This year's Spring Festival, were you urged to marry and have children by the seven aunts and eight aunts?
Behind the social troubles of young people during the New Year's Holiday, low fertility rates have become a common phenomenon in many countries around the world. At present, in 203 countries and regions in the world, more than 80 countries and regions have a total fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1, developed countries in Europe and the United States are generally at low fertility levels or ultra-low fertility levels, and Germany, Italy, Russia and other countries have already experienced negative population growth. In east Asian cultural circles, South Korea experienced negative population growth in 2021, and Japan's birth population in 2020 hit a 100-year low.
This issue focuses on the reality of low fertility in developed countries in Europe and the United States, while reviewing the solutions of these countries in coping with the dilemma of birth rates. The author believes that the low fertility dilemma in European and American countries is closely related to the transformation of women's roles in modern society. Women entering the workforce are taking on too many childcare responsibilities, and appropriate government intervention can help ease the burden on women and have a positive effect on fertility.
Written by | Wang Jiayin
"Priceless" Children: The Reality of Low Fertility
In modern society, why do people still have children?
In the public and private spaces where we live, there are children everywhere, on the road by the parents in their hands, in the arms, in the playground specially set up in the children's exclusive facilities and projects, on public transportation wearing school uniforms, twittering into a pile. Slogans like "Everything for the children, everything for the children" can still be seen in educational facilities. It has become difficult for modern people to treat children as part of economic development, and the employment of child labor is prohibited by law and morally condemned. But children and their guardians often lead to discussions about how children should be raised, how children should appear in public spaces, and how social resources should be used. Tracing the social significance of children in history, sociologists have also found that after the Industrial Revolution, entering the modern society,—— almost when the economic benefits of children disappeared, the emotional benefits of children and the role of children's situation as moral and ethical benchmarks became more prominent. If children once had the possibility of supplementing the family labor force and bringing economic benefits, with the process of modernization, children have become more and more "priceless".
"Pricing Priceless Children", by Viviana Zelider, Peppermint Experimental | East China Normal University Press, January 2018.
As children become more expensive, the pace of childbearing seems to have slowed down: most developed countries, as well as some developing countries, have now entered low or very low fertility rates. This is also often the focus of social attention, although this change is in line with sociological and demographic experience:
With the process of industrialization and modernization, demography has observed that the birth rate and fertility rate of a region will gradually decline. The first population transition theory was put forward by the demography community, that is, after two stages of high mortality and high birth rate, low birth rate and high mortality rate, the society will eventually shift to a double-low model of low mortality and low birth rate.
Traditional experience generally holds that the total fertility rate (TFR: total fertility rate) = 2.1, that is, assuming that the average number of children in the group of women of childbearing age is 2.1, it can guarantee population iteration. After the millennium, low birth rates and low fertility rates are no longer unique to developed countries, and many developing countries have achieved low or very low fertility rates (TFR below 2.1 or even 1.3).
Here it is necessary to make a simple distinction between the birth rate and the fertility rate: the birth rate refers to the ratio of the average number of newborns in a given year to a thousand people, which is a real reference. The total fertility rate (TFR) is a hypothesis: the specific measurement needs to be grouped by age, which can be simply understood as estimating the average number of children in childbearing age (15-45 years old) in a lifetime at a certain point in time. The advantage of the total fertility rate is that it is more time-sensitive, does not need to wait until the end of the childbearing age of women to be counted, and can observe changes in fertility trends in a timely manner.
Does low fertility mean that people are more reluctant to have children? Not necessarily. It is not that people do not want to have children, but in the face of the complex realities of society and individual families, the birth plans that people can actually complete are often different from what individuals hope.
In research over the past few decades, scholars have found that most people still express fertility intention, but often people are more willing to have children than they actually have. The comparison of the two can also reflect the impact of social reality on the trajectory of an individual's life. Even before the advent of modern contraception, people still had some planning and control over fertility. In times of socio-economic downturn, even families with food and clothing will carefully control the number of newborns. Taking the family as a unit, taking heterosexual marriage relationships as an example, for more detailed observation, the situation may be more complicated: for example, the differences between wives and husbands in terms of overall fertility intentions and gender orientation of newborns.
This difference between willingness and reality also reflects the complex motivations behind fertility decisions. Admittedly, children are considered pure, innocent, and innocent, along with the perception that the act of crossing the door of life should be "selfless" and worthy of praise. In fact, when people enter the fertility track, the reasons for this may be more complex. Whether it is "selfish" or not, perhaps should not be considered in the first place.
