureau into the East China Bureau, and expanded the Jireliao Military Region, with Lin Biao as commander.
In this way, taking into account the changes in the battlefield situation and the enemy situation, Mao Zedong decided to let Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao, the two most trusted right-hand men, take the elite troops to the northeast.
In the face of unpredictable difficulties, in the face of unfamiliar areas without a base, open up new and larger battlefields!
This is the strategist Mao Zedong!
With the joint cooperation of Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao, even if they are both sick, even if there is a lot of unknowability in the future, Mao Zedong is still at ease. Because he relied on the wisdom and thoughts of Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao.
Just at this moment, the torture of kidney disease made Luo Ronghuan feel difficult to support.
He was afraid of delaying the major plan for the mobilization of troops, and asked the central authorities whether he could recuperate for a period of time, and if he had to go to the northeast, it would be better for him not to be the main leader of the troops.
Li Yu and Shu Tong also called the central authorities and suggested that Luo Ronghuan rest.
But the central power: the northeast still has to go, and the treatment conditions may be better after going to the northeast.
This shows Mao Zedong's high trust and ardent expectations for Luo Ronghuan.
As a result, Luo Ronghuan no longer mentioned the matter of recuperation, but concentrated all his energy on dispatching troops.
On October 24, Luo Ronghuan received a telegram from the central authorities, asking him to "take the command organ lightly and go to the northeast within the day."
On the same day, Luo Ronghuan, who was dragging his sick body, bid farewell to the former leaders of the Shandong Branch Bureau and Li Yu and Shu, who had just joined the work of the East China Bureau, and led the command organs to embark on a journey by car.
On October 29, Lin Biao and Xiao Jinguang, who had turned north from Puyang, Henan, arrived in Shenyang, Liaoning Province.
In this way, Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao rushed to the northeast separately and began their second close cooperation since the red army period.
Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao were like this, and at the critical moment when it was necessary to open up a new battlefield, they were always solemnly used by Mao Zedong as the main force and vanguard, killing the enemy's territory.
At this time, although Lin Biao, who had been in the battle front for a long time, lacked the tempering of actual combat, he painstakingly studied military theory during his illness in the Soviet Union, and his military command attainment was greatly improved.
However, he did not bring a single soldier to the northeast battlefield, and he was a veritable commander of the light pole.
After eight years of arduous war tempering in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Luo Ronghuan had changed from a pure leader of political work to an all-round military and political marshal, and the number of troops brought to the northeast by his own hands had reached more than 60,000.
At this time, remembering the name given to him by Luo Ronghuan's primary school principal, he was a real "Huan Huan Yu Zheng", he was mighty and mighty, and he was galloping across the vast territory.
On November 13, Luo Ronghuan, who crossed the sea from Longkou in Shandong Province to the north, arrived in Shenyang several times and met with Peng Zhen, secretary of the Northeast Bureau, at the Sanjing Street Museum.
The two shook hands, very happy, and after greeting each other, Peng Zhen briefed Luo Ronghuan on the situation in the northeast. Then, Luo Ronghuan went to visit Lin Biao, who had already arrived in Shenyang.
The old partners have not seen each other for more than seven years, and once they see each other, they are naturally very cordial, but they still talk more about the troops.
The two big hands are held together, marking the official beginning of the second cooperation of "Lin Luo".
At the same time, the Kuomintang's U.S. ordnance and equipment units had already sailed north from the sea to Qinhuangdao, and under the cover of aircraft, they began to make a fierce attack on our troops guarding Shanhaiguan. The battle between the enemy and us was very fierce.
On November 15, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the Northeast Bureau, ordering the line of Shanhaiguan and Suizhong to exhaust the exhausted enemy, while I concentrated the largest force at the most favorable time and place, under the command of Lin Biao or Luo Ronghuan, to carry out a counter-offensive and annihilate the enemy.
This was the first telegram related to their cooperation after "Lin Luo" cooperated in the Northeast Liberation Battlefield.
After that, Luo Ronghuan, lin biao, and Peng Zhen, and sent letters and telegrams to the leaders of the central and northeastern units to ask for instructions and discuss countermeasures for the struggle against the enemy, and issued orders for dispatching troops and dispatching generals.
However, the enemy's follow-up troops are still being transported from American warships to Qinhuangdao. Due to the strength of the enemy and the weakness of the enemy and the huge disparity in strength, our customs guards took the initiative to withdraw from Shanhaiguan on the 16th.
In this regard, the Northeast Bureau urgently decided to let Lin Biao go to the front line to direct the operation.
