Disruption and Reconstruction of Order in the Field: A Reflection on ukraine

Executive Summary:

Although the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict occurred suddenly, its root cause is the inevitable consequence of the intricate security game between the United States, Russia and Ukraine after the Cold War. An armed "grey rhinoceros" has entered, and order in the arena will overlap with destruction and reconstruction.

　　After more than two years of COVID-19, with Sweden declaring the end of the epidemic as the world's first country on February 9, many European countries have lifted all epidemic restrictions. While humanity seems to have just seen a glimmer of light in this battle against COVID-19, another hot war has suddenly descended on the hinterland of Eastern Europe. In the early morning of February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered an emergency televised speech announcing his decision to launch a special military operation in the Donbass region. Subsequently, the military operation quickly evolved into a full-scale armed conflict against Ukraine. In the blink of an eye, the shadow of the Cold War once again enveloped the European continent, and people even exclaimed whether World War III was coming.

　　Although the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict occurred suddenly, its root cause is the inevitable consequence of the intricate security game between the United States, Russia and Ukraine after the Cold War. An armed "grey rhinoceros" has entered, and order in the arena will overlap with destruction and reconstruction.

The essence of the conflict in Ukraine is the result of strategic interaction between the United States and Russia

　　In Mackinder's geopolitical map, whoever controls the "heartland" of Eastern Europe will control the world. It was through its control of Eastern Europe that the former Soviet Union established a bipolar pattern against the hegemonic United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union hollowed out this "heart" from the Eurasian organism, creating a power vacuum at the center of Eurasia. Since then, the United States and Russia have begun a 30-year struggle in this area based on the establishment of secure borders with each other. Russia needs a strategic buffer to alleviate its security pressure from the west, while the United States has incorporated the former Soviet Union's sphere of influence into its strategic space through NATO's successive eastward expansions, squeezing Russia's strategic space step by step, thus exacerbating Russia's security anxiety.

　　Brzezinski said in The Big Chess Game, "Russia is more likely to be a problem if the United States does not create an environment in which Russians believe that an increasingly organic connection with transatlantic Europe is Russia's best bet." In 1993, then-Russian President Boris Boris Yeltsin publicly endorsed Poland's accession to the transatlantic alliance and believed that the process was in Russia's national interest, and the current Russian President Vladimir Putin also proposed joining NATO three times. It can be seen that post-Cold War Russia has not tried to ease relations with the United States and Europe. However, the United States has never regarded Russia as an equal partner, and has always regarded it as an adversary, ignoring Russia's legitimate security concerns. Russia's hardline behavior in Ukraine is a projection of Russia's stress response under the pressure of NATO's eastward expansion. If Russia today has become an enemy of the United States and Europe because of the war against Ukraine, then the role of this enemy is also the consequence of the failure of the United States to shape the security strategy of Russia after the Cold War.

The accumulation of contradictions in Ukraine is the root cause of the conflict

　　Its own division and complexity have left Ukraine mired in the mud of internal and external interweaving, bringing the dilemma of diplomatic choices, and eventually falling into the vortex of armed conflict. Many analysts believe that the US-Russia scramble has dragged Ukraine into armed conflict, but in essence, it is Ukraine's own stubborn disease that has created a battlefield for great power competition.

　　First of all, the special geopolitical environment of Ukraine. Ukraine is the last defensive barrier of the "strategic buffer belt" to Russia, but for NATO it is the forefront of containing Russia's offensive. Although NATO has always been ambiguous about Ukraine's demands for joining NATO, for Russia, which is highly sensitive to security needs, the Ukrainian issue is the bottom line and core interest. The forces of the East and the West have never given up on the struggle for Ukraine.

　　Second, the divisive nature of the Ukrainian state itself. Ukraine itself was a product of the collapse of the empire, and the intricacies of nationalities, religions, and languages always put the country at risk of disintegration. Ukrainians make up the majority of ukraine in the west, while Russians in the eastern Donbass region have a high proportion. The west is Catholic, while the east is Orthodox. Although Ukraine was once predominantly Russian-speaking, the process of "de-Russianization" that Ukraine began after the 2014 Crimean armed conflict further intensified the contradictions between East and West. The Donbass region in the east is pro-Russian, while the western region, centered on the capital Kiev, is pro-Western.