Empirical research shows that expectant parents not only look forward to newborns, but also expect newborns to manifest and consolidate marital relationships, intergenerational relationships, connections with friends and communities, and complete social expectations. The experience of childbearing can itself be a process of building social identity and mobilizing social resources.
Some scholars also asked, in modern society, why do people still have children? From the perspective of economic and personal development alone, childbearing is more or less a thankless task. In the United States in 2013, only one child was raised until the age of 18, and the average cost was $245,000. But looking around the world today, the new generation is really separated from the support of the original family, and the time to settle down is getting late: once a 16-year-old teenager may be able to go out and run, and it is possible to support the family; today's people who do so are often considered to be forced by the situation and sympathetic. The importance of education and university diplomas for personal career development and family building is self-evident today. Today, even when legally adults are 18 years old, most young people still rely on their parents to complete higher education, start a family, and raise children. People may still hold the idea that having a child can help the elderly, leaving aside the unreliability and unpredictability of this expectation, in addition to the direct economic investment in the development of children, fertility is actually likely to reduce or slow down the accumulation of personal wealth and pension expectations.
However, the cost and difficulty of childbirth are not limited to the loss of money, whether it is embryos or teeth and teeth, toddlers, they lack the ability to survive independently. There is no point in putting a million pounds next to a newborn, who can't make their own formula, change diapers, or see a doctor. As dependents, children are required to have an additional adult to provide care services, and the younger the child, the more dependent they are on the care provided by outside adults. At the same time, this is becoming increasingly demanding for the caregivers of children, especially mothers. If children are deemed to enjoy a high density of care services, receive a good moral and cultural education, maintain a healthy body and lifestyle, etc., then mothers are often identified as the primary and main responsible persons of the child.
The work of the nurturer is no longer easy, and when women enter the workplace, the relationship between work and the role of mother is even more cemented.
Stills from Home on the Ramp.
The Myth of Motherhood Trap: The Illusion of "Balance" in career and family
The pitfalls of the motherhood myth pervade both real and fictional works. In this narrative, "Mom is Superman": As new life comes into the world, the women in the family are running on the track to become super mothers. From pregnancy preparation to childbirth to parenting, she is a self-taught doctor, nurse, teacher and commander: she must pay attention to her own food and clothing, but also pay attention to and arrange what the child is doing, what to do, and what to do. From the advantages and disadvantages of breastfeeding, the choice of public or private kindergartens, to how much money to save for the future education of children, children bumping and unhappy, grades fluctuating, etc., mothers are called to the front line.
Women have been providing labor even before entering the formal labor market – but it is often unpaid and ignored as a result. Continuing the Marxist tradition, we can see that women perform all kinds of labor in the family and the community, not only in the upbringing of children, the future labor force, but also in maintaining the functioning of the family and the community – their work behind the scenes, which is the basis of social reproduction – when the male labour force returns home, their work can be suspended, while the women work endlessly.
The process of modernization and urbanization has given women the opportunity to enter the labor market, and the increase in women's labor force participation rate has brought many benefits to better protect the rights and interests of women and children and promote economic development. Especially in the capitalist market, the labor force is gender-neutral, and women's contribution to the formal economy and the labor market is an indispensable part of economic development. But at the same time, in the two hinges of the capitalist economic system and patriarchal society, working women are not thrown into the trap of "how to balance work and family": the problem itself presupposes that women should also provide domestic work in addition to social labor – women bear a double burden. On the one hand, she must participate in the formal labor market of society, have a job, get a salary ticket, earn money to support the family, otherwise, in the capitalist system, the unnetized labor force is difficult to be recognized; on the other hand, she must work two jobs a day, and the patriarchal society wants her to return home to take a second shift, playing the role of a wife who pays for her husband, a mother who sacrifices for her children, and an omnipotent caregiver for the family.
Working Moms Don't Leave Work, by Allie Russell Hawkheeld, Untranslated by Shawso, Life, Reading, New Knowledge Triptych Bookstore, September 2021.
The assumption of balance, since it is difficult to establish in reality, is inevitably reflected in fertility. Until the 1970s, in developed countries such as Europe and the United States, fertility rates showed a clear negative correlation with women's labor force participation rates: as more and more women entered their careers, they would have fewer children or postpone having children. It was not until the end of the 20th century that a positive correlation between the two emerged in a few regions (Northern Europe, the United States). In recent years, this trend has also been observed in developing countries: in India, for example, young women who find work are more likely to postpone marriage and childbearing.