On November 19, Lin Biao set out from Shenyang to the front line to command, and Peng Zhen and Luo Ronghuan sat in the remote control of the Northeast Bureau.
In order to make the command effective and the communication convenient, Luo Ronghuan did not hesitate to take away Su Jing, Li Zuopeng, and other major combat staff officers who had come with him from Shandong, as well as the radio stationer Lin Biao, and from this we could see Luo Shuai's broad-mindedness.
Time entered 1946, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan faced the war situation is not optimistic, but also need to help each other, coordinate and cooperate, solve problems, and move forward hand in hand.
On January 4, 1946, in order to meet the needs of the war situation, the General Headquarters of the Coalition Army was divided into a forward command and a rear command.
Lin Biao led the former general to command the operation in western Liaoning, while Luo Ronghuan presided over the work of the rear general, consolidating the rear, reorganizing the troops, and providing materials and troops.
Just when Luo Ronghuan needed to show his grand plan, his condition was even more serious. On January 5, 1946, after careful consideration, Mao Zedong instructed Luo Ronghuan to be treated in a Soviet hospital.
Luo Ronghuan took a group photo with Wang Jiaxiang's family in Moscow
On January 10, the Kuomintang and the Communists signed an armistice. However, Chiang Kai-shek successively transported five armies from Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Vietnam to the northeast. Therefore, the situation of small fights inside the Guan and big fights outside the Guanxi was revealed.
On April 18, on the same day as the liberation of Changchun, the Kuomintang army, under the cover of aircraft artillery, began to storm Siping.
Luo Ronghuan was fully in favor of the policy of completely smashing the enemy's offensive and striving to achieve an armistice. The question is exactly what kind of playing style should be adopted.
At this time, although the "Lin Luo" were not in the same geographical location, one on the Siping front and one in the rear of Dalian, they could exchange their ideas and cooperate through telegrams.
As the battle of Siping became more intense, on April 23, Luo Ronghuan called the Northeast Bureau in Dalian and relayed to the Central Committee and Lin Biao in the front:
Our army attacked Chiang Kai-shek's army at Siping
"The Kuomintang army is now attacking us in a divided manner on the vast battlefield, which is convenient for me to break through each of them, and I can seek its weakness from the movement, concentrate my superior strength, and break through each one."
But Lin Biao neither called back nor withdrew his troops.
In fact, Lin Biao did not want to stick to Siping. From Jinzhou onwards, he tried his best to avoid a decisive battle with the superior forces of the Kuomintang.
His slogans were "Retreat, Retreat, Retreat", "Passive, Passive, Passive". However, the central government did not agree to the retreat.
Mao Zedong was far-sighted and far-sighted, and he could see farther and more thoroughly than Lin Biao and Huang Kecheng. He fought a political battle to overwhelm the enemy in momentum:
First, the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek did not take our army seriously, and always believed that we were "Zhu Mao bandits.", so why don't we compete with them?
Second, we did not have time to establish a base area in the northeast, and many ordinary people in the northeast did not understand us and still held a little luck in the Kuomintang, and if we did not pass one or two hard battles, we could not break their illusions.
Third, the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party rely on strength, and our army needs a strong and heroic momentum too much.
Therefore, for the above reasons, Mao Zedong must fight a battle at Siping.
On May 14, under the cover of aircraft, tanks, and artillery, the Kuomintang troops launched a series of onslaughts on the positions of the Siping Northeast Democratic Coalition Army. The Democratic Coalition resisted valiantly, with heavy casualties.
Late at night on May 18, the Democratic Coalition forces retreated from Siping. Then, Lin Biao personally drafted a telegram proposing to the central government to abandon Siping.
On May 19, Mao Zedong finally issued a retreat order to Lin Biao: "If you feel that it is impossible to continue to hold Siping, you should take the initiative to abandon Siping and prepare to change from position warfare to mobile warfare." ”
The Battle of Siping not only showed Mao Zedong's arrogance in daring to confront tough problems, but also showed the mobile and flexible strategy and tactics that Mao Zedong has always advocated.
Fighting is right, and withdrawing is also right. It embodies the scientific attitude of Mao Zedong and his subordinates Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan to seek truth from facts.
On May 19, Luo Ronghuan and Peng Zhen immediately rushed to the "former general" of Fanjiatun near Gongzhuling to meet Lin Biao, who had retreated north from Pear Tree.
In Fanjiatun, our army in the northeast held a meeting to discuss its future operational policy. In the discussion, one proposition is to continue to hold changchun and not to retreat, and the other is to withdraw from Changchun and withdraw to the north of the Songhua River.
