Chen Dingding (Professor, Jinan University, Dean of haiguo Tuzhi Research Institute), Nadine Godehardt (Gao Tingting, Senior Research Fellow, Asia Department, German Institute of International and Security Affairs, Berlin), Maximilian Mayer (Mei Feihu, Young Professor, Center for Advanced Studies in Security, Strategy and Integration, University of Bonn), Xin Zhang (Associate Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, East China Normal University, Russian Studies Center)
Translator/Zhu Jihui (PhD candidate, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University)]
As China and the EU prepare for the EU-China video summit on April 1, China-EU relations have reached an unprecedented stalemate. The reactions of the two sides to the war in Ukraine and their views on the political crisis that followed were very different. While war is a major concern for Chinese diplomacy, and President Xi Jinping has stated that "China does not want to see the situation in Ukraine get to this point," there is a world of difference between the various assessments of the situation between China and Europe.
On the vast majority of issues – understanding the root causes of the war, assessing the impact of the war, risks or potential solutions – Chinese leaders and European governments, as well as the European Commission in Brussels, have expressed very different, and sometimes even opposite, positions. The future of international relations seems inevitable to move towards a world divided into spheres of influence and newly defined military alliances, a world in which mistrust, fear of vulnerability and economic protectionism are about to become major features of politics.
The ongoing war in Ukraine threatens to render the already beleaguered Sino-European relationship dysfunctional. While Europe and China are at a crossroads, finding a way out of this quagmire is crucial. First, it is necessary to review the main grievances of both sides.
President Xi Jinping meets with European Council President Michel and European Commission President von der Leyen (Xinhua)
European opposition to China's position
Europe does not understand for the first time why China's leaders have not yet condemned Russia as an aggressor of Ukraine, or as a first step, to openly distance themselves from Russia. Whatever the cause of the conflict, Russian troops have entered Ukraine; moreover, Russian missiles have deliberately and continuously destroyed civilian buildings such as apartment buildings, theaters and hospitals, causing terrible damage and suffering. The European side also argues for the need for a comprehensive international investigation into the war crimes committed in the recent Bucha massacre.
Second, China supports "the security concerns of all countries, including Russia," while saying that "the purposes and principles of the UN Charter should be jointly upheld," a rhetorical balance that Europe sees as support for Russia. While there are fears that the Chinese government could undermine sanctions against Russia, Josep Borrell, the EU's head of foreign policy, has made it clear that only China can effectively mediate the conflict.
Third, Chinese officials and scholars don't seem to realize that the war is a shock to all Europeans. The scale of the death toll, the destruction of cities across Ukraine, the growing number of refugees moving westward, and the geographic proximity and emotional resonance of the war will fundamentally change Europeans' perception of shared security, economic dependence, and national sovereignty. This change was most evident in the German government's defense policy, epitomized in Chancellor Olaf Schultz's speech to the Bundestag a few days after the Russian invasion began.
Fourth, the risks of this war are not fully understood in China. For example, the conflict could be internationalized. As of now, the two warring parties are Russia and Ukraine, but we are on the verge of World War III if NATO forces intervene, Russia resorts to nuclear blackmail, or China supplies Russia with weapons systems. In addition, the war has had a huge global impact in a range of areas, including on global food supplies, international financing and world economic stability.
China's objections to the European position
The Chinese side stressed that Europeans do not understand China's specific threat perception of the United States and , from China's perspective — how it relates to Russia's security perception of NATO expansion. China has compared NATO's expansion in Eastern Europe to recent geopolitical manipulation by the United States and its allies around China – particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy, the emerging U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and the Activities of the Anglo-American Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS). In this sense, China sees NATO expansion as a key factor in the current root causes of conflict.
Second, It is difficult for European officials to accept China's position that China is not a "warring party" and is not a party to a conflict; and that It has its own position on issues against Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States, and tries to maintain a balance between them. However, Chinese Ambassador to the United States Qin Gang also clarified that "there is no forbidden area for cooperation between China and Russia, but there is also a bottom line, that is, the purposes and principles established by the Charter of the United Nations." ”
Third, for China, the war shows that European governments and the European Union are not independent of the United States. Europeans were not fully aware of the re-emergence of transatlantic bloc politics, which ultimately meant the loss of European autonomy in international affairs. As a result, China, while facing U.S. containment in the Asia-Pacific region, has seen Europe abandon the idea of developing an autonomous relationship with China.
Fourth, regardless of how the current conflict unfolds, China, like many countries – including India, South Africa, Turkey, Israel or Saudi Arabia – has and will continue to maintain legitimate economic and military cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.
Four possible future scenarios for EU-China relations
The above grievances over the war in Ukraine – and we have given just a few main examples – reflect deeper cognitive and political frictions on both sides that could further affect China-EU relations in the near future. The recent EU-China summit is therefore the most important in many years.
In order to understand its potential impact and predict possible future trajectories, several possible scenarios will be described below, discussing more and coordinated steps between China and the EU in the Ukraine war, and developing a rational plan for the future in the short term to identify obstacles and opportunities. In this difficult time, doing so will help to reflect on how to overcome the threat of escalation of conflict.
The main trajectory of Sino-EU relations can be explained in two dimensions: on the one hand, the sustainability of political systems (the opposition between "resilience" and "fragility"), and on the other hand, the interconnected operability of economic, social and technological systems (the opposition between "integration/connection" and "fragmentation").
