At present, Russia and Ukraine are fighting fiercely, Russia is thunderous and unconcealed, breaking through the Ukrainian army defense line, the Ukrainian navy and air force were almost completely destroyed after an hour, only some fighters are currently engaged in the final death struggle, the Current Russian army has approached the Ukrainian capital Near Kiev, according to the official media revealed that Russia used five major tactics in this special military operation, one of which is the large-depth penetration strategy developed during the Soviet period. It is therefore necessary to talk about the past and present life and actual use of the Soviet theory of the Great Depth Campaign.
Development of the theory of the Great Depth Campaign
The soviet union's earliest idea of in-depth operations appeared in the Soviet field regulations of 1929, when it was recognized that successful campaign breakthroughs were achieved by using infantry and armored units and aviation to break through the depth of the enemy's defenses, which were reflected in specific regulations, such as article 191 of the 1929 Field Ordinance, which stated that battalion-based combat units should be assigned to penetrate the enemy's second defensive zone. At that time, the idea of large-depth operations had only just sprouted, and a systematic operational theory had not yet been formed, and it was more about the use of cooperation among various units at the tactical level, but the thinking of large-depth operations that sprouted at this time still laid the foundation for the future development of theory and pointed out the direction.
The development of the great depth strategy also has to mention a person, he was then the head of the Operations Department of the Soviet General Staff Andafilov, who believed in the "Characteristics of the Modern Army Group Campaign" that only by launching simultaneous attacks on the enemy's front line and depth could it be possible to break through the direction of the enemy army, and in the subsequent report "Basic Issues of Tactics and Campaign Law Related to army reconstruction", the future idea of large-depth operations was specifically expounded for the first time, although in 1931 Andafiroff was killed in an air raid. However, his research results have played a very positive role in promoting the development of the theory of large-depth operations.
In 1933, Tukhachevs, known as the founder of the Great Depth Strategy, presented to the Soviet Union the exercise report "Strengthening Infantry Divisions to Break Through the Enemy's Fortress Zone in a Narrow Front" expounding the principle of coordination between the various branches of the armed forces, and the following year Tukhachevska discussed the tactical issue of coordination between the various branches of the armed forces in his book "On the Development of the Form of Command", and these ideological ideals were finally implemented and implemented in the operational regulations of the time.
However, with the Great Purge and the division of strategic understanding within the Soviet Union, the development of the Great Depth Strategy was forced to stop, and it was not until after the German army carried out the Blitzkrieg that the Soviet Union realized the correctness of the strategic direction of the Great Depth Strategy, but it was too late.
The rebirth of the theory of the Great Depth Campaign during World War II
After the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, when the German armored torrent swept into 200 kilometers of Soviet territory, Stalin suddenly thought of a sentence written by Tukhachevsky in his letter before his death: "The future war will be a war of engines, and the concentration of armored forces can form a huge assault fist, and it is not easy to resist them", so on the eve of the Soviet-German war, the Soviet Union could only be forced to adopt a simple linear defense strategy without depth, and the troops were rigidly arranged along the national border, and even the salient departments were fighting between the various arms In the absence of effective coordination, the layout of the Soviet army was easily broken by the German army, and the Soviet army deployed in the salient was easily surrounded by the German army, and thus annihilated, while the Soviet combat deployment only believed in offensive, defensive, and counter-offensive. The lack of flexibility in the face of complex situations caused the Soviet army to suffer huge losses in the early stages of the Soviet-German operation.
After a bloody lesson, in 1942 the Soviet army finally realized that the previous strategy and tactics were not enough to confront the German army, the Soviet Union finally ushered in a strategic turning point in the resistance to the German army after rationalizing the strategic and tactical and weapons personnel allocation, that is, the famous Battle of Kursk, in this battle, the Soviet army used a large number of anti-tank weapons to resist the first wave of attacks of the German army with tank troops as the front, and then in the counter-offensive stage, the Soviet army used the close cooperation between various services to successfully encircle the German army. In the later stages of the Soviet-German War, the Soviet Union's grand strategy of depth matured, and the victories in the battles accelerated the defeat of Nazi Germany.
Since the Soviet Union and Germany were two countries fighting directly, the Soviet Union's theory of large-depth operations was often compared with the German blitzkrieg theory, and since both theories were advanced military theories at that time, and at the same time achieved great results, it is necessary to talk about the similarities and differences between the two.
The great depth strategy and the German blitzkrieg have in common
The theory of blitzkrieg and the theory of large-depth operations have similarities in terms of theoretical foundation, basic national conditions, and combat forms. First of all, the two theories are based on the theory of motorized operations used intensively by tank troops proposed by the British military scientist Fuller and the theory of air power by the Italian military scientist Duhei, both of which emphasize the large-scale independent use of tank units in cooperation with aviation units.
Secondly, both theories are based on the theory of operations based on mechanized troops, so a large number of armored units and fighters are needed, while the Soviet Union was economically withered and industry was backward in the early days of its establishment, and after the five-year plan, the Soviet Union established a military industrial system, and Germany also expanded its equipment through the war economic system, and the two established a military industry that could undertake the operational theory into practice.
Finally, both combat styles emphasize depth operations while emphasizing rapid penetration operations by independent armored units. Guderian believed that after the rapid breakthrough of the armored forces, they should not consider the risk of flanking exposure, and penetrate the enemy's heart to destroy its command and communication systems, so as to achieve the purpose of dividing and encircling the enemy. The Soviet Union believed that the cluster armored forces should continue to destroy the enemy deeply, so as to completely block the enemy's campaign and even the strategic depth of the connection, so as to break through one by one.
The great depth strategy differs from the German blitzkrieg
After saying the same point, let's talk about the differences, first of all, the background of the Formation of german Blitzkrieg and the Soviet Union's large-depth operation is different, although behind the seemingly identical is different strategic considerations, World War II Germany to take blitzkrieg is mainly caused by special geography and lack of war potential, in the last moments of World War II also tenaciously guarded Berlin Soldiers have almost no oil Many tanks helplessly become scrap iron, so for Germany need to rely on armored forces to quickly end the battle so as not to fall into the quagmire of war, In fact, the Blitzkrieg was nothing more than a compromise made by Germany to resolve the contradiction between its vast war ambitions and its limited war potential.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was completely different, as the Soviet Union not only had a strong industrial base and extremely rich oil resources, while the Soviet Union's vast land and long borders necessitated the Soviet Union to carry out large-depth and continuous assault operations on the basis of a large army and armored force.
Practical application in the Russo-Ukrainian War
After the end of World War II, the Soviet Union's theory of large-depth strategy was further developed, and with the increasingly advanced weapons and equipment, the theory of large-depth strategy was gradually developed into a standard measured by both depth and height. And this time Ukraine adopted a large-depth breakthrough strategy, Russia from the east of Kharkiv, the south of Odessa and the north of the border with Belarus to lightning blitz Ukraine, in the shortest possible time to form a siege of Ukraine, while Russia's precision-guided missiles will almost destroy Ukraine's important military facilities, the actual combat effect shows that the Russian tactics are very effective, the current Russian tank force has approached the Ukrainian capital Kiev.