Lin Biao believed that Changchun had no danger to defend, and the defensive line was more than 100 miles, and a large number of defenders were needed.
If the enemy besieges the city first, and at the same time concentrates aircraft, artillery, and tanks to cover the infantry attack a little, our army will not be able to defend the city, and it will lose the opportunity for mobile warfare. Therefore, it advocates continuing to withdraw north.
Lin Biao's opinion did not receive a warm response from everyone, only the approval of Luo Ronghuan.
Unlike Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan focuses on explaining the problem from the strategic aspect, which is more likely to be recognized by others:
Changchun and Jilin are both big cities, which are not conducive to defense, and the defensive line is wide, and now the troops are very tired.
If Changchun is defended and the enemy inserts from the meihe estuary along the Fengji line to Jilin, it will beat the rear of our army in the northeast to pieces. Not only could Changchun not be defended, but it was necessary to retreat to the great desert of Western Manchuria and Mongolia.
After discussion, the Northeast Bureau finally decided: to retreat to the north bank of the Songhua River and retreat to Harbin.
This large-scale withdrawal of troops was very different from the guiding ideology of the central authorities at that time that every inch of land must be contested.
On May 20 and 27, Lin Biao sent two consecutive telegrams to the Central Committee, stating his claims and reasons.
In the telegram, he specifically mentioned that Luo Ronghuan had returned to the front line to participate in the command, and also agreed with his opinion.
After the decision to withdraw troops was issued, many cadres of the army, including senior cadres, could not think clearly and complained. Luo Ronghuan exchanged views with the cadres one by one and asked them to obey Lin Zong's decision-making.
With the assistance of Luo Ronghuan, Lin Biao took 200,000 allied troops across the Songhua River within fifteen days and retreated to Harbin, successfully escaping the pursuit of the Kuomintang troops.
These fifteen days were extremely passive and life-and-death days for the Northeast Alliance.
At the end of May 1947, Chen Yun affirmed the avoidance of the decisive battle of Jinzhou and the successful command of the Siping retreat as two major events in the first seven months of entering the northeast, and said that if these two things were wrong at that time, then it would be difficult for the northeast to have a good situation in the future.
After Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan led their troops to retreat north to the Harbin front, Chiang Kai-shek also decided to make a temporary truce in the northeast, and the Kuomintang and the Communists took advantage of the fifteen days of respite and made adjustments.
Chiang Kai-shek is certain to launch a major offensive. On the other hand, we should pay close attention to summing up the combat experience in the previous stage, determine the principle of adhering to the struggle in the northeast, and prepare to smash the new offensive of the Kuomintang army.
On June 16, 1946, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a telegram to the Northeast Bureau drafted by Liu Shaoqi and revised by Mao Zedong:
At present, the situation in the northeast is serious, and in order to unify the leadership, it has been decided to make Lin Biao the secretary of the Northeast Bureau, the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army.
Peng Zhen, Luo Ronghuan, Chen Yun, and Gao Gang were appointed deputy secretaries of the Northeast Bureau and deputy political commissars of the Northeast Democratic United Army, and five of them formed the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau.
The Central Committee believes that this division of labor is not only necessary but also possible under the present circumstances, and the Central Committee believes that all comrades will be able to work together in harmony, unite under the new division of labor, and strive to overcome difficulties and strive for victory.
The telegram became known as the June 16 Decision. Just as Mao Zedong handed over the overall situation of Shandong to Luo Ronghuan during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and now, in the most difficult early stage of the War of Liberation, he handed over the overall situation of the northeast to Lin Biao.
And Lin Biao wants to complete the heavy task of fighting against the enemy, and he needs a good partner like Luo Ronghuan.
After that, Peng Zhen was transferred back to the central government, Chen Yun went to Nanman to sit in the town, and Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao cooperated.
At this time, Lin Biao was still as dedicated to combat as in the past. Riding on a wooden chair, with his elbows on the back of the chair, facing the wall full of military maps, sitting for half a day was his daily homework.
He was very good at combat calculations, but he rarely asked about other things. Luo Ronghuan was well aware of this characteristic of his, calling it "Lin Zong's key doctrine" and giving him full understanding.
As a result, he frequently traveled back and forth between Harbin and the Twin Cities, taking on the leadership of the troops' political work, training, mobilization, equipment, logistical support, and military construction.
Due to the busyness of things, the doctor's advice to work no more than three hours a day had to be put on the shelf.
Yes, at a critical juncture in the turning point of the Chinese revolution, it is practically impossible to ask Luo Ronghuan to put down his work.