A liberal new order of multilateral peace
Under the most optimistic scenario, the EU and China have built highly resilient social and political systems. The reconstruction of Ukraine has increased opportunities for cooperation between the two sides on infrastructure, revived the UN Charter at the diplomatic level, and promoted the flourishing of Eurasian trade. Europe's ideas of democracy, peace, social justice, and autonomy are incorporated into a restructured, rules-based international order that is strong enough to coexist with China's "community of shared future for mankind." From this position of relying on strength and self-confidence, significant progress has been made in the political, economic and technological connectivity between the EU and China. A fruitful and pragmatic competition in terms of technical standards, regulatory practices or regulations will dominate future exchanges between China and Europe.
yesterday future
This scenario assumes that a high degree of economic connectivity coexists with increased social and political frictions. The world is characterized by highly integrated markets and globalized production chains, but the capacity of governments is rather weak. While governments aim to establish national security and the resilience of their respective political systems, a mix of threats such as disinformation, economic coercion, targeted sanctions, or cyberattack crime occurs every day.
Economically, China and Europe benefit greatly from integrated markets and production chains, but tense security tensions are causing political and social unrest in European society. The gradual weakening of the normative power of the EU, the loss of value-based decisions to influence politics, and the breaking of fundamental rights have led to the political radicalization of European society and rising hostility toward an increasingly powerful China.
The opposition of the West to the "other"
In this context, the Eu-China summit in April 2022 failed; the positions of both sides formed an unprecedented and insurmountable stalemate. Lines of communication at all levels are cut off. In a world where societies and national governments are very fragile, that's why they aim to build political blocs between like-minded partners. Distrust is everywhere, the increase in transatlantic cohesion is in opposition to the Sino-Russian bloc, and the dominant logic of international relations follows the principle of "if you do not support me, you are against me" principle. Regionalized trade relations and anti-globalization trends have been strengthened. National protectionism is on the rise, and global trade, supply chains, and connectivity are being kept to a minimum. In addition, international arms control is not in place and the regional and global arms race is in full swing. Both European and Asian societies have experienced serious loss of cohesion and political upheaval.
Multipolar world
In this scenario, the EU's strategic autonomy over the United States and China is strengthened. This path combines a high degree of political resilience with a fragmentation of the global economy, society and technology, accelerating the formation of different political blocs. In their respective groups, the world has indeed become poorer, but also very secure. Global production chains are a thing of the past; connectivity is largely confined to specific groups. Commercial, cultural and academic exchanges at the international level are shrinking because of the disconnect between the different groups. It is a world of hyper-nationalism, with the scramble for resources gradually internalized. This will lead to instability in all regions and the rise of proxy wars waged by the United States, Russia, China, or Europe.
There are many possibilities for China-EU relations, and de-escalation requires efforts from all parties (infographic)
Options for easing the situation
Three of these four scenarios paint a bleak picture of future Eu-China relations. As a foundation for sustainable cooperation, the future of diplomacy is at stake. Europe and China would do well to understand that, if they can, they should be involved in stabilizing multilateralism – before the war in Ukraine escalates significantly again.
We believe that, notwithstanding these differences, Europe and China can and should consider measures to mitigate the long-term effects of the war in Ukraine. First, keep the channels of communication open (and encourage communication at all political levels). A key point here is to see this conflict as a long-term problem, not just a short-lived war. Forward-looking diplomacy means preparing for conflict situations that can last for months or even years, and the conflict could escalate further. At the same time, such a long-term vision requires anticipating that both Ukraine and Russia will inevitably go through complex reconstruction phases and the opportunities that will arise from it.
Secondly, a working group could be established to identify common interests and global risks in the war in Ukraine and to discuss possible options within the framework of the United Nations system. In order to effectively promote the relevant work, we should distinguish between different goals and levels. China and the EU must: 1) coordinate to promote a ceasefire as soon as possible; 2) create an international environment conducive to peace talks; and 3) coordinate at the UN level to prepare for the necessary post-war security assurances and arrangements.
Thirdly, in the short term, we should achieve coordinated action. The two sides could jointly condemn the use of force against civilians, and could adopt a joint resolution in the UN Security Council calling for the establishment of humanitarian corridors in Kiev, Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities, and working together through the World Food Programme and UN channels to ensure logistics and food supplies to particularly vulnerable countries of the Global South, including Lebanon, Sudan and Yemen.
In the medium term, we can drive all kinds of concerted action. Both sides could consider sending a United Nations peacekeeping mission to implement a ceasefire on the Russian-Ukrainian border and promote post-conflict stability — in particular Russia's military withdrawal. Both sides could call for an emergency G-20 meeting to negotiate peace and post-war reconstruction. The EU and China may find a different approach than Syria, linking China's Belt and Road Initiative with the EU's Global Pathway initiative to work together for Ukraine's reconstruction.
Given these different scenarios, the chances of preventing the deterioration of China-EU relations remain slim. However, both sides would benefit greatly from a stable relationship. Even if, to some, these cooperative measures seem somewhat out of reach at present, prudent diplomacy still requires efforts to avoid specific consequences. The change in mentality on both sides is the key premise: we need to get out of the isolation caused by the great plague and avoid the logic of "internal circulation" thinking and the non-black-and-white thinking mode. Instead, in the current and future crisis communication, there is a need for stronger and more diverse channels of communication between the EU and China.
[Original text :"Europe and China at a Crossroads: 4 scenarios for China-EU relations amid the war in Ukraine", Dingding Chen, Nadine Godehardt, Maximilian Mayer, and Xin Zhang, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/europe-and-china-at-a-crossroads/, released on March 29, 2022. In Chinese edition, the author has updated the content in light of the development of the situation since then. 】
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