When women enter the labour market, they have more things to consider and prioritize their affairs. Declining fertility rates may be the result of women's strategic arrangements for the timing of childcare. This does not mean that women do not have children, but simply choose to have children later: on the one hand, this may be due to the loss of opportunity costs of childbearing, on the other hand, it may also be a cumulative effect – investing in the workplace may reduce the cost of childcare time and energy that women can afford. In the case of a certain period of childbearing age, one effect of delaying the birth of children is that there are fewer children, and the fertility rate is also reduced.
As mentioned earlier, nursing requires a lot of energy and time, around the 1980s, demographers proposed the "learning hypothesis": the mother as a difficult occupation is not innately owned, but acquired, after becoming a mother, women will increasingly appreciate the hardships of motherhood, especially the difficulty of balancing occupation and family care work - the difficulty of reconciling the two is most obvious after the birth of a child. Women are also realizing that maintaining a small family is more conducive to their employment and career development. Empirical studies in the United States and Sweden have indeed observed that after the birth of a child, the likelihood of women, especially working women, having a second child declines.
The type of work women do can also have an impact on childbearing outcomes, specifically the intensity of work pressure and women's autonomy over work arrangements. Under the "job strain" model, women are reluctant to expand their families if they perceive high job requirements and little autonomy. Work pressure can also lead to conflict between work and family: for example, the complexity and difficulty of the scheduling of various affairs have increased, and the cost of communication and emotional friction in family life has increased. If women's marriage and family emphasize the rigid gender division of labor and gender roles, the conflicts and dilemmas encountered by women may be worse. Here, we also need to realize that based on long-standing gender stereotypes and gender stereotypes in the workplace, it is more difficult for women to obtain positions with high benefits in the workplace, and it is more difficult to arrange work freely and coordinate working hours. In other words, working mothers are easily caught between the two sides.
If you only focus on fertility, only worry about the decline in fertility, it may be an unfair examination of women in the workplace. First, as mentioned above, the gradual decline in fertility rate is a major trend in population development on a global scale, and on the other hand, the low fertility rate brought about by women's participation in labor or a positive development cannot be ignored. Employment and participation in the labour market are an empowerment for women: it allows women to participate more in society and to reduce their dependence on the family. In discussing the first demographic transition, demographers noted that having a job contributed to women's independence. Working women are more likely to be protected from family injustice or even abuse. They have less fear of being abandoned by their families and cut off from their sources of subsistence. At the same time, the work also provides them with a certain guarantee for raising children, so that they have less worries in this regard. In this way, they can relatively win more free adjudication power in the matter of childbearing, and they are more able to cope with the fertility expectations and pressures exerted by the family and the outside world. In specific fertility practices, they may also be more effective in mastering and communicating contraceptive measures.
The Highly Watched Female Body: The Collective Plight of Women in maternal expectations
How many children you have, when you have them, and what kind of marital situation you have depends on and also reflects the degree of control people have over their bodies. Women, as the main body capable of conceiving newborns and undertaking childbearing, may find themselves easily mired in the quagmire: they may be regarded as objects with reproductive value and pushed onto the track of marriage and childbearing; at the same time, they are considered to be the subjects of childbearing, providing parenting, and maintaining parenting ethics, and they are placed on extremely high maternal expectations. In heterosexual patriarchal social systems, the dilemma of the profession of mother inevitably becomes the dilemma of all women: whether or not women are willing to become mothers, they are regarded as potential mothers, and may be raised and treated as potential mothers. As a result, in the competition for further education, employment, promotion, etc., whether a woman is single or married, or what her fertility status is, she may be forced to a disadvantageous position.
Men, on the other hand, don't seem to have to face the problem of "balancing family and career" from the start. The symbolic role of men in heterosexual marriage and childbearing paradigms may be more significant: the existence of the paternal position may provide legitimacy to heterosexual marital relationships themselves, as well as the role of wives and newborns within them. The role of the father does not give men de facto parenting responsibilities; in everyday life, men are more relaxed and uncomplaining not to participate in complicated and trivial childcare, care, arranging matters and time, attending various occasions, and so on.
The Invisible Woman: The Sociology of Family Affairs, by Ann Oakley, translated by Wang Li, Nanjing University Press, November 2020.