By the summer of 1948, with regard to the northeast battlefield, Mao Zedong had a keen grasp of the trend of the Kuomintang-Communist war from the overall situation, and put forward the grand idea that we would close the door and fight the dogs" in the northeast of Chiang Kai-shek.com.
He clearly instructed the main force of our army in the northeast to quickly move south to the Beining line, conquer Jinzhou, and seize this strategic commanding height.
At this time, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan commanded more than one million troops, while the total number of nationalist troops in the northeast battlefield under the jurisdiction of the Kuomintang Wei Lihuang Department was less than 600,000.
But at this time, Lin Biao and Mao Zedong had a deep disagreement on the strategic direction. This is mainly manifested in his inability to decide whether to fight Changchun first or Jinzhou first.
On April 18, 1948, Lin Biao, after consulting with Luo Ronghuan, Gao Gang, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Liu Yalou, Tan Zheng and others, decided to gather the strength of nine columns to take on the task of siege and reinforcement, and attack Changchun.
Lin Biao put forward the slogan of "training good soldiers and fighting Changchun." This decision was also reported to the Central Military Commission.
Mao Zedong judged that the key to the northeast battlefield was Jinzhou, and repeatedly explicitly and implicitly suggested that Lin Biao was moving south to the Beining line.
In mid-May, Lin Biao decided to concentrate two columns to try to attack Changchun. An attack was ordered when the terrain and enemy situation were not very clear, and the results were not ideal.
As a result, the operational policy was changed from strong attack to long-term siege and long-term siege. In this way, the troops hovered between Changchun and Shenyang, and did nothing for a while.
Luo Ronghuan was not satisfied with Lin Biao's slogan of "long siege and long siege" and his practices, and repeatedly seriously advised him to lead his troops to the south, and the Central Military Commission also called many times to criticize him.
However, at this time, Lin Biao was also the secretary and political commissar of the Northeast Bureau, and he could not listen to Luo Ronghuan's advice at all, so Luo Ronghuan had no choice but to propose to convene the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau to discuss.
In this way, there is a discord between "Lin Luo".
In July, at the meeting of senior cadres of the Northeast Bureau, Lin Biao once again stressed the policy of besieging Changchun, saying that at present, changchun grain is already very difficult, and if it is further encircled, the enemy will inevitably break through, and we can surround and annihilate it.
Luo Ronghuan said: "The enemy has air transport, and there is no shortage of food and ammunition!" It will only be a waste of time for us to continue to surround us. If we do not carry out the instructions to close the door and beat up the dogs, and let more than 400,000 people of the Wei Lihuang Group run away, it will increase the difficulties for the future liberation of the whole country. ”
Lin Biao Liu Yalou Luo Ronghuan was on the Jinzhou front
The Standing Committee members unanimously supported the policy of going south to fight Jinzhou. Lin Biao had no choice but to agree to send a telegram to the Central Committee to report on the results of the discussions of the Standing Committee of the Northeast Bureau.
On July 2, the Northeast Bureau sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission, saying: "Everyone believes that it is better for our army to still fight in the south, and it is not appropriate to attack Changchun reluctantly and passively." ”
They decided that "in mid-August, our army will begin to fight south with the largest main force", first attacking the enemy in Yixian County, Xingcheng and Shanhaiguan, and then capturing Chengde.
Receiving the telegram from Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan, Mao Zedong was particularly happy, feeling that the blueprint for the Liaoshen War had finally entered his preset track.
Therefore, on July 30, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the Northeast Bureau and pointed out: "Regarding your new battle plan, we feel that you should first consider fighting against Jinzhou and Tangshan. ”
During this period, letters and telegrams between Mao Zedong and "Lin Luo Liu" rushed to discuss and consult repeatedly on the issue of fighting in the south. The three words "Lin Luo Liu" gradually appeared frequently in Mao Zedong's military anthologies.
Although the Northeast Bureau made the decision to go south to the Beining Line, Lin Biao was still worried and waited.
He stressed the serious enemy situation on the Bac Ninh Line, feared that Fu Zuoyi, who was dominating Pingjin, would go north to reinforce, and proposed that only when the North China troops advanced westward into Datong and dispersed Fu Zuoyi's main force could the Northeast People's Liberation Army go south.
Mao Zedong then urgently ordered the Yang Chengwu Corps in North China to Suiyuan in the west and end Fu Zuoyi's old lair. Lin Biao instead stressed the difficulty of raising food for the troops, the lack of rain gear, the washing of bridges, and the inconvenience of transportation.
