Old Week
Abstract: During World War II, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who served as the commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, was revered by Japan as a "god of war" and became an idol for almost all Japanese officers and soldiers, so was his military command talent really high?
During World War II, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who served as the commander of the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy, was revered by Japan as a "god of war" and became an idol of almost all Japanese officers and soldiers, so was his military command ability really high?
Let's take a look at Yamamoto's experience.
Yamamoto Isoroku was born on April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka City, Niigata Prefecture, formerly known as Takano Fifty-Six, the seventh child of his father, Takano Sadayoshi, who was fifty-six years old at birth, hence the name Fifty-Six. His mother's mother's Yamamoto family was the Nagaoka clan, a famous samurai family, and because they had no heirs, they passed him on to the Yamamoto family, which was called Yamamoto Isoroku.
In 1901, at the age of 17, Yamamoto was admitted to the 32nd class of the Edajima Naval Academy with a second place score, and graduated in 1904 with a grade of 7.
After graduation, he was assigned to the armored cruiser Nisshin, served as a second lieutenant trainee gunner, participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and was wounded in the famous Battle of Tsushima, leaving him with a permanent disability after his index and middle fingers were interrupted.
In 1908, he entered the Naval Artillery School. In 1914, he entered the Naval University for further study, and in 1916, he graduated from the 14th term of the Naval University.
In April 1919, he went to Harvard University in the United States to study abroad. At that time, the Japanese Navy regarded the United States as the number one imaginary enemy, so it would send young and outstanding talents in the Navy to study in the United States in order to have a direct understanding of the United States. Yamamoto, Nagano Yusei (later Chief of the Military Command), and Mitsumasa Minouchi (later Minister of the Navy) were all elites sent by the public to stay in the United States, which shows that Yamamoto was already a key training object of the Japanese Navy at that time. After returning to China in May 1921, he became an instructor at the Naval University. In December 1924, he became an instructor and deputy captain of the Kasumigaura Air Force of the Japanese Navy.
In 1925, Yamamoto became naval attaché at the Japanese Embassy in the United States. In 1928, Yamamoto resigned and returned to Japan. In this way, Yamamoto studied and worked in the United States for a total of nine years, so he had a deep understanding of the United States.
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After returning to Japan, he successively served as the captain of the cruiser Isuzu and the aircraft carrier Akagi. In 1929, he was promoted to rear admiral and promoted to the position of chief of technical department of the Naval Aviation Department and commander of the First Air Force. In 1929 and 1934, he was a member of the Japanese Naval Delegation to London to participate in the Naval Arms Limitation Conference.
In 1933, he was promoted to Commander of the First Air Fleet. He was promoted to vice admiral in November 1934. In December 1935, he was promoted to Minister of Aviation.
In December 1936, he became Deputy Governor of the Navy. Because Yamamoto knew the strength of the United States very well, and knew that there was no possibility of victory in going to war with the United States, the difference in national strength was absolutely impossible, so he resolutely opposed the alliance with Germany and the War with Britain and the United States, and was called the anti-war three masters with the then Minister of the Navy, Mitsumasa Minouchi, and the director of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Inoue, and became a thorn in the side of the hardliners of the Army, and also received death threats, so in order to protect his safety, the Navy was transferred to the commander of the Combined Fleet in September 1939. Because the commander of the combined fleet had the protection of the fleet sailors, it was naturally much safer than the Navy provincial lieutenant who had only one or two guards.
From Yamamoto's experience, it can be seen that most of his experience has been in institutions and schools, and his time as a cruiser, aircraft carrier captain and commander of the First Air Fleet has been less than five years, and the command experience of front-line troops is not much.
As for Yamamoto's sneak attack on Pearl Harbor at its brightest moment, this plan was not Yamamoto's idea, first, during the exercise in March 1940, Rear Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, then commander of the First Air Force, commanded the aircraft carriers "Akagi" and "Ryūjō" to attack the battleships "Nagato" and "Mutsu" commanded by Yamamoto, but Ozawa changed the original exercise plan, launching a sea and air assault with 81 carrier-based aircraft, and "sinking" all the battleships "Nagato" and "Mutsu" in one fell swoop; second, the British Navy "sunk" the two battleships "Nagato" and "Mutsu" in one fell swoop; second, the British Navy "" The task force centered on the aircraft carrier HMS Glory made a surprise attack on the Italian port of Taranto in November 1940. Afterwards, Yamamoto specifically asked the naval attaché of the Japanese Embassy in Italy to learn from the Italian side about the details of the British attack. Therefore, Yamamoto's attack on Pearl Harbor was actually an enlarged version of the British surprise attack on Taranto. Moreover, the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor led the fleet by Vice Admiral Tadaichi Minamimo, and the first-line command was Nanyun, and Yamamoto did not have specific instructions for Nanyun in specific command, so Nanyun finally only carried out two waves of air raids, and returned without attacking the most important shipyards and naval oil depots.