The government's macro intervention will also have different degrees of impact on fertility rates and individual fertility practices. In the European experience, government intervention policies can be divided into two categories: one is to focus on maintaining the traditional family unit and the division of gender roles, emphasizing the family as the main place of child-rearing; the other is to transfer child-rearing responsibilities from the family to social institutions. The French demographer Chesnais summarized the two models as "nation of families" and "nation of individuals".
Specifically, the former promotes a "return to tradition" patriarchal leadership of family ethics, supporting men as the main source of family income, while women return to stereotypical maternal roles as wives, mothers, and nurturers and caregivers in the family; this model also aims to benefit large families that live together for many generations. The policies pursued by Germany and Italy generally follow this model.
The latter focuses on the needs of the individual who bears the burden of childbearing in childcare, encourages women's rights in the public sphere, and pays attention to the actual life experience of children; in the consideration of the family, it tends to weaken the role of the family as a parenting unit, and does not emphasize or encourage the traditional family model. Nordic, French, and British policies are largely in line with this model. In terms of the effect of previous implementation in Europe, the individual type may have a more encouraging effect on fertility. The government has come forward to protect the rights and interests of women of childbearing age in employment and the workplace through institutional and economic means, and to protect or support child-rearing women to remain in the public sphere; at the same time, in addition to direct economic subsidies, the government may support social care institutions and systems to assist infant and young child rearing work, and so on. It has a positive effect on fertility and a positive impact on maintaining female labor force participation.
The effectiveness of this type of policy may also lie in the fact that it is in line with the general direction of the second demographic transition. Around the turn of the millennium, in the face of new developments in population change, the demography community once again tried to summarize and summarize. The characteristics of the second demographic transformation include: on the basis of the low birth rate, marriage and childbearing are further unbound, and diversified marriage and childbearing arrangements coexist with family forms: for example, the marriage rate is low, divorce, remarriage, cohabitation, family reorganization and other forms of marriage and love life and childcare continue to develop.
Christen Reighter, video screenshot of the TED Talk "I Don't Want Kids – Stop Saying I'll Change My Mind."
The discussion of the second demographic transition may also be an opportunity to reflect on the definition of "family" and the single marriage and childbearing track. It is true that the heterosexual patriarchal marriage and childbearing paradigm of the past will still exist; but it cannot be ignored that the needs of individuals in society for self-development have never been the same, and the discussion of fertility should eventually return to the care of the individual. Man is the end rather than the means, and personal life experiences and choices should not be just a means to complete a certain marriage and childbearing track. The parenting unit can be the traditional paradigm of the extended family, the nuclear family, or it can be the individual, the social network of personal choice, the family of personal choice. At the same time, whether parenting is in the personal life plan or not, people can also survive decently, and they do not have to bear the responsibility of reproductive morality or the associated life and work difficulties. Women do not have to be mothers, and mothers do not have to be the only ones designated as fosters. A social environment that supports fertility is necessarily also an environment that allows and supports people to choose not to have children.
Key References:
Begall, K., & Mills, M. (2011). The impact of subjective work control, job strain and work–family conflict on fertility intentions: A European comparison. European Journal of Population/Revue européenne de Démographie, 27(4), 433.
Balbo, N., Billari, F. C., & Mills, M. (2013). Fertility in advanced societies: A review of research. European Journal of Population/Revue europeenne de demographie, 29(1), 1-38.
Billari, F., & Kohler, H. P. (2004). Patterns of low and lowest-low fertility in Europe. Population studies, 58(2), 161-176.
Blackstone, A. (2019). Childfree by choice: The movement redefining family and creating a new age of independence. Dutton.
Bloom, D. E., Canning, D., Fink, G., & Finlay, J. E. (2009). Fertility, female labor force participation, and the demographic dividend. Journal of Economic growth, 14(2), 79-101.
Brewster, K. L., & Rindfuss, R. R. (2000). Fertility and women's employment in industrialized nations. Annual review of sociology, 26(1), 271-296.
Chesnais, J. C. (1996). Fertility, family, and social policy in contemporary Western Europe. Population and development review, 729-739.
Schoen, R., Kim, Y. J., Nathanson, C. A., Fields, J., & Astone, N. M. (1997). Why do Americans want children?. Population and development review, 333-358.
Zaidi, B., & Morgan, S. P. (2017). The second demographic transition theory: A review and appraisal. Annual review of sociology, 43, 473-492.
Zelizer, V. A. (1994). Pricing the priceless child: The changing social value of children. Princeton University Press.
Author | Wang Jiayin
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