In short, "the northeast main force is still uncertain about the departure time."
Yang Chengwu (first from right) commands the battle at the front
In August, Chiang Kai-shek held a military conference in Nanjing, and formulated a policy of retreating from the northeast, securing central China, insisting on Shenyang until the end of October, and at the same time making a plan to withdraw from Shenyang according to changes in the situation.
Military intelligence is urgent. However, Lin Biao still stressed that the logistical support could not be put in place, and the road conditions along the road were unfavorable to the operation of large troops, and other objective reasons delayed the dispatch time of the troops.
Mao Zedong imagined that although the telegram was sent by "Lin Luoliu", the key lay in Lin Biao, who was delaying and pushing responsibility.
The reason for this is the logistical aspect of Luo Ronghuan's management, as if the logistics have dragged its feet. In fact, Luo Ronghuan spared no effort to supervise the strict implementation of logistical support.
Mao Zedong was very angry at Lin Biao's behavior of being afraid of his head and tail, dragging his feet openly and secretly, and disregarding the overall situation.
He sent a rare telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou with a rare stern telegram, in fact criticizing Lin Biao:
"Your dispatch is far away, so that Yang Chengwu's lone army will come out early." Fu Zuoyi had little concern in the east, vigorously aided Sui, drove Yang Chengwu away, and turned back to deal with you, what was the benefit of the battle situation? ”
Lin Biao did not dare to delay any longer, and ordered six columns and three independent divisions to march to the outskirts of Jinzhou, leaving six main columns and fourteen independent divisions to wander around Changchun, Shenyang, and the area south of Shenyang.
At this time, a telegram from the Central Military Commission pointed out that the deployment of equal division of troops was wrong, especially several main columns were too close to Shenyang, so that the enemy in Shenyang would not dare to come to reinforcements, which would affect the second phase of the battle plan.
After Lin Biao received the call, he was unhappy in his heart and asked Luo Ronghuan's opinion.
Luo Ronghuan mobilized on the eve of the Liaoshen Campaign
Luo Ronghuan said: "Chairman Mao and the central authorities have the foresight to ask us to quickly take Jinzhou and return to our division to annihilate the enemy who came out to reinforce Shenyang!" More troops should be transferred to the Jinzhou front so that the enemy in Shenyang can rest assured. ”
Lin Biao said worriedly: "I think it is good, but Jinzhou is not paper paste, there are more than 100,000 enemies in it, the fortifications are strong, and the firepower is very strong." In case the battle is not possible for a while, the reinforcements from Huludao will come and the enemy of Shenyang will advance westward, and we will suffer a big loss! ”
Luo Ronghuan said, "The reinforcements of Huludao and Jinxi must be blocked!" I want to order the 2nd Column, 5th Division and 3rd Column to rush to Yixian County, so that the 4th Column can quickly go south, seize Tashan and Xihaikou, and block the enemy on Huludao! ”
Finally, Lin Biao agreed. It was Luo Ronghuan's firm determination and thoughtfulness that dispelled Lin Biao's suspiciousness and lack of confidence.
On September 12, the Liaoshen Campaign was officially launched. By the 29th, the People's Liberation Army had successively conquered Changli and Beidaihe in Hebei Province and Suizhong and Xingcheng in Liaoning Province, cutting off the Western Liaoning Corridor and dividing and encircling the enemies in Jinzhou and Yixian, and the war progressed relatively smoothly.
Jiefangyi County
On September 21, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou led the front-line command composed of divisional, political, and logistical organs to leave the twin cities and set out south to command the key battles of the Liaoshen Campaign to conquer Jinzhou one by one.
In the early morning of October 2, the headquarters arrived in Zhangwu. At this time, all corps and echelons had entered the designated positions, waiting to launch a general attack on Jinzhou.
After breakfast, the headquarters radio station received a situation report, and found that the enemy in Huludao had added four divisions.
After Lin Biao saw the telegram, his eyebrows wrinkled. His main concerns are threefold:
One is the lack of food and oil, especially the car only carries gasoline from the rear to the south one-way, and the second is that the rear transportation line is too long.
Third, he was afraid that Fu Zuoyi would go north and Jinzhou would not be able to attack, and a large number of cars, tanks, and heavy artillery would not be able to withdraw due to lack of gasoline, and would even be severely damaged under the enemy's attack.
Lin Biao pondered bitterly for a whole day, but still had no certainty of victory, and his original determination to attack Jinjin was shaken again, so at 8 p.m. on the 2nd, in the name of Lin, Luo, and Liu, he sent an urgent telegram to the Central Military Commission, asking him to return to the division to fight Changchun.