　　Finally, the failure of state governance in Ukraine. Known as the "granary of Europe" at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, but after 30 years of economic development and political transformation, it was almost reduced to a "failed state" and on the verge of collapse. Zhang Hong, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that the neoliberal "Washington Consensus" led to the emergence of oligarchy in Ukraine's political transformation, which led to the development of Ukraine's state form from collusion to captivity, and finally to the edge of "defeated state".

　　In summary, the failure of Ukraine's state governance, the tearing of domestic separatist forces, and the disturbance of external forces, Ukraine has always walked on a tightrope. For Ukraine, it is safer to act as a "bridge between East and West" (Kissinger) than to "take sides". However, both Yanukovych and Zelenskiy introduced external forces from one side to counter the other, and eventually eroded the independence of their own countries.

A new world?

　　In recent years, academic and policy circles have been exploring the transformation of the international order based on three assumptions: first, China's rapid development; second, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; and third, the subversion of a new round of technological revolution. While people are looking at the "metacosm" from afar, international politics has returned in the form of the most primitive armed conflict of iron and blood. Once armed conflict has begun, it will not be performed according to a fixed script. The outcome of the war is unknown, but the Conflict in Ukraine is destined to have far-reaching consequences for the international order in transition.

　　First, the return of great power politics, the failure of the international system and the upheaval of the post-Cold War international order. Although there is a description of the international pattern of "one superpower and many powers" or "the era of infinity", the units in the system have never formed a force to balance hegemony, and "following the strong" has become the behavioral logic of many countries. Today, Russia, as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council and a nuclear power, is demonstrating to NATO, led by the United States, in the form of armed conflict, and its impact on the international order is of a turning point. In After Hegemony, Kioghan argues that the decline of hegemony does not necessarily lead to armed conflict, because the inertia of the system will still maintain the order of the system. However, the withdrawal of the group during the Trump era, the failure of international organizations in the new crown pneumonia epidemic, and the non-neutral characteristics of the international system have become more prominent, which has brought many difficulties to the existing international system. Today, NATO's eastward expansion has brought about a hot war in Eastern Europe, and this armed conflict is also a major test of the international system with the United Nations at its core.

　　Second, Europe's geopolitical security landscape faces a reshuffle. On February 24, the day Russia launched a military special operation, German Chancellor Schoelz said that "it is a terrible day for Ukraine, a dark day for Europe". Subsequently, the United States and the European Union imposed a series of harsh sanctions on Russia, including the announcement on February 27 that some Russian banks would be kicked out of SWIFT. Germany has changed its previous position of not providing weapons to conflict zones, providing weapons to Ukraine. If the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact triggered the "NATO obsolescence theory" and Trump's alienation from allies led to "NATO brain death", then Biden's diplomatic strategy to repair the alliance coupled with the impact of the Ukraine conflict may become a shot in the arm for NATO. On Feb. 26, Biden spoke publicly about the possibility of Finland and Sweden joining NATO. However, the activation of NATO will only exacerbate the security dilemma of the European continent, bring about an imbalance in the overall geopolitical security environment in Europe, and the probability of a new Cold War will surge.

　　Finally, the global strategy of the United States will face "going east and looking west", and China needs to seize the strategic opportunity and maintain strategic determination. In 2011, when the United States began withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama proposed an "eastward" shift in the U.S. global strategy — a "pivot to the Asia-Pacific region." With the rapid development of China's economy, it is facing increasing strategic pressure from the United States. In 2017, Trump positioned China as a "strategic competitor" in the U.S. National Security Strategy, proposing an "Indo-Pacific strategy" aimed at containing China. After the Biden administration took office, it intensified competition with China and released the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy report on February 11. However, the outbreak of conflict in Ukraine has necessitated the United States to re-"look west" and consider the geosecurity challenges it and its allies face in Europe. The possible "east-to-west" of the US global strategy will bring about tremendous changes in China's strategic environment. China needs to maintain strategic sobriety and strategic determination at all times, and firmly follow the path of peaceful development in the midst of turmoil and crisis.

　　(The author is a professor and deputy director of the Institute of Northeast Asian Geopolitics and Economics, Jilin University)

[Disclaimer: This article only represents the views of the author and does not represent the position of China Social Science Network]　

Source: China Social Science Network Author: Yao Lu