Then came the Battle of Midway, where the Japanese suffered a crushing defeat. As for the reasons for the fiasco of the Japanese army in the case of overwhelming superiority, this number has already published articles before, not simply because the US military deciphered the code, the battlefield is one-way transparent, but the Japanese army's combat plan is inherently problematic, dividing the participating units into eight formations, and also divided into two combat directions thousands of kilometers apart in Aleutian and Midway, even in the direction of Midway, it is also divided into several combat formations with a distance of hundreds of kilometers, and once the situation occurs, it is too late to rescue each other. In terms of the most important combat aircraft, the aircraft carrier fleet commanded by Nanyun has only 266 carrier-based aircraft in total (in addition, there are 56 aircraft on the aircraft carrier that are split and packaged to enter the airport on the island after the occupation of Midway, a total of 322), while the 3 US aircraft carriers have 233 carrier-based aircraft, plus 121 aircraft of the Midway Shore-based Aviation Corps, a total of 354 aircraft, which has surpassed the Japanese in the number of aircraft! This was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Japanese army. If the Japanese army had put all 8 aircraft carriers, 5 seaplane carriers, and 700 combat aircraft into the direction of Midway, even if the U.S. military deciphered the code, it would have crushed the U.S. military. Therefore, the battle plan of dispersing one's own forces is doomed to failure.
Although it is said that this plan was formulated by the first staff officer (that is, chief staff officer) of the Combined Fleet, Kuroshima Kamejin Navy Daisa, but Kuroshima is Yamamoto's most important and trusted confidant, and this plan was also approved by Yamamoto, can't Yamamoto see the hidden dangers?
In addition, in the map deduction organized by the Japanese Navy before the battle, there were already 9 bullets in the Japanese aircraft carrier, but Yamamoto did not think so, and sent it off with the sentence "The US army is not so powerful."
After the battle, although Yamamoto said that he would ask the emperor to take responsibility, he actually let Nanyun take the blame and removed the commander of the First Air Fleet of Nanyun, while he still sat on the throne of the commander of the combined fleet - the credit for the attack on Pearl Harbor was not given to Nanyun, all on his own head, and Wude was not bad.
In the subsequent Guadalcanal Campaign, Yamamoto's command was still problematic, and never took the suppression of Henderson Airfield on Guadalcanal as the primary task, although several surface ships were sent to shell Henderson Airfield, which was also unsatisfactory, and eventually led to the US military basically grasping the air supremacy in the waters around Guadalcanal, thus making the Japanese suffer heavy losses on Guadalcanal, the Japanese lost a total of 1 aircraft carrier, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 24 ships (134,900 tons) and 16 transport ships (85,000 tons) including 6 submarines, including 2 aircraft carriers, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 3 transport ships (12,200 tons), the losses of both sides were roughly equal, but such losses were unbearable for Japan, and the Japanese lost a total of 892 aircraft (including 427 air battle losses) and 2,362 pilots. It also made the Japanese naval aviation shed blood on Guadalcanal.
The most fundamental reason for the defeat of the Japanese Navy on Guadalcanal was the lack of understanding of the role of air supremacy in modern warfare. Many people think that Yamamoto is an aviation faction because he planned the attack on Pearl Harbor, and because he served as the captain of the "Akagi" aircraft carrier, the chief of the technical department of the Naval Aviation Department, the commander of the First Air Force, and the director of the Aviation Headquarters. In fact, Yamamoto is still a big ship giant gunner in his bones, his understanding of aviation operations is still very superficial, the most typical performance is that in the Battle of Midway, he arranged Nanyun's aircraft carrier fleet in the first wave, as "cannon fodder" for fighting with the US army, and arranged the battleship fleet behind ah, undertaking the main offensive decisive battle task. The Combined Fleet also discovered the presence of radio signals from U.S. aircraft carriers in the waters off Midway, and he did not inform Nanyun of such important intelligence, fearing that the flagship battleship Yamato might reveal the whereabouts of the battleship fleet.
Therefore, Yamamoto still regarded the battleship as the main force, and although he held so many aviation positions, he did not really know the autumn and truly realize the winning role of air supremacy in the war.
It can be seen from this that Yamamoto is deficient in both military command and military thinking, and there is still a gap between him and the real famous general.
It was only because of the great success of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the "beheading" of the US military on April 18, 1943, that he was revered by Japan as a "god of war" and became an idol that inspired the officers and men of the Japanese army.
(The picture of this article is from the network)