After breakfast on October 3, Yin Jian, chief of the operations section of the headquarters, asked Liu Yalou, chief of staff: "Are you going to move on?" ”
"101 decided not to leave for the time being, and asked the staff of the organ to set up a radio station to maintain contact with the columns." Liu Yalou answered.
For the sake of the secrecy of the campaign operations, the Northeast People's Liberation Army called Lin Biao's code name "101", Luo Ronghuan's code name "102", and Liu Yalou's code name "103".
At 10 o'clock in the evening, Yin Jian asked again if he could act. Liu Yalou was very embarrassed, and he simply instructed the Operations Section to pay attention to receiving telegrams from the Central Military Commission: "Translate as you go, and keep informed at any time." ”
Early the next morning, Liu Yalou finally couldn't hold back and found the political commissar Luo Ronghuan. At this time, Luo Ronghuan had just gotten up and had not yet washed his face.
"Why don't you move forward?" Luo Ronghuan was surprised that the train stayed in place for a day.
Liu Yalou told him: "Lin Zong is considering going back to changchun. ”
"What?" Luo Ronghuan couldn't bear Lin Biao's foresight, he couldn't believe his ears a little, "What kind of evil is this?" ”
"Yesterday, the radio received a situation report, and the enemy sent four more divisions to Huludao. Lin Zong was originally afraid of being attacked by the enemy on three sides when attacking Jinzhou, and he was even more worried after seeing this report. He sent an urgent report to the Central Military Commission yesterday in the name of Lin Luoliu. ”
"How does this work?" Luo Ronghuan couldn't help but roar. He looked grim and pulled up Liu Yalou to find Lin Biao.
Luo Ronghuan could not help but be surprised and annoyed that Lin Biao ignored the orders of the Central Military Commission and arbitrarily changed the battle plan and direction when the troops were approaching the city and the battle was about to begin, but at the same time felt that he had a heavy responsibility.
The most fundamental duty of political commissars is to ensure that the army obeys the Party's orders, otherwise it is a dereliction of duty.
Moreover, Lin Biao sent a report to the Central Military Commission without consultation or even ventilation in the name of "Lin Luoliu" without authorization, which was an extreme act of disrespect for his colleagues and violation of organizational and military discipline!
The discord between the "Lin Luo" sounded again, and the volume increased.
"101, you sent a report to the Central Military Commission that you should consider returning to the division to attack Changchun, right?" Luo Ronghuan found Lin Biao, who was pacing on the platform of the station, tried his best to suppress the fire, and asked calmly.
"Yes." Lin Biao replied very crisply. He had always acted arbitrarily and arbitrarily, and he did not feel anything wrong with this unauthorized decision-making.
Lin Biao's concerns are also justified:
The enemy troops in Guannei sent four more divisions to Huludao by sea, so that the enemy's aid to Huludao and Jinxi increased to eleven divisions, and there were a total of eight enemy divisions in Jinzhou City.
Once the battle starts, reinforcements may not be able to stop it. If we can't stop it, we're passive. It is better to go back and fight Changchun to be stable.
Luo Ronghuan bitterly persuaded Lin Biao, pointing out that in order to fight Jinzhou, the central government issued three orders and five shens. Comrade Mao Zedong criticized us last time for being unsteady and losing cleanly. The determination to attack the jinjin that has just been made has suddenly changed, how to explain it to the central authorities?
Now that hundreds of thousands of troops have been pulled to western Liaoning, the outskirts of Jinzhou have been cleared, and the commanders and fighters are full of fighting spirit, and suddenly they are not fighting, what will the soldiers think? These are all problems.
"Any decision will be problematic. The biggest problem now is that we have prepared a table of dishes, but there are two tables of guests, how to eat? Lin Biao stressed that the enemy situation had changed.
"Just add a few more pairs of chopsticks." What kind of climate can a mere four divisions become? Moreover, the plan to attack Jinzhou was approved by the Central Military Commission and Chairman Mao, and our determination cannot be shaken. Luo Ronghuan said emphatically.
"What the central government approves must not be changed?" So what do you commanders want us to do! Lin Biao asked with some irritation. He had rarely seen his mediocre partner so tough.
Luo Ronghuan knew that his words had stimulated Lin Biao, and if Lin Biao really made a stubborn mistake, it would be really difficult to deal with.
So Luo Ronghuan slowed down and said, "101, have you ever thought about it, withdrawing from Jinzhou will also fall into passivity and affect the war situation." ”
"I didn't say I was going to withdraw from Jinzhou." Lin Biao argued, "I am suggesting to the Central Military Commission that Jinzhou can be quickly captured or attacked, otherwise Changchun will be fought." I am considering two plans, and I also ask the Central Military Commission to consider and give instructions. ”
Luo Ronghuan did not budge, and he insisted: "The telegram emphasizes that it is advantageous to fight Changchun and difficult to fight Jinzhou, which obviously shows a tendency. I don't think the Central Military Commission will agree.
In fact, this is also a problem that Lin Biao is worried about. The reason why he wanted to use the "Lin, Luo, and Liu" joint name to send a report was to increase the weight of his speech.
Now that Luo Ronghuan was resolutely opposed, Lin Biao consulted Liu Yalou's opinion, and Liu Yalou also agreed to Luo Ronghuan's suggestion.
Lin Biao thought for a while and asked his secretary to tell the confidential office to recover the telegram. But the telegram had already been sent at 4 o'clock in the morning.
Luo Ronghuan suggested not waiting for the Central Military Commission to call back and re-express our position, indicating that we still have to fight Jinzhou.
Lin Biao turned the corner and agreed. So the three of them studied and rewrote the telegram. The telegram said:
We intend to still attack Jinzhou. As long as we make full preparations and then launch a general offensive, there is still a possibility of annihilating the enemy, at least one or most of the enemy.
At present, if we turn back to attack Changchun, it will take too much time, even if we do not attack Changchun, the enemy will automatically break through, I can recover Changchun, and I can annihilate the enemy.
Moreover, after Mao Zedong received a telegram from Lin Biao that he wanted to return to his division to attack Changchun, he was angry and annoyed. He immediately drafted a telegram to Lin Biao on behalf of the central authorities in straightforward and sharp language.
The telegram said: In April and May, Changchun was easy to fight, but you did not dare to fight, and in July, Changchun was equally easy to fight, and you did not dare to fight.
Now that the deployment of the attack on Jinzhou has been completed, you have not dared to fight Jinzhou because of a change in enemy situation that is not very big, and you want to go back to Changchun.
The telegram used three "dare not fight" in a row, and the harshness of the wording, the harsh tone, and the harshness of the language in the telegram are unique among the tens of thousands of telegrams drafted by Mao Zedong.
Liu Yalou read the telegram in the confidential room and smiled bitterly: "Sure enough, it was criticized." Commissar Luo's opinion was still correct, but fortunately we sent another telegram, otherwise it would have been worse. ”
Lin Biao hesitated, and he also had his reason. Mao Zedong ignored the increase in troops on Huludao and ordered the attack on Jinjin, which was indeed a dangerous move.
The key to the entire Liaoshen campaign was not whether jinzhou could be captured, but whether it could stop the kuomintang's eastward marching corps gathered in western Jinzhou.
Chiang Kai-shek mobilized eleven divisions in the land of Huludao, while the Northeast Coalition army had only eight divisions tasked with blocking the attack.
Once the Jinxi defensive line was breached, the Kuomintang EastWard Advance Corps could attack the Jinzhou defenders who were close at hand to attack the attacking jin troops under the fortified city.
Therefore, the Tashan front line is the life and death line of the two warring sides, and it is also the weak rib that Lin Biao can not rest assured of.
On the eve of the siege, Lin Biao also stressed: "The most important guarantee for attacking Jinzhou is to block the enemy troops in the west of Jinzhou. ”
Luo Ronghuan also saw the danger of the Tashan defense line, and he suggested sending Su Jing, the chief of the operations department, to the fourth column to assist in directing the operation.
Su Jing
The Battle of Tower Hill was fought first. The development of the war situation is extremely cruel, and it can be described as a mountain of bones and a river of blood.
In the bitter battle of six days and six nights, our army annihilated more than 6,000 enemies in Tashan alone. Our army finally held its position, thus ensuring the victory of the Battle of Jinjin.
At 10:00 a.m. on October 14, Lin Biao gave an order that the battle to attack Jinzhou finally began.
After thirty-one hours of fierce fighting, by 6:00 noon on 15B, the nationalist Jinzhou defenders were completely annihilated by 120,000 people, and our army paid the price of more than 24,000 casualties.
The victory in the battle against Jin realized the strategic intention of Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission, cutting off Chiang Kai-shek's "lifeline" of communicating north China and northeast China in one fell swoop.
On October 17, a long-besieged army of the defending enemy in Changchun declared an uprising, including the remnants of the defending enemy of one corps headquarters and one army after another surrendered. Changchun, once the capital of puppet Manchukuo, was liberated.
Zheng Dongguo arrived in Harbin
The success of our army in Jinzhou and Changchun proved the correctness of Mao Zedong's instructions on the southbound Beining line.
On October 21, the enemy's "Westward Advance Corps," the Liao Yaoxiang Corps, which had been hesitant to patrol from Shenyang, went south from Zhangwu and began to make contact with our army from the 23rd, and was heroically and tenaciously blocked in either direction.
Under the command of Lin Biao, the main force of the attack on Jinjin, the rapid return to the division, and the other roads also concentrated on the centripetal, about half a million troops on the 26th surrounded Liao Yaoxiang's corps in an area of about 120 square kilometers in the Black Mountain and the Great Tiger Mountain, and launched an unprecedented war of annihilation.
I entered the Hu family shack in three columns and one battalion, and saw that there were many antennas here, and the sound of the radio "ticking" sounded in one piece, and it was estimated that there was a big future, so a fierce grenade suddenly blew Liao Yaoxiang's command system of the Westward Advance Corps into a pot of porridge, and all of them were paralyzed.
Because the enemy and our troops were mixed together in the western Liaoning Corridor, encircling and counter-breaking, interspersing and blocking, pursuing and fleeing, the tactical movements changed dazzlingly.
Therefore, Lin Biao simply came to control the chaos and ordered the troops to fight wherever there was gunfire, and rush wherever the gunfire was intense. The column should not go to the division, the division should not go to the regiment, everyone should go to Liao Yaoxiang.
For a time, the western Liaoning Plain was covered with smoke and dust, the roar was tremendous, and hundreds of thousands of troops rushed north and south, tearing up the black soil. After two days and one night of fighting, more than 100,000 people of Liao Yaoxiang's corps were all annihilated.
After Chiang Kai-shek learned of the news of the collapse of Liao Yaoxiang's corps in Beiping, he wrote in his diary in frustration: The whole army in the northeast seems to be caught in the fate of running out of ink, and he is anxious and sincerely does not know what to do!
On November 2, our army took advantage of the victory to go straight down to Shenyang and Yingkou, and the 52-day Liaoshen Campaign ended with a brilliant victory in annihilating 470,000 enemy troops.
The Liaoshen Campaign was the first of the three major battles that shocked the world. After receiving the news of the victory, the central authorities immediately sent a telegram to Lin Biao and others to congratulate the liberation of the entire northeast.
After the Liaoshen Campaign, Lin Biao reversed his lonely and indifferent disposition in the past, full of enthusiasm and a smile.
As the supreme commander of the northeast battlefield, although he had hesitations to go south to the Beining Line, worried about the fear of the two Jinjin operations, and made mistakes such as not breaking the sea route and causing the enemy to flee, or even made mistakes in resisting and confronting the Instructions of the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong.
However, as one of the main organizers, planners and commanders of the battle, he was a meritorious man.
However, during the Liaoshen Campaign, Luo Ronghuan resolutely implemented the strategic decision of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to attack Jinzhou first and seal the Kuomintang army in the northeast and completely annihilate it, thus playing an important role in winning the victory in the Liaoshen Campaign.
In November 1948, Luo Ronghuan organized the drafting of a summary report on the Liaoshen Campaign. While they were discussing, Lin Biao walked in.
Luo Ronghuan greeted him and said, "101, this paragraph is written into our hesitation on the issue of hitting Jinzhou, what do you think?" ”
Lin Biao was overjoyed at the victory of the great battle, and when he heard this, he stretched his face in disappointment and looked at the paragraph that Luo Ronghuan was referring to in the report.
Although Luo Ronghuan was very euphemistic in wording, very peaceful in tone, and listed many reasons and objective reasons for Lin Biao's hesitation, Lin Biao was still full of anger.
He thought that the victor was not condemned, so without a word, he threw the manuscript on the table with great force, and lifted the curtain and left.
In this way, the discord between the "LinLuo" cooperation once again appeared.
A few years later, Mao Zedong wrote in a poem mourning Luo Ronghuan: "The Long March is not an embarrassing day, and the battle is a big problem." Among them, it was Lin Biao who criticized it, and it was Luo Ronghuan who praised him.
In any case, the key to Mao Zedong's ability to strategize on the northeast battlefield and win a decisive victory thousands of miles away and direct a spectacular drama in the history of modern warfare lies in his subordinates Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao.
As the supreme commanders and principal decision-makers of our army in the northeast region, Luo Ronghuan and Lin Biao's courage, boldness, insight, and determination are indeed outstanding, and their contributions are